Lawyer Wellbeing

Lawyer Wellbeing, Workplace Experiences and Ethics: A Research Report by Vivien Holmes, Julian Webb, Stephen Tang, Susan Ainsworth and Tony Foley for the Victorian Legal Services Board + Commissioner, the Law Society of New South Wales and the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia (LPBWA) comments 

This report discusses the findings from survey research conducted in March–April 2024 across the 3 Australian Uniform Law jurisdictions (Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia). The research examines the relationships between lawyer wellbeing, ethical climate, workplace incivility and wellbeing safeguards in legal workplaces. It also explores how these various factors influence individuals’ intentions to leave either their current workplace, or the legal profession. 

Core concepts and themes 

Ethical climate 

The term ‘ethical climate’ is used to describe the shared experiences of what is ethical and unethical in an organisation. Our participants perceived 3 main dimensions of ethical climate in their workplaces: a) positive ethical behaviours and relationships b) self-interest and self-protection c) rule-breaking and ‘ethical flexibility’. 

The degree to which participants perceived these dimensions operating in their workplace varied by gender and practice setting. Further, the 3 dimensions were experienced by participants as distinct ethical climate ‘types’. Just under half of survey participants reported working within a more positive, ethically engaged climate, characterised by higher positive ethical behaviours/relationships and low levels of self-interested behaviours or ethical flexibility. Approximately one-third were working in an ethically apathetic environment, with lower than average levels of positive ethical behaviours, and slightly higher than average perceptions of the 2 negative dimensions. The remaining participants described an ethically questionable environment, with high levels of self-interest or ethical flexibility, and low levels of positive ethical behaviour. 

Psychological distress 

Consistent with previous studies of lawyer wellbeing, about 30% of participants reported symptoms indicative of a higher risk for a depressive or anxiety condition. Female participants appear to be significantly more likely to report some degree of distress, but are not significantly more likely to experience moderate or severe levels of distress. Psychological distress was highest in lawyers with less than 5 years post-qualification experience (PQE). Levels of distress scores decreased significantly with increasing experience. 

Incivility 

This study indicates that incivility is a widespread problem across the legal industry. However, the intensity of incivility reported does not seem high relative to other studies. Experience of incivility varies by gender, PQE and status: women and junior lawyers generally experience more of it. Principals experience it less than any other practising certificate holder. Peers, supervisors and clients are significant instigators of incivility. 

Positive wellbeing 

The survey measured positive subjective wellbeing by asking about 9 attributes: positive emotions, engagement, positive relationships, meaning, accomplishment, physical health, mindset, environment and economic security. The strongest contributor to participants’ positive wellbeing was their relational experience at work, specifically, encouraging and supporting others in the workplace. Lawyers’ sense of meaning – believing that their work was valuable and worthwhile – was also given significant weight in relation to their wellbeing. On the negative side, physical health scored the lowest rating. There is a clear correlation between wellbeing and ethical climate types. Participants in ethically questionable climates experience poorer physical health, relative disengagement and a reduced sense of meaning in the work. 

Psychosocial supports 

Participants were asked to identify the strength with which they endorsed their organisation’s provision of 6 specified psychological and social supports to staff. Two-thirds of the support items identified were positively endorsed by more than 50% of participants. However, nearly half of respondents felt that their workplaces did not show sufficient understanding of the importance of employee mental health. The only ‘support’ item to be favourably endorsed by over two-thirds of respondents was the ability to count on the support of colleagues in fulfilling the requirements of their job. The research found (as expected) a strong negative correlation between total psychosocial support and incivility, and a strong positive correlation between positive ethical behaviours and relationships and the presence of good psychosocial supports. The data suggests that organisations that provide a positive ethical climate are better at providing a psychosocially safe environment, while a psychosocially safe environment is also perceived to be one that promotes positive ethical behaviours and relationships. What predicts higher levels of psychological distress? Unsurprisingly, there was a marked relationship between higher levels of psychological distress and lower levels of positive wellbeing. Further, higher levels of psychosocial support were associated with lower levels of psychological distress. The experience of incivility, regardless of the instigator or other demographic or situational factors, was consistently associated with higher levels of psychological distress. While levels of psychological distress were highest in lawyers with less than 5 years PQE (see section 2), when controlling for PQE, principal practising certificate holders had significantly higher levels of psychological distress than all other practising certificate holders. This suggests that the fact of being a principal practising certificate holder has a specific adverse effect on wellbeing. The vulnerability of both junior lawyers and principals to psychological distress supports the view that the mental health of lawyers is a top-down problem. In other words, it is consistent with a view that the root problem is structural and, at least in part, shaped by organisational values, and assumptions about professional identity and (work) commitment (cp. Collier, 2025; Lister & Spaeth, 2024; Krill et al. 2022) that not only come from the top of the organisation, but also impact the ability of law firm leaders to address their own wellbeing. 

Does experience of workplace incivility predict wellbeing/distress/perceptions of ethical climate? 

Greater incivility was associated with lower perceptions of positive ethical behaviours, and higher perceptions on the other 2 negative ethical climate dimensions. Total incivility experience was also associated with lower levels of positive wellbeing. However, the relationship between incivility and wellbeing is better explained through the presence/ absence of ethical behaviour or an ethic of care. Nonetheless, incivility experience, regardless of source or perceptions of ethical climate, has a direct impact on psychological distress. Four distinct clusters of incivility instigators were identified, corresponding to (1) supervisors; (2) external sources (clients, collaborators or judiciary); (3) coworkers and subordinates and (4) incivility from any of these 6 sources. The negative effect of incivility on wellbeing was greater when the source of the incivility was a supervisor. Further, the source of incivility was material to participants’ perceptions of workplace ethical climate (a more negative ethical climate, if the source was the supervisor). Nonetheless, the source of incivility had no effect on psychological distress: any form of incivility has a direct and robust effect on distress. 

Intention to leave the profession 

Lawyers’ intention to leave the profession within the next 12 months was predicted only by low positive wellbeing and high psychological distress. Respondents gave reasons for their intentions to leave. In order of frequency, these included: a) the ‘reward/effort’ bargain and working conditions b) stress, pressure and/or ‘burnout’ c) desire for a role or career change d) poor leadership, management and work culture e) negative impact of work on physical and/or mental health. Among those who had been practising for less than 5 years, poor leadership, management and work culture assumed a higher relative importance. 

What predicts a lawyer’s intention to leave? 

Almost one in 3 participants expressed an intention to leave their employer within the next year. Moreover, nearly one in 10 expressed an intention to leave the profession within the year. 

Intention to leave employer 

Lawyers’ intention to leave their employer was predicted by:

a) low levels of positive wellbeing, much more so than high levels of psychological distress b) low psychosocial support, more so than the extent of incivility c) incivility from supervisors, rather than from external sources or from peers d) an ethical climate that valued ‘ethical flexibility’. 

The value of beneficial supports at work 

Respondents commented positively on the following, in order of frequency:

a) paid counselling, support from a psychologist or Employee Assistance Program b) management approach, which included monitoring of workloads/working hours/ staff at risk, showing an interest in staff and allowing time for debriefing c) flexible workload and use of leave (or additional leave) to cope with personal circumstances d) flexible work arrangements, including working from home e) additional leave, billing relief to support wellbeing, flextime/time in lieu for excess hours f) informal peer support. 

Other respondents commented on the ineffectiveness of supports at work, inconsistencies between policy and practice, and the futility of providing individually focused supports without addressing unreasonable/ excessive workloads and the quality of management. 

Conclusion and areas for action 

Conclusions 

Overall, our findings indicate that there is a gap between the perceptions and experiences of more senior and junior members of the profession. This underscores the importance of investigating the views and experiences of those at lower levels of the hierarchy, and using the results to encourage critical reflection on organisational culture by senior managers. It also highlights how critical the first 5 years of legal practice are to lawyers’ wellbeing. For those interested in the sustainability of the legal workforce, targeted attention to improving lawyers’ experiences of the first 5 years of practice, as well as (or indeed through) the quality of management, should be a priority. Individual employers should also be concerned as voluntary turnover (employee resignations and retirements) can be associated with declines in productivity, loss of organisational knowledge, disruption in service quality to clients and additional costs of recruitment, induction, and staff training. 

The wellbeing analysis indicates a range of areas in which positive wellbeing can be improved. Active attention to both ethical climate and psychosocial support offers a pathway to building the greater sense of community, agency, engagement and motivation required to enhance wellbeing. While there was a high proportion of participants who reported experiencing psychosocial supports in the workplace, this came mostly informally from colleagues (rather than from formal mechanisms in the organisation), or from the introduction of more flexibility in work arrangements – which firms are increasingly adopting. The latter was seen as a priority by many participants. 

Specific recommendations/areas for action 

A key challenge for many in the legal workforce is that demands more than occasionally exceed resources. This imbalance needs to be addressed by employers, with the support of their professional bodies, and also perhaps with the use of some regulatory levers. We offer some relatively broad recommendations and identify some key areas for action:

a) the implementation of beneficial workplace supports 

b) information and education, including

• The wellbeing experiences and needs of Indigenous and ethnically diverse practitioners are insufficiently understood; targeted research and action on that research would be valuable. 

• Further research into the experiences of principal practising certificate holders would be beneficial, not least in that interventions targeting principals to support and strengthen their own wellbeing may in turn prove beneficial for our other most vulnerable group, junior lawyers. 

• It would be useful to identify and audit/ evaluate examples of effective flexible work arrangements, so that best practice could be better identified and rolled out across the profession. 

• Professional and regulatory bodies are encouraged to develop targeted guidance on the legal and regulatory obligations and professional best practice expectations placed on organisations, principals and supervisors to protect and enhance the professional wellbeing of staff.

 c) the ‘business model’ 

We encourage Uniform Law regulators to explore interventions that address harmful economic drivers of law firm practice. In particular, we recommend a thorough examination of practices which: – limit lawyers’ sense of meaning, purpose and accomplishment in their work, particularly early in lawyers’ careers – lead to overwork and a neglect of physical and mental health – create vulnerabilities to workplace incivility, which arise through stress and misaligned values. 

Further, we recommend that this process of discovery and design should be undertaken together with members of the profession, with representation from early career lawyers and lawyers from underrepresented segments of the profession. 

Finally, regulators should develop a systematic approach to recording and understanding the stories and experiences of lawyers who leave the profession, especially those who leave prematurely or following adverse experiences.

Candidature

The Australian Electoral Commission, in declaring candidates for the 2025 Federal general election, states 

The Australian Electoral Officer for Western Australia today declared all candidates for the election of Senators for Western Australia in the 2025 federal election in accordance with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. 

Mr Rodney Culleton was among those candidates declared. This follows his lodgement of a fully completed nomination form and mandatory qualification checklist, together with the requisite $2,000 fee, before the close of nominations 12 midday on Thursday 10 April 2025. Mr Culleton’s nomination declared that he was not an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent. 

The provisions of the Electoral Act do not give the AEC or any AEC officer the power to reject a fully completed candidate nomination, regardless of whether any answer to a question of the qualification checklist is incorrect, false or inadequate (see section 170A, Electoral Act). This means the AEC cannot reject a nomination even if it contains a false declaration as to the eligibility of that person to stand for election. 

The AEC notes Mr Culleton is listed on the National Personal Insolvency Index as an undischarged bankrupt. It appears therefore that he may have made a false declaration as part of his nomination process. The AEC has referred this matter to the Australian Federal Police for their consideration. 

Under section 44(iii) of the Constitution: “Any person who is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representative.” 

Following Mr Culleton’s nomination as a candidate under the same circumstances at the 2022 federal election, the AEC referred the matter to the Australian Federal Police. A prosecution relating to this matter is ongoing. 

Mr Culleton’s name will appear on the WA Senate ballot paper in the 2025 federal election. 

If the AEC is presented with compelling evidence that other candidates in the 2025 federal election may have also signed a false declaration we will consider whether similar referrals to the AFP are warranted to ascertain if the candidate has committed an offence. 

Editor’s notes: Intending candidates must make themselves aware of the operation of section 44 of the Constitution which includes the following.

The AEC separately notes 

s44 Disqualification: “Any person who: (iii) is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent; shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.” 

44 Disqualification 

Any person who: is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power; or is attainted of treason, or has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer; or is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent; or holds any office of profit under the Crown, or any pension payable during the pleasure of the Crown out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth; or has any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public Service of the Commonwealth otherwise than as a member and in common with the other members of an incorporated company consisting of more than twenty‑five persons; shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. 

Subsection (iv) does not apply to the office of any of the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth, or of any of the Queen’s Ministers for a State, or to the receipt of pay, half pay, or a pension, by any person as an officer or member of the Queen’s navy or army, or to the receipt of pay as an officer or member of the naval or military forces of the Commonwealth by any person whose services are not wholly employed by the Commonwealth. ... 

Section 44 of the Constitution - grounds for disqualification 

A person is disqualified from nominating as a candidate or sitting in the Parliament where the person becomes subject to any of the five conditions listed in this section: 

Section 44(i) 

Section 44(i) of the Constitution applies to two categories of persons: a person who is “under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power”; and a person who “is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power.” In the 1988 case of Nile v Wood [1988] 140 CLR 133, the Court clarified that the first category of disqualification under section 44(i) captures any “person who has formally or informally acknowledged allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power and who has not withdrawn or revoked that acknowledgement”. 

The second category of disqualification under section 44(i) captures a state of affairs involving the existence of a status or of rights under the law of a foreign power. It applies to persons who have certain rights because of a formal citizenship link with a foreign power, and therefore to any person who holds dual or plural citizenship. 

In the 1992 case of Sykes v Cleary [1992] HCA 60, the Court found that candidates are disqualified from election to Parliament if they do not take "all reasonable steps" to renounce their other citizenship before nomination. 

In the more recent matters of Re Canavan; Re Ludlam; Re Waters; Re Roberts [No 2]; Re Joyce; Re Nash; Re Xenophon [2017] HCA 45, Re Gallagher [2018] 17 the Court upheld the approach taken by the majority of Justices in Sykes v Cleary. That is, to give section 44(i) its ordinary and natural meaning, subject only to the implicit qualification in section 44(i) that the foreign law conferring for foreign citizenship must be consistent with the Constitutional purpose of the provision. 

The Court has made it clear that whether a person has the status of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power necessarily depends upon the law of the foreign power. That is so because it is only the law of the foreign power that can be the source of the status of citizenship or of the rights and duties involved in that status. Accordingly, it is essential that candidates rigorously check their ancestry and to obtain their own legal advice on whether they may be a citizen of a foreign power. 

The Court has also held that an Australian citizen who is also a citizen of a foreign power will not be prevented from participating in the representative form of government ordained by the Constitution by reason of a foreign law which would render an Australian citizen irremediably incapable of being elected to either house of the Commonwealth Parliament. As is apparent, to rely upon this approach is conditional on both an analysis of the action taken by the intending candidate and the effect of the overseas law. Intending candidates will need to obtain clear legal advice on whether their circumstances are able to fit within this aspect of section 44(i) of the Constitution. 

The cases make it clear that if the issue of overseas citizenship is not resolved by the close of candidates’ nominations, then it is likely that the candidate will not be qualified to stand for election due to the operation of section 44 of the Constitution. 

Section 44(ii) 

Section 44(ii) of the Constitution applies to two categories of persons: a person “attainted by treason”; and a person who “has been convicted and is under sentence or subject to be sentenced”. 

The first category of disqualification would probably only apply where the person has been convicted of the offence of “treason” contained in section 80.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995. 

The second category of disqualification is that the person is under sentence or is subject to be sentenced for any offence against the law of the Commonwealth or a State that carries a sentence of 12 months imprisonment or longer. As an example, in the matter of Re Culleton [No. 2] [2017] HCA 4 the Court was asked to consider whether Senator Culleton may have at the time of nomination as a candidate, been “convicted and under sentence or subject to be sentenced for an offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer” contrary to subsection 44(ii) of the Constitution. 

The Court held that despite the subsequent annulment of the conviction, at the time of the nomination as a candidate Senator Culleton was to be sentenced for the offence of larceny, a crime involving property theft in NSW. This offence was punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to five years; but where the value of the property involved in the offence does not exceed $5,000, the maximum term of imprisonment that the Local Court may impose is two years. Senator Culleton's offence concerned property of a value less than $2,000. Accordingly, he was liable for imprisonment for a maximum term of two years. Therefore, the Court concluded that he was disqualified under section 44(ii) of the Constitution and his election was invalid, making his place vacant under section 45 of the Constitution. The Court ordered a special recount of Senate ballot papers in Western Australia, the state where Senator Culleton was elected. 

Section 44(iii) 

Section 44(iii) of the Constitution disqualifies a person if they are “an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent”. While there have been no specific decisions on the scope of section 44(iii), this appears to established by a question of fact as to whether a person has been made a bankrupt and whether the period of bankruptcy has concluded or been discharged. 

The Full Federal Court decisions in Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8 contains a brief discussion of section 44(iii) and section 45 of the Constitution. 

The AEC notes that the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) is required to maintain the Bankruptcy Register and The National Personal Insolvency Index (NPII) which contain a publicly available and permanent electronic record of all personal insolvency proceedings in Australia.

Culleton appears elsewhere in this blog, eg here and here 

Fitness, Fictions and Naivety

In Pivotto v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licencing [2025] QCAT 130 the Tribunal has considered sovereign citizen claims in relation to revocation of a firearms licence. 

The Tribunal states 

 [1] Ms Pivotto is a young lady who, until being caught driving her car at a speed exceeding the prescribed limit, was the holder of a licence entitling her to possess and use firearms. Her conduct after receiving the infringement notice and fine resulted in her licence being revoked. I expect that most people reading this will immediately ask - what does a speeding fine have to do with a firearms licence? The answer to this lies in the manner in which Ms Pivotto chose to challenge that fine. 

[2] Having received the infringement notice and fine, she wrote a letter to the Queensland Police Service espousing views that, on any reading of the letter, indicated she held sovereign citizen ideologies. She effectively asserted that the Queensland Police had no authority to fine her for speeding, and that she was not the named person on the infringement notice but rather her ‘strawman’ name was what appeared thereon. 

[3] By the time of the hearing before me, she had seen the error of her way. She had accepted that what she had learned through her own research was not only entirely misguided it was simply wrong. As I listened to her, and observed her, during the hearing she had accepted that when choosing to challenge the fine in the manner she did, presenting her case as it was put in that letter, she was not only naïve, but her actions were also stupid. 

[4] That being said, whilst I understand the reason why the respondent took the step it did to revoke her firearms licence on the strength of the letter written and the ideologies expressed therein, something I say more about later in these reasons, having listened to and considered all that Ms Pivotto had to say in the hearing I was satisfied that a finding she was not a fit and proper person on the ground of public interest for her to hold a firearms licence is one that should not stand. Accordingly I set aside the respondent’s decision to revoke her licence. 

Background 

[5] On 6 December 2022, Ms Pivotto was issued with a firearms licence under the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), licence number 26657936 (the Firearms Licence). 

[6] On 26 September 2023, she was charged with a traffic infringement, namely exceeding the designated speed limit of 100 KMH by at least 11KMH but not exceeding 20 KMH. It carried a fine of $464.00. 

[7] She chose not to pay the fine. Rather she sought to challenge the validity of the asserted infringement and fine. In doing so she sent an undated letter to the Queensland Police Service. It was short. It contained the following comments: (the Challenge Letter)

An infringement notice dated 26/09/23 addressed to AMELIA ROSE PIVOTTO was received containing an ‘Alleged Speed Travelled 113.’ ... This letter is being written to refute this alleged speeding fine as, according to section 8, sub-section 12 of the Imperial Acts Application Act, ‘All fines and forfeitures before conviction are illegal and void.’ 

This letter is also being written to address that my name is not on this infringement notice, rather my strawman’s name AMELIA ROSE PIVOTTO is whom this infringement notice is addressed to. Police, being a corporate entity, cannot claim power, authority or have jurisdiction over a living human, therefore, this alleged spending fine will not be paid by the living human, Amelia Rose Pivotto. 

Lastly, according to section 71 of the Commonwealth Constitution ‘Department of the States have no lawful authority to issue fines or take property as they are not a court’. The Commonwealth Constitution is the highest law of the land and dictates that there are only two levels of government, Federal and State. Police act as a third tier of Government, coming under the State Government. Local Government bodies, such as the Police force, are not recognised and/or given authority to act as a de-facto third tier of Government.

[8] Having received the Challenge Letter, on 30 October 2023 the respondent, via its authorised officer, caused a notice (the Revocation Notice) to be served on Ms Pivotto revoking her Firearms Licence. (the Decision) 

[9] The premise for the Decision was that the content of the Challenge Letter indicated to the respondent that Ms Pivotto held sovereign citizen beliefs relating to the laws of Queensland not being applicable to her. In the reasons provided to her accompanying that notice the decision-maker noted that he had considered the requirement under the Act that to be entitled to hold a firearms licence the person must be a ‘fit and proper person’, and as a result of the content of the Challenge Letter indicating those apparently held sovereign citizen beliefs he reached this conclusion:

I am satisfied that there is a real risk to public safety as you have advised you do not intend on complying with the laws of this State, and those which are enforced by Police. Accordingly, I have determined that it is in the public interest for your licence to be revoked. 

[10] As Ms Pivotto was then entitled to do, on 27 November 2023 she applied to this Tribunal for a review of the Decision. The premise for her application was expressed as follows:

I am a law abiding citizen and personally believe that the law must be upheld. I have every intention of complying with the law, and do so daily. I never intended to come across as a Sovereign Citizen or to hold Sovereign Citizenship beliefs. I thought I was quoting the Constitution, (sic) however, I obviously received some poor legal advice without fully understanding what this advice meant. I have since paid the fine. ... 

The Revocation notice served states ‘The expression “fit and proper person” standing alone, carries no precise meaning’ therefore, it is difficult to understand how this decision was made. One cannot judge another’s character based solely on one letter, rather, the whole character must be known and all facts considered. 

[11] It was against this background that the application came before me for hearing. It is hoped that the reasoning as I have expressed it herein assists Ms Pivotto to understand the basis upon which the Decision was made, albeit one which now I have set-aside. ... 

[14] The background facts gave rise to a singular issue to be decided in this proceeding. That is whether, on the premise of public interest, Ms Pivotto was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. As I discussed it with the respondent’s representative during the hearing after he had concluded his opening remarks, this could be dealt with by answering a single question, namely – ‘Does Ms Pivotto hold sovereign citizen ideologies ?’. If the answer to that was yes, then the Decision must be affirmed, although I say something more about that later in these reasons. If the answer to that was no, then the Decision must be set-aside. 

[15] That something more, which for the sake of completeness and hopefully future reference when the issue of the sovereign citizen argument rears its head, is the extent to which more than just the expression of sovereign citizen ideologies may be required in some circumstances where a decision-maker is being called up to consider the discretion which is enshrined in the Weapons Act to revoke a firearms licence. ... 

[24] As it was required to do, the respondent provided its ‘List of Materials’ dated 2 January 2024 in which it included a copy of the Decision, the Challenge Letter, and a record of Ms Pivotto’s traffic record showing the speeding infringement. It also included extracts from the Weapons Act and references to a number of decisions of the Courts, which as I understood the purpose of same was to say they were relevant to the decision that was required to be made. 

[25] Ms Pivotto similarly provided a small bundle of documents as she was required to do. This is as filed on 23 June 2024. It described in relatively brief terms the circumstances that brought about the fine and the later attendance by Queensland Police Officers at her residence, at which time she was served with the Revocation Notice and her firearms were seized. Therein she also included copies of other correspondence from the Police Service and a copy of a receipt showing payment of the fine. Within the page entitled ‘Order of Events’, Ms Pivotto made these statements:

I was doubtful that I had really exceeded the speed limit by the amount stated and had previously heard of other people contesting speeding fines they thought were incorrect. I started to do some research on the Know Your Rights website, which advocates to assist people in ensuring Australia’s laws are properly applied and carries an endorsement from former Western Australian Senator Rod Culleton. I had read and watched videos on how to contest a speeding fine by writing a letter to the officer who issued the fine. After some research, I then wrote a letter quoting what I had read on the website as well as quoting the Constitution guidance. ... . 

I never thought sending a letter to contest the fine would have such negative consequences of affect my firearms licence in any way as I am a law abiding citizen and thus was my first offence. I wasn’t aware of the term “sovereign citizen”, which is not mentioned on the Know Your Rights website, and my research for this appeal reveals that it appears to relate to beliefs that I have never held. I quoted the Know Your Rights website and the Constitution as that was the advance that was given. ...

[26] Ms Pivotto also provided, and sought to rely on, five written reference from persons speaking to her character. Two of these are undated, the other three are dated in November 2023. None of the persons who provided these references were presented as witnesses in the hearing. 

[27] Ms Pivotto was extensively cross-examined by Mr Ferguson for the respondent. In my opinion it is unnecessary for me to set out in great detail that examination, it being sufficient to note the following that became very apparent during that examination: (a) The comments and views expressed in the Challenge Letter were for the most part Ms Pivotto quoting from what she had read on the Know Your Rights website, without any understanding of what it meant; (b) She accepts the arguments she was making in the Challenge Letter were not correct; (c) She accepts that the Queensland Government has the power to make laws, that the Queensland Police Services has the power to enforce laws, and that this Tribunal has the power to make decisions; (d) She now accepts that the content of the Know Your Rights website is not correct; and (e) She does not hold herself out as a sovereign citizen. 

[28] What also became apparent during the cross-examination is that Ms Pivotto had contravened the Weapons Act in two ways whilst holding her firearms licence, namely: (a) She left her rifle in her car whilst her car was parked in the carpark of her home unit, albeit whilst the car was locked and the bolt of the rifle removed and locked in the car’s glovebox; and (b) She uses her rifle for work purposes, such not permissible under the conditions of her licence such which was limited to recreational use and at a shooting club. 

[29] When these were brought to Ms Pivotto’s attention during the hearing she explained that her understanding of what she had done was correct in terms of securing her rifle, and in terms of work use of the rifle which she thought was covered by the recreational condition. But following the explanation given to her by Mr Ferguson as to the meaning of the legislation, she accepted neither was correct and that she had contravened the legislation. 

The Submissions 

[30] In her closing submissions, Ms Pivotto stated the following: (a) She relied on what she thought was a credible website; (b) Her actions in sending the Challenge Letter was based on her own research and the thought that was what she had to do and the basis for any challenge; (c) She accepts that her actions were misguided, misconceived, and based on ignorance; (d) She does not claim to be a sovereign citizen. 

[31] In his closing submissions, Mr Ferguson raised these points for my consideration: (a) The Challenge Letter clearly demonstrates sovereign citizen beliefs. It is the sort of rhetoric engaged in by a person holding such beliefs; (b) The Queensland Police Service must be satisfied that a person who wishes to hold a firearms licence is a fit and proper person to do so. Whilst the Police Service is aware of the two contraventions of the Weapons Act by Ms Pivotto, she had explained her understanding was that what she did was correct, and if that is accepted as being true then it is another example of Ms Pivotto’s naivety; (c) Whilst the persons giving the character references were not presented as witnesses, the content of those documents is consistent with what was observed of Ms Pivotto during the hearing; (d) Overall, based on what he heard from and observed of Ms Pivotto during the course of the hearing nothing gave him cause for concern other than the content of the Challenge Letter. ... 

[33] Shortly before the publication of that article [in Proctor], Cash QC DCJ on the District Court of Queensland had cause to consider the sovereign citizen argument in a matter before him in R v Sweet wherein the applicant, having been charged with offences under the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld), argued that he constituted two separate legal entities, which his honour noted was the sovereign citizen argument of the strawman duality, and as such the applicant submitted that the indictment had charged the incorrect entity. 

[34] The following short extract from his Honour’s reasons is instructive in understanding the manner in which the Court dealt with the sovereign citizen argument on that occasion:

 [2] The applicant now applies for these charges to be dismissed. The essence of the applicant’s argument is that he possesses two distinct personas. One the ‘real live flesh and blood man’ and the other a ‘straw man’ or ‘dummy corporation’. The former is designated in the applicant’s material as ‘Kym-Anthony:’ and the latter as KYM ANTHONY SWEET. According to the applicant’s argument, the real person is not subject to the laws of Queensland, and the charges should be dismissed. 

[3] Merely setting out the argument is sufficient to show it is nonsense. It is apparent that the applicant is one of a group of people who for some years have attempted, universally without success, to avoid the operation of laws with which they do not wish to comply. The term ‘organised pseudo legal commercial argument’ litigants (OPCA) was coined by Rooke ACJ in Meades v Meades to describe adherents to these discredited theories. The ideas promoted by OPCA litigants emerged, of course, in the United States. They have since spread to most parts of the common law world, including Queensland. Recognising that the arguments presented by OPCA litigants are largely incoherent, if not incomprehensible, courts have been increasingly willing to dismiss their claims summarily. 

[4] The ‘straw man’ argument has its origins in the premise that human beings do not inherently possess a legal personality. Instead, some separate legal identity is imposed upon them (through birth certificates and the like) by the government. This process creates a kind of contract, but one that can be repudiated by the human being, usually through a declaration or affidavit ... and ‘surrendering’ the birth certificate. The purported effect of such repudiation is to render the human being immune to the laws of the relevant polity. The processes adopted by OPCA litigants to achieve this repudiation can be arcane. Some of the language used, and documents relied upon, resemble spells or incantations. 

[6] In Australia, a human being is also a legal person. An adult human being with full capacity can sue and be sued. They are subject to the criminal laws of this state. These fundamental propositions cannot be doubted. It is true that a natural person can create a legal entity that has a distinct legal personality – such entities are commonly called companies – but this is an adjunct to, rather than a replacement for, the legal personality of the human being. One way of illustrating why this must be so is to consider the consequences of the ability to ‘renounce’ legal personhood. The law has at times recognised categories of person who did not possess a legal personality. These categories included, before 1833, slaves, who were regarded as chattel property, could be bought and sold, and who had no rights under the law. At times women and children were thought not to possess a legal personality. Blackstone regarded children as the property of their fathers, and women have been regarded as chattels without a distinct legal personality. The fates of people who were in these categories were rarely pleasant. If the applicant were somehow able to renounce his legal personality, he would become a human being without rights. He would be mere property. Such an outcome would be antithetical to our society and system of laws.

[35] Such bears a similarity to the argument raised by Ms Pivotto in the Challenge Letter noting that in that letter Ms Pivotto also asserted what she said was her ‘strawman’s name’ in capital letters, and used the language of a ‘living human’ not being subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Thus the reasoning and discussion by Cash QC DCJ is apposite to Ms Pivotto’s situation in this proceeding. 

[36] Yet when questioned during cross-examination about what she meant by these statements, Ms Pivotto could not explain it. The same can be said about the balance of what was contained in the Challenge Letter. Her only explanation for using the language and form of argument was that she followed what was on the website. This is clear evidence of Ms Pivotto’s naivety. 

[37] Having observed her during the hearing and listening to her answers to the questions posed of her by Mr Ferguson, I was readily able to conclude that she did not understand the meaning of that which she had written in compiling the Challenge Letter. She did so in total ignorance of what it meant and the effect it might have on her in the circumstances of how she may be viewed by the law. That being so, I accept she does not hold sovereign citizen ideologies. She stupidly embarked on a serious step without in any way endeavouring to properly inform herself of the correctness of what she was doing. She charged in totally blind as to its meaning and effect. ... 

[53] With those observations in mind, the position may be expressed in another way. In my opinion the mere holding of sovereign citizen ideologies would not be, of itself, sufficient to warrant the exercise of the discretion to revoke a firearms licence in the absence of some other evidence which points to the risk of misuse. But that is not to say that the mere holding of such ideologies would not be sufficient to warrant not issuing a firearms license in the first place. It seems to me that it would be sufficient of itself unless an applicant for such a licence could demonstrate awareness of the need for public and individual safety, and that he/she would take the requisite steps to ensure such safety.

Standards

The draft standards identified in the preceding post regarding the LACC accreditation are - 

2. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION 

2.1 Definitions 

In this document, unless the context requires otherwise –

active learning involves student engagement in critical analysis of the knowledge they acquire, application of that knowledge to factual situations or scenarios, producing solutions supported by legal arguments, and reflection on the process followed. 

Admission Rules means the LACC Model Admission Rules 2015. 

Admitting Authority means the body responsible for all or any of accrediting, monitoring, reviewing and re-accrediting a law course for the purpose of preparing students for admission to the legal profession. 

AQF means the Australian Qualifications Framework. 

assessment method is the manner by which a student’s learning may be tested and evaluated to be able to award a grade. Examples of different assessment methods include examinations, research essays, reflective notes and vivas, class participation, mooting and mock trials, oral examinations, problem solving exercises and practical tests, submissions and advice. 

CALD means the Council of Australian Law Deans. 

CALD Standards means the CALD Standards for Australian Law Schools. 

communication means the imparting or exchanging of information by oral, visual or verbal (including written) means. 

delivery mode means the manner by which the content of the law course is communicated for teaching, learning and assessment purposes. Delivery may be fully in-person, fully online, a blended combination including in-person and online, or by other modes to facilitate distance education. 

direct interaction occurs when two or more persons are communicating and engaging with one another in real time and can hear and, where available, see each other. 

EFTSL means Equivalent Full Time Student Load. 

element means – (a) in the case of a law school that follows the topics listed for a prescribed area of knowledge set out in Schedule 1 of the Admission Rules, one of those topics; or in the case of a law school that follows the topics set out in the guidelines provided for an prescribed area of knowledge set out in that Schedule, a topic included in the law school's curriculum for that area of knowledge. 

in-person means where two or more persons are face-to-face in the physical presence of the others whether on campus or at another location. 

invigilation means supervision whether in-person, online, by technological or other means, or a combination of means, to ensure the academic integrity of the grade  awarded to a student by the assessment method. For example, invigilation may be by using suitable automated supervision software or an examiner observing or supervising a student in the presence of the examiner (whether in-person or online). 

LACC means the Law Admissions Consultative Committee. 

law course means a tertiary academic course in law, whether or not it leads to a degree in law. 

law school includes – (a) an academic unit within a university responsible for conducting a law course  in Australia that leads to a degree or other qualification in law; or another institution conducting a law course  course that leads to a qualification in law, other than a university degree in law, 

online means participation in teaching and learning activities, or assessments, in a virtual or online environment that is connected to, served by, or available through the internet or other telecommunications network. An example is synchronous online learning. 

prescribed area of knowledge means an area of knowledge prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Admission Rules, the teaching of which may include statutory interpretation as set out in the LACC Statement on Statutory Interpretation. (Note:  Law Admissions Consultative Committee, Statement on Statutory Interpretation (2009).)

self-accrediting provider means a registered higher education provider that has been authorised under section 45 of the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011 (Cth) to self-accredit courses of study that lead to a higher education award that the provider offers or confers. 

synchronous online learning means direct interaction between a student, teacher and/or other students in a virtual or online environment. Examples include attending live-stream lectures (but not listening to a pre-recorded lecture), videoconference calls and interactive online chatroom discussions. 

teaching method means the way in which the law school communicates and teaches the content of the law course to students, which may depend on the delivery mode. Examples include lectures, workshops, seminars, tutorials, flipped classrooms, group discussions, group work, problem solving, moots, role-play, programmed sessions and simulations (but not student preparation or self-directed study). 

unit means a subject or unit of study that may be undertaken as part of a law course. 

TEQSA means the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency.

Interpretation 

Headings are for convenience only, and do not affect interpretation. 

The following rules also apply in interpreting this document, except where the context makes it clear that a rule is not intended to apply. 

(a) A reference to – 

(i) a legislative provision or legislation (including subordinate legislation) is to that provision or legislation as amended, re-enacted or replaced, and includes any subordinate legislation issued under it; (ii) a document (including this document) is to that document or provision as amended, supplemented or replaced; (iii) a person includes any type of entity or body of persons, whether or not it is incorporated or has a separate legal identity, and any executor, administrator or successor in law of that person; and (iv) anything (including a right, obligation or concept) includes each part of it. 

(b) A singular word includes the plural and vice versa. 

(c) If a word or phrase is defined, any other grammatical form of that word or phrase has a corresponding meaning. 

(d) If an example is given of anything (including a right, obligation or concept) such as by saying it includes something else, the example does not limit the scope of the thing. 

(e) In deciding whether a student will have acquired or demonstrated appropriate understanding and competence in relation to an element or area of knowledge, as the case requires, an Admitting Authority will have regard to –

(i) the Level 7 criteria specified in the AQF; (ii) the Threshold Learning Outcomes for the Bachelor of Laws/LLB or Juris Doctor/JD as the case requires; and (iii) any other matter that the Admitting Authority considers relevant. 

PURPOSES OF THE STANDARDS 

The purposes of these Standards are – 

(a) to assist an Admitting Authority, when accrediting, monitoring, reviewing or re- accrediting a law course, to determine whether that law course –

(i) will provide for a student to acquire and demonstrate appropriate understanding and competence in each element of a prescribed area of knowledge; and (ii) will provide a student with the knowledge and skills to meets the requirements of the LACC Statement on Statutory Interpretation; 

(b) to provide clear, tangible guidance about what evidence is required to satisfy each standard relating to – (i) the delivery of the law course; (ii) the nature of a law course; (iii) the duration of a law course; (iv) the content of a law course; (v) teaching a prescribed area of knowledge; and (vi) assessment of a student's understanding and competence; and 

(c) to provide greater certainty for law schools about the matters which an Admitting Authority will consider relevant when accrediting, monitoring or re-accrediting a law course. 

4. THE STANDARDS 

4.1 The delivery of the law course 

• The law course, or one or more of the units which comprise it, may be delivered fully or partially online. (a) Explanatory note The law school may select the appropriate delivery mode across teaching, learning and assessments, for one or more units or the whole law course. The Admitting Authority may seek information from the law school about the delivery mode offered. 

4.2 The nature of the law course 

• The law course is a tertiary academic course in law, whether or not it leads to a degree in law. 

(a) Explanatory note 

The law course must be "a coherent sequence of units of study leading to the award of a qualification" in law.  This applies when a law course is a single degree and when a law course is part of a combined or double degree, to the law component of that combined or double degree. The qualification must be a degree or another similar qualification in law,  awarded upon successful completion of a tertiary academic course. A law course may be considered for accreditation is “a tertiary academic course … accredited in Australia" for the purposes of these Standards if it is either one of the following - (i) provided by a self-accrediting provider on the National Register of Higher Education Providers; (ii) currently accredited by TEQSA as leading to a regulated higher education award; or (iii) conducted by or on behalf of the New South Wales Legal Profession Admission Board. 

(b) How can a law school show that it has met this standard? 

A law school needs to provide the Admitting Authority with evidence that - the law course leads to a degree or similar qualification in law; and is comprised of a coherent sequence of units of study which form a course designated as a law course; and the law course is – (A) provided by a self-accrediting provider on the National Register of Higher Education Providers; accredited by TEQSA as a course of study leading to a higher education award; or (C) conducted by or on behalf of the New South Wales Legal Profession Admission Board. 

4.3 The duration of the law course 

• The law course includes the equivalent of at least three years' full-time study of law. 

• Intensive or block delivery should only be used for a prescribed area of knowledge where the law school satisfies the Admitting Authority that it is appropriate in all the circumstances. 

(a) Explanatory note 

The total credit points for the  units in the law course must equal or exceed an EFTSL of 3.0. 

The course may be offered in a full-time, part-time or accelerated mode. 

An accelerated mode may include intensives, which are units taught during compressed timeframes outside the usual 12-week semester (i.e. two terms a year) or nine-week trimester (i.e. three terms a year) and might be taught over a winter or summer break, or through block learning models during shorter, but  more frequent, terms. The Admitting Authority may seek further information and data from the law school, for example, in relation to student attendance requirements and whether the intensive or block delivery would enable students to acquire the appropriate level of understanding and competence in the prescribed area/(s) of knowledge and statutory interpretation. 

The LACC Statement on Duration of Legal Studies, provides that the requirement for at least three years’ full-time study refers to three calendar years and that – A law course that can be completed in fewer than three years may be accredited … if the relevant law school satisfies the Admitting Authority that the course is, indeed, the equivalent of a three calendar year full- time course undertaken at the relevant law school, in terms of the breadth and depth of its content, the teaching methods to be employed and the assessment criteria and methodology. 

(b) How can a law school show that it has met this standard? 

A law school needs to provide the Admitting Authority with evidence - (i) that the credit points allocated for the law course in total are equal to or exceed those required for an EFTSL of 3.0; and (ii) if the course can be completed in less than three calendar years, that the course is, indeed, the equivalent of a three calendar year full-time course undertaken at the relevant law school, in terms of the breadth and depth of its content, the teaching methods employed, and the applicable assessment criteria and methodology. 

A law school can give the Admitting Authority the same evidence about the duration of the course that it provided for the purpose of recently being reviewed externally or being accredited by either a self-accrediting provider or by TEQSA. If the law school chooses to do this, unless the Admitting Authority determines otherwise, it will need to – (i) show that the recent review or accreditation required the law school to satisfy a similar standard to that required by the Admitting Authority; and (ii) set out the relevant standard against which it was recently reviewed or accredited; (iii) set out when the review or accreditation occurred and by whom it was conducted, and (iv) give the Admitting Authority copies of the principal documentary evidence that it provided for the purpose of that review or accreditation. 

4.4 The learning outcomes for the law course

• The statement of learning outcomes for the law course is directed to enabling students to acquire and demonstrate appropriate understanding and competence in the prescribed areas of knowledge and statutory interpretation. 

(a) Explanatory note 

TEQSA requires the specified learning outcomes for each course of study to "encompass discipline-related and generic outcomes, including … knowledge and skills required for employment and further study related to the course of study, including those required to be eligible to seek registration to practise where applicable" (emphasis added). 

(b) How can a law school establish that it has met this standard? 

A law school needs to – (i) set out any relevant learning outcomes for the law course; and (ii) show how achieving each of these outcomes will demonstrate that a student has acquired and demonstrated appropriate understanding and competence in each of the prescribed areas of knowledge. 

4.5 Content of the law course 

• The law course includes teaching or other instruction in each of the specified elements in each of the prescribed areas of knowledge set out in Schedule 1 of the Admission Rules. 

• The law course also meets the requirements of the LACC Statement on Statutory Interpretation. 

(a) Explanatory note 

A prescribed area of knowledge need not be taught in a  unit bearing the same name as that used for the area in the Admission Rules. Similarly, the elements of an area of knowledge need not be taught in one or unit; they could be taught in several units. 

An Admitting Authority may consider that the number of hours allocated to teaching a prescribed area of knowledge is relevant when determining whether that area is adequately covered. 

(b) How can a law school show that it has met this standard? 

A law school needs to - (i) describe where each element of each prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation is taught in the law course. This might be done by way of a matrix or by mapping. Evidence could include the course syllabus, unit descriptions or, by way of examples, lecture outlines or reading guides; and (ii) estimate the total teaching hours allocated to the teaching of each prescribed area of knowledge, and describe the teaching methods having regard to the delivery modes for each prescribed area of knowledge indicating the predominant teaching method and delivery mode and the use of other teaching methods and delivery modes; and (iii) the total teaching hours provided should equate to at least 36 hours for each prescribed area of knowledge. If the estimated number of teaching hours for any prescribed area of knowledge is less than 36 hours because of the teaching method used or student research, demonstrate how the learning outcomes will be achieved in that area. 

4.6 Teaching the law course and active learning 

• Each prescribed area of knowledge and any unit subject relating to statutory interpretation is taught by people qualified to teach that area of knowledge. 

• The law school uses teaching methods which enable each student to acquire the appropriate understanding and competence in each element of every prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation. 

• An Admitting Authority will consider the number of hours provided for active learning and/or direct interaction in a prescribed area of knowledge when considering whether a law course will enable a student to acquire an adequate level of understanding and competence. 

• Each student in the law course has ready access to legal information resources that are sufficient in quantity and quality to enable the student to acquire the appropriate understanding and competence in each element of every prescribed area of knowledge. 

(a) Explanatory note The quality of teaching directly affects a student's acquisition of understanding and competence. Three dominant influences upon the quality of teaching are – (i) the qualifications and experience of the teachers; (ii) the teaching methods employed; and (iii) access to legal information resources, particularly library resources. A student needs to acquire both understanding and competence in each 11(b) element of each prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation. Admitting Authorities consider that this will not occur unless the teaching methods demonstrably require active learning. 

Admitting Authorities consider that direct interaction between students and teachers whether in-person or through synchronous online learning remains the primary reliable means of achieving these results. 

How can a law school show that it has met this standard? 

A law school needs to satisfy the Admitting Authority that - 

(i) teachers in the program – • meet the AQF requirement that a teacher should have a degree one level higher than that of the course in which the person teaches, or • have equivalent experience in practice or teaching (which may be demonstrated by reference, say, to a person's specialist practice, scholarship, or standing in the academic community or legal profession), or • if a teacher does not fully meet either of the preceding criteria, that person's teaching is guided and overseen by other staff who do meet one or more of those criteria. 

A law school should provide a complete list of teaching staff (continuing, fixed-term and any casual staff employed at the date upon which accreditation or re-accreditation is sought) and their relevant academic qualifications. The Admitting Authority may request further information about the relevant practice or teaching experience of staff who do not have the requisite higher degree.); 

(ii) the methods generally employed in teaching prescribed areas of knowledge across all delivery modes, enable students to acquire appropriate understanding and competence in each element of that area of knowledge and statutory interpretation. (A law school will need to identify and explain any departures from those generally employed methods, in teaching any particular area of knowledge.); and 

(iii) the design of the law course and its program of instruction primarily comprises provides for at least 18 hours of either or both of – face-to-face instruction and active learning; and (B) instruction and learning involving direct interaction between teacher and student, whether in-person or through synchronous online learning, (A) (iv) (v) and enables students to acquire and demonstrate appropriate understanding and competence in each element of each prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation. 

(A law school will need to provide evidence of the extent to which the design of the law course and its program of instruction provides for active learning and/or direct interaction in each prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation.); and the law school enables each student to have ready access to legal information resources, in paper or in electronic form; and those resources are sufficient in quantity and quality to enable each student to acquire appropriate understanding and competence in each element of each prescribed area of knowledge. xx It would be relevant for an Admitting Authority to know whether the law school’s library has been independently assessed by the CALD Standards Committee and has been independently determined to have met, in this respect, the CALD Standards. 

A law school can give an Admitting Authority the same evidence about teaching each of the prescribed areas of knowledge and statutory interpretation Statutory Interpretation and about its legal information resources that it provided for the purpose of recently being reviewed externally or accredited by either a self-accrediting provider or by TEQSA. Unless the Admitting Authority determines otherwise, the law school will need to – show that the recent review or accreditation required the law school to satisfy a similar standard to that required by these Standards; and set out the relevant standard against which it was reviewed or accredited; and set out when the review or accreditation occurred and by whom it was conducted; and (iv) give the Admitting Authority copies of the principal documentary evidence that it provided for the purpose of that review or accreditation. 

4.7 Assessing understanding and competence 

• Assessment requirements verify that a student has – (i) acquired appropriate understanding and competence in every prescribed area of knowledge; and acquired the relevant knowledge and skills set out in the LACC 

• The law course requires a student to achieve at least a pass grade before satisfactorily completing any subject or unit in which a prescribed area of knowledge or statutory interpretation  is taught or assessed.  

• An Admitting Authority may consider for each unit that covers a prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation, the allocation of assessments, the assessment methods and whether a sufficient proportion of assessments are conducted by invigilation to ensure the law course provides an appropriate level of quality assurance that a student has been awarded a grade that accurately reflects their level of acquired understanding and competence. 

(a) Explanatory note 

An Admitting Authority must be able to rely on a law school’s minimum requirement for completion - a pass grade - as the conclusive indicator that a student has, in fact, acquired an appropriate level of understanding and competence in every element of a prescribed area of knowledge and has acquired the relevant knowledge and skills set out in the LACC's Statement on Statutory Interpretation. 

Invigilation of assessments provides an extra level of quality assurance that the grades awarded to students accurately reflects their level of acquired understanding and competence, particularly in an online learning environment. 

(b)  How can a law school establish that it has met this standard? 

A law school needs to - (i) provide evidence that it requires, and that students are made aware, that all elements of each prescribed area of knowledge and all of the law school's teaching or other instruction in statutory interpretation are assessable; and (ii) provide evidence that its methods of assessment methods in each  unit in which a prescribed area of knowledge is taught confirm that a student has attained an appropriate understanding and competence in that area; and (iii) provide evidence that its methods of assessment methods confirm that a student has achieved all of the outcomes specified in the LACC's Statement on Statutory Interpretation; and (iv) provide evidence that at least 50% of assessments for each unit that covers a prescribed area of knowledge and statutory interpretation is conducted by invigilation; and (v) if grade descriptors apply to prescribed areas of knowledge, set out the descriptor for a pass grade; and (vi) explain the process it uses to satisfy itself that grades awarded accurately reflect the level of student attainment.

Law Teaching Standards

The Admissions Committee of the Legal Services Council (Council) and the Law Admissions Consultative Committee (LACC) Consultation paper on proposed revisions to the Accreditation Standards for Australian Law Courses notes 

The Council is a statutory body that oversees the operation of the Legal Profession Uniform Law in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia. 

The Council’s Admissions Committee develops the Legal Profession Uniform Admission Rules and provides advice to the Council about admissions matters. 

The LACC is a national group that reports to the Council of Chief Justices of Australia and New Zealand. The LACC’s main role is to forge consensus on admission and admission-related matters nationally, between the bodies represented by its members. The Council provides the LACC with secretariat support. 

The Admissions Committee and the LACC work closely together to facilitate national consistency in admissions matters. 

About this consultation 

LACC first published the Accreditation Standards for Australian Law Courses (Standards) in July 2018. The Standards set important minimum standards for the accreditation of law courses. The Standards also seek to give law schools greater certainty about the matters which an admitting authority will consider relevant when accrediting, monitoring or re-accrediting a law course. In late 2023, the Committees became aware of some emerging issues in relation to the accreditation of law courses, partly arising as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Committees resolved to undertake an initial targeted consultation to explore how these issues might be addressed. Key issues under exploration included how the Standards might be enhanced to respond to the prevalence of virtual or online delivery and given the emergence of new digital technologies. The initial consultation also explored other matters, such as the use of intensives or block delivery models. 

Having considered the range of views expressed in initial consultation submissions in late 2024, the Committees have developed draft revised Standards (Draft Revised Standards) for public consultation. The Draft Revised Standards are attached (Attachment A). 

Relevant overarching policy considerations 

In developing the Draft Revised Standards, the Committees have given particular consideration to the desirability of minimum standards for the accreditation of law courses across Australia which are fit for purpose in the context of widespread online or blended delivery and other developments in contemporary Australian legal education, so as to further national consistency. 

Other policy considerations the Committees have taken into account include: • the legislative objective of regulation which is efficient, effective, targeted and proportionate and the development of accreditation policies and procedures which are consistent, uniform and transparent across Australia • recognition of the broader national higher education regulatory landscape and higher education policy settings, including the role of the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) and its regulatory and enforcement powers • the importance of innovation in the design and delivery of law courses to achieve enhanced student learning outcomes • equity, accessibility, diversity and inclusion for students to be able to attain a legal qualification and enter the legal profession, and • potential implementation impacts on law course providers. 

Proposed revisions to the Standards 

The Committees propose revisions to update, clarify and streamline the Standards in relation to the delivery of law courses, and support effective online learning with respect to teaching hours and the introduction of new requirements for active learning and invigilated assessments. The proposed revisions would also introduce additional guidance for intensives and block learning models and make other minor changes. The Committees propose a transitional period, as set out below. 

Online delivery of law courses 

The Committees are aware of the growth in the number of law courses being delivered online and are concerned to ensure that the Standards support online delivery which is appropriate and effective in achieving student learning outcomes. 

The proposed revisions to the Standards reflect the existing position that law courses may be delivered fully in-person, fully online or via a blended delivery model. In this context, the Committees propose new requirements to support the effectiveness of online delivery, including by setting minimum standards for active learning and student engagement (set out in the next section).  

This approach aligns with the national regulation of tertiary education providers which, to promote innovation, flexibility and focus on learning design and delivery outcomes across providers, does not prescribe types of delivery modes. It also recognises that policy at the national level acknowledges online learning as a legitimate way to promote equity, access and inclusion in higher education. 

The Committees have heard initial consultation feedback about the importance of ensuring that certain cohorts of students, such as women, First Nations people, those living in regional, rural, remote and very remote (RRRR) areas and those from neurodiverse backgrounds or with a disability, have improved access to legal education by law courses being offered fully or partially online. This enhances diversity of representation across the legal profession and in RRRR areas seeking to attract lawyers. The Committees recognise the role of the Standards in supporting these objectives, while maintaining appropriate minimum standards in relation to law courses. 

The relevant changes in the Draft Revised Standards are as follows: • new clause 4.1 (The delivery of the law course) • adjusted and new definitions at clause 2.1 for “online”, “delivery mode”, “in-person” and “synchronous online learning”, as well as the deletion of the “face-to-face” definition, and • ancillary adjustments to clause 4.6 (Teaching of the law course and active learning) to extend current Standards to apply to the range of delivery modes possible for online learning. 

The revised definitions have been developed taking into account initial consultation feedback about the need for: • clearer definitions to respond to the widespread online delivery of law courses • clearer delineation between synchronous and other online learning, and having regard to consistency with the national regulation of tertiary education providers • a definition for “delivery mode” that does not limit the types of delivery modes permitted when tertiary education providers offer a course of study • updating the definition of “online” by removing references to technological hardware given the emergence of laptops, tablets, wearables and the possible development of other new types of hardware, and • removal of the “face-to-face” definition, as it was creating some confusion. Instead, the Committees propose that the definition of “in-person” will continue to apply with slight modification. 

Teaching hours, active learning and student engagement 

The Committees propose revisions in response to initial stakeholder feedback that the Standards: • be brought up-to-date by clarifying that teaching may be delivered not just in-person, but also through online or blended delivery modes, and • provide an indicative range of possible ways in which teaching may occur through the introduction of a definition for “teaching method”. 

Consistent with the clarifications for online learning, the Draft Revised Standards propose revisions at clause 4.5 (Content of the law course) and the introduction of new definitions at clause 2.1 for “delivery mode” and “teaching method” to provide clearer guidance as to what may count towards the 36 hours of teaching for each Priestley 11 subject. 

To support effective online delivery, the Committees also propose to make updates to the Standards in relation to active learning and student engagement. The Committees propose these revisions in response to initial stakeholder feedback that active learning and student engagement in an online learning environment is best supported by synchronous online learning, and that the Draft Revised Standards can best achieve consistency in accreditation by setting a threshold number of hours to promote active student learning and engagement that would apply across all delivery modes. 

The Draft Revised Standards propose revisions to clause 4.6 (Teaching the law course) by transferring commentary, with minor modification, about “active learning” to a new definition at clause 2.1 and by updating the definition of “direct interaction” to ensure it is appropriate for an online teaching and learning environment. 

The minor modifications to the definition of “active learning” remove the reference to “test” (so there is no confusion with assessments) and includes a reference to factual “scenarios”. The introduction of a new proposed requirement at clause 4.6 would allow an admitting authority to consider the number of hours provided by a law school for a student’s active learning and engagement in a Priestley 11 subject when considering whether a law course will enable a student to acquire an adequate level of understanding and competence. 

The Committees consider the provision of a minimum number of 18 hours for active learning and/or direct interaction, whether the student’s participation is in-person or through synchronous online learning, sets an appropriate balance between active and other learning. A minimum 18 hours is proposed as this would equate to 50% of the student experience with respect to the 36 hours of teaching for a Priestley 11 subject. 

Invigilated assessments 

In relation to assessments, the Committees received feedback in the initial stakeholder consultation that: • universities should continue to have flexibility to allow for best practice innovation in assessment design and to select the assessment method that best achieves the desired learning outcomes, and • it would be appropriate for a requirement to be imposed that at least 50% or half of all assessments for a Priestley 11 subject must be conducted by a form of invigilated assessment. 

This seeks to provide a sufficient level of assurance that a student has been appropriately awarded their grades and law degree. 

The Draft Revised Standards introduce a new requirement at clause 4.7 (Assessing understanding and competence) and new definitions for “assessment method” and “invigilation” at clause 2.1. 

The introduction of a new requirement at clause 4.7 would allow an admitting authority to consider for each unit of the law course that covers a Priestley 11 subject and statutory interpretation, the allocation of assessments, the assessment methods and whether a sufficient proportion of those assessments are conducted by invigilation (whether an online invigilated exam or another type of invigilated assessment). This will allow the admitting authority to ensure the law course provides an appropriate level of quality assurance that a student has been awarded a grade that accurately reflects their level of acquired understanding and competence. 

The Draft Revised Standards impose a new requirement at clause 4.7(b) that at least 50% of assessments for a unit covering a Priestley 11 subject and statutory interpretation be conducted by a form of invigilated assessment. The new requirement does not require any specific method of invigilated assessment to allow law schools flexibility to use a method of assessment that would best achieve the intended learning outcomes and suit the delivery mode. 

The introduction of a new definition for “assessment method” seeks to respond to initial stakeholder feedback that it would be helpful to include examples of the types of assessments that law schools may use in addition to examinations. 

The introduction of a new definition for “invigilation” seeks to confirm that supervision of an assessment applies to all types of delivery modes, including when an assessment is conducted in-person or online. 

Intensives and block learning models 

The Committees received initial stakeholder feedback that it would enhance national consistency of accreditation if there was additional guidance in the Standards about the use of intensives and block delivery and what is needed for a law course to be considered “intensive”. 

While the Committees are aware of two law schools that have already introduced block delivery of a whole law course, other stakeholders have expressed reservations about the appropriateness of intensive or block delivery models for Priestley 11 subjects. 

To respond to the initial stakeholder feedback, the Committees propose to update the Standards to include additional guidance that intensive or block delivery should only be used for Priestley 11 subjects where the law school satisfies the admitting authority that it is appropriate in all the circumstances. To support this, it is proposed that the Standards also provide commentary that an admitting authority may seek further information and data from a law school, and that the Standards include more information about the nature of accelerated modes of delivery, of which intensive or block learning models are a type. 

The proposed additional guidance acknowledges the practices of the Victorian and New South Wales admitting authorities which have already considered or are in the process of considering the offerings of the two law schools that have already introduced block delivery models for a whole law course. 

By making these amendments to the Standards, it is intended that law schools may make a case for delivery in accelerated mode (intensive or block delivery) by satisfying the admitting authority that it is appropriate in all the circumstances for Priestley 11 subjects to be delivered in the proposed way. It is also intended that law schools that adopt intensive or block delivery of Priestley 11 subjects would still need to meet the at least three-year (or equivalent) requirement for the duration of the law course and the proposed new minimum requirement for active learning and student engagement discussed above. It may be open to the admitting authority to consider whether a reduced number of teaching hours would be permissible for a Priestley 11 subject. The Draft Revised Standards propose amendments at clause 4.3 (The duration of the law course) in response to the initial stakeholder feedback. 

Other minor revisions 

The Draft Revised Standards propose other minor revisions to update, clarify and streamline in response to initial stakeholder feedback. These include: • a new definition of “law course” at clause 2.1 that draws from the drafting in the Uniform Law Admission Rules12 and further commentary in the explanatory note at clause 4.2(a) to clarify the requirement for a coherent sequence of units applies to a law course that is a single degree and, for a combined or double degree, to the law component of the combined or double degree • a new definition of “unit” at clause 2.1 that is consistent with the TEQSA definition13 and accompanying revisions throughout the Draft Revised Standards, for example at clauses 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5, and • updates to the definition of “prescribed areas of knowledge” at clause 2.1 and elsewhere to include statutory interpretation. 

Regulatory landscape 

The LACC Standards operate alongside the Australian Law School Standards,14 developed by the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD), as well as the broader national regulation of the higher education sector by TEQSA. 

When developing the Draft Revised Standards, the Committees have been mindful of TEQSA’s resourcing,  role and regulatory powers in maintaining academic integrity in the tertiary education sector, and TEQSA having particular focus on responding to commercial contract cheating services and the emergence of generative AI. The Committees have also considered what universities and law schools are required to do to meet the TEQSA academic integrity requirements. Each university is required to have an up-to-date academic integrity policy and procedures that respond to contract cheating and generative AI, and to comply with the TEQSA re-accreditation process, regular TEQSA audits, and respond to enquiries or participate in other initiatives. 

To support universities adapt and respond to contract cheating and generative AI, TEQSA has published extensive resources, guidance and best practice materials about how universities can maintain academic integrity with respect to these technological developments. Anyone, including universities, students and members of the public, can report an alleged contract cheating service to TEQSA. Regarding generative AI, TEQSA encourages universities to take the approach that “assessment and learning experiences equip students to participate ethically and actively in a society where AI is ubiquitous”. 

The Committees are mindful not to include requirements in the Standards that would replicate these aspects of TEQSA’s work. This aligns with the intended application of the Standards, that they complement and not duplicate the standards of CALD and TEQSA. 

Proposed implementation timing 

The Committees anticipate working towards a publication date in the second half of 2025, although this may depend on the nature of the feedback received through the consultation process. 

The Committees propose there be a staggered two-year implementation period to facilitate transition. 

During this period: 

• The final revised Standards will be published one year before the date of commencement. 

• In the year following commencement, the final revised Standards will apply to: o all applications for accreditation and re-accreditation, and o all other accredited law courses. It is anticipated that each admitting authority will communicate with law schools which are in this category.