Biodiversity

'Global genetic diversity status and trends: towards a suite of Essential Biodiversity Variables (EBVs) for genetic composition' by Sean Hoban , Frederick I Archer, Laura D Bertola, Jason G Bragg, Martin F Breed, Michael W Bruford, Melinda A Coleman, Robert Ekblom, W Chris Funk, Catherine E Grueber, Brian K Hand, Rodolfo Jaffé, Evelyn Jensen, Jeremy S Johnson, Francine Kershaw, Libby Liggins, Anna J MacDonald, Joachim Mergeay, Joshua M Miller, Frank Muller-Karger, David O'Brien, Ivan Paz-Vinas, Kevin M Potter, Orly Razgour, Cristiano Vernesi and Margaret E Hunter in (2022) Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society comments

Biodiversity underlies ecosystem resilience, ecosystem function, sustainable economies, and human well‐being. Understanding how biodiversity sustains ecosystems under anthropogenic stressors and global environmental change will require new ways of deriving and applying biodiversity data. A major challenge is that biodiversity data and knowledge are scattered, biased, collected with numerous methods, and stored in inconsistent ways. The Group on Earth Observations Biodiversity Observation Network (GEO BON) has developed the Essential Biodiversity Variables (EBVs) as fundamental metrics to help aggregate, harmonize, and interpret biodiversity observation data from diverse sources. Mapping and analyzing EBVs can help to evaluate how aspects of biodiversity are distributed geographically and how they change over time. EBVs are also intended to serve as inputs and validation to forecast the status and trends of biodiversity, and to support policy and decision making.

 

Here, we assess the feasibility of implementing Genetic Composition EBVs (Genetic EBVs), which are metrics of within‐species genetic variation. We review and bring together numerous areas of the field of genetics and evaluate how each contributes to global and regional genetic biodiversity monitoring with respect to theory, sampling logistics, metadata, archiving, data aggregation, modeling, and technological advances. We propose four Genetic EBVs: (i) Genetic Diversity; (ii) Genetic Differentiation; (iii) Inbreeding; and (iv) Effective Population Size (Ne). We rank Genetic EBVs according to their relevance, sensitivity to change, generalizability, scalability, feasibility and data availability. We outline the workflow for generating genetic data underlying the Genetic EBVs, and review advances and needs in archiving genetic composition data and metadata. We discuss how Genetic EBVs can be operationalized by visualizing EBVs in space and time across species and by forecasting Genetic EBVs beyond current observations using various modeling approaches. Our review then explores challenges of aggregation, standardization, and costs of operationalizing the Genetic EBVs, as well as future directions and opportunities to maximize their uptake globally in research and policy. The collection, annotation, and availability of genetic data has made major advances in the past decade, each of which contributes to the practical and standardized framework for large‐scale genetic observation reporting. 

Rapid advances in DNA sequencing technology present new opportunities, but also challenges for operationalizing Genetic EBVs for biodiversity monitoring regionally and globally. With these advances, genetic composition monitoring is starting to be integrated into global conservation policy, which can help support the foundation of all biodiversity and species' long‐term persistence in the face of environmental change. We conclude with a summary of concrete steps for researchers and policy makers for advancing operationalization of Genetic EBVs. The technical and analytical foundations of Genetic EBVs are well developed, and conservation practitioners should anticipate their increasing application as efforts emerge to scale up genetic biodiversity monitoring regionally and globally.

Digital Property

'The New Things: Property Rights In Digital Files?' by Johan David Michels and Christopher Millard in (2022) Cambridge Law Journal considers 

the property status of digital files, such as electronic documents, under English law. We argue that, while mere information is rightly not considered property, digital files are not mere information. Instead, they are distinct virtual objects that exist at the logical – or software – layer of a computer system. Property law could recognise digital files as a new, third kind of thing, alongside things in possession and in action. Doing so might help resolve disputes over access to digital files, by providing proprietary remedies similar to those available for paper documents.

The authors state

Suppose company A creates an electronic database of its customers and stores the digital file on the servers of cloud provider B. A owns its own computer and any intellectual property (“IP”) rights in the database content. B owns the servers and has practical control over the digital file. What about legal rights to the file itself: the collection of information stored on the server? Is that A's property? What if B refuses to let A access the file? Can A then call upon a proprietary remedy? 

In this paper, we look at the property status of digital files, such as electronic documents, emails, and photographs, under English law. The topic is complicated. The concept of property can be “peculiarly difficult to define or even to describe”. 

Further, whether an object qualifies as property depends on the legal context. As Lord Porter remarked: “‘property’ is not a term of art but takes its meaning from its context and … the document or Act of Parliament in which it is found.” 

Applying this complex legal concept to ever-changing information technology (“IT”) is challenging. We aim to identify the relevant challenges and suggest possible solutions. We start by reviewing two possible objections to treating digital files as property. First, mere information is not property under English law. Yet digital files are not mere information. Instead, they are virtual objects that differ in relevant ways from the information they contain. Second, digital files do not fit the traditional categories of things recognised as property under English law. Nonetheless, digital files could be considered a new, third kind of thing, in line with the emerging treatment of cryptocurrencies. 

In our view, recognising property rights in digital files is appropriate where: (1) their characteristics make them a good fit for property law; and (2) policy reasons support extending property rights in a given legal context. We focus on commercial law and argue that property rights could help resolve commercial disputes over interference with access to a digital file. An example would be where a cloud provider excludes a customer from a digital file which the customer has uploaded to the cloud. Property law would provide the customer with a remedy to recover the digital file, as it does for paper documents. With the Law Commission of England and Wales currently reviewing the legal status of digital assets, now is the time to consider the case for property rights in digital files. 

II. The Boundaries of Property: Beyond “Mere Information” 

A. Mere Information Is Not Property 

English law does not recognise information itself as property. 

Sir John Mummery explained this using the example of a letter as follows:

(1) The physical sheets of paper are the property of the purchaser. When the letter is sent, property in the paper passes to the recipient. (2) The written composition contained in the letter is treated differently. That is owned by the author, in the form of a copyright. The recipient comes to own the paper, but not the copyright in the written work, which the author retains. (3) In contrast, the information contained within that composition (the ideas, facts, etc.) is not regarded as property. It is free for anyone to use. 

Floyd L.J. similarly considered that:

the law has been reluctant to treat information itself as property … there are sharp distinctions between the information itself, the physical medium on which the information is recorded and the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical medium and the rights are treated as property, the information itself has never been. 

Depending on the circumstances, information can be subject to other, non-proprietary rights. For example, the recipient can have an obligation of confidentiality, which protects information from being disclosed or used for other purposes. Such an obligation can be imposed expressly by contract or impliedly. Alternatively, it can arise as an equitable duty from the relationship between the parties and the nature of the information. Yet any such obligations are enforceable against another party only as a personal matter; they are not based on property rights. 

There are three main reasons why information is not regarded as property, namely: (1) that doing so imperils free speech; (2) that information is a poor fit for property rights; and (3) that property rights are unnecessary.