'Bullshitters. Who Are They and What Do
We Know about Their Lives?' (IZA Institute of Kabor Econics, 2019) by John Jerrim, Phil Parker and
Nikki Shure
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‘Bullshitters’ are individuals who claim knowledge or expertise in an area where they
actually have little experience or skill. Despite this being a well-known and widespread
social phenomenon, relatively few large-scale empirical studies have been conducted into
this issue. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining teenagers’
propensity to claim expertise in three mathematics constructs that do not really exist.
Using Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) data from nine Anglophone
countries and over 40,000 young people, we find substantial differences in young people’s
tendency to bullshit across countries, genders and socio-economic groups. Bullshitters are
also found to exhibit high levels of overconfidence and believe they work hard, persevere
at tasks, and are popular amongst their peers. Together this provides important new insight
into who bullshitters are and the type of survey responses that they provide.
The authors state
In his seminal essay-turned-book On Bullshit, Frankfurt (2005) defines and discusses the
seemingly omnipresent cultural phenomenon of bullshit. He begins by stating that “One of the
most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each
of us contributes his share” (Frankfurt, 2005: 1). His book spent weeks on the New York Times’
bestsellers list in 2005 and has recently been cited in the post-truth age to better understand
Donald Trump (e.g. Jeffries, 2017; Heer, 2018; Yglesias, 2018).
Other philosophers have since expanded on his work, most notably G. A. Cohen in his essay
“Deeper into Bullshit” (Cohen 2002), but there has been limited large scale empirical research
into this issue. We fill this important gap in the literature by providing new cross-national
evidence on who is more likely to bullshit and how these individuals view their abilities and
social status. This is an important first step in better understanding the seemingly ubiquitous
phenomenon of bullshit.
We make use of an influential cross-national education survey administered every three years
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), namely the
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). This data is commonly used by the
OECD and education researchers to benchmark education systems or the performance of
specific subgroups of pupils (e.g. Anderson et al., 2007; Jerrim and Choi, 2014; Parker et al.,
2018), but has never been used to compare participants across countries in terms of their
proclivity to bullshit. This paper fills this important gap in the literature.
Previous academic work on bullshit has been limited and mostly theoretical. Black (1983)
edited a collection of essays on “humbug”, the predecessor of bullshit, which he defines as
“deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of
somebody's own thoughts, feelings or attitudes” (Black, 1983: 23). Frankfurt (2005) is the first
theoretical treatment of the concept of “bullshit” and he situates it in terms of previous
philosophical traditions. A crucial aspect of bullshitting in Frankfurt’s work is the fact that
bullshitters have no concern for the truth, which is different than a purposeful lie (Frankfurt,
2005: 54). Cohen responds to Frankfurt’s essay and focuses on a slightly different definition
of bullshit where “the character of the process that produces bullshit is immaterial” (Cohen,
2002: 2).
Petrocelli (2018) is one of the few studies to explore bullshitting empirically. He looks at the
“antecedents of bullshit”, namely: topic knowledge, the obligation to provide an opinion
hypothesis (i.e. individuals are more likely to bullshit when they feel social pressure to provide
a response) and the “ease of passing bullshit hypothesis” (i.e. people are more willing to bullshit
when believe they will get away with it). He finds that participants are more likely to bullshit
when there is pressure to provide an opinion, irrespective of their actual level of knowledge.
Petrocelli also concludes that individuals are more likely to bullshit when they believe they can
get away with it, and less likely to bullshit when they know they will be held accountable for
the responses they provide (Petrocelli, 2018). His work uses smaller sample sizesthan our work
(N ≈ 500) and does not answer the question of who bullshitters are and how they view their
abilities or social standing.
Pennycook et al. (2015) is the only other empirical study focused on bullshit. They present
experiment participants with “pseudo-profound bullshit” - vacuous statements constructed out
of buzzwords - to ascertain when they can differentiate bullshit from meaningful statements
and create a Bullshit Receptivity (BSR) scale. Their results point to the idea that some people
may be more receptive towards pseudo-profound bullshit, especially if they have a more
intuitive cognitive style or believe in the supernatural (Pennycook et al., 2015). Their study
focuses on ability to detect bullshit and the mechanisms behind why some people cannot detect
bullshit, rather than proclivity to bullshit, which is the focus of this paper.
In psychology, there has been a related literature on overconfidence and overclaiming. More
and Healy (2008) provide a thorough overview of existing studies on overconfidence and
distinguish between “overestimation”, “overplacement”, and “overprecision” as three distinct
types of overconfidence. Overestimation occurs when individuals rate their ability as higher
than it is actually observed to be, overplacement occurs when individuals rate themselves
relatively higher than their actual position in a distribution, and overprecision occurs when
individuals assign narrow confidence intervals to an incorrect answer, indicating
overconfidence in their ability to answer questions correctly (More and Healy, 2008). The type
of questions we use to construct our bullshit scale are closely related to overestimation and
overprecision since the individuals need to not only identify whether or not they are familiar
with a mathematical concept, but also assess their degree of familiarity.
Similar to how we define bullshit, overclaiming occurs when individuals assert that they have
knowledge of a concept that does not exist. In one of the first studies on overclaiming, Philips
and Clancy (1972) create an index of overclaiming based on how often individuals report
consuming a series of new books, television programmes, and movies, all of which were not
real products. They use this index to explore the role of social desirability in survey responses.
Stanovich and Cunningham (1992) also construct a scale of overclaiming using foils, fake
concepts mixed into a list of real concepts, and signal-detection logic for authors and magazines
to examine author familiarity. In both of these studies, however, the focus is not on the actual
overclaiming index. Randall and Fernandes (1991) also construct an overclaiming index, but
use it as a control variable in their analysis of self-reported ethical conduct.
Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, and Lysy (2003) focus more directly on overclaiming. They construct
an overclaiming index using a set of items, of which one-fifth are non-existent, and employ a
signal-detection formula to measure overclaiming and actual knowledge. They find that
overclaiming is an operationalisation of self-enhancement and that narcissists are more likely
to overclaim than non-narcissists (Paulhus et al., 2003). Atir, Rosenzweig, and Dunning (2015)
find that people who perceive their expertise in various domains favourably are more likely to
overclaim. Pennycock and Rand (2018) find that overclaimers perceive fake news to be more
accurate. Similar to Atir et al. (2015), we find that young people who score higher on our
bullshit index also have high levels of confidence in their mathematics self-efficacy and
problem-solving skills.
We contribute to the existing literature on the related issues of bullshitting, overconfidence and
overclaiming in three important ways. First, we use a large sample of 40,550 young people
from nine Anglophone countries to examine bullshit, which enables us to dig deeper into the
differences between subgroups (e.g. boys versus girls, advantaged vs. disadvantaged young
people). Second, we provide the first internationally comparable evidence on bullshitting. We
use confirmatory factor analysis to construct our scale and test for three hierarchical levels of
measurement invariance (configural, metric and scalar). This allows us to compare average
scores on our bullshit scale across countries in a robust and meaningful way. Finally, we also
examine the relationship between bullshitting and various other psychological traits, including
overconfidence, self-perceptions of popularity amongst peers and their reported levels of
perseverance. Unlike many previous studies, we are able to investigate differences between
bullshitters and non-bullshitters conditional upon a range of potential confounding
characteristics (including a high-quality measure of educational achievement) providing
stronger evidence that bullshitting really is independently related to these important
psychological traits.
Our findings support the view that young men are, on average, bigger bullshitters than young
women, and that socio-economically advantaged teenagers are more likely to be bullshitters
than their disadvantaged peers. There is also important cross-national variation, with young
people in North American more likely to make exaggerated claims about their knowledge and
abilities than those from Europe. Finally, we illustrate how bullshitters display overconfidence
in their skills, and are more likely to report that they work hard when challenged and are popular
at school than other young people.
The paper now proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA) 2012 data and our empirical methodology. This is
accompanied by Appendix A, where we discuss how we test for measurement invariance of
the latent bullshit scale across groups. Results are then presented in section 3, with discussion
and conclusions following in section 4.