'Natural Law with and without God' by Jonathan Crowe in (2024) 4 Australian Journal of Law and Religion 17 comments
There is a common perception of natural law theory as characteristically (if not necessarily) theistic. This is sometimes presented as a drawback by secular critics of natural law thinking. Natural law authors themselves differ on the role of theism within their theories. Some have argued that natural law theory presupposes theism, while others have sought to give their views a secular basis. This article explores the relationship between natural law theory and theism. I begin by defining the characteristic features of the natural law outlook. I show that these core aspects of natural law thought can be rendered consistent with both theistic and non-theistic worldviews. However, these worldviews may yield different responses to some fundamental questions about natural law, such as where natural law comes from; how (and to what extent) humans can know about natural law; why humans should follow natural law; and whether natural law changes. I explore the consequences for natural law theories of theistic and non-theistic answers to these questions. I then offer some reasons for thinking that a version of theism incorporating what I term ‘qualified teleological perfectionism’ provides the most coherent foundation for the natural law outlook.
The natural law tradition in ethics, politics, and jurisprudence is widely associated with theistic authors such as Thomas Aquinas, who has been characterised as the paradigmatic natural law theorist. Several contemporary proponents of natural law theory, such as John Finnis, Mark Murphy, and Robert George, are also well known for their religious commitments (specifically, their Roman Catholicism). It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that natural law theory is widely viewed as characteristically (if not necessarily) theistic. This is sometimes presented as a drawback by critics who maintain that ethical, political, and legal theories should be acceptable to a range of religious and secular viewpoints.
Natural law authors themselves differ on the role of theism within their theories. Theistic proponents of natural law take different views on whether their natural law views can be separated from their religious commitments. There are, roughly, three kinds of perspectives on this issue. Some authors maintain that natural law, being based on human rationality, is logically independent of theism. Some hold the contrary view that natural law is untenable outside a theistic framework. There is also a middle position: some authors maintain that natural law ideas, although logically independent of theism, cohere with it in such a way as to make both natural law and theism more appealing. I will ultimately defend a version of this third position in the present article.
It is also important to note that the theological views of self-identified natural law authors are far from uniform. There is, as noted previously, a tendency for prominent defenders of natural law to be Roman Catholics, due no doubt in part to the long and venerable tradition of Catholic natural law thought and scholarship. However, Reformed natural law theories are currently undergoing a major revival. There are also some influential contemporary natural law authors who either prescind from theological positions or expressly situate their theories within an atheistic framework.
This article explores the relationship between natural law theory and theism. I begin by discussing the characteristic features of the natural law outlook. I contend that these core aspects of natural law thought can be rendered consistent with both theistic and non-theistic worldviews. However, these worldviews may yield different responses to fundamental questions about natural law, such as where natural law comes from; how (and to what extent) humans can know about natural law; why humans should follow natural law; and whether natural law changes. I explore the consequences for natural law theories of theistic and non- theistic answers to these questions. I then offer some reasons for thinking that a version of theism incorporating what I term ‘qualified teleological perfectionism’ provides the most coherent foundation for the natural law outlook.