From Samuel B Kent's infamous judgment in
Bradshaw v Unity Marine (147 F.Supp.2d 668, 2001 A.M.C. 2358) -
Before proceeding further, the Court notes that this
case involves two extremely likable lawyers, who
have together delivered some of the most amateurish
pleadings ever to cross the hallowed causeway into
Galveston, an effort which leads the Court to surmise
but one plausible explanation. Both attorneys have
obviously entered into a secret pact -- complete with
hats, handshakes and cryptic words -- to draft their
pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of
gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the
Court would be so charmed by their child-like efforts
that their utter dearth of legal authorities in their
briefing would go unnoticed. Whatever actually occurred,
the Court is now faced with the daunting task
of deciphering their submissions. With Big Chief
tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-may-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor's
edge sense of exhilaration, the Court begins. ...
Defendant begins the descent into Alice's Wonderland
by submitting a Motion that relies upon only one
legal authority. The Motion cites a Fifth Circuit case
which stands for the whopping proposition that a federal
court sitting in Texas applies the Texas statutes
of limitations to certain state and federal law claims.
See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 n. 1 (5th
Cir.1998). That is all well and good -- the Court is
quite fond of the Erie doctrine; indeed there is talk of
little else around both the Canal and this Court's water
cooler. Defendant, however, does not even cite
to Erie, but to a mere successor case, and further fails
to even begin to analyze why the Court should approach
the shores of Erie. Finally, Defendant does
not even provide a cite to its desired Texas limitation
statute. [FN2] A more bumbling approach is difficult
to conceive -- but wait folks, There's More! ...
The Court cannot even begin
to comprehend why this case was selected for reference.
It is almost as if Plaintiff's counsel chose the
opinion by throwing long range darts at the Federal
Reporter (remarkably enough hitting a nonexistent
volume!). And though the Court often gives great
heed to dicta from courts as far flung as those of
Manitoba, it finds this case unpersuasive. There is
nothing in Plaintiff's cited case about ingress or
egress between a vessel and a dock, although counsel
must have been thinking that Mr. Liddy must have
had both ingress and egress from the cruise ship at
some docking facility, before uttering his fateful
words. ...
Despite
the continued shortcomings of Plaintiff's supplemental
submission, the Court commends Plaintiff for his
vastly improved choice of crayon -- Brick Red is much
easier on the eyes than Goldenrod, and stands out
much better amidst the mustard splotched about
Plaintiff's briefing. But at the end of the day, even if
you put a calico dress on it and call it Florence, a pig
is still a pig.
Now, alas, the Court must return to grownup
land. As vaguely alluded to by the parties, the issue
in this case turns upon which law -- state or maritime -- applies to each of Plaintiff's potential claims versus
Defendant Phillips. And despite Plaintiff's and Defendant's
joint, heroic efforts to obscure it, the answer
to this question is readily ascertained. ....
After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier,
having received no useful guidance whatever from
either party, the Court has endeavored, primarily
based upon its affection for both counsel, but also out
of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what
it perceived to be the legal issue presented. Despite
the waste of perfectly good crayon seen in both
parties' briefing (and the inexplicable odor of wet dog
emanating from such) the Court believes it has satisfactorily
resolved this matter. Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
At this juncture, Plaintiff retains, albeit seemingly to
his befuddlement and/or consternation, a maritime
law cause of action versus his alleged Jones Act employer,
Defendant Unity Marine Corporation, Inc.
However, it is well known around these parts that
Unity Marine's lawyer is equally likable and has been
writing crisply in ink since the second grade. Some
old-timers even spin yarns of an ability to type. The
Court cannot speak to the veracity of such loose talk,
but out of caution, the Court suggests that Plaintiff's
lovable counsel had best upgrade to a nice shiny No.
2 pencil or at least sharpen what's left of the stubs of
his crayons for what remains of this heart-stopping,
spine-tingling action. [FN4]
FN 4 reads
In either case, the Court cautions
Plaintiff's counsel not to run with a
sharpened writing utensil in hand -- he could
put his eye out.
Colourful, but not a model for Australian litigators and decisionmakers.