The 56 page
Review of the Commonwealth’s counter terrorism arrangements from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
states that
The Commonwealth has strong, well‑coordinated counter‑terrorism (CT) arrangements. Overall, these have been quite successful – although the Martin Place siege and the stabbing of police in Melbourne raise questions.
The threat of terrorism in Australia is rising and it is becoming harder to combat.
Responding to this worsening threat picture, on 4 August 2014 the Government boosted funding to CT activities. National security agencies are significantly bolstering their capabilities to detect and disrupt the threats we face.
Every dollar must be spent wisely. We face a new paradigm that demands ever more careful prioritisation. National security agencies must come together seamlessly around shared priorities.
A restructure or reshuffle of national security agencies is not the answer. But more must be done to strengthen cross-agency coordination and leadership.
Whatever we do, there is no short‑term solution to our evolving terrorist challenge. It is almost inevitable that we will have more terrorist attacks on Australian soil.
Long term, we must put a greater effort into reducing – rather than managing – the pool of terrorists, their supporters and sympathisers.
The report states -
• Many plots – some quite major – have been disrupted.
• There have been 35 prosecutions and 26 convictions.
• There has been no large scale terrorist attack on Australian soil in the post-2001 period.
The three fatalities within this period all happened in the Martin Place siege.
The two terrorist attacks in that period – the stabbing of two policemen in Melbourne and the Martin Place siege with its two tragic victims – were carried out by individuals who planned and acted alone. Crimes planned like this are, by nature, always extremely difficult for police and security agencies to prevent.
In the years since 11 September 2001:
• many more departments and agencies have been drawn into the CT effort. Coordination is better than ever
• new legislation has been progressively introduced to provide the legal tools to prosecute terrorists and better disrupt support to terrorism
• modest efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and to promote community cohesion are now underway.
After that, we're into cliches - rising tides and so forth
The rising tide of terrorism
The threat of terrorism in Australia is rising and it is becoming harder to combat.
• There are an increasing number of Australians joining extremist groups overseas.
• There are an increasing number of potential terrorists, supporters and sympathisers in our community.
• There is a trend to low tech ‘lone actor’ attacks which are exponentially harder to disrupt: there may be no visibility of planning and no time delay between intent and action.
• There is now an intergenerational dimension, with the families of known terrorists increasingly radicalised and involved.
• The international forces driving terrorist ideology and capabilities are stronger, and extremist narratives have increasing appeal in the Australian community.
• Terrorists are using sophisticated technologies and methodologies to stay under the radar.
• Terrorists are now adept at exploiting social media to distribute polished propaganda products.
Reflecting this environment, there is an increasing requirement for early disruption of terrorist plans to best ensure public safety. This comes at the cost of securing sufficient evidence to prosecute.
• This leaves potential terrorists at large. It also erodes trust, confidence and relationships with at risk communities. It may also undermine public confidence in national security agencies and the Government generally.
No discussion, alas, of distrust induced by institutional overreach and hyperbole on the part of Government Ministers and associates.
Winning many battles – but not the war
Despite improvements in CT capability, a terrorist attack is possible. All of the terrorism related metrics are worsening: known numbers of foreign fighters, sympathisers and supporters, serious investigations.
We are not ‘winning’ on any front.
The Martin Place siege and the Melbourne attack on police are examples of a global trend: we face an increasing number of potential terrorists who are hard to detect and often willing to attack using quickly implemented, low tech tactics.
Responding to this worsening threat picture, on 4 August 2014 the Government boosted funding to CT activities. National security agencies are significantly bolstering their capabilities to detect and disrupt the threats we face.
Every dollar must be spent wisely. We face a new paradigm that demands ever more careful prioritisation. National security agencies must come together seamlessly around shared priorities.
A restructure or reshuffle of national security agencies is not the answer. But more must be done to strengthen cross-agency coordination and leadership.
Whatever we do, there is no short term solution to our evolving terrorist challenge. It is almost inevitable that we will have more terrorist attacks on Australian soil.
Long term, we must put a greater effort into reducing – rather than managing – the pool of terrorists, their supporters and sympathisers.
The community is key.
To counter violent extremism we must work with our at risk communities. We must build resilience to terrorist ideology and assist individuals to disengage and de radicalise from violent extremist beliefs and influences.
Future direction
To combat the challenge most effectively, we need to:
5. acknowledge that we have entered a new, long-term paradigm of heightened terrorism threat with a much more significant ‘home grown’ element
6. further improve and broaden the scope of our national CT strategy to provide a clear direction to the national security community and to improve our cooperation with at-risk communities
7. strengthen further cross agency leadership and coordination by designating a National CT Coordinator as the Government’s leading advisor on CT
8. develop a COAG strategy to counter violent extremism, increasing Australia’s national commitment to this work
9. better manage increasing resource pressures by tightening priorities and lessening the burden of the efficiency dividend on some areas of national security agencies
10. improve our communication with the public on CT threats by introducing a single threat level system to improve usability and to give the public more meaningful information.
The recommendations (on the US model) are -
1. The Government, in close consultation with states and territories through the ANZCTC, develop a new national CT strategy which appropriately coordinates and balances our efforts to counteract the various threats we face, including from home-grown lone actors and radicalisation in our community.
2. The Government implement the following arrangements to provide strong, clear and co ordinated leadership to ensure agencies respond effectively and appropriately to terrorism:
a. designate a senior official as the National CT Coordinator.
b. establish and expand an Executive Group at the Secretary/Agency Head level, chaired by the CT Coordinator, to set the strategic direction for the Commonwealth’s CT efforts
c. mandate that the Australian Counter-Terrorism Centre draw together policy and operational agencies, including secondees from the states and territories, to work together closely on operations, policy challenges and capability development.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has meanwhile called [
PDF] for a Commonwealth law enforcement white paper, commenting
Strong international, technological, political and social forces
are changing the criminal challenge to Australia. These forces
mean that the Australian Government will to need to take a
greater role in law enforcement in the future.
So far, the Commonwealth’s responses to these challenges
have been evolutionary, reactive or incremental. While
those responses include excellent innovations, some change
occurs because events make recent decisions redundant - a
concern amply demonstrated by the recent funding top-up
for counterterrorism spending. There are also questions
about where national leadership is needed to meet these
challenges, and whether our current responses, particularly
to serious and organised crime, are still optimal.
All our law enforcement agencies face important
organisational challenges, especially with sharing
information, getting people with the right skills, and
incorporating technology into their work.
An examination of these factors shows that it’s time for the
federal cabinet to take a coordinated and strategic look at
its law enforcement responsibilities, starting with a review.
While a national review covering all areas of law enforcement
would be preferable - so that state and territory law
enforcement agencies could be included - that’s probably
not practical yet. So the initial step should be a review of how
today’s Commonwealth law enforcement system needs to
adapt to the anticipated operating environment over the next
10–20 years.
The review should examine the interdependencies within
the Commonwealth system, its links with the state
and territory law enforcement systems, international
partnerships and capacity building, and the relationship
between the Commonwealth agencies and the private and
community sectors.
The review should lead to a statement of the desired
policy, organisational, legislative, operational and resource
landscape for law enforcement out to 2020–30. Such a
statement should leverage and institutionalise relationships
between all agencies with a stake in making Australia a ‘just
and secure’ society.
A major policy statement is needed now because it would
explain what the Australian Government intends to do in the
law enforcement space in the future, and how it will work
with the other jurisdictions to achieve those aims. A law
enforcement white paper process, which would help inform
the Federation White Paper that’s now under development,
would be a good way to assemble the arguments and allow
the federal cabinet to decide on what role it will take in this
central policy area. It would also provide the clear policy lead
for all federal law enforcement and related agencies to do
their own forward planning, based on the understanding they
are contributing to Cabinet’s aims and working as part of an
interdependent system.