(Un)Harnessing AI

The interim report by the Productivity Commission on Harnessing Data and Digital Technology - consistent with the national government's enthusiasm for AI - can be read as proposing a looser regulatory framework. 

The report states 

Data and digital technologies are the modern engines of economic growth. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), which can extract useful insights from massive datasets in a fraction of a second, could transform the global economy and speed up productivity growth. 

 

Australia needs to harness the consumer and productivity benefits of data and digital technology while managing and mitigating the downside risks. There is a role for government in setting the rules of the game to foster innovation and ensure that Australians reap the benefits of the data and digital opportunity. 

 

The economic potential of AI is clear, and we are still in the early stages of its development and adoption. Early studies provide a broad range of estimates for the impact of AI on productivity. The Productivity Commission considers that multifactor productivity gains above 2.3% are likely over the next decade, though there is considerable uncertainty. This would translate into about 4.3% labour productivity growth over the same period. But poorly designed regulation could stifle the adoption and development of AI and limit its benefits. Australian governments should take an outcomes based approach to AI regulation – one that uses our existing laws and regulatory structures to minimise harms and introduces technology specific regulations as a last resort. 

 

Data access and use can fuel productivity growth: insights from data can help reduce costs, increase the quality of products and services and lead to the creation of entirely new products. But some requirements in the Privacy Act, the main piece of legislation for protecting privacy, are constraining innovation without providing meaningful protection to individuals. For example, complying with the controls and processes baked into the Act can make consent and notification a ‘tick box’ exercise – where businesses comply with the letter of the law but not the spirit of it. The Australian Government should amend the Privacy Act to introduce an alternative compliance pathway that enables firms to fulfil their privacy obligations by meeting outcomes based criteria. 

 

Data about individuals and businesses underpins growth and value in the digital economy. But often those same individuals and businesses cannot easily access and use this data themselves. Under the right conditions, giving people and businesses better access to data that relates to them can stimulate competition and allow businesses to develop innovative products and services. A mature data sharing regime could add up to $10 billion to Australia’s annual economic output. 

 

Experience shows that we need a flexible approach to facilitating data access across the economy, where obligations placed on data holders and the level of government involvement can match the needs and digital maturity of different sectors. New lower cost and flexible regulatory pathways would help to guide expanded data access throughout the digital economy, focusing first on sectors where the gains can be significant and relatively easy to achieve. 

 

Financial reports provide essential information about a company’s financial performance, ensuring transparency and accountability while informing the decisions of investors, businesses and regulators. Government can further spark productivity by making digital financial reporting the default – that is, mandatory lodgement of financial reports in machine readable form. At the same time, the Australian Government should remove the outdated requirement that financial reports be submitted in hard copy or PDF format. This change would increase the efficiency and accuracy with which information is extracted and analysed.

The  draft recommendations are

 Artificial intelligence 

Draft recommendation 1.1 Productivity growth from AI will be built on existing legal foundations. 

Gap analyses of current rules need to be expanded and completed. Australian governments play a key role in promoting investment in digital technology, including AI, by providing a stable regulatory environment. Any regulatory responses to potential harms from using AI must be proportionate, risk based, outcomes based and technology neutral where possible. 

The Australian Government should continue, complete, publish and act on ongoing reviews into the potential gaps in the regulatory framework posed by AI as soon as possible. 

Where relevant gap analyses have not begun, they should begin immediately. 

All reviews of the regulatory gaps posed by AI should consider: • the uses of AI • the additional risk of harm posed by AI (compared to the status quo) in a specific use case • whether existing regulatory frameworks cover these risks potentially with improved guidance and enforcement; and if not how to modify existing regulatory frameworks to mitigate the additional risks. 

Draft recommendation 1.2 AI specific regulation should be a last resort 

AI specific regulations should only be considered as a last resort for the use cases of AI that meet two criteria. These are: • where existing regulatory frameworks cannot be sufficiently adapted to handle the issue • where technology neutral regulations are not feasible.   

Draft recommendation 1.3 Pause steps to implement mandatory guardrails for high risk AI 

The Australian Government should only apply the proposed ‘mandatory guardrails for high risk AI’ in circumstances that lead to harms that cannot be mitigated by existing regulatory frameworks and where new technology neutral regulation is not possible. Until the reviews of the gaps posed by AI to existing regulatory structures are completed, steps to mandate the guardrails should be paused. 

Data access 

Draft recommendation 2.1 Establish lower cost and more flexible regulatory pathways to expand basic data access for individuals and businesses 

The Australian Government should support new pathways to allow individuals and businesses to access and share data that relates to them. These regulatory pathways will differ by sector recognising that the benefits (and the implementation costs) from data access and sharing are different by sector. This could include approaches such as: • industry led data access codes that support basic use cases by enabling consumers to export relatively non sensitive data on a periodic (snapshot) basis • standardised data transfers with government helping to formalise minimum technical standards to support use cases requiring high frequency data transfers and interoperability. 

These pathways should be developed alongside efforts that are already underway to improve the Consumer Data Right (which will continue to provide for use cases that warrant its additional safeguards and technical infrastructure) and the My Health Record system. 

The new pathways should begin in sectors where better data access could generate large benefits for relatively low cost; and there is clear value to consumers. Potential examples include: • enabling farmers to combine real time data feeds from their machinery and equipment to optimise their operations and easily switch between different manufacturers • giving tenants on demand access to their rental ledgers which they can share to prove on‑time payments to new landlords or lenders • allowing retail loyalty card holders to export an itemised copy of their purchase history to budgeting and price comparison tools that can analyse spending and suggest cheaper alternatives. The scope of the data access pathways should expand over time based on industry and consumer consultation, where new technology, overseas experience or domestic developments show that there are clear net benefits to Australia.   

Privacy regulation 

Draft recommendation 3.1 An alternative compliance pathway for privacy 

The Australian Government should amend the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to provide an alternative compliance pathway that enables regulated entities to fulfil their privacy obligations by meeting criteria that are targeted at outcomes, rather than controls based rules. 

Draft recommendation 3.2 Do not implement a right to erasure 

The Australian Government should not amend the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to introduce a ‘right to erasure’, as this would impose a high compliance burden on regulated entities, with uncertain privacy benefits for individuals. 

Digital financial reporting 

Draft recommendation 4.1 Make digital financial reporting the default 

The Australian Government should make the necessary amendments to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) to make digital financial reporting mandatory for disclosing entities. The requirement for financial reports to be submitted in hard copy or PDF format should also be removed for those entities.

Pseudolaw and GenAI

'Pseudolaw and the illusion of legal meaning' by Joe McIntyre in (2025) Alternative Law Journal states 

This article is an overview of the contemporary phenomenon of pseudolaw and argues that, at its heart, it involves a mistaking of the form of legal argumentation for its substance. Essentially, through the use of legalistic language, archaic sources and strange rituals, an illusion of legal meaning is created which tricks users into believing their actions are legally meaningful. This article argues that it shares common features with generative AI, in that it produces an illusion of meaning which users mistake for actual meaning. It then explores this juxtaposition and its implications for responses to pseudolaw. 

Anyone who has spent extended time in Australian courts in the last five years will be familiar with the very strange phenomenon that is pseudolaw. A confident, assertive, self-represented litigant will rise to make their appearance only to argue the judge has no authority as the court is displaying the wrong coat of arms; or they will assert they are a ‘natural person’ not subject to the law; or they argue that the judge has somehow committed treason. A vivid illustration is provided in the case of Georganas v Georganas, when a pseudolaw ‘guru’ interceded from the public gallery:

Unknown Speaker: Stand down … Judge [X], you are concealing treason against the King of England … you are now charged, you are under arrest … You are trading in necromancy, you are treating dead people in this courtroom. You are in treason. You are in treason, you must stand down under the Bill of Rights now.

These types of arguments are, of course, without any legal merit. They do not work, and are rightly regarded as ‘obvious nonsense’, ‘pseudo-legal gibberish’, or ‘gobbledygook’. Yet these forms of argument continue to proliferate, with a significant growth seen in the years since the COVID-19 pandemic. This is no longer a fringe concern: such matters are now occurring on a daily basis in Australian courts, and in some jurisdictions is already being seen to profoundly reshape litigation. 

Courts are busy places, and pseudolaw can be particularly disruptive, not least because of the disproportionate impact of each pseudolaw case compared to other cases. The case law involving pseudolaw matters commonly includes statements of judicial concern about the systemic impact of such cases. For example, in Rossiter v Adelaide City Council, Livesey J observed that pseudolegal arguments have ‘without reservation been rejected as involving both legal nonsense and an unnecessary waste of scarce public and judicial resources.’ The burden of dealing with pseudolaw matters is having a profound impact on the courts. As one judicial officer put it:

It uses up so much court resources because every time they want to file something they end up making the lives of the Registry staff miserable. [The clerk’s] email inbox … [is] full of emails from them. They have changed the whole face of the civil justice system.

In this article, I provide an overview of the contemporary phenomenon of pseudolaw and argue that – at its heart – it involves a mistaking of the form of legal argumentation for its substance. Essentially, through the use of legalistic language, archaic sources and strange rituals, an illusion of legal of meaning is created which tricks users into believing their actions are legally meaningful. That these users lack legal literacy, are largely alienated from the law, and desperately want to believe in the promise of pseudolaw means that this illusion is difficult to displace. I argue, however, that it is critical the scale and nature of this threat to the good administration of justice is recognised and countered – not least because it is quickly merging with another emerging phenomenon, the use of generative AI (‘GenAI’), which shares many of these same characteristics. 

This article briefly draws out the similarities between GenAI and pseudolaw, with the goal of helping the reader better understand both phenomena. Unfortunately, the collision between GenAI and pseudolaw is already beginning to disrupt our courts, and it is increasingly necessary that we are all familiar with the contours of both the overlap between them and their impact upon the administration of justice. 

Ultimately, I argue that – as amusing as some of the examples may be – pseudolaw itself is no laughing matter. It is, as I have written elsewhere, ‘disrupting our courts … threatening our judicial officers and administrators [and] harming all who come into contact with it.’ The same is true on the increasing use of GenAI in litigation – it can appear humorous, but is increasingly problematic. As these two phenomena collide, it is critical we stop laughing and start learning.

'The Impact of Pseudolaw on Local Government' by Stephen Young and Harry Hobbs in (2025) 36(4) Public Law Review comments 

The COVID-19 pandemic saw a significant rise in the number of people making pseudolegal arguments in an effort to avoid public health measures. Legal scholarship exploring this phenomenon has largely focused on its impact on the administration of justice. However, as the level of government closest to the community, local governments have also faced a growing strain from pseudolegal adherents and conspiracy theorists. In this article, we explore their (misuse) of law and its impact on local government in Australia and New Zealand. We find three main impacts. Pseudolegal adherents have: attempted to construct parallel governance institutions as a means to exert power and control; intimidated and harassed local government authorities by issuing threats and disrupting public meetings; and, imposed a substantial administrative burden on staff by inundating offices with baseless correspondence. While pseudolaw may seem like obscure or picayune legal quirkiness, its impact on local government is anything but minor—it constitutes a growing threat to governance, public safety, and the rule of law. ... 

In May 2024, Lance Vervoort, Chief Executive Officer of the Hamilton City Council, received a letter submitted as part of a Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (NZ) (‘LGOIMA’) request. The letter contained excerpts from the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), and the 1947 Nuremberg Code. The excerpts were liberally annotated with explanations such as, ‘New Zealand became a member of the ICCPR 1978 and being INTERNATIONAL LAW, it supersedes all Legislation’. The letter explained further that these ‘are VERYY [sic] IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS which all peoples should be aware of, but most people aren’t’. The author of the letter asserted that Hamilton City Council is breaching international law because it is illegally conducting medical experiments on the people of Hamilton by fluoridating drinking water. The author declared that the obligation to follow the law is based on consent freely given. As he had not consented to fluoridation, the Council is operating criminally. 

Almost every legal claim in the letter is wrong. In New Zealand (and Australia), international law does not automatically supersede domestic legislation; the relationship between the state and its citizens is not based on contract; and a duly enacted law applies regardless of whether a person consents to its operation. The veracity of the factual claims is no better. Fluoride is a naturally occurring compound that is found in almost all fresh water. Fluoridation is the addition of fluoride to drinking water to protect against tooth decay, a well-established public health measure with decades of evidence demonstrating that it effectively improves oral health. The legal basis for fluoridation in New Zealand is also sound. Prior to 2021, the judiciary consistently found that local governments possessed the legal authority to fluoridate water. Since 2021, amendments to the Public Health Act 1956 (NZ) have made the position even clearer. Under s 116E of the Act, the Director-General may direct a local authority to add fluoride to its drinking water. Even if Mr Vervoort agreed with the author of the letter, he has no power to counteract a direction and remove fluoride. In any event, as this example demonstrates, concerns around fluoridation are often mixed with conspiracy theory and pseudolaw, such as the claim that it ‘removes freedom of choice by consumers’. The result is that any potentially meritorious legal questions are buried among voluminous and incoherent claims. 

The letter did not clearly ask a question of the council. Nonetheless, because it was filed as a LGOIMA request, the Hamilton City Council was required by law to respond. While the Council’s response was short, merely explaining that it was following the laws and regulations of New Zealand, it necessitated time, attention and resources that might have been better placed elsewhere. One strange letter is not a problem. However, this is just one of many conspiracy and pseudolaw-inflected LGOIMAs that the Council has responded to in the last few years. Hamilton is not alone. Local governments across New Zealand and Australia increasingly face administrative burdens derived from pseudolegal conspiracies. In some cases, they also face intimidation, threats and a real risk of physical harm. 

This is not new to those working in local government. The growing legal literature on pseudolaw and sovereign citizens, however, largely focuses on the origins, spread and manifestation of pseudolegal beliefs worldwide and their impact on law and the administration of justice rather than on the burdens it imposes on local government authorities. Similarly, while scholars in other disciplines examine pseudolaw through the lens of conspiracy theorising, extremism, criminal justice, and linguistics, there remains a dearth of study of pseudolegal adherents’ impact on local government. This is especially concerning now that pseudolaw has a ‘global reach’, having ‘migrated across the common law world and appear[ing] also in arrange of civil law countries’. We address this lacuna in this article. We focus specifically on its impact on local governments in Australia and New Zealand. Our study allows us to identify that pseudolaw is affecting local government in several significant ways. Furthermore, it reveals that although the impact is felt similarly across jurisdictions, the conduct of adherents manifests itself in diverse styles as pseudolaw evolves and adapts as it migrates. Pseudolaw in Australia and New Zealand has latched onto local legal, political and moral issues and arguments, including those based on the rights of Indigenous peoples. 

Our article is divided into two substantive parts. Recognising that pseudolaw remains an understudied phenomenon, in Part II, we contextualise our subject. We explain what pseudolaw is, orient our article in the wider legal literature, and provide background to understand what is occurring in New Zealand and Australia. In Part III, we explore the three primary impacts pseudolaw and sovereign citizens have on local government in Australia and New Zealand. First, adherents are establishing alternative and parallel governance institutions, including ‘Common Law Courts’ to enforce their vision of society. Second, members of these groups threaten and intimidate elected councillors and council staff by serving warrants and judgments issued from their fake courts and disrupting public meetings. Third, members waste the time and resources of local government by abusing local government obligations and by refusing to pay for services. Ultimately, the costs of responding to pseudolegal claims are more than financial — they represent a broader erosion of public institutions and a challenge to democratic governance.