Sony

Earlier this year I noted the dispute between Sony and its insurers over compensation regarding large-scale unauthorised access to Sony's global entertainment network.

The BBC and The Register now note that Sony has amended its network's terms and conditions, with consumers being initially required to waive the right to collectively sue over future security breaches.

Users of the network will have to agree to the amended terms the next time they log on. They will however be able to then manually opt out of the agreement within the following 30 days, by sending a letter to Sony's Los Angeles headquarters. That opt out letter will be able the sender to retain the right to participate in a class action suit without any need for arbitration.

In the absence of the opt out users will now have to try to resolve any legal issues using an arbitrator picked by Sony, prior to participating in a class action.

The new amendment - characterised as 'Binding Individual Arbitration' - specifies that -

any Dispute Resolution Proceedings, whether in arbitration or court, will be conducted only on an individual basis and not in a class or representative action or as a named or unnamed member in a class, consolidated, representative or private attorney general action.

Bounding participation in online services through a requirement that users first submit to private arbitration is not exceptional or necessarily offensive. It is for example a feature of most domain name registration regimes.

Sony has however been criticised for the way that it has introduced the changes, criticised as obscurely presented for an audience with 'click fatigue' (ie young consumers who do not understand legal small print and are accustomed to signalling their consent by mechanistically clicking 'agree'). Some presumably won't bother to send an letter from the UK, Australia or other locations outside the US.

Sony might more effectively - in terms of legal disquiet and its corporate profile - have adopted a more positive approach to consent and allowed consumers to opt out electronically, particularly opt out after viewing a plain english explanation of the consequences.

Non-profit laundering

The Australian Institute of Crminology has released 'Misuse of the non-profit sector for money laundering and terrorism financing (Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no.424) by Samantha Bricknell.

The 6 page note [PDF] is drawn from the AIC's Money laundering and terrorism risks to Australian non-profit organisations by Bricknell, McCusker, Chadwick & Rees, not yet available on the Institute's site.

Bricknell comments that -

The manner in which terrorist organisations finance their activities became a policy focal point after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Non-profit organisations, and charities in particular, were identified as potentially significant contributors to terrorism financing. This premise was based on known links between charitable giving and prominent terrorist groups, and the vulnerabilities of the non-profit sector to misuse.

Money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risks to the Australian non-profit sector are thought to be low. However, the impact of such misuse is inevitably high. One of the underlying premises in combating non-profit misuse has been the application of a response proportionate to risk. Australia has based its response on education, sector outreach and peak body codes of conduct, alongside more conventional forms of regulatory control.

This paper examines vulnerabilities to ML/TF misuse and the publicly available evidence for actual misuse. It is suggested that the Australian response could incorporate a more uniform commitment from the sector to adopting risk-based strategies, with government providing education for the sector that is based on the identification of specific points of vulnerability.

Elron and employment

Given my interest in belief systems - particularly legal and scholarly reception of religion and parapsychology - I've been reading the Fair Work Ombudsman's 88 page report [PDF] on employment aspects of Scientology.

The latter is the cult founded by L Ron Hubbard and featuring delights such as Xenu, who supposedly shipped billions of people to Earth some 75 million years ago, parked them around volcanoes and killed them using hydrogen bombs (their spirits remaining to haunt our contemporaries unless dispelled through application of a substantial payment to the uber-Scientologists in return for a form of spiritual cleansing).

The Ombudsman is a Commonwealth government agency established as part of the national workplace regulation reforms, an area of interest given my teaching employment law. Yesterday it released the findings of a lengthy investigation into allegations regarding the employment practices of the Church of Scientology (CoS). That investigation did not address the facticity of Scientology's beliefs. It was more restricted, exploring whether the CoS is bound to apply minimum working conditions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), awards or agreements (and whether the CoS is required to keep certain time and wage records as part of that regime). As importantly, the Ombudsman considered whether people working for the church are employees and whether they have been receiving benefits to which they are entitled under the Fair Work Act, awards or agreements.

The Ombudsman has characterised CoS entities which engage in trading activities as constitutional corporations for the purposes of the Fair Work Act and its predecessor legislation. It has gone to state that -

• some allegations raised by some witnesses fall outside the statutory time limit for consideration or cannot be sustained and are therefore unable to be pursued,
• it will continue to investigate allegations raised by one witness which relates to an entity known as Get off Drugs Naturally,
• it will refer to other relevant authorities allegations made against the CoS which fall outside its jurisdiction, and
• it will request that the CoS and its related entities conduct a comprehensive self-audit to ensure compliance with the Fair Work Act – and if employees are found to have been underpaid, for those underpayments to be rectified.

That self-audit should prudently be conducted at the earliest opportunity using a consultant that the Ombudsman approves and who has no connection to the church. The consultant should be briefed to -

• review the procedures for the engagement of workers and to properly determine the applicable Modern Award and National Employment Standards for each individual,
• review the status of existing employees to ensure they are receiving their lawful entitlements,
• recommend the introduction of changes to record-keeping and issuing of play slips and the Fair Work Information Statement to ensure compliance with the Fair Work Act, and
• recommend a framework to the Church which enables the identification of relevant legislation relating to all employee entitlements, such as long service leave.

That review reflects the formal Finding that the Ombudsman "considered, but was not persuaded, by submissions from the CoS that the Fair Work Act did not apply because the church 'is a religious entity ... and there isn’t any worker relationship or employer relationship'", given that documents and policies examined by Fair Work inspectors during the investigation "plainly contradicted" the CoS assertion.

The Ombudsman characterised the CoS as a "bureaucratised organisation" which "appears to have imported practices and procedures into Australia with little thought to workplace relations laws". A consequence of that indifference is arguably that -

Witnesses told the Fair Work Ombudsman they were directed to work up to 72 hours without a break to complete tasks assigned to them for as little as $10 a week at a time when the Federal Minimum Wage for a full-time adult before shift and weekend penalties was $543.78 for a 38-hour week.

Several features of the arrangements within the CoS entities were not consistent with volunteer or voluntary work and "a significant level of control and direction was applied to workers by more senior church members who held positions of authority".

The Ombudsman went on to comment that -

the complaints that have been investigated, and the receipt of further complaints, is indicative of systemic problems relating to the way labour has been obtained by the CoS and which has caused these arrangements to be the subject of external criticism.

At the very least, the volume of complaints should alert the CoS that there needs to be a change to the current practices relating to how they recruited and are receiving free labour from their followers, should they hope to reduce the number of complaints into the future.

Equally, the Fair Work Ombudsman offers advice to persons giving their labour for free to any religious organisation that they should be mindful of their intentions in doing so and to the extent possible, protect their own interests and immediately withdraw their labour if they perceive that their relationship ceases to be truly voluntary.

In many instances, the witnesses provided considerable free labour to the CoS over a period of several years where they either knew or ought to have known that they were unlikely to be paid for that work from an early stage.

In time-honoured bureaucratic tradition, the Ombudsman notes that -

Some claimed the use of unconscionable tactics by the CoS designed to retain their commitment. The Fair Work Ombudsman makes no findings in respect of those allegations, but advises that if workers providing services to religious or any other organisation consider that they are being subjected to intimidation or other illegal pressure to continue to provide their labour, they should contact police.

COPPA

The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is seeking public comment on proposed amendments to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule.

That FTC Rule gives effect to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act [COPPA], US federal legislation requiring operators of websites or online services directed to children under 13, or those that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information from children under 13, to obtain verifiable consent from parents before collecting, using, or disclosing such information from children.

The Rule implementing COPPA came into effect in 2000. It was reviewed in 2005; with another review last year. The FTC is expected to release final recommendations for broader online privacy regulations later this year.

The proposed amendments - some 122 pages [PDF] - seek to ensure that the Rule "continues to protect children’s privacy ... as online technologies evolve", through modifications in five areas -

• definitions, including the definitions of "personal information" and "collection"
• parental notice
• parental consent mechanisms
• confidentiality and security of children's personal information
• the role of self-regulatory "safe harbor" programs.

The expression of concern regarding parental consent coincides with the EU work on consent, e-marketing and data protection noted earlier this month and discussed in a forthcoming article in Privacy Law Bulletin.

The FTC summarises the major changes as follows.

Definitions

The COPPA Rule requires covered operators to obtain parental consent before collecting personal information from children. The FTC proposes updating the definition of “personal information” to include geolocation information and certain types of persistent identifiers used for functions other than the website’s internal operations, such as tracking cookies used for behavioral advertising. In addition, the Commission proposes modifying the definition of “collection” so operators may allow children to participate in interactive communities, without parental consent, so long as the operators take reasonable measures to delete all or virtually all children’s personal information before it is made public.

Parental Notice

The proposed amendments also seek to streamline and clarify the direct notice that operators must give parents prior to collecting children’s personal information. The proposed revisions are intended to ensure that key information will be presented to parents in a succinct “just-in-time” notice, and not just in a privacy policy.

Parental Consent Mechanisms

The FTC also proposes adding new methods to obtain verifiable parental consent, including electronic scans of signed parental consent forms, video-conferencing, and use of government-issued identification checked against a database, provided that the parent’s ID is deleted promptly after verification is done. These supplement the nonexclusive list of methods already set forth in the Rule.

The FTC proposes eliminating the less-reliable method of parental consent, known as “e-mail plus,” which is available to operators that collect personal information only for internal use. This method currently allows operators to obtain consent through an email to the parent, coupled with another step, such as sending a delayed email confirmation to the parent after receiving consent.

To encourage the development of new consent methods, the Commission proposes establishing a voluntary 180-day notice and comment process whereby parties may seek Commission approval of a particular consent mechanism. In addition, the Commission proposes permitting operators participating in a Commission approved safe-harbor program to use a method permitted by that program.

Confidentiality and Security Requirements

To better protect children’s personal information, the Commission proposes strengthening the Rule’s current confidentiality and security requirements. Specifically, the Commission proposes adding a requirement that operators ensure that any service providers or third-parties to whom they disclose a child’s personal information have in place reasonable procedures to protect it, that operators retain the information for only as long as is reasonably necessary, and that they properly delete that information by taking reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to, or use in connection with, its disposal.

Safe Harbor

Finally, the FTC proposes to strengthen its oversight of self-regulatory “safe harbor programs” by requiring them to audit their members at least annually and report periodically to the Commission the results of those audits.

Among other areas of interest the amendments indicate that -

The Commission believes that, with respect to the subset of websites and online services directed to children or having actual knowledge of collecting personal information from children, broader Rule coverage of photos is warranted. In addition, the Commission believes that the Rule’s definition of “personal information” should be expanded to include the posting of video and audio files containing a child’s image or voice, which, similarly to photos, may enable the identification and contacting of a child.

Therefore, the Commission proposes to create a new paragraph (i) of the definition of “personal information” that states: A photograph, video, or audio file where such file contains a child’s image or voice;

This proposed change will ensure that parents are given notice and the opportunity to decide whether the posting of images or audio files is an activity in which they wish their children to engage.

The amendments document also states that -

In recent years, geolocation services have become ubiquitous features of the personal electronics market. Numerous commenters raised with the Commission the issue of the potential risks associated with operators’ collection of geolocation information from children.

Some commenters urged the Commission to expressly modify the Rule to include geolocation information, given the current pervasiveness of such technologies and their popularity among children. Others maintained that geolocation information is already covered by existing paragraph (b) of the Rule’s definition of “personal information,” which includes “a home or other physical address including street name and name of a city or town.”

Technologies that collect geolocation information can take a variety of forms and can communicate location with varying levels of precision. Generally speaking, most commonly used location tracking technologies are capable of revealing a person’s location at least down to the level of a street name and the name of a city or town. In the Commission’s view, any geolocation information that provides precise enough information to identify the name of a street and city or town is covered already under existing paragraph (b) of the definition of “personal information.” However, because geolocation information may be presented in a variety of formats (e.g., coordinates or a map), and in some instances may be more precise than street name and name of city or town, the Commission proposes making geolocation information a standalone category within that definition.

Those commenters who opposed the inclusion of geolocation information within COPPA’s definition of “personal information” argued that such information cannot be used to identify a specific individual, but only a device. However, as discussed above, the Commission finds this argument unpersuasive. Physical address, including street name and name of city or town, alone is considered personal information under COPPA. Accordingly, geolocation data that provides information at least equivalent to “physical address” should be covered as personal information.

Olympic Identity

'The End of Olympic Nationality' by Peter Spiro (forthcoming as a chapter in Kim Rubenstein [ed] Allegiance & Identity In a Globalised World Cambridge University Press 2012) argues that -

Sport supplies useful terrain on which to explore meanings of loyalty and identity. At the international level, the preferences of consuming publics break down along national lines. In perhaps no other context are states and their citizens as unified as they are with respect to international competition, overcoming political, social, and cultural cleavages. The Olympic Games represents an apex of this national solidarity.

This paper describes the hybrid public/private regime of Olympic nationality, the baseline of which requires athletes to be citizens of the countries for which they compete. The regime obstructs transfer of Olympic nationality in important respects. This regime has been justified as a shield against instrumental naturalization and lax state naturalization regimes, and ostensibly works to maintain some correlation between an athlete’s organic national identity and the flag for which she competes. But eligibility requirements relating to eligibility are easily gamed. They create barriers to movement and discriminate against naturalized citizens inconsistent with human rights norms.

The paper argues that nationality requirements should be abandoned. Olympic competition should move to a club sports model in which athletes can play for any national team that will have them. This change would not detract from the quality of Olympic competition nor would it diminish sentimental attachment to national teams.

In his introduction Spiro comments that

Recent Olympic games have produced a litany of stories highlighting putatively anomalous national affiliations of various competitors. It is not clear, however, why these cases should be considered anomalous. We don’t insist that our professional athletes hale from the cities that they play for. Why should we demand any more from Olympic athletes?

This chapter first describes the regime of Olympic nationality. This regime is hybrid public/private. It is largely parasitic on state nationality rules, but obstructs transfer of Olympic nationality in important respects. This regime has been justified as a shield against instrumental naturalization and lax state naturalization regimes, and ostensibly works to maintain some correlation between an athlete’s organic national identity and the flag for which she competes (by way of "protect[ing] the integrity of international competition", in the words of the statute of the International Ice Hockey Federation).

No doubt there are a mounting number of cases in which citizenship has been acquired on an instrumental basis for purposes of Olympic competition, where an athlete’s prior connection to her flag state is tenuous or nonexistent. Such activity may facilitate “muscle drain” from poor to richer countries; it may also advantage countries with more liberal or discretionary citizenship regimes. Nationality transfers have been derided as "country swapping," an exercise in flying “flags of convenience," "quickie citizenship," "passport bartering," and "athletic mercantilism." But efforts to combat these putative ills are themselves normatively problematic. To the extent that Olympic nationality is pegged to state citizenship, the rules will be variably applied. The overlay of Olympic nationality creates barriers to movement and discriminates against naturalized citizens inconsistent with human rights norms.

This is an important subject which has gone understudied. Olympic nationality is important in itself. The Games implicate huge stakes for all involved – states, particular sports, and individual competitors. Eligibility rules are a prominent feature of the sporting landscape. The Olympic nationality regime has been in an unstable condition, warranting study on its own terms. But Olympic nationality may also supply a useful optic on the condition of citizenship more generally. Put to work in this way, the trajectories of Olympic nationality cast doubt on the durability of citizenship in its traditional conception as delimiting the boundaries of human community. The chapter argues that Olympic citizenship is no longer sustainable, at least to the extent that it constrains the discretion of states in composing their Olympic representation. Olympic competition should move to a club sports model, in which athletes can compete for any team that will have them. The trajectory of Olympic citizenship supplies further evidence for the postnational proposition that citizenship is a waning institution.

He goes on to comment that -

As a general matter, states have been more inclined to commodify immigrant admissions than citizenship determinations. In the United States, for example, it is the green card that is (in effect) for sale, not the naturalization certificate. Global mobility breaks down along class lines; transnational elites can travel without restriction (for many a green card would add little value) where the nonpropertied face high barriers to entry. Citizenship itself except at the margins commands little market value.

In the Olympic context, citizenship is valuable only to the extent that it facilitates eligibility. In a hypothetically free market, some athletes would be willing to pay for citizenship, especially where it made the difference to allowing an individual to compete (primarily among second-rank athletes disadvantaged by the national quota system). With respect to top athletes, the market value is reversed, and some states would be willing to pay the athlete to accept citizenship by way of establishing Olympic eligibility. But citizenship is a formality. There is no reason why citizenship needs to be extended to the athlete beyond the requirements of the Charter and statutes of the sporting federations. It serves no purpose beyond eligibility. The individual is not being made a citizen on the expectation that she will establish or maintain a connection in any other way. There is no pretense of social membership

Polls

With hype about Kevin Rudd as "preferred PM" in mind I'm rereading 'Opinion polls: issues and preferred party, and preferred PM, July 2004' (Australian Parliamentary Library Research Note no. 2 2004–05) by Sarah Miskin & Greg Baker, Miskin's 'Interpreting opinion polls: some essential details' (Research Note No. 52, 24 May 2004) [PDF] and the 46 page Victorian Parliamentary Library paper on Public opinion polls [PDF] by Rachel Macreadie from earlier this year.

Macreadie notes the suggestion by Murray Goot in 'Polls as Science, Polls as Spin' (1993) that we -

reject the idea that the polls are in pursuit of some pure, unmediated, pre-existing entity called public opinion and think of the polls instead as guides to what the public is likely to think about an issue given their exposure to certain sorts of information.

She comments that -

This paper examines public opinion polling in Australia and in other jurisdictions, and functions as a guide to interpreting polling results.

Public opinion polls, particularly those released in the lead up to an election, stimulate considerable debate and speculation amongst the media, the public and politicians. Opinion polls essentially attempt to capture public opinion, or the public’s mood, on a given issue at a particular moment in time. Opinion polls are regularly conducted on voting intentions and leadership preferences, but can be undertaken on any social or commercial matter that the polling groups or commissioners of such polls determine. The study of public opinion polling has drawn on journalism and market research and also attracts scholars of history, sociology, psychology and communications.

The primary focus of this research paper is public opinion polling in its political context. The paper is designed as an introduction to the study of public opinion and opinion polling and to provide Parliamentarians with a guide to interpreting and understanding opinion polls, their strengths and limitations. It looks specifically at polling groups in Australia, but also draws on developments and information from other jurisdictions. It cannot, in the space available, provide a comprehensive account of every aspect of this large topic, which has received an extensive amount of research. It does aim to draw on the most salient elements of that research, to assist Members in their duties.

This paper begins in Part A by briefly examining the development of the concept of ‘public opinion’, which importantly underpins the activity and industry of opinion polling. Part A then provides an overview of opinion polling and its modern development, beginning with the first ‘straw’ polls conducted in the 1820s. The essential distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods is discussed. Part B examines the many factors - methodological, social and situational - that account for variations in poll results, while Part C provides a guide to the main polling groups in Australia.

Part D examines the impacts of opinion polls in terms of elections, politicians, policy, polling failures and successes, and the role of journalists. This section also briefly looks at other forms of polling, including exit polls, focus groups, and the controversial practice known as ‘push polling’. Part D concludes by considering recent developments in measuring public opinion, such as social media, internet polling, real-time debate tracking and betting markets.

The Dog that doesn't bark?

From Deborah Kirkman's 1996 history [PDF] of the Australian Press Council -

The second recommendation of the Senate inquiry in respect of the APC was one connected with the second main area of criticism of the Council: its complaints facility. Aggrieved readers of publications have three options open to them. First, they can initiate legal proceedings against the newspaper or magazine, an option that is realistically only viable for the rich or the very poor. Second, they can approach the publication and try and obtain a correction, clarification or opportunity to reply. Or, third, they can make a complaint to the APC. It is the latter option that people turn to when they rule out option one and fail in their attempt at option two.

The inquiry, like most observers of the Council, appeared to assume that the only outcome of the complaints procedure was an adjudication. Yet nearly twice as many complainants have their complaints mediated or are prepared to withdraw them after receiving the newspaper’s response than refer their complaints to the Council. The inquiry found that the APC should "be given power to impose and enforce sanctions on the print media. This should be done by legislation if necessary".

The Chair of the Committee, Senator Barney Cooney, explained that the sanctions may include fines and even suspending publication for a short time. Professor Flint immediately attacked the idea of a statutory authority:

It’s a draconian power. My immediate reaction is that I don’t think in a democratic society that any authority should be vested with the power. If the council can be given that power, who else may be given the same power? Giving us the power to impose fines would turn us into a court. It wouldn’t work. It would mean complainants and media organisations turning up with QCs and arguing for days over such fines, making Council’s work longer and more expensive.

Or, as Geoff Hussey put it, "a statutory authority is contradictory to the whole concept of freedom of the press. A statutory authority would leave the government which imposes the authority with the power to influence the freedom of the press".

It is difficult to disagree with this argument, especially when consideration is given to the way courts operate in Australia. Involvement in the court system means a great deal of money and long delays often resulting in anxiety. The original concept of the APC was for an alternative to the court system, one which was accessible to all.

This is a good place to put in a word about the role of the Press Council’s secretariat. As noted above, it is not commonly known that, as the first people to touch base with complainants, the secretariat’s aim is to try and mediate between publications and the public. Where possible, an amicable solution is found ... either by way of a letter to the editor being published, a follow-up article being printed, a clarification made etc. Other complaints are outside the Council’s remit, such as those regarding television or radio, and the remainder are either not followed up by the complainant or the file is closed once the publication has responded and the complainant is happy to let the complaint rest. It is only when mediation by the secretariat is unsuccessful or the newspaper fails to satisfy the complainant’s concern that a complaint is considered by the Council which issues an adjudication on the matter.

If the powers of the Council were increased to include the imposition of fines, what would be the scale of the fines, who would be the trustee of the money, would it be spent and, if so, by whom and on what? If the fines were to be in the form of compensation to a complainant, would not the APC be inundated with complainants who were after monetary compensation as opposed to the concept of upholding an ethical press? The idea behind the imposition of fines is to give teeth to the "toothless tiger". The problem with the idea is that a fully equipped tiger might bite off the hand that feeds it! Even in the most litigious country in the world - America - opponents of Press Councils with punitive powers are to be found. In their article 'Press Councils: the answer to our First Amendment Dilemma?', John Ritter and Matthew Leibowitz make the point that the power of a press council to publicise its decisions gives the "toothless" watchdog something which is noticed - a loud bark. It is from this loud bark that press councils derive their real power 'developing public awareness of problems in the free press-fair press area'. Even the customers of the APC are in two minds on the issue. While a majority of respondents to the APC’s survey of complainants strongly indicated that the APC should be able to impose a fine if the decision goes against the publication, 59% were not primarily concerned with monetary compensation.

APC detractors have pointed out that the Council does not even have the power to enforce publication of its adverse adjudications. The APC counters that, in the period 1988-1993, for example, an average 91% of adverse adjudications were published in the newspaper or magazine concerned, or not published by agreement. Of the remainder, the publications refused to publish or there were specific reasons for non-publication such as legal advice not to do so. The public, it is suspected, would have a higher regard for the APC if it had the ability to enforce publication of adverse adjudications. When this idea was suggested to Geoff Hussey, he was very firm in his antagonism to such a move. "To make publication mandatory", he argued, "would move it away from being a self-regulatory body. It would necessitate government regulation, a statutory authority, one that is able to levy fines". What is being suggested in this essay is not the levying of fines, but a simple amendment to the APC’s principles that requires the publication of all adverse adjudications. As most publications already co-operate, making mandatory the publication of adverse adjudications should not prove to be a problem.

It would, likewise, increase the APC's prestige if a similar rule was enacted that required the entire adjudication be published (not an edited version) and in a prominent position. It is not surprising that only 4% of past complainants were very satisfied with the publicity the Council’s decision received compared with 30% who were very dissatisfied. Yet, if a situation arose again in which they had a similar complaint, 52% would take it to the APC. The picture is therefore not all bad for the Council. In fact, the complaints procedure itself is simple and very well explained. The inability to enforce publication of adverse adjudications is one area that could be bettered.

The Press Council's 2009-10 Annual Report [PDF] features the Charter of a free press in Australia adopted by the Council in 2003 and presumably relished by those who remember that freedom of the press belongs to those who own a press -

Preamble

Freedom of opinion and expression is an inalienable right of a free people.

Australia is committed to The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the Declaration provides:

Everyone has the right of freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

In a truly democratic society open debate, discussion, criticism and dissent are central to the process of generating informed and considered choices. These processes are crucial to the formation of values and priorities and help in assessing and finding solutions to social, economic and political problems.

A free press means a free people and the people of Australia have a right to freedom of information and access to differing views and opinions and declare that the following principles are basic to an unfettered flow of news and information both within Australia and across the nation’s borders.

The Principles

1. Freedom of the press means the right of the people to be informed by the press on matters of public interest so that they may exercise their rights and duties as citizens.

2. The press shall not be subject to government licence and government authorities should not interfere with the content of news nor restrict access to any news source.

3. The press has a responsibility to the public to commit itself to self-regulation which provides a mechanism for dealing with the concerns of members of the public and the maintenance of the ethical standards and journalistic professionalism of the press.

4. It is in the public interest for the press to make available to the people a wide diversity of views and opinions.

5. It is the responsibility of the press to protect the people’s right to know and to contest encroachments upon that right by governments, groups or individuals.

6. Laws, regulations and practices which in any way restrict or inhibit the right of the press freely to gather and distribute news, views and information are unacceptable unless it can be shown that the public interest is better served by such laws, regulations or practices than the public interest in the people’s right to know.

We might ask whether self-regulation by the major media groups - print or otherwise - is effective and whether a more meaningful regime would be outweighed by crimps on free speech. ACMA's incapacity in dealing with the 'Cash For Comments' affair isn't a distant memory. Reading the hand-on-heart ethics statement from News Limited -

News Limited group publications aim for the highest editorial and ethical standards. Editorial employees and contributors should be open-minded, fair and respect the truth. ...
1.1 Facts must be reported impartially, accurately and with integrity.
1.2 Clear distinction must be made between fact, conjecture and comment.
1.3 Try always to tell all sides of the story in any kind of dispute

I do wonder whether the princes of print are living up to their aspirations.

One response might be that we need a justiciable national Bill of Rights that enshrines privacy and freedom of speech (the latter not necessarily the same as the freedom that comes from owning a press, as distinct from a keyboard). Such a Bill might offset the preparedness of some governments to gut human rights Charters such as that in Victoria.