Foucauldian Off

'From Biopower to Psychopower: Bernard Stiegler's Pharmacology of Mnemotechnologies' by Nathan Van Camp in Ctheory comments that

During a seminar at the University of Vermont in 1982, merely two years before his untimely death, Michel Foucault indicated that he may have insisted too much on the technologies of domination in the course of his work and in the same breath announced that he planned to correct this theoretical weakness by connecting his earlier analyses of power relations to a historico-conceptual analysis of what he tentatively called "technologies of the self." Unfortunately, his early death, but possibly also some limitations inherent to his theoretical framework, kept him from elaborating this project in a more systematic way. However, despite Foucault's pronounced intention to shift the focus of his research to technologies of self-formation that would enable subjects to regain a certain amount of autonomy in the face of modern power mechanisms, this aspect of his work has been largely neglected in recent radical political theory. Although it is now widely recognized among critical theorists that Foucault's work needs serious revisions for relevance in today's context, few have yet taken serious interest in the conclusions that should have to be drawn from his announcement at the Vermont seminar. On the contrary, many of those who claim to be still working in a Foucauldian spirit simply assume that it is his famous concept of biopower that requires renewed attention. 

I argue that such an exclusive focus on Foucault's concepts of biopower and biopolitics has been detrimental to an appropriate understanding of the workings of power in today's Western societies The work of the French theorist of technology, Bernard Stiegler, reveals that contemporary power technologies no longer mainly aim at disciplining bodies or regulating life-processes, but at controlling and modulating consciousness. Such a substitution of psychopower for biopower, Stiegler suggests, is closely connected to the substitution of consumer capitalism for production capitalism. Subsequently, I will show that in his late work, Foucault ventured to analyze how psychotechnologies could be transformed into emancipation technologies, but that his own persistent focus on biopolitical issues kept him from elaborating a proper psychopolitical perspective on the most salient technologies of domination of his own time. To conclude, I propose that Stiegler's pharmacological notion of power technologies provides a more practicable alternative to the theologico-political models that seem to inspire the work of many of those who have taken up Foucault's legacy.

Van Camp concludes -

One of the most important tasks with which critical theory is faced today is therefore to develop an affirmative psychopolitics which could reconstitute the mnemotechnical system in the face of the psychotechnologies of globalized psychopower. 

Foucault's writings are only partially helpful to gain a better understanding of the technologies of domination with which democratic societies are confronted today. Because he believes that power is always exercised over bodies or the life-process, he not only overlooked the emergence of psychopower, but he also misunderstood the essential critical role of institutions that take care of the socialization of psychotechnologies. He could, for example, only regard education as a disciplinary technology through which docile bodies are produced and not also as a psychotechnique through which minors could be taught how to deal critically with texts and images. If, despite his late interest in writing as self-technology par excellence, Foucault did not succeed in correcting his exclusive focus on biopower, it is mainly because he did not grasp the pharmacological nature of power technologies. Most of the radical political thinkers who have taken up Foucault's legacy suffer from the same deficiency. Given their utterly pessimistic diagnosis of the state of the contemporary world, many of them lapse into forms of religious anarchism to oppose the prevailing power mechanisms. 

Nowhere is this strategy more openly pursued than in Agamben's analysis of what he, loosely following Foucault, calls an "apparatus" (dispositif). While for the late Foucault an apparatus could also support processes of individuation, Agamben only seems to focus on its capacity to produce processes of de-individuation: "What defines the apparatuses that we have to deal with in the current phase of capitalism is that they no longer act as much through the production of a subject, as through the processes of what van be called desubjectivation". And he adds: "We could say that today there is not even a single instant in which the life of individuals is not modeled, contaminated, or controlled by some apparatus." At first sight, such a bleak assessment of the current state of affairs has much in common with the processes of psychic and collective de-individuation Stiegler attempts to analyze. However, the problem with Agamben's discussion of what he calls the oikonomia of apparatuses is not only that it focuses exclusively on its potential to control biological life and hence almost completely ignores its potential to control and modulate the mind, but also that for Agamben this oikonomia is nothing but "a factual state with no alternative". Hence, as Stiegler argues, Agamben "leaves this poison without a remedy." For Agamben, the pharmakon is a poison pure and simple, never a remedy. Furthermore, since Agamben thinks of apparatuses as the totalizing version of ancient religious rituals which establish a separation between the sacred and the profane, it should come as no surprise that his only alternative to the oikonomia of apparatuses is yet again a religious gesture, albeit a more radical one. What is required today, Agamben argues, is nothing less than a counterapparatus that is capable of restoring "to common use what sacrifice had separated and divided." Readers of Agamben's work are probably familiar with this gesture, although it never really becomes clear how it actually works. Simplifying a bit, it basically consists in performing "the cut of Apelles," as Agamben calls it The Time that Remains, or a "divide of the division" elsewhere, which would bring about an enigmatic messianic time in which man would be finally redeemed from the domination of sovereign power (the "real state of emergency"). From the perspective of Stiegler's thought, however, such a gesture is, as I have attempted to show above, nothing but a denial of the originary technicity of temporality. No experience of time is possible without mnemotechnics; opposing oneself to a homogeneous chronological time is nothing but a metaphysical gesture. 

Hence, if industrial democracy is to have a future, we should first recognize that it makes no sense rejecting the mnemotechnical system as such. Given its pharmacological nature, the only way to confront contemporary psychopower is by re-inventing this same mnemotechnical system in such a way that it enables the emergence of a new culture of care. Any critical response to the current mnemotechnical system must arise from within its own possibilities. The most promising aspect of today's digital devices, as Stiegler argued in his essay 'The Discrete Image,' is that its users are no longer destined to remain passive receivers of real time imagery. The danger of the current mnemotechnical system is that it threatens to collapse the gap between primary retention and secondary retention and that it consequently could obtain a monopoly over what to retain and what not to retain in perception. The new digital mnemotechnical devices, however, give their users the power to 'discretize' the continuous flow of imagery that presents itself to the psychic apparatus in the sense that users can disrupt their reality effect and regain a critical distance. By rewinding, replaying and even re-assembling the given imagery, we can regain the power to actively select and organize the tertiary and secondary retentions which otherwise would remain completely under the control of the programming industries. There is, however, no reason to be utterly optimistic about the prospects of the emergence of a new mature technological culture. Although we have recently witnessed a number of revolutionary events and the rise of new civil movements in which new digital mnemotechnical devices have played decisive roles, it is also clear that these potentially emancipatory technologies could -- as Adorno and Horkheimer already knew - just as easily be recuperated by the programming industries to reach ever more passive consumers. Moreover, whether such a strategy to slow down the temporalization of time in the digital era does not actually betray an attempt to reclaim a position which the psychic apparatus occupied before the analog and digital revolution occurred, remains a vexed question. It is nonetheless clear, however, that if the 20th century was the age of biopolitics, the 21st century will be the age of psychopolitics.

'The Skull-Bone and the Bloody Head: Lacan's Lamella and Kojèvo-Hegelian Desire' by Andrew Ryder in 6(1) International Journal of Žižek Studies (2012) meanwhile states that

Slavoj Zizek has made it his essential project to renew an understanding of G.W.F. Hegel’s subjectivity by means of the psychoanalytic theory and practice of Jacques Lacan. One crucial element in such an endeavor is Lacan’s notion of the lamella, a particular understanding of excessive desire as indestructible and exterior to the self. I would like to investigate Zizek’s characterization of the lamella in Lacan’s work and its Hegelian antecedent (particularly evident in the famous reading of Alexandre Kojève), as well as bringing the thought of Georges Bataille, a significant interlocutor for Lacan, to bear on the formation and ramifications of the idea. Most importantly, I would like to investigate the question of sexual difference as it has bearing on the lamella (and on subjectivity) as a result, and to suggest a feminine aspect to its image that has perhaps gone unnoticed.

Rendition

'Extraordinary Rendition and the Quest for Accountability in Europe' (UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05/2012) by Suzanne Egan comments that

Despite the conclusions of many high level investigations in Europe that European States had facilitated the practice of “extraordinary rendition” engaged in by the United States post 9/11, very little progress has been made in holding those States accountable for their actions and omissions. Distinguishing between various forms of accountability, it takes as its primary focus the prospects of achieving legal accountability for complicity in extraordinary rendition in Europe. Recognising that complicity is a complex phenomenon that embraces a wide spectrum of conduct, the article applies the accountability lens to different degrees of participation in extraordinary rendition, namely, direct and active participation on the one hand, to indirect or passive forms of participation. It concludes that while international human rights law is capable of addressing direct forms of complicity, significant challenges are faced in holding European states legally responsible where indirect participation in the process is concerned. Further obstacles are faced in compelling the initiation of public inquiries into complicity and in mitigating invocation of national security interests in the context of civil proceedings. By thus exposing the current fault-lines of human rights law in dealing with this issue, the underlying aim of the article is to help focus minds on the possibilities for filling those gaps and the best means of influencing the policy of States in the matter of extraordinary rendition.

Fakes and Tests

'Raid uncovers alleged fake ID racket in Turner' by Christopher Knaus in today's Canberra Times reports on my photoshopping - this time of NZ drivers licences for use by underage (or banned) nightclubbers -

An imperfect New Zealand driver’s licence, a strangely mismatched Australian accent, and cluey nightclub bouncers helped lead police to a local fake ID production lab, with a stash of over 100 fake IDs, two tasers, and a replica assault rifle. 

Canberra’s fraud squad yesterday raided a Turner apartment they suspected had acted as a major fake ID production hub since 2010. The raid, which was the result of a six month investigation, uncovered 130 remarkably genuine New Zealand and Californian driver’s licences and proof of age cards. 

An 18-year-old had been allegedly using the apartment to flog off the fake IDs for between $70 to $110 each. 

Police allege he used a sophisticated’’ printer and a computer to gradually perfect the bogus idntification over time. Police are unsure exactly how many of the IDs were in circulation, or if they were being distributed interstate.

The CT indicates that the photoshop kid's venture  ran into trouble when bouncers at Canberra nightspots "began to notice inconsistencies, including the lack of New Zealand accents"

"A lot of counterfeit licences had been produced in an attempt to get into nightclubs, or to purchase alcohol in liquor stores", detective acting sergeant Rachel Batterham said. "In turn, security staff contacted police, and this has started what has been a very lengthy and complex investigations.  It is fairly sophisticated in the fact that he has been doing this for a little while, and learning how to improve on the quality of the licenses."...

Police say they have a number of new leads as a result of those raids. Sergeant Batterham said the fake IDs could potentially have been used to get other forms of identification, set up bank accounts and get credit cards. Those in possession of the licences will also be spoken with by police, and could face possible charges.

No fun at Mooseheads for them!

Do we need more than an accent and unpleasant jokes about the amatory habits of NZ sheep? 'The British Citizenship Test: The Case for Reform’ by Thom Brooks in 83(3) The Political Quarterly (2012) 560-566 meanwhile argues that

mmigration presents a daunting challenge to successive British governments. The public ranks immigration as one of the leading policy issues after the economy and employment. There is also greater public support for stronger immigration controls than in many other countries. In response, government strategy has included the use of a citizenship test. While the citizenship test is widely acknowledged as one key part of immigration policy, the test has received surprisingly little critical analysis. This article is an attempt to bring greater attention to serious problems with the current test and to offer three recommendations for its revision and reform. First, there is a need to revise and update the citizenship test. Secondly, there is a need to expand the test to include questions about British history and basic law. The third recommendation is more wide-ranging: it is that we reconsider what we expect new citizens to know more broadly. The citizenship test should not be viewed as a barrier, but as a bridge. The focus should centre on what future citizens should be expected to know rather than how others might be excluded. The test should ensure that future citizens are suitably prepared for citizenship. There is an urgent need to improve the test and this should not be an opportunity wasted for the benefit of both citizens and future citizens alike.

For a local perspective see ‘The Australian Citizenship Test: Process and Rhetoric’ by Farida Fozdar and Brian Spittles in 55(4) Australian Journal of Politics and History (2009) 496-512 and the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 23A. see

Litigation Funding

'Regulation of Litigation Funding' by Michael Legg at the UNSW Centre for Law, Markets & Regulation offers offers a concise overview of developments in the regulation of litigation funding in Australia.

Legg comments that

 The unregulated status of the litigation funding industry in Australia ended with the Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 6) dated 12 July 2012. The effectiveness of this 'light touch' regime is likely to impact the protections that exist for consumers who are expected to avail themselves of class actions in seeking access to justice and the volume of litigation commenced against Australian businesses, especially listed corporations who are the target of shareholder class actions. 

He goes on to note that

 The Full Federal court in Brookfield Multiplex Limited v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (2009) 260 ALR 643 found that funded class action litigation was a managed investment scheme (MIS) subject to Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act. The New South Wales Court of Appeal in International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining Ltd [2011] NSWCA 50 found that a litigation funder of commercial litigation was required to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL). The Chameleon Mining case has been granted special leave by the High Court. The Federal Government initially instructed the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to grant interim class order relief to compliance with the AFSL and MIS regimes. 

The Corporations Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 6) excludes litigation funding in relation to class actions or insolvency proceedings from the MIS and AFSL regime but imposes requirements on litigation funders to manage conflicts of interest. Pre-existing consumer protection laws such as prohibitions on misleading conduct, unfair contract terms and unconscionable conduct continue. However, two important regulatory pillars, capital adequacy and licensing, are omitted.

Blawgs

'Law Faculty Blogs and Disruptive Innovation: The Data' (U Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-22) by J. Robert Brown Jr comments that

 Blogging by law faculty has been going on for more than a decade. During that period, law faculty blogs have become widespread. They have also been increasing used as authority in law review articles and court decisions. The ... paper sets out the empirical data that shows who, as of May/June 2012, is actually blogging at various law schools. This is a notoriously difficult data set to create since there is no single list of law faculty blogs. Moreover, some faculty blog at non-faculty blogs. 

The data in this document includes a breakdown of the number of law faculty bloggers by law school. Interestingly, most law faculty bloggers are at law schools outside the top 50 as ranked by US News. In addition, the data includes the number of citations for law blogs in both law reviews and court opinions. One law faculty blog has over 700 citations in law reviews. Another has over 40 citations in cases. 

Finally, the data includes a list of US law faculty in the top 200 of SSRN downloads for May 2012. The list includes any blogging affiliation of these faculty. The data shows that for faculty in the list but outside the top 10 law schools (based upon the ranking created by US News) many of them blog, suggesting that there is a correlation between blogging and SSRN downloads.

Zombies and No-Names

The delicious 'Death and Taxes and Zombies' by Adam Chodorow in (2012) Iowa Law Review comments that -

The U.S. stands on the precipice of a financial disaster, and Congress has done nothing but bicker. Of course, I refer to the coming day when the undead walk the earth, feasting on the living. A zombie apocalypse will create an urgent need for significant government revenues to protect the living, while at the same time rendering a large portion of the taxpaying public dead or undead. The government’s failure to anticipate or plan for this eventuality could cripple its ability to respond effectively, putting us all at risk. 

This article fills a glaring gap in the academic literature by examining how the estate and income tax laws apply to the undead. Beginning with the critical question of whether the undead should be considered dead for estate tax purposes, the article continues on to address income tax issues the undead are likely to face. In addition to zombies, the article also considers how estate and income tax laws should apply to vampires and ghosts. Given the difficulties identified herein of applying existing tax law to the undead, new legislation may be warranted. However, any new legislation is certain to raise its own set of problems. The point here is not to identify the appropriate approach. Rather, it is to goad Congress and the IRS into action before it is too late.

In Kryziak v McDonagh [2012] WASC 270 the Court dealt with a 'sovereign citizen', who in a previous matter claimed not to have a name -

By charge PE 26728 of 2011 Tadeusz-Edmund Krysiak was charged with the offence of driving without authority on 15 May 2011 a Mazda sedan, registered number 1DPC-205 on Eastbourne Crescent, Nollamara, whilst not being a person authorised by pt IV A of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) and whose authority to drive at the time was suspended, contrary to s 49(1)(a) and s 49(3)(c) of the Road Traffic Act 1974. 

Before the hearing in the Magistrates Court the applicant had filed by post a document entitled Notice of Reservation of Rights, which can only be described as an extravagant and disjointed polemic asserting that he reserved his exclusive and ancient rights, including a right to jury trial, asserting that all statutes should be in harmony with the common law, and asserting that he could best be described as an authorised agent of the entity 'TadeuszEdmund Krysiak' with limited liability. He asserted that the court had no jurisdiction and that the charge should be dismissed as invalid and that there was evidence of inherent fraud ab initio. This notice asserted a series of discredited and exploded fallacies about legal and constitutional rights see Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASC 14; Glew v White [2012] WASCA 138 and Hedley v Spivey [2012] WASCA 116 and, on any view, was a misguided, illinformed and preposterous collection of meaningless protests. 

His case came on for hearing before his Honour, Mr G N Calder in the Magistrates Court at Perth on 26 July 2011. When the case was called a person, presumably the applicant, came forward but upon being asked to identify himself he refused, preferring instead to make submissions to the effect that he reserved all his rights and again refusing to identify himself, saying, 'I reserve all my rights and I am best described as the authorisation to the accused with limited liability'. His Honour refused to allow this person to speak further unless and until he clearly identified himself and directed him to sit in the back of the court. Again, but with some protest, the person who had come forward did so. Then his Honour, having observed that there was no person in the court who had identified themselves as having the name Krysiak and being the accused, directed that the case should proceed in the absence of the accused under s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), it having been established that notice to the accused had been given under s 75. 

At this point, his Honour announced, obviously speaking to the person at the back of the court, that if he were Tadeusz-Edmund Krysiak and identified himself as that person he could participate in the proceedings but, if not, he would not be allowed to participate and the matter would be dealt with under s 55. At this point, Mr Krysiak identified himself and when asked who he was said, 'I am commonly known as TadeuszEdmund Krysiak' and when asked if that was his name he said, 'I don't have a name, sorry, your Honour' and at that point his Honour decided to proceed under s 55 as previously proposed. ...

Further

In both appeals the applicant asserts that the learned magistrate erred by contravening s 115 of the Constitution by making an order for a monetary penalty in Australian dollars knowing that there was no gold or silver coin available as legal tender in payment of a debt and, further, by issuing a monetary penalty in terms of Australian dollars, being Australian currency, payment of which cannot be made as it would breach the Currency Act 1965 (Cth), as there is no currency in circulation above $2 and no valid promissory notes available to discharge debt (see grounds 6 and 7 of SJA 1083 of 2011 and grounds 11 and 12 in SJA 1085 of 2011). 

These are, possibly, the most egregious of all of the applicant's contentions. Arguments to this effect were roundly rejected in Re Skyrings Application (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 629; (1985) 59 ALJR 561. In that case, Deane J said that there had been:

... a submission that the combined effect of a number of sections of the Constitution is to erect a barrier against the issue by the Commonwealth of paper money as legal tender. The sections of the Constitution upon which particular reliance is placed are ss 51(xii), (xvi) and (xvi) and 115. Mr Skyring also referred to ss 105 and 105A. Additionally, reference was made to the provisions of the Currency Act 1965 (Cth) dealing with coins. The argument, if accepted, would result in the invalidity of s 36(1) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) which provides that 'Australian notes are a legal tender throughout Australia'. 

Similar arguments were also addressed by the Supreme Court of Queensland in Lohe v Gunter [2003] QSC 150 where Holmes J said:

[8] The respondent argued that there was no means by which he might lawfully pay fines or costs because of the failure of the Crown to provide currency as prescribed by the Currency Act 1965, s 16 of that which provides for coinage as legal tender. There was, he said, no legal sanction for the issue of paper money; and there was a lack of correspondence between the face value of coins and the price at which they may be bought using paper money. (He referred to a particular example of a set of gold coins being bought for an amount far in excess of its face value.) 

[9] As to the first part of the respondent’s argument, Deane J in Re Skyring’s Application (No 2) reached the conclusion that there was no constitutional bar against the issue of paper money as legal tender, a view which has been confirmed subsequently on a number of occasions. [Re Skyring (1994) 68 ALJR 618; Skyring v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (Unreported, Court of Appeal No 176/1993, 12 May 1944); Owen v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Unreported, Full Court of the Federal Court, Qd 132, 1995. As to the second aspect, in Cusack v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1012; [2002] ATC 4676, Cooper J considered an argument which turned around the difference between money as a unit of value and money as currency by which obligations are discharged. There was, he said, a presumption given statutory effect in provisions of the Currency Act and the Reserve Bank Act 1959 that parties contracted and parliament legislated with reference to the nominal value of money as expressed by legal tender; currency when used as legal tender was valued at its face value without regard to its intrinsic worth. The value of coins departed from their face value only when they were not being used as currency and were regarded simply as a commodity. The weight of authority is thus against the respondent’s first point, and the reasoning of Cooper J is persuasive against the second.

Qld Cameras

The compliance review report [PDF] by the Queensland Office of the Information Commissioner on Camera Surveillance and Privacy: Review of camera surveillance use by Queensland government agencies and compliance with the privacy principles in the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) has been tabled in the state Parliament.

The review examined camera surveillance in Queensland government agencies (including local government and public authorities), in particular the extent to which camera surveillance systems were designed and operated with privacy considerations in mind and an audit of camera surveillance usage. 

The 173 page report notes that

The reviewed camera surveillance systems were generally operated in a practical way, in order to deliver public safety and security, and with respect for privacy. This could be attributed almost entirely to the experience and commitment of the operatives who set up and run the systems. 

However, there were significant privacy-related gaps in the administration of the systems. One common example was the inability for individuals to discover or access footage which contained images of them. Another example was that arrangements with other agencies, particularly the Queensland Police Service, were operating informally, creating ambiguity about management responsibilities, such as ensuring that the use and disclosure of the footage was in accordance with the privacy principles. Each gap represents a risk, which if left unmanaged, could result in a privacy breach that could significantly affect members of the community. This review found this situation had arisen through a lack of corporate level direction and review and a lack of documented policies and procedures that addressed the complete spectrum of relevant considerations.

Acting Qld Privacy Commissioner Lemm Ex commented that -

By and large, the 20,000 or more cameras being operated by Queensland government agencies are being operated with attention to privacy issues. This has largely been due to the efforts of the operational staff, who have applied common sense to the development and operation of the systems. 

The ambiguity surrounding management responsibilities of camera surveillance systems represents a risk, which if left unmanaged, could result in a significant privacy breach. 

Agencies’ privacy vulnerabilities would be greatly reduced if corporate attention was given to the operation of the camera surveillance systems with privacy considerations in mind. 

This report recommends that all Queensland government agencies review their camera surveillance systems, and the policies and procedures regarding their governance to improve compliance with the privacy principles under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld).

The report recommends that all Queensland government agencies operating camera surveillance systems:

• implement a system for tracking the number and details of surveillance cameras operated by the agency. 
• obtain and evaluate evidence regarding the effectiveness of camera surveillance for the purpose identified, the ongoing costs and benefits of camera surveillance systems and the features of camera surveillance systems required for the system to fulfil the agency’s purposes, before an agency implements or expands camera surveillance systems
• ensure the management of their camera surveillance systems is consistent with their given reasons for the camera surveillance, both in documented policies and procedures, and in practice. 
• ensure that information collected by the camera surveillance system is complete and up-to-date, including through clear policies and procedures for storage, retention and disposal of camera surveillance footage, and training. 
• review the extent to which they have provided notices to the community about the use of camera surveillance, particularly in the immediate vicinity of the cameras.
• ensure data security practices protect camera surveillance footage against loss, unauthorised access, disclosure, modification or other misuse and that these practices are described in documented policies and procedures. 
• publish information about their holdings of camera surveillance footage including the currency of the footage, so that individuals can discover if there is any camera surveillance footage held by the agency which might contain images of them. 
• provide publicly accessible information, preferably in the vicinity of each of the cameras they operate, informing the community of the camera’s ownership and a point of contact for the relevant agency. 
• ensure they have policies and procedures in place which detail how individuals can obtain from an agency any camera surveillance footage which contains images of them, subject to exemptions prescribed in the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). 
• actively inform the community of the presence of camera surveillance systems, the rationale for their deployment, the privacy safeguards for the system and the mechanism by which the community can apply for access to the surveillance footage. 
• review the way in which camera surveillance footage is scanned and material extracted in response to requests for copies of the footage, and ensure this process is demonstrably consistent with the privacy principles. 
• ensure policies and procedures are in place for use and disclosure of personal information that ensure that personal information is used for secondary purposes or disclosed only as provided for in the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), for example, with the consent of the individuals concerned; to prevent serious threats to health, safety or welfare; for law enforcement; or for research purposes. 
• develop administrative arrangements for disclosure of information where this is usual practice, for example, a Memorandum of Understanding with the Queensland Police Service, and adopt a standardised request form which ensures disclosure of camera surveillance footage is in accordance with the privacy principles. 
• review contracts with private security contractors to ensure contracts bind the contractors to compliance with the privacy principles. 
• develop policies and procedures to ensure that any camera surveillance footage transferred overseas, for example placed on the internet, is done within a clear legislative authority.

Those recommendations reflect the report's conclusion that

By and large, the cameras … are being operated by people who were mindful of privacy issues. This was primarily due to the efforts of operational staff, who have applied common sense to the development and operation of the systems.

Nevertheless, the over arching finding of this review is that Queensland public sector agencies have further work to do in identifying, managing and reducing existing privacy risks to the community associated with agency use of camera surveillance footage. This is particularly critical given the increasing use of camera surveillance by Queensland government agencies and the need to satisfy higher community expectations regarding the management of such privacy risks.

Generally, executive management have not adequately turned their minds to the governance questions about camera surveillance: questions of the reason for having camera surveillance; the scope and boundaries of its use; its effectiveness, as demonstrated by hard evidence; how the camera footage should be used, disclosed, kept or destroyed; and most relevantly for this review, the privacy rights of individuals.

The disconnection between corporate governance and local operations has resulted in a range of privacy impacts, including concerning signs that legislative non-compliance is occurring in some respects. Widespread camera surveillance has costs, not least in the area of privacy. When a surveillance system is poorly managed, public concerns can arise about the advent of a ‘Big Brother’ culture, which includes a range of concerns about unnecessary surveillance, poorly targeted surveillance, costs outweighing benefits, information being gathered about individuals for secret or inappropriate purposes, lack of access and accountability in government and generally that the system is degraded and ineffective. These concerns are particularly liable to arise if the camera system fails to deliver on advertised benefits such as the prevention of crime.

What are those supposed benefits?  The report notes that five rationales are typically advanced for CCTV -

• reassuring the public and thus increasing feelings of safety or reducing fear of crime; 
• preventing crime and disorder by acting as an effective psychological deterrent to potential offenders; 
• aiding the detection of crime and disorder and enabling a greater proportion of crime to come to the attention of police or security personnel; 
• enhancing the apprehension and successful prosecution of offenders by enabling the effective deployment of officers and the gathering of evidence; or 
• acting as a general site management tool that assists police or security personnel to effectively manage locations. 

It notes that “research has not found that camera surveillance necessarily delivers on these purposes".

The report is a useful complement to the broader Surveillance in Public Places – Final Report [PDF] by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in 2010 and the 2011 WA Auditor General report on Use of CCTV Equipment and Information [PDF] noted here.