Biometrics

Automated facial recognition and policing: a Bridge too far?' by Joe Purshouse and Liz Campbell in (2021) Legal Studies comments 

Automated facial recognition (AFR) is perhaps the most controversial policing tool of the twenty-first century. Police forces in England and Wales, and beyond, are using facial recognition in various contexts, from evidence gathering to the identification and monitoring of criminal suspects. Despite uncertainty regarding its accuracy, and widespread concerns about its impact on human rights and broader social consequences, the rise of police facial recognition continues unabated by law. Both the Government and the domestic courts were satisfied that police use of this technology is regulated adequately by existing statutory provisions regulating the processing of data and police surveillance generally. That is, until the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Others [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, where it was held that the respondent's use of AFR was unlawful. This paper provides an analysis of AFR, reflecting on the outcome of that case and evaluates its nuanced findings. We suggest that the judgment leaves considerable room for police AFR to continue with only minor, piecemeal amendment to the legal framework. Drawing on comparative experience and relevant socio-legal scholarship, we argue that the relatively unfettered rise of police facial recognition in England and Wales illuminates deeper flaws in the domestic framework for fundamental human rights protection and adjudication, which create the conditions for authoritarian policing and surveillance to expand.

Disaster

What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction, the 11th lessons learned report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, states

The U.S. government has now spent 20 years and $145 billion trying to rebuild Afghanistan, its security forces, civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society. The Department of Defense (DOD) has also spent $837 billion on warfighting, during which 2,443 American troops and 1,144 allied troops have been killed and 20,666 U.S. troops injured. Afghans, meanwhile, have faced an even greater toll. At least 66,000 Afghan troops have been killed. More than 48,000 Afghan civilians have been killed, and at least 75,000 have been injured since 2001—both likely significant underestimations. 

The extraordinary costs were meant to serve a purpose—though the definition of that purpose evolved over time. At various points, the U.S. government hoped to eliminate al-Qaeda, decimate the Taliban movement that hosted it, deny all terrorist groups a safe haven in Afghanistan, build Afghan security forces so they could deny terrorists a safe haven in the future, and help the civilian government become legitimate and capable enough to win the trust of Afghans. Each goal, once accomplished, was thought to move the U.S. government one step closer to being able to depart. 

While there have been several areas of improvement—most notably in the areas of health care, maternal health, and education—progress has been elusive and the prospects for sustaining this progress are dubious. The U.S. government has been often overwhelmed by the magnitude of rebuilding a country that, at the time of the U.S. invasion, had already seen two decades of Soviet occupation, civil war, and Taliban brutality. Since its founding in 2008, SIGAR has tried to make the U.S. government’s reconstruction of Afghanistan more likely to succeed. Our investigations held criminals accountable for defrauding the U.S. government; our audits and special projects reports identified weaknesses in programs before it was too late to improve them; our quarterly reports provided near real-time analysis of reconstruction problems as they unfolded; and our lessons learned reports identified challenges that threaten the viability of the entire American enterprise of rebuilding Afghanistan, and any similar efforts that may come after it. SIGAR has issued 427 audits, 191 special project reports, 52 quarterly reports, and 10 comprehensive lessons learned reports. Meanwhile, SIGAR’s criminal investigations have resulted in 160 convictions. This oversight work has cumulatively resulted in $3.84 billion in savings for the U.S. taxpayer. 

After conducting more than 760 interviews and reviewing thousands of government documents, our lessons learned analysis has revealed a troubled reconstruction effort that has yielded some success but has also been marked by too many failures. Using this body of work, as well as the work of other oversight organizations, SIGAR has identified seven key lessons that span the entire 20-year campaign and can be used in other conflict zones around the globe. These lessons form the backbone of this report, with a chapter devoted to exploring each in detail: 

1. Strategy: The U.S. government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve. 

The challenges U.S. officials faced in creating long-term, sustainable improvements raise questions about the ability of U.S. government agencies to devise, implement, and evaluate reconstruction strategies. The division of responsibilities among agencies did not always take into account each agency’s strengths and weaknesses. For example, the Department of State is supposed to lead reconstruction efforts, but it lacked the expertise and resources to take the lead and own the strategy in Afghanistan. In contrast, DOD has the necessary resources and expertise to manage strategies, but not for large-scale reconstruction missions with significant economic and governance components. This meant no single agency had the necessary mindset, expertise, and resources to develop and manage the strategy to rebuild Afghanistan. For the U.S. government to successfully rebuild a country, especially one still experiencing violent conflict, civilian agencies will need the necessary resources and flexibility to lead in practice, not just on paper. 

This poor division of labor resulted in weak strategy. While initially tied to the destruction of al-Qaeda, the strategy grew considerably to include the defeat of the Taliban, an insurgent group deeply entrenched in Afghan communities, then expanded again to include corrupt Afghan officials who undermined U.S. efforts at every turn. Meanwhile, deteriorating security compelled the mission to grow even further in scope. U.S. officials believed the solution to insecurity was pouring ever more resources into Afghan institutions—but the absence of progress after the surge of civilian and military assistance between 2009 and 2011 made it clear that the fundamental problems were unlikely to be addressed by changing resource levels. The U.S. government was simply not equipped to undertake something this ambitious in such an uncompromising environment, no matter the budget. After a decade of escalation, the United States began a gradual, decade- long drawdown that steadily revealed how dependent and vulnerable the Afghan government remains. 

2. Timelines: The U.S. government consistently underestimated the amount of time required to rebuild Afghanistan, and created unrealistic timelines and expectations that prioritized spending quickly. These choices increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programs. 

The U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan could be described as 20 one-year reconstruction efforts, rather than one 20-year effort. U.S. officials often underestimated the time and resources needed to rebuild Afghanistan, leading to short-term solutions like the surge of troops, money, and resources from 2009–2011. U.S. officials also prioritized their own political preferences for what they wanted reconstruction to look like, rather than what they could realistically achieve, given the constraints and conditions on the ground. Early in the war, U.S. officials denied the mission resources necessary to have an impact, and implicit deadlines made the task even harder. As security deteriorated and demands on donors increased, so did pressure to demonstrate progress. U.S. officials created explicit timelines in the mistaken belief that a decision in Washington could transform the calculus of complex Afghan institutions, powerbrokers, and communities contested by the Taliban. 

By design, these timelines often ignored conditions on the ground and forced reckless compromises in U.S. programs, creating perverse incentives to spend quickly and focus on short-term, unsustainable goals that could not create the conditions to allow a victorious U.S. withdrawal. Rather than reform and improve, Afghan institutions and powerbrokers found ways to co-opt the funds for their own purposes, which only worsened the problems these programs were meant to address. When U.S. officials eventually recognized this dynamic, they simply found new ways to ignore conditions on the ground. Troops and resources continued to draw down in full view of the Afghan government’s inability to address instability or prevent it from worsening. 

3. Sustainability: Many of the institutions and infrastructure projects the United States built were not sustainable. 

Reconstruction programs are not like humanitarian aid; they are not meant to provide temporary relief. Instead, they serve as a foundation for building the necessary institutions of government, civil society, and commerce to sustain the country indefinitely. Every mile of road the United States built and every government employee it trained was thought to serve as a springboard for even more improvements and to enable the reconstruction effort to eventually end. However, the U.S. government often failed to ensure its projects were sustainable over the long term. Billions of reconstruction dollars were wasted as projects went unused or fell into disrepair. Demands to make fast progress incentivized U.S. officials to identify and implement short-term projects with little consideration for host government capacity and long-term sustainability. U.S. agencies were seldom judged by their projects’ continued utility, but by the number of projects completed and dollars spent. 

Over time, U.S. policies emphasized that all U.S. reconstruction projects must be sustainable, but Afghans often lacked the capacity to take responsibility for projects. In response, the U.S. government tried to help Afghan institutions build their capacity, but those institutions often could not keep up with U.S. demands for fast progress. Moreover, pervasive corruption put U.S. funds sent through the Afghan government at risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. These dynamics motivated U.S. officials to provide most assistance outside Afghan government channels. While expedient, the approach meant that Afghan officials were not getting experience in managing and sustaining U.S. reconstruction projects over the long term. As a result, even when programs were able to achieve short-term success, they often could not last because the Afghans who would eventually take responsibility for them were poorly equipped, trained, or motivated to do so. 

4. Personnel: Counterproductive civilian and military personnel policies and practices thwarted the effort. 

The U.S. government’s inability to get the right people into the right jobs at the right times was one of the most significant failures of the mission. It is also one of the hardest to repair. U.S. personnel in Afghanistan were often unqualified and poorly trained, and those who were qualified were difficult to retain. DOD police advisors watched American TV shows to learn about policing, civil affairs teams were mass-produced via PowerPoint presentations, and every agency experienced annual lobotomies as staff constantly rotated out, leaving successors to start from scratch and make similar mistakes all over again. These dynamics had direct effects on the quality of reconstruction. There were often not enough staff to oversee the spending, and certainly not enough who were qualified to do so. This was particularly true for civilian agencies, such as State or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which should have been leading the effort but were unable to meaningfully perform that role. This compelled the better-resourced DOD to fill the void, creating tensions with civilian agencies that often had different ideas but fewer staff to offer. 

5. Insecurity: Persistent insecurity severely undermined reconstruction efforts. 

The absence of violence was a critical precondition for everything U.S. officials tried to do in Afghanistan—yet the U.S. effort to rebuild the country took place while it was being torn apart. For example, helping Afghans develop a credible electoral process became ever more difficult as insecurity across the country steadily worsened—intimidating voters, preventing voter registration, and closing polling stations on election day. In remote areas where the Taliban contested control, U.S. officials were unable to make sufficient gains to convince frightened rural Afghans of the benefits of supporting their government. Insecurity and the uncertainty that it spawns have also made Afghanistan one of the worst environments in the world to run a business. The long-term development of Afghanistan’s security forces likewise saw a number of harmful compromises, driven by the immediate need to address rising insecurity. The danger meant that even programs to reintegrate former fighters faltered, as ex-combatants could not be protected from retaliation if they rejoined their communities. 

6. Context: The U.S. government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. 

Effectively rebuilding Afghanistan required a detailed understanding of the country’s social, economic, and political dynamics. However, U.S. officials were consistently operating in the dark, often because of the difficulty of collecting the necessary information. The U.S. government also clumsily forced Western technocratic models onto Afghan economic institutions; trained security forces in advanced weapon systems they could not understand, much less maintain; imposed formal rule of law on a country that addressed 80 to 90 percent of its disputes through informal means; and often struggled to understand or mitigate the cultural and social barriers to supporting women and girls. Without this background knowledge, U.S. officials often empowered powerbrokers who preyed on the population or diverted U.S. assistance away from its intended recipients to enrich and empower themselves and their allies. Lack of knowledge at the local level meant projects intended to mitigate conflict often exacerbated it, and even inadvertently funded insurgents. 

7. Monitoring and Evaluation: U.S. government agencies rarely conducted sufficient monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their efforts. 

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is the process of determining what works, what does not, and what needs to change as a result. Conceptually, M&E is relatively straightforward, but in practice, it is extremely challenging. This is especially true in complex and unpredictable environments like Afghanistan, where staff turnover is rapid, multiple agencies must coordinate programs simultaneously, security and access restrictions make it hard to understand a program’s challenges and impact, and a myriad of variables compete to influence outcomes. The absence of periodic reality checks created the risk of doing the wrong thing perfectly: A project that completed required tasks would be considered “successful,” whether or not it had achieved or contributed to broader, more important goals. 

SIGAR’s extensive audit work on sectors spanning health, education, rule of law, women’s rights, infrastructure, security assistance, and others collectively paints a picture of U.S. agencies struggling to effectively measure results while sometimes relying on shaky data to make claims of success. As detailed in this chapter, the U.S. government’s M&E efforts in Afghanistan have been underemphasized and understaffed because the overall campaign focused on doing as much as possible as quickly as possible, rather than ensuring programs were designed well to begin with and could adapt as needed. As a result, the U.S. government missed many opportunities to identify critical flaws in its interventions or to act on those that were identified. These shortcomings endangered the lives of U.S., Afghan, and coalition government personnel and civilians, and undermined progress toward strategic goals. 

In conclusion, this report raises critical questions about the U.S. government’s ability to carry out reconstruction efforts on the scale seen in Afghanistan. As an inspector general’s office charged with overseeing reconstruction spending in Afghanistan, SIGAR’s approach has generally been technical; we identify specific problems and offer specific solutions. However, after 13 years of oversight, the cumulative list of systemic challenges SIGAR and other oversight bodies have identified is staggering. As former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley told SIGAR,

“We just don’t have a post-conflict stabilization model that works. Every time we have one of these things, it is a pick-up game. I don’t have confidence that if we did it again, we would do any better.”

This was equally apparent after the Vietnam War, when a war-weary and divided country had little appetite to engage in another similar conflict. After Vietnam, for example, the U.S. Army disbanded most active duty civil affairs units and reduced the number of foreign area officers, the Army’s “regionally focused experts in political-military operations.” 

Special Forces moved away from counterinsurgency and instead focused on conducting small-scale operations in support of conventional forces. And USAID’s global staff was gradually cut by 83 percent. 

In other words, according to former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane, “After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision.” After all, declining to prepare after Vietnam did not prevent the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; instead, it ensured they would become quagmires. Rather than motivating the U.S. government to improve, the difficulty of these missions may instead encourage U.S. officials to move on and prepare for something new. According to Robert Gates, former secretary of defense from 2006–2011:

I have noticed too much of a tendency towards what might be called ‘Next-War-itis,’ the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be needed in a future conflict. . . . Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today.

The post-Afghanistan experience may be no different. As this report shows, there are multiple reasons to develop these capabilities and prepare for reconstruction missions in conflict-affected countries:

1. They are very expensive. For example, all war-related costs for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan over the last two decades are estimated to be $6.4 trillion. 

2. They usually go poorly. 

3. Widespread recognition that they go poorly has not prevented U.S. officials from pursuing them. 

4. Rebuilding countries mired in conflict is actually a continuous U.S. government endeavor, reflected by efforts in the Balkans and Haiti and smaller efforts currently underway in Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Yemen, Ukraine, and elsewhere. 

5. Large reconstruction campaigns usually start small, so it would not be hard for the U.S. government to slip down this slope again somewhere else and for the outcome to be similar to that of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, after the last two decades in Afghanistan and Iraq, State, USAID, and DOD have all signaled they do not see large-scale missions as likely in the future. The Stabilization Assistance Review approved by all three agencies in 2018 noted, “There is no appetite to repeat large-scale reconstruction efforts, and therefore our engagements must be more measured in scope and adaptable in execution.” Just as after Vietnam, today U.S. policymakers and the public they serve may have sound reasons for avoiding another prolonged conflict and reconstruction mission. However, that does not mean such an endeavor is avoidable in the future. 

As SIGAR’s Stabilization report notes, “there will likely be times in the future when insurgent control or influence over a particular area or population is deemed an imminent threat to U.S. interests.” If the U.S. government does not prepare for that likelihood, it may once again try to build the necessary knowledge and capacity on the fly. As seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, doing so has proven difficult, costly, and prone to avoidable mistakes. 

As former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker observed, “You have to start working on it before you need it.” One former senior DOD official likewise noted that rebuilding another country requires advanced skills that must be cultivated ahead of time. “You wouldn’t invent how to do infantry operations [or] artillery at the start of a war. You need [to already have] the science behind [reconstruction] and people who think about it 24/7.” Building on SIGAR’s body of work, as well as the work of inspector general offices across the government, this report points to conceptual, administrative, and logistical work that should be done between large-scale reconstruction efforts to increase the U.S. government’s chances of success in future campaigns. 

The nature and range of the investment necessary to properly prepare for these campaigns is an open question. In previous lessons learned reports, SIGAR has made recommendations for existing U.S. government offices to create a database of qualified personnel to call up when necessary, build interagency doctrine for security sector assistance, and establish anti-corruption offices within key agencies. As former U.S. envoy to Afghanistan James Dobbins observed, properly preparing “doesn’t mean that you have to have a standing capability to immediately train [an entire army], but you need to have the know-how and an ability to surge those kinds of resources.” Others have argued that such an ability requires a permanent office with the authority and funding to prepare for, plan, execute, and evaluate all reconstruction missions. U.S. agencies should continue to explore how they can ensure they have the strategic planning capabilities, reconstruction doctrine, policies, best practices, standard operating procedures, institutional knowledge, and personnel structures necessary for both large and small reconstruction missions.

Sovereignty

'The Developing Concept of Sovereignty: Considerations for Defence Operations in Cyberspace and Outer Space' by Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Rebecca Azzopardi, Wendy Elizabeth Bonython, Jonathan Crowe, Steven R. Freeland, Samuli Haataja, Danielle Ireland-Piper and Nathan Mark offers important insights regarding sovereignty, with an incisive analysis of sovereignty in the cyber and outer space spheres.

 The introductory chapter considers literature pertinent to the debate to show why it is important for Defence and policy planners to considering sovereignty in a Defence context. Chapter Two provides a critical analysis of the concept of sovereignty, how it has developed and how the concept may be constructed, informed by recent and ongoing critical debates. Chapter Three considers how the concept of sovereignty may apply in the emerging domain of cyberspace, with Chapter Four considering sovereignty’s application to the space domain. Chapter Five provides some concluding thoughts and recommendations for future consideration. 

Each chapter may be considered as a standalone document for members of an interest-specific audience.

Indigenous Arts

The Treasurer has announced a Productivity Commission inquiry into the nature and structure of the markets for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Visual Arts and Crafts alongside policies to address deficiencies in these markets. 

The announcement states - 

 The Australian Government recognises that art is an important way for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to tell stories, share and strengthen cultures and connection to Country, promote understanding of history, strengthen communities, and expand economic opportunities. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art is a vital part of Australia's identity and makes a large contribution to the economy. A significant and increasing proportion of products in the 'style' of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander arts and crafts that are sold in Australia are imitations that do not have any connection to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and provide no economic benefit to their communities. These products cause offence and harm to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and cultures and mislead consumers. The House of Representatives Report on the impact of inauthentic art and craft in the style of First Nations peoples (the Report), tabled in 2018, found that there is a lack of information and analysis on the markets for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander arts and crafts. Recommendation 1 of the report stated: The committee recommends as a matter of urgency that the Productivity Commission conducts a comprehensive inquiry into the value and structure of the current markets for First Nations art and crafts. The Government Response to this Report was tabled in Parliament on 2 September 2020. The Government agreed to Recommendation 1 of the Report, stating: The Government will commission a Productivity Commission study into the nature and structure of the markets for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander arts and crafts and policies to address deficiencies in these markets.

The Commission is asked to 

examine the value, nature and structure of the markets for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander arts and crafts and policies to address deficiencies in the markets. 

In undertaking the study, the Commission should:

• examine the nature and structure of the different parts of the domestic and international markets including authentic and inauthentic products 

• identify deficiencies and barriers in the markets and how they affect artists and other stakeholders 

• assess costs, benefits, governance arrangements, risks, practicalities and implementation challenges of any policy responses.

In doing so, the Commission should have regard to:

3.1. both regulatory and non-regulatory responses to the problems in the relevant markets, including education and social marketing measures, labelling and other certification arrangements, industry codes and the role of existing consumer and intellectual property laws 

3.2. the impacts on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander artists, and more broadly, the Australian Indigenous and the wider community from policy and regulatory reform 

3.3. the advantages and disadvantages of current initiatives that intend to remedy problems in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander art and craft markets, and the lessons that can be learnt from them 

3.4. proposing possible policy and regulatory responses to address the identified deficiencies in the markets 

3.5. where it is feasible, indicate any quantitative estimates of the benefits, costs and commercial impacts of policy reforms.

In undertaking this research, the Commission should also consider: House of Representatives Standing Committee reports, including the Indigenous Affairs inquiry into the impact of inauthentic art and craft in the style of First Nations peoples and submissions received as part of the development of the Indigenous Visual Arts Industry Action Plan being led by the Australian Government and to be released in the first half of 2021.

Medications

The national Health Minister has announced establishment of an Expert Advisory Committee to lead the Review of the National Medicines Policy (NMP) for the Department. 

 The NMP is a statement of principles designed to guide the range of activities encompassing medication management, access and affordability of medicines in Australia through a partnership approach between all sectors. 

 Published in 2000, the NMP is a well-established framework to promote four objectives: timely access to the medicines that Australians need, at a cost individuals and the community can afford; medicines meeting appropriate standards of quality, safety and efficacy; quality use of medicines; and maintaining a responsible and viable medicines industry. The NMP is not prescriptive about the programs and processes used to deliver these four objectives. While the objectives of the NMP continue to resonate today, the landscape in which the policy operates has changed significantly with rapid therapeutic and technological innovations which have expanded treatment options for patients and increased their complexity. 

The NMP has influenced a number of important strategies, frameworks and programs developed since its publication. However, feedback suggests the Review may need to consider modifying and/or including additional objectives such as the centricity of the consumer, transparency and equity, and the relationship with the policy enablers (health literacy, implementation and communication strategies, and performance measures). This feedback has been incorporated into the Terms of Reference for the Review. 

 The Terms of Reference are stated as

This is a high level review aimed at identifying any gaps in the NMP’s objectives, partnership approach and accountabilities. 

The Review of the NMP will:

• Evaluate the current NMP objectives and determine whether these should be modified or additional objectives included. 

• Assess the NMP’s utility in the context of rapidly evolving treatments options, population changes, interconnected relationships and system-wide capacities. 

• Consider the centricity of the consumer within the NMP and whether it captures the diversity of consumers’, and their needs and expectations. 

• Consider the definition of medicines and whether the NMP needs to be expanded to include health technologies. 

• Identify options to improve the NMP’s governance; communications, implementation (including enablers) and evaluation. 

• Review the NMP partners and provide options for building greater accountability including addressing conflicts of interest. 

The Review will be inclusive of the community and supported by a consultation process that ensures the diversity of stakeholders and consumers are captured, including a call for public submissions and a stakeholder forum. 

The review process will begin in August 2021 and is anticipated to take approximately six months. 

 The Committee will be chaired by Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Professor Michael Kidd AM. Members include Professor Lloyd Sansom AO; Mrs Janette Donovan; Dr Sarah Dineen-Griffin and Mr David Herd.

Hacking

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security's Advisory report on the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 offers the following recommendations - 

Recommendation 1  The Committee recommends that, in line with the proposed expansion of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security’s oversight role, the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020, the Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill 2020 and, to the extent necessary, other legislation be amended to expand the oversight remit of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to cover the intelligence functions of the ACIC (including, but not limited to, the use of network activity warrants by the ACIC). 

Recommendation 2  ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020, the Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill 2020) and, to the extent necessary, other legislation be amended to expand the oversight remit of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to cover the intelligence functions of the AFP (including, but not limited to, the use of network activity warrants by the AFP). 

Recommendation 3  ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020, the Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill 2020) and, to the extent necessary, other legislation be amended to extend the oversight remit of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security’s oversight to include all intelligence functions of the AFP (including, but not limited to, not the use of just network activity warrants). 

Recommendation 4  ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 and, to the extent necessary, other legislation be amended to expand the inspection mandate and functions of the Commonwealth Ombudsman to cover – in explicit terms – the propriety of the AFP and ACIC’s actions, practices, policies and activities under these new powers. 

Recommendation 5  ... where a Bill proposes to give operational or intelligence agencies specific new or expanded powers, those agencies should, in addition to providing input to any departmental submission, provide a separate unclassified submission to the Committee which should, at least, outline the necessity and proportionality of the proposed new or expanded powers. Such a submission should include, where appropriate, case studies on the current environment and how the use of any proposed new or expanded powers will assist the agency in the carrying out of its functions. The Committee also recommends that the Department of Home Affairs not make any further submission to the Committee that purports to be authored by, or submitted on behalf of, the “Home Affairs Portfolio”. For the avoidance of doubt this recommendation should not preclude an agency providing a classified submission in addition to any unclassified submission. 

Recommendation 6 ...  in support the proposed expansion of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s oversight remit (see Recommendations 1 and 2), the AFP and the ACIC provide an unclassified annual report to the Committee which sets out:  to the extent it is possible to do so in an unclassified report, similar information to what is required to be provided under section 3ZZVL of Schedule 3 of the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 (except that information should be provided in respect of all three of the new powers rather than just the account takeover warrants); and  the offences in respect of which the warrants were sought or obtained. This new reporting requirement should be supplemented by classified briefings to the Committee outlining the use of the new powers and their relationship both to each other and other existing powers provided to the AFP and ACIC. 

Recommendation 7 ... the INSLM Act be amended to provide for INSLM review of the data disruption, network activity and account takeover warrants introduced by the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 within three years of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The Committee further recommends that the INSLM Act be amended to require the INSLM to provide a copy of his or her report to the Committee at the same time the report is provided to the Minister. 

Recommendation 8 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security may conduct a review of the data disruption, network activity and account takeover warrants not less than four years from when the Bill receives Royal Assent to allow the Committee to take into account any report by the INSLM. In addition the Committee recommends that the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that each of the new powers sunset five years from the date on which the Bill receives Royal Assent. 

Recommendation 9 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that the issuing authority for all of the new powers introduced by the Bill, including emergency authorisations, must be a superior court judge (either of the Federal Court or a State or Territory Supreme Court), except for Account Takeover Warrants which may be granted by an Eligible Judge per Section 12 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth). 

Recommendation 10 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to provide additional requirements on the considerations of the issuing authority to ensure the offences are reasonably serious and proportionality is maintained. The effect of any changes should be to strengthen the issuing criteria and ensure the powers are being used for the most serious of offending.  This should include specific consideration as to whether the offending relates substantially to: offences against the security of the Commonwealth per Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code; offences against humanity including child exploitation and human trafficking per Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code; serious drug, weapons and criminal association offences per Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code; and money laundering and cybercrime offences per Chapter 10 of the Criminal Code. These examples are not exhaustive, but designed to reflect the intention of the Bill as seen through the Explanatory Memorandum and evidence to this Committee.  This should include the nature of the offending and its relationship to other serious offences. 

Recommendation 11 ...  the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that the issuing authority, to the extent known, must consider the following:  consideration to third parties specifically, including their privacy;  specific consideration of privileged and journalistic information; and,  specific consideration of privacy impacts, financial impacts, and the ability of individuals to provide or receive care. 

Recommendation 12 ... the Government commission a review of Commonwealth legislation to determine whether the concepts of “serious offence”, “relevant offence” and other similar concepts:  should be made consistent across different Acts of Parliament (noting that, for example, the definition of “serious offence” in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 is different to the definition of “relevant offence” in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004; and  whether the threshold for the concept of “serious offence” in all Commonwealth legislation should be – at a minimum – an indictable offence punishable by a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment or more, with a limited number of exceptions. This body of work should inform the eventual electronic surveillance bill being considered by the Department of Home Affairs and other departments. 

Recommendation 13 ...  the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that, in order to provide an emergency authorisation for disruption of data held in a computer:  in addition to the matters set out in proposed section 28(1C) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, an authorising officer must be satisfied that that there are no alternative means available to prevent or minimise the imminent risk of serious violence to a person or substantial damage to property that are likely to be as effective as data disruption; and  the authorising officer must consider the likely impacts of the proposed data disruption activity on third parties who are using, or are reliant on, the target computer and be satisfied that the likely impacts on third parties are proportionate to the objective of the emergency authorisation. In addition, the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 should be amended so that, where an issuing authority declines to retrospectively approve an emergency data disruption authorisation, the issuing authority may require the AFP or ACIC to take such remedial action as considered appropriate in the circumstances, including financial compensation. 

Recommendation 14 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that any post-warrant concealment powers must be exercised within 28 days after the relevant warrant has expired unless the AFP or the ACIC (as applicable) has obtained the approval of a superior court judge to undertake post-concealment activities at a later date. Consistent with the recommendation made by the INSLM, the superior court judge should be required to consider:  how the AFP or the ACIC (as applicable) is proposing to conceal access;  the likely privacy implications at the time and in the place where the concealment activity is proposed to occur; and  whether, in all the circumstances, the concealment activity is appropriate. In addition, and noting that the Committee did not receive evidence on concealment in relation to computer warrants, the Committee recommends that the Government consider whether the same amendment should be made in respect of computer access warrants in the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 consistent with the recommendation made by the INSLM. 

Recommendation 15 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that:  for the purposes of proposed paragraphs 27KE(7)(b) and 27KE(12) (and any other relevant provision), a data disruption warrant may only authorise the AFP or ACIC to cause material loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer if the loss or damage is necessary to do one of the things specified in the warrant (i.e. it is not enough that the loss or damage is “justified and proportionate”); and  the AFP and ACIC must notify the Commonwealth Ombudsman or IGIS (as appropriate) as soon as reasonably practicable if they cause any loss or damage to other persons lawfully using a computer. The notification to the Commonwealth Ombudsman or IGIS (as applicable) must include, among other things, details of the loss or damage caused by the disruption activity and an explanation of why the loss or damage was necessary to do one of the things specified in the warrant. 

Recommendation 16 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that the power to temporarily remove computers and other things from premises under a data disruption warrant or a network activity warrant must be returned to the warrant premises as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so. 

Recommendation 17 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 should be amended to change the reporting requirements from the agencies to the Commonwealth Ombudsman from six-monthly to annually. 

Recommendation 18 ... the Government introduce legislation to implement the Committee’s recommendations in its report on press freedom as soon as possible. In the meantime, the Committee recommends that the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that the issuing criteria for each of the proposed new powers requires the applicant, and the issuing authority, to consider the following matters in respect of any warrant that relates to – or may affect – a person working in a professional capacity as a journalist or a media organisation:  the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of journalist sources; and  the public interest in facilitating the exchange of information between journalists and members of the public to facilitate reporting of matters in the public interest. 

Recommendation 19  Consistent with Recommendation 2 of the Committee’s report on press freedom, the Committee recommends that the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to require that – with respect to an application for a data disruption warrant, a network activity warrant or an account takeover warrant that is being sought in relation to a journalist or media organisation – a “public interest advocate” be appointed. 

Recommendation 20 ...  the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to make clear the issuing criteria for an assistance orders also requires the issuing authority to be satisfied that:  the order for assistance – and not just the disruption of data – is: − reasonably necessary to frustrate the commission of the offences that are covered by the disruption warrant; and − justifiable and proportionate, having regard to (i) the seriousness of the offences that are covered by the disruption warrant and (ii) the likely impacts of the data disruption activity on the person who is subject to the assistance order and any related parties (including, if relevant, the person’s employer) and (iii) the likely impacts of the data disruption activity on other persons, including lawful computer users or clients of the person subject to the order; and  compliance with the request is practicable and technically feasible (noting that these criteria are to be found in the industry assistance measures introduced by the Assistance and Access Act 2018). 

Recommendation 21 ...  the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to require consideration by the issuing authority, to the extent that is possible, of whether a person is, or has been, subject to other mandatory assistance orders (including mandatory assistance orders made under other Commonwealth legislation). Having regard to the covert nature of mandatory assistance orders, and the fact that it may not be possible for the issuing authority or applicant to have knowledge of previous (or even concurrent) orders, the Committee further recommends that the Government develop a mechanism to ensure that individuals and companies are not subject to multiple mandatory assistance orders unless specific consideration is given to whether, in all of the circumstances, it is reasonably necessary and proportionate. 

Recommendation 22 ...  the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to:  impose a maximum period during with a non-emergency mandatory assistance order may be served and executed (and if the order is not served and executed within that period, the order will lapse and a new order must be sought);  require all applications for a non-emergency mandatory assistance order to be made in writing;  require all applications for a non-emergency mandatory assistance order to include, to the extent known key particulars, including the nature of the mandated assistance;  prohibit the AFP and the ACIC, unless absolutely necessary, from seeking a non-emergency mandatory assistance order in respect of an individual employee of a company (i.e. assistance should only ever be sought from the company or business);  set out the process that must be followed in respect of the service of a non-emergency mandatory assistance order on the specified persons, and link the commencement of an order to the date and time of service; and  require that an issuing authority consider whether a person is, or has been subject, to a non-emergency mandatory assistance orders (including mandatory assistance orders made under other Commonwealth legislation). 

Recommendation 23 ... the Government make clear that no mandatory assistance order, including those defined in the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020, can ever be executed in a manner that amounts to the detention of a person. 

Recommendation 24 ...  the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to introduce good faith immunity provisions for both assisting entities and those employees or officers of assisting entities who are acting in good faith with an assistance order. 

Recommendation 25 ... the Explanatory Memorandum to the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to make it clear that decisions under the proposed new powers are not excluded from judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act). For the avoidance of doubt, the Committee believes that no decision made in relation to data disruption warrants, network activity warrants and account takeover warrants should be exempt from judicial review under the ADJR Act. 

Recommendation 26 ... proposed paragraph 27KA(3)(b)ofthe Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to provide that the statement of facts and grounds accompanying all applications for data disruption warrants must specify the following matters to the extent that is possible:  the acts or types of acts of data disruption that are proposed to be carried out under the warrant;  the anticipated impacts of those specific acts or types of acts of disruption on the commission of the relevant offence (that is, how they are intended to frustrate that offence); and  the likelihood that the relevant acts or types of acts of disruption will achieve that objective. 

Recommendation 27 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that only individuals who satisfy the following requirements may apply for a data disruption warrant or an account takeover warrant:  the person is a law enforcement officer in relation to the AFP or ACIC (as applicable) within the meaning of section 6A of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004;  the person has been individually approved, by written instrument made by the AFP Commissioner or ACIC CEO (as applicable) to apply for data disruption warrants; and  the relevant agency head is satisfied that the person possesses the requisite skills, knowledge and experience to make warrant applications, and the person has completed all current internal training requirements for making such applications. 

Recommendation 28 ...  paragraph 27KC of the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended so that, rather than a judge having to be satisfied, that a data disruption warrant would be “justifiable and proportionate”, the judge must be satisfied, to the extent possible at the time an application is made, that a data disruption warrant is:  reasonably necessary to frustrate the commission of the offences referred to in the warrant application; and  proportionate, having regard to: − the specific nature of the proposed disruption activities; − the proportionality of those activities to the suspected offending; − the potential adverse impacts of the disruption activities on non- suspects; and − the steps that are proposed to be taken to avoid or minimize those adverse impacts, and the prospects of those mitigating steps being successful. 

Recommendation 29 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 and the IGIS Act be amended to make it clear that staff members of the Australian Signals Directorate are subject to IGIS oversight if they are seconded to the AFP or ACIC to execute a data disruption warrant for and on behalf of the AFP or ACIC. 

Recommendation 30 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to strengthen the issuing authority considerations for network activity warrants, including by amending the definition of a “criminal network of individuals” to require there to be a reasonable suspicion of a connection between:  the suspected conduct of the individual group member in committing an offence or facilitating the commission of an offence; and  the actions or intentions of the group as a whole. 

Recommendation 31 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to clarify that a decision-maker, and the issuing authority, must consider the privacy implications to the extent they are known, of a proposed network activity warrant. To be clear, the committee does not believe that privacy considerations should be determinative in their own right, just that they should be considered. 

Recommendation 32 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020  be amended to require a sworn affidavit setting out the grounds of an application for an account takeover warrant (consistent with the delayed notification search warrants in the Crimes Act). 

Recommendation 33 ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be amended to require an issuing authority to consider, to the extent that is possible at the time the application is made, whether a proposed account takeover warrant is likely to have an adverse impact on third parties, including a specific requirement to assess the likely:  impacts on personal privacy;  financial impacts on individuals and businesses;  impacts on a person’s ability to conduct their business or personal affairs; and  impacts on a person’s ability to have contact with family members or provide or receive care. 

Recommendation 34  ... the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Bill 2020 be passed, subject to the amendments outlined above.

Freedom

'The Meaning of Academic Freedom: The Significance of Ridd v James Cook University' by Adrienne Stone in (2021) 43 Sydney Law Review 241 comments 

The case of Ridd v James Cook University raises important questions as to the content and scope of the principle of academic freedom, and its application to public criticism of academic research and university governance. It presents a rare opportunity for the High Court of Australia to consider the legal content of the principle of academic freedom, and the outcome of the case will likely be very significant for Australian universities. This article provides a principled foundation to suggest that James Cook University’s termination of Professor Ridd contravened critical and widely accepted aspects of the principle of academic freedom. It takes issue with the majority decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia under appeal on two bases. First, it suggests that the majority paid insufficient regard to the principle of academic freedom, which should properly have informed the interpretation of the provisions of the relevant university enterprise agreement relating to ‘intellectual freedom’. Second, given the requirements of the principle of academic freedom and the principle’s centrality to the purposes of a university, the particular provision that protects ‘intellectual freedom’ should have been understood, in some circumstances, to take priority over the code of conduct that Ridd was found to have breached.