18 March 2022

Scams

The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) has instituted Federal Court proceedings against Meta Platforms, Inc. and Meta Platforms Ireland Limited, alleging that the Facebook subsidiaries engaged in false, misleading or deceptive conduct by publishing scam advertisements featuring prominent Australian public figures in breach of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (ASIC Act). Meta is also alleged to have aided and abetted or was knowingly concerned in false or misleading conduct and representations by the advertisers. 

The ACCC is seeking declarations, injunctions, penalties, costs and other orders.

The ACCC alleges that the ads, which promoted investment in cryptocurrency or money-making schemes, were likely to mislead Facebook users into believing the advertised schemes were associated with well-known people featured in the ads, such as businessman Dick Smith, TV presenter David Koch and former NSW Premier Mike Baird. 

 The ACCC states that the schemes were scams, with the people featured in the ads neither approved or endorsing them. The ads contained links which took Facebook users to a fake media article that included quotes attributed to the public figure featured in the ad endorsing a cryptocurrency or money-making scheme. Users were then invited to sign up and were subsequently contacted by scammers who used high pressure tactics, such as repeated phone calls, to convince users to deposit funds into the fake schemes. 

The ACCC does not appear to have commented on the presence of the same ads in other digital platforms and indeed in online 'mainstream media'. 

 ACCC Chair Rod Sims comments 

The essence of our case is that Meta is responsible for these ads that it publishes on its platform. It is a key part of Meta’s business to enable advertisers to target users who are most likely to click on the link in an ad to visit the ad’s landing page, using Facebook algorithms. Those visits to landing pages from ads generate substantial revenue for Facebook. 

We allege that the technology of Meta enabled these ads to be targeted to users most likely to engage with the ads, that Meta assured its users it would detect and prevent spam and promote safety on Facebook, but it failed to prevent the publication of other similar celebrity endorsement cryptocurrency scam ads on its pages or warn users. 

Meta should have been doing more to detect and then remove false or misleading ads on Facebook, to prevent consumers from falling victim to ruthless scammers..

The ACCC alleges that Meta was aware that the celebrity endorsement cryptocurrency scam ads were being displayed on Facebook but did not take sufficient steps to address the issue. The celebrity endorsement cryptocurrency scam ads were still being displayed on Facebook even after public figures around the world had complained that their names and images had been used in similar ads without their consent. 

The ACCC notes

Apart from resulting in untold losses to consumers, these ads also damage the reputation of the public figures falsely associated with the ads. Meta failed to take sufficient steps to stop fake ads featuring public figures, even after those public figures reported to Meta that their name and image were being featured in celebrity endorsement cryptocurrency scam ads. 

UK SLAPP consultation

The UK Ministry of Justice has released an urgent Call for Evidence on Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, ie SLAPPs, characterised as 

an abuse of the legal process, where the primary objective is to harass, intimidate and financially and psychologically exhaust one’s opponent via improper means. These actions are typically initiated by reputation management firms and framed as defamation or privacy cases brought by individuals or corporations to evade scrutiny in the public interest. 

They are claims brought by extremely wealthy individuals and corporations. The invasion of Ukraine has heightened concerns about SLAPPs, as we have clearly seen that aggression is closely associated with clamping down on free speech and reporting of events. We need to isolate these cases in devising counter-measures, so that while we prevent our justice system being abused we do not curb access to justice in legitimate cases. In responding to SLAPPs, we need to fully understand the breadth of litigation and range of misconduct involved. A Call for Evidence will enable us to establish a number of things. 

Firstly, we want to hear at first hand from parties who have been involved in SLAPPs – their experiences and the impact on them personally and professionally. Secondly, we are conscious that high profile cases are likely to represent the tip of this iceberg, in two important respects. One is the number of pre-action letters that are issued in cases that never reach court as they result in a settlement or other form of agreement. The other is the chilling effect of SLAPPs – the perfectly appropriate news investigations that may be curtailed or not even started because of the fear or the risk of their incurring the crippling expense of High Court litigation. 

 The Call states 

The term SLAPPs is commonly used to describe activity that aims to discourage public criticism through an improper use of the legal system. 

SLAPPs have two key features: 

• They target acts of public participation. Public participation can include academic research, journalism and whistle-blowing activity concerned with matters of societal importance, such as illicit finance or corruption. 

• They aim to prevent information in the public interest from being published. This can be by threatening or bringing proceedings which often feature excessive claims. 

Individuals or organisations wishing to prevent information reaching the public eye engage reputation management firms or legal professionals to help them do so. This will often result in communications to the targeted individuals or organisations which threaten litigation, though the desired outcome is to prevent further investigations from taking place. Occasionally SLAPPs serve to divert attention from legitimate enquiries, by commencing action on spurious points such that the target’s resources are consumed and taken away from their initial focus. SLAPPs are often framed as legal cases, but they represent an abuse of law and procedure as their principal objective is stifling public debate, rather than the pursuit of a legal remedy. SLAPPs are frequently threatened or brought in defamation law, though increasingly data protection and privacy law is being misused against free speech within the law. 

Why are we looking at this issue? 

The Government is concerned that SLAPPs threaten free speech within the law and the rule of law, which are fundamental parts of our democratic tradition. Public watchdogs, including the press and public officials, are vital in ensuring accountability and transparency in our legal system. We are aware that SLAPPs interfere with parliamentary affairs: reports suggest parliamentary clerks have been subject to SLAPPs such that their constitutional duties are impeded. 

SLAPPs are often brought by powerful entities whose resources vastly exceed those whom they seek to silence, resulting in public interest reporting being withdrawn pre- emptively to avoid expensive confrontation. This means a single successful SLAPP can have far-reaching consequences, in effect censoring others who fear similar tactics. 

Provisional data from the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE) estimates there were 14 SLAPPs cases in the UK in 2021, an increase on the two cases in both 2020 and 2019 and one case in 2018. Whilst this may appear to be a small number of cases, we are issuing this Call for Evidence to uncover information about cases which might have gone unrecorded. We believe there will be many, as well as cases which never reached court because the respondent was intimidated into settling, which are likely to far exceed the number of cases which reach court. The think tank Foreign Policy Centre found in its 2020 survey of 63 investigative journalists working globally on corruption that civil legal cases, including cease and desist letters, surveillance, interrogation by authorities and smear campaigns, were experienced by more than 50% of respondents. 73% of those receiving threats had been threatened with legal action. 61% of respondents also reported that their investigations had uncovered a link (directly or indirectly) with UK financial and legal jurisdictions.  

The Government is supportive of media freedom here and abroad. We have taken action to protect the press through the National Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists led by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and the Home Office, which provides measures to counter threats to journalists’ physical safety. 

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office lead on the Government’s participation in and support of the Media Freedom Coalition, a partnership of countries working together committed to media freedom and safety of journalists and to hold to account those who would harm journalists for doing their job. Members of the Coalition have signed the Global Pledge on Media Freedom, a written commitment to improving media freedom domestically and working together internationally. 

Whilst SLAPPs are typically designed to intimidate opponents psychologically, there is evidence suggesting that these threats can escalate into physical harm. Tragic cases overseas, such as the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia who reportedly faced over forty SLAPPs cases at the time of her death, illustrate how public interest investigative reporting can attract intimidation by lawsuit and, separately, risk to physical safety. In the first instance this Call for Evidence focuses on establishing evidence about the use of SLAPPs in England and Wales, before focusing on reforms within defamation law, which to date has been the primary vehicle for SLAPPs cases. We welcome broader suggestions on how to address SLAPPs to inform Government action to curb this abuse of law.

The Call centres on a SLAPPs Questionnaire -

Impact on SLAPPs recipients 

Question 1: Have you been affected personally or in the conduct of your work by SLAPPs? If so, please provide details on your occupation and the impact SLAPPs had, if any, on your day to day activity including your work and wellbeing. 

Question 2: If you have been affected by SLAPPs, please provide details on who issued the SLAPP (for example, a legal or public relations professional), the form (for example, an email or letter) and the content. Was legal action mentioned? If yes, please provide details on the type of action. 

Question 3: If you have been subject to a SLAPP action how did it proceed? For example, a pre-action letter or a formal court claim resulting in a hearing. Did you settle the claim and what was the outcome of the matter? 

Question 4: If you are a member of the press affected by SLAPPs, has this affected your editorial or reporting focus? Please explain if it did or did not do so, including your reasons. 

Question 5: If you have been affected by SLAPPs, did you report this to anyone? Please explain if you did or did not do so, including your reasons. What was the outcome? 

Question 6: If you have been affected by SLAPPs, please provide details on the work you were undertaking at the time, including the subject matter referred to by SLAPPs. 

Legislative reforms Statutory definition for SLAPPs 

Question 7: Do you agree that there needs to be a statutory definition of SLAPPs? 

Question 8: What approach do you think should be taken to defining SLAPPs? For example, should it be to establish a new right of public participation? What form should that take? 

Question 9: If a new right of public participation were introduced, should it form an amendment to the Defamation Act 2013, or should it be a free-standing measure, recognising that SLAPP cases are sometimes brought outside of defamation law? 

Question 10: Do you think the approach should be a definition based on various criteria associated with SLAPPs and the methods employed? 

Question 11: Are there any international models of SLAPP legislation which you consider we should draw on, or any you consider have failed to deal effectively with SLAPPs? Please give details. 

Question 12: Would you draw any distinction in the treatment of individuals and corporations as claimants in drawing up definitions for SLAPP type litigation? 

Reforms stemming from there being a defined cohort of SLAPPs cases 

Question 13: Which other reform options for tackling SLAPPs would you place on a statutory footing? Please give reasons. 

Question 14: Are there additional reforms you would pursue through legislation? Please give reasons. 

Defamation (libel) laws 

The Serious Harm Defence 

Question 15: Does the serious harm test in defamation cases have any effect on SLAPPs claims? 

Question 16: Are there any reforms to the serious harm test that could be considered in SLAPPs cases? 

The defence of Truth 

Question 17: Does the truth defence in defamation cases have any effect on SLAPPs claims? 

Question 18: Are there any reforms to the defence of truth that could be considered in SLAPPs cases? For example, should we reverse the burden of proof in SLAPPs cases, so that claimants have to demonstrate why a statement is not true? 

The defence of Honest Opinion 

Question 19: Does the honest opinion defence in defamation cases have any effect on SLAPPs claims? 

Question 20: Are there any reforms to the honest opinion defence that could be considered in SLAPPs cases? 

The defence of Public Interest 

Question 21: How far does the public interest defence in defamation cases provide a robust enough defence in SLAPPs claims? 

Question 22: Are there any reforms to the public interest defence that could be considered in SLAPPs cases? 

Reports protected by Privilege 

Question 23: Does the privilege defence in defamation cases have any effect on SLAPPs claims? 

Question 24: Are there any reforms to the privilege defence that could be considered in SLAPPs cases? 

Question 25: Do you have any views on whether qualified privilege should be extended in relation to reporting of Parliamentary debate of SLAPPs. 

Libel Tourism 

Question 26: To what extent does the appropriate jurisdiction test assist as a defence to defamation in SLAPPs claims? 

Question 27: Are there any reforms to the appropriate jurisdiction test that could be considered in SLAPPs cases? 

Other Possible Defamation reforms on SLAPPs 

Question 28: Do you consider that the Government should consider reforming the law on actual malice to raise the threshold for defamatory statements made against SLAPP claimants? Please give reasons. 

Question 29: If you agree the Government should pursue actual malice reforms, what form should these take? 

Other Possible Reforms 

Question 30: Are there any other areas of defamation law that you consider may be reformed to address the problems SLAPPs cases give rise to? 

Procedural reforms 

Pre-Action Protocols 

Question 31: Do you have any views or experience on how the Pre-Action Protocol for Media and Communications operates in SLAPPs cases? If so, to what extent does it help to regulate the conduct of SLAPPs claims? Please explain your response. 

Question 32: Do you have any views or suggestions on amendments to Pre-Action Protocols which would improve upon existing pre-action conduct in SLAPP cases? Please explain your response. 

Strike-Outs 

Question 33: To what extent do you consider that SLAPP type litigation represents an abuse of process, and should be considered by courts for strike-out action? 

Question 34: How would you propose to reform or strengthen the use of strike-out in addressing SLAPP type litigation? 

Civil Restraint Orders 

Question 35: Are Civil Restraint Orders currently an effective procedure against SLAPPs litigants? If not, what reforms do you propose? Question 36: Should the court consider anything beyond the current issues of number of applications and merits of a case when considering whether to issue a CRO? 

Other procedural reforms 

Question 37: Do you have any other suggestions for procedural reform to be pursued either by the Government or considered by the judiciary or Civil Procedure Rule Committee in relation to SLAPPs cases? Should a permission stage be applied to SLAPPs cases? 

Regulatory reforms 

Solicitors Regulation Authority Guidance on SLAPPs 

Question 38: If you are a solicitor, does the SRA guidance provided on SLAPPs help you understand your professional duties in conducting disputes? Please explain your answer. 

Reporting SLAPPs 

Question 39: If you have been affected by SLAPPs, did you report the issue to a professional regulator? Please explain and give reasons for your decision. If you did so, what was the outcome? 

Defamation costs reforms 

Question 40: How was your SLAPP funded (private funding, CFA, other (please specify))? 

Question 41: How were adverse costs addressed (private funding, ATE, other (please specify))? 

Question 42: Please give details of the costs of the case, broken down (i) by stage and (ii) by which party had to pay them. 

Question 43: Do you agree that a formal costs protection regime (based on the ECPR) should be introduced for (i) all defamation cases, or (ii) SLAPPs cases only – please give reasons? 

Question 44: If so, what should the default levels of costs caps be for (i) all defamation cases, or (ii) SLAPPs cases only – please give reasons? 

Question 45: Do you have any other suggestions as to how costs could be reformed in (i) all defamation cases, or (ii) SLAPPs cases only – please give reasons?

16 March 2022

Social Media

Yesterday's report by the House of Representatives Select Committee on Social Media and Online Safety reflected the following terms of reference.

The Committee will inquire into: 

a) the range of online harms that may be faced by Australians on social media and other online platforms, including harmful content or harmful conduct; 

b) evidence of: i) the potential impacts of online harms on the mental health and wellbeing of Australians; ii) the extent to which algorithms used by social media platforms permit, increase or reduce online harms to Australians; iii) existing identity verification and age assurance policies and practices and the extent to which they are being enforced; 

c) the effectiveness, take-up and impact of industry measures, including safety features, controls, protections and settings, to keep Australians, particularly children, safe online; 

d) the effectiveness and impact of industry measures to give parents the tools they need to make meaningful decisions to keep their children safe online; 

e) the transparency and accountability required of social media platforms and online technology companies regarding online harms experienced by their Australians users; 

f) the collection and use of relevant data by industry in a safe, private and secure manner; 

g) actions being pursued by the Government to keep Australians safe online; and 

h) any other related matter. 

The resultant Recommendations were

R 1  The Committee recommends that the Australian Government propose the appointment of a House Standing Committee on Internet, Online Safety and Technological Matters, from the commencement of the next parliamentary term. 

R 2  The Committee recommends that, subject to Recommendation 1, the Australian Government propose an inquiry into the role of social media in relation to democratic health and social cohesion, to be referred to the aforementioned committee or a related parliamentary committee. 

R 3  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner undertakes research focusing on how broader cultural change can be achieved in online settings. 

R 4  Subject to the findings in Recommendation 3, the Committee recommends that the Australian Government establishes an educational and awareness campaign targeted at all Australians, focusing on digital citizenship, civics and respectful online interaction. 

R 5   The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner examine the extent to which social media companies actively prevent: § recidivism of bad actors, § pile-ons or volumetric attacks, and § harms across multiple platforms.  The eSafety Commissioner should then provide the Australian Government with options for a regulatory framework, including penalties for repeated failures. 

R 6  The Committee recommends that the Office of the eSafety Commissioner be provided with adequate appropriations to establish and manage an online single point of entry service for victims of online abuse to report complaints and be directed to the most appropriate reporting venue, dependent on whether their complaints meet the requisite threshold, and in consideration of a variety of audiences such as children, parents/carers, women, people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and other relevant vulnerable groups. 

R 7  The Committee recommends that the Australian Government refer to the proposed House Standing Committee on Internet, Online Safety and Technological Matters, or another committee with relevant focus and expertise, an inquiry into technology-facilitated abuse, with terms of reference including: § The nature and prevalence of technology-facilitated abuse; § Responses from digital platforms and online entities in addressing technology-facilitated abuse, including how platforms can increase the safety of their users; and § How technology-facilitated abuse is regulated at law, including potential models for reform. 

R 8  The Committee recommends that the Australian Government significantly increase funding to support victims of technology-facilitated abuse, through existing Australian Government-funded programs. This should include additional funding for specialised counselling and support services for victims; and be incorporated in the next National Action Plan to End Violence Against Women and Children 2022-2032. 

R 9  The Committee recommends that future reviews of the operation of the Online Safety Act 2021 take into consideration the implementation of the Safety by Design Principles on major digital platforms, including social media services and long-standing platforms which require retrospective application of the Safety by Design Principles. 

R 10  The Committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, in conjunction with the eSafety Commissioner and the Department of Home Affairs, examine the need for potential regulation of end-to-end encryption technology in the context of harm prevention. 

R 11  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner, as part of the drafting of new industry codes and implementation of the Basic Online Safety Expectations: § Examine the extent to which social media services adequately enforce their terms of service and community standards policies, including the efficacy and adequacy of actions against users who breach terms of service or community standards policies; § Examine the potential of implementing a requirement for social media services to effectively enforce their terms of service and community standards policies (including clear penalties or repercussions for breaches) as part of legislative frameworks governing social media platforms, with penalties for non-compliance; and § Examine whether volumetric attacks may be mitigated by requiring social media platforms to maintain policies that prevent this type of abuse and that require platforms to report to the eSafety Commissioner on their operation. 

R 12 The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner examine the extent to which social media companies actively apply different standards to victims of abuse depending on whether the victim is a public figure or requires a social media presence in the course of their employment, and provides options for a regulatory solution that could include additions to the Basic Online Safety Expectations. 

R 13  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner, in conjunction with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications and the Department of Home Affairs and other technical experts as necessary, conduct a review of the use of algorithms in digital platforms, examining: § How algorithms operate on a variety of digital platforms and services; § The types of harm and scale of harm that can be caused as a result of algorithm use; § The transparency levels of platforms’ content algorithms; § The form in which regulation should take (if any); and § A roadmap for Australian Government entities to build skills, expertise and methods for the next generation of technological regulation in order to develop a blueprint for the regulation of Artificial Intelligence and algorithms in relation to user and online safety, including an assessment of current capacities and resources. 

R 14  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner require social media and other digital platforms to report on the use of algorithms, detailing evidence of harm reduction tools and techniques to address online harm caused by algorithms. This could be achieved through the mechanisms provided by the Basic Online Safety Expectations framework and Safety By Design assessment tools, with the report being provided to the Australian Government to assist with further public policy formulation. 

R 15  The Committee recommends that, subject to Recommendation 19, the proposed Digital Safety Review make recommendations to the Australian Government on potential proposals for mandating platform transparency. 

R 16  The Committee recommends the implementation of a mandatory requirement for all digital services with a social networking component to set default privacy and safety settings at their highest form for all users under 18 (eighteen) years of age. 

R 17  The Committee recommends the implementation of a mandatory requirement for all technology manufacturers and providers to ensure all digital devices sold contain optional parental control functionalities. 

R 18  The Committee recommends that the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications conduct a Digital Safety Review on the legislative framework and regulation in relation to the digital industry. The Digital Safety Review should commence no later than 18 months after the commencement of the Online Safety Act 2021, and provide its findings to Parliament within twelve (12) months. 

R 19  The Committee recommends that, subject to Recommendation 18, the Digital Review examine the need and possible models for a single regulatory framework under the Online Safety Act, to simplify regulatory arrangements. 

R 20  The Committee recommends that the Digital Review include in its terms of reference: § The need to strengthen the Basic Online Safety Expectations to incorporate and formalise a statutory duty of care towards users; § The scope and nature of such a duty of care framework, including potential models of implementation and operation; § Potential methods of enforcement to ensure compliance, including penalties for non-compliance; and § The incorporation of the best interests of the child principle as an enforceable obligation on social media and other digital platforms, including potential reporting mechanisms. 

R 21  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner: § Increase the reach of educational programs geared at young people regarding online harms, with a particular focus on reporting mechanisms and the nature of some online harms being a criminal offence; § Formalise a consultation and engagement model with young people through the Australian Government’s Youth Advisory Council in regards to educational themes and program delivery; and § Report to the Parliament on the operation and outcomes of the program, including research identifying whether this has resulted in a reduction in online harm for young people. 

r 22  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner work in consultation with the Department of Education, Skills and Employment to design and implement a national strategy on online safety education designed for early childhood, and primary school-aged children, and secondary school-aged young people, including: § A proposed curriculum, informed by developmental stages and other relevant factors; § Potential methods of rollout, including consultation and engagement with children, young people, child development and psychology experts, digital education experts and other specialists in online harm; and § A roadmap provided to parents of these age groups detailing methods of addressing online harm. 

R 23  The Committee recommends that the eSafety Commissioner design and administer an education and awareness campaign aimed at adults, particularly in relation to vulnerable groups such as women, migrant and refugee groups, and people with disabilities, with a focus on the eSafety Commissioner’s powers to remove harmful content and the mechanisms through which people can report harmful content and online abuse. 

R 24  The Committee recommends that the Australian Government work with states and territories to ensure that relevant law enforcement agencies are appropriately trained on how to support victims of online harm. This should include trauma-informed approaches as well as a comprehensive understanding of police powers and other relevant avenues, such as the relevant powers of the eSafety Commissioner. 

R 25  The Committee recommends that the Australian Government review funding to the eSafety Commissioner within twelve (12) months to ensure that any of the Committee’s recommendations that are agreed to by the Government and implemented by the Office of the eSafety Commissioner are adequately and appropriately funded for any increased resource requirements. 

R 26  The Committee recommends that the Online Safety Youth Advisory Council, via the eSafety Commissioner, provide a response to this report and its recommendations within six (6) months of its establishment and full membership.

01 March 2022

Algorithmic Domination

'Algorithmic Domination in the Gig Economy' by James Muldoon and Paul Raekstad in (2022) European Journal of Political Theory 1–21 comments 

Digital platforms and application software have changed how people work in a range of industries. Empirical studies of the gig economy have raised concerns about new systems of algorithmic management exercised over workers and how these alter the structural conditions of their work. Drawing on the republican literature, we offer a theoretical account of algorithmic domination and a framework for understanding how it can be applied to ride hail and food delivery services in the on-demand economy. We argue that certain algorithms can facilitate new relationships of domination by sustaining a socio-technical system in which the owners and managers of a company dominate workers. This analysis has implications for the growing use of algorithms throughout the gig economy and broader labor market.

The authors argue 

Algorithmic decision-making is increasingly deployed in a variety of important contexts from criminal justice and policing to credit scoring and healthcare (Kitchin, 2017). The proliferation of algorithms throughout society has led to the growth of a large body of literature in science and technology studies, legal studies, computer science, sociology, geography and media studies, among others (Beer, 2017; Striphas, 2015; Ziewitz, 2016). Corresponding to this growth in the use of algorithms has been an explosion of app-mediated platform labor (Graham et al., 2017). In the UK, the number of adults who undertook tasks obtained through a digital platform doubled from 2016 to 2019 (Huws 2020: 4). This has also resulted in the rapid spread of digital management practices throughout different parts of the workforce. 

Algorithms are employed because they promise to make processes more efficient, accurate, and unbiased. However, an emerging critical literature has called into question the idea that algorithms can evade human bias in decision making. There is a range of evidence suggesting that algorithms can often reproduce and exacerbate structural inequalities, injustices, and forms of unfreedom, rather than alleviate them (Benjamin, 2019; Noble, 2018; O’Neil, 2016). Recent discussions of algorithmic injustice have contributed to calls for greater attention to questions of fairness and accountability including issues of procedural fairness and more substantive approaches focused on interventions into decision outcomes and their social impact (Janssen and Kuk, 2016; Pasquale, 2015; Zimmerman et al., 2020). 

While questions of algorithmic injustice have received widespread consideration, political philosophers have so far paid less attention to the question of how algorithms impact our freedom. In this article, we develop the concept of algorithmic domination to address these concerns and provide an account of the dominating effects of algorithms used as tools of worker control. Algorithmic domination can occur in a variety of different domains, but we focus here on the role of algorithms as a tool by companies to manage contract workers involved in app-work in the gig economy (Duggan et al., 2020). 

Consider the following examples. Amazon warehouse employees report working under constant surveillance with timed toilet breaks and just nine seconds to process a package (Selby, 2017). Uber drivers must work during peak periods to chase ‘surge pricing,’ often earning less than the minimum wage. A hidden army of ‘microworkers’ labor on platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk and Clickworker, receiving as little as US$2–3 an hour for monotonous piece-rate tasks with no employment benefits or protections (Jones, 2021). What these examples have begun to point to is the potential negative impact of the deployment of algorithms in the gig economy and other sectors impacted by the introduction of digital technology (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016). 

For contractors of companies such as Uber and Deliveroo, the tasks, time to complete, rate of pay, and delivery route can all be automatically assigned through the protocols of the company’s software. Within such socio-technical systems, it can appear as if workers are no longer instructed by a human manager but by an automated computer algorithm. This raises the question of whether certain precarious workers could be said to be governed – and perhaps even dominated – by a non-human computer system. Does a company’s ability to nudge, incentivize, manipulate, and control workers’ behavior through algorithmic management constitute an objectionable form of uncontrolled power? 

We argue that algorithmic domination occurs when an individual is subjected to an uncontrolled power, the operations of which are determined by an algorithm. The particular case study we focus on in this article is gig workers in the food delivery and ride hail sectors, but the concept of algorithmic domination can, in principle, be applied much more broadly to other workers in the gig economy and in standard employment contracts where algorithms are also employed to manage workers (Huws, 2020). In the case of the gig economy, we argue that the use of this software for managing workers facilitates a power structure and social relationship of domination between bosses and workers. Algorithms are deployed by bosses as part of a broader socio-technical system designed and implemented in order to create and sustain a specific regime of labor control (Kitchin, 2017; Lee et al., 2015). Our analysis emphasizes that beneath the appearance of automatic decision making and neutral service delivery lies the recognizable exercise of social power. These systems can increase the capacity for bosses to dominate workers by providing new tools for them to exercise uncontrolled power and weaken the ability of workers to organize and resist This is not a radically new form of power, but an augmentation of existing capacities and their formalization in new socio-technical systems that embed certain patterns of labor management and work relationships as the new normal. 

Understanding how these forms of algorithmic domination operate in practice is important due to how tech companies often employ the language of worker flexibility, freedom, and autonomy as key benefits of their business models. Revealing the sham behind their claims of self-entrepreneurship and empowerment helps us understand the realities of work in the platform economy (Ahsan, 2020). Technology companies claim their algorithmic forms of management offer greater freedom. However, if we are right, what they can enable is the increased domination of workers. 

Algorithmic domination can give rise to distinctive relationships between bosses and workers mediated through digital technology. Workers taking commands generated by an algorithm may have less room to negotiate specific aspects of their work schedule and may be subject to more stringent and demanding forms of workplace control. The affordances of the new technology increase computational asymmetries between bosses and workers and allow the former to intervene at a more minute level in ways that are not feasible if required to be undertaken by a human supervisor. Algorithmic domination is also distinctive in adopting new systems of gamification and incentive schemes administered through software that has been specifically designed to induce certain responses from workers. 

This article proceeds as follows. First, we draw on the writings of labor and socialist republicans to identify how workers are subjected to distinct forms of domination in the capitalist workplace. We then put this literature into conversation with an emerging body of empirical studies of algorithmic management to show how republican theories of non-domination can address cases of work in the gig economy involving systems of algorithmic management. In the following section, we define algorithmic domination and explain how it could be applied to case studies in the food delivery and ride hail sectors. We then argue that the dominating aspect of algorithms in the workplace is not intrinsic to the technology itself, but is part of the power relations established within capitalist enterprises. As a result, we briefly examine an alternative possibility of algorithms utilized by platform co-operatives, which we argue could potentially involve a non-dominating use of algorithms in work processes. Finally, we conclude by establishing a framework for how algorithmic domination could be applied to other cases.

28 February 2022

Election Funding

Policy observations and recommendations from today's NSW ICAC report on Investigation into political donations facilitated by Chinese Friends of Labor in 2015 (Operation Aero)

Donation laws across Australian jurisdictions 

Political financing laws differ significantly, however, across the federal, state and territory jurisdictions. Without a prohibition and caps on the amount of donations that can be made in other jurisdictions, such as in the federal system, all prohibited donors in NSW still have a vehicle to exert political influence by making major donations elsewhere. 

While uniformity in political finance regimes across jurisdictions may not be feasible (or necessarily desirable) there is a need for greater transparency as a control to prevent undue influence and corruption. However, as NSW, Queensland and other jurisdictions continue to reform their electoral donation and expenditure laws, it can be argued (or at least perceived) that electoral funding systems are becoming more divergent than harmonised. 

Concerns about the lack of harmonisation of election finance laws across Australia were raised in the Commission’s 2014 report, titled Election funding, expenditure and disclosure in NSW: Strengthening accountability and transparency, as follows: Each state, territory and commonwealth jurisdiction has its own set of electoral funding laws. Operating at a national level, parties, third-party campaigners and associated entities could take advantage of discrepancies between the laws of the different state and federal jurisdictions. NSW laws have the greatest discrepancies when compared with the other electoral funding laws of Australia. Relative to other jurisdictions, NSW caps and disclosure thresholds are lower, specific groups are banned from donating, and public funding is higher, thereby creating an environment in which cross-jurisdictional differences may be exploited. 

The channelling of donations through different jurisdictions is a way of circumventing the intent of the rules in NSW. As a result, tracking the flow of money – and influence – from donors to campaigners to election expenditure is exceedingly complex. For example:

• property development organisations in NSW can lawfully donate for the purpose of funding federal campaigns, but not at state level 

• an individual, living in any Australian jurisdiction, can make a single or multiple lawful donations uncapped at the federal level 

• the threshold for disclosure of donations at the federal level ($14,500) is much greater than it is for NSW or any other state in Australia 

• a property developer looking to influence a political party can donate $14,499 at the federal level to be used for “federal purposes” and it need not be disclosed.

By law, money for federal purposes must be kept in separate bank accounts; for example, one to be specifically used for “other/general purposes”. In practice, money from the “other/general purposes” account could be allocated for state purposes without being identified in any NSW audit. 

Mr Huang, who was based in NSW, was not constrained by the dollar amount of donations he could make at the federal level. Indeed, official records show that between 2012 and 2015, Mr Huang (either by himself or by companies associated with him) made as many as 20 donations, totalling $1,095,000, to parties at the federal level. Mr Dastyari, former NSW Labor general secretary and Australian senator, gave evidence that accepting funds into the NSW Labor federal account, which would otherwise be prohibited at the state level, is a known practice, as follows:

[Counsel Assisting]: [Mr Dastyari]: And that was your practice when you were general secretary, I take it? Of course, I mean, yeah, you, the rules, the rules are very very clear. You take, they’re not, let’s be clear, prohibited state donors are not prohibited federal donors. You take the money, accept the money into the federal campaign account, and you fully disclose it. 

As Mr Dastyari (indirectly) pointed out during the inquiry, the $100k cash given by Mr Huang could legitimately have been donated at the federal level:

...to me what’s incomprehensible about this entire enquiry, to be honest, is that, is if the series of events that have been purported are true, they could have just accepted the money into the federal campaign account, which is what, how you normally take money from prohibited donors or people above the limits. 

The federal rules allow you to take that money. 

In Australia’s federal system, it is not uncommon for there to be nine separate sets of laws regulating many areas of public policy. Although the Commission cannot direct recommendations at the Commonwealth Government, it would nonetheless be helpful if there was greater coordination between the federal, states and territories to ensure that reforms to strengthen legislation in one jurisdiction do not unduly create legislative loopholes in another. For example, greater consistency and transparency is needed around the definitions of “donor”, “donation” and “donation threshold”. Regardless of whether a level playing field between jurisdictions is an attainable goal, at the very least, there should be minimal confusion. This is particularly so with regard to donation disclosure and compliance requirements; both for the donor and the responsible reporting person(s) in political parties. 

Cash donations 

Compared with payments made by electronic funds transfer, credit card or cheque, donations made in cash can be more easily: • recorded in the name of a person or organisation that is not the real donor (possibly to conceal a prohibited donation) or not recorded at all • split to avoid donation caps or disclosure caps. 

An examination of the NSW Labor financial records by the NSWEC shows that most cash deposits were, in the period under investigation, less than $1,000, and that transactions involving large amounts using cash was not a common business practice. The cash donations disclosed by NSW Labor in relation to the 2015 CFOL dinner appear to be exceptions. As discussed above, there was no regulation in NSW specific to cash donations until 31 December 2019. 

In the NSW Parliamentary Legislation Review Committee Digest Report (No 7/57 – 22 October 2019, iv), the committee noted that the intention of the Electoral Funding Amendment (Cash Donations) Bill 2019 was to: ...improve traceability and transparency of donations, promote compliance and improve the integrity of the electoral system. These intentions are consistent with the broader objects of the Electoral Funding Act 2018. 

Since 1 January 2020, it has been unlawful for a person to knowingly make or receive a political donation in cash that exceeds the value of $100 (s 50A Electoral Funding Act 2018). The penalty to be imposed on a person who does any act that is unlawful under divisions 5 (Management of donations and expenditure), 6 (Prohibition of certain political donations) or 7 (Prohibition of donations from property developers or tobacco, liquor or gaming industries) of Part 3 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018, if the person was at the relevant time aware of the facts that result in the act being unlawful, is set out in the offence provision s 145(1). 

The offence under s 145(1) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 carries a maximum penalty of 400 penalty units or imprisonment for two years, or both. At the time of writing this report, it is noted that prosecution in Court is required to enforce an offence under s 145(1) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 relating to a contravention of the cash donation provision in s 50A of the Act. The Commission notes, however, that the NSWEC can issue penalty notices under s 148 of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 for breaches of other provisions of the Act, including offences under s 145(1) relating to contraventions of various sections in Part 3 Division 5 of the Act (concerning management of donations and expenditure), which carry similar penalty unit points and terms of imprisonment. 

For the offence of exceeding the $100 cash limit, a distinction should be made between the value of the cash donation made, and the role and responsibility of the person who accepted the cash donation. 

Consider, for example, a cash donation that exceeds the cap by $50. If a local government electoral candidate accepted a cash donation of $150, this would be an offence, but one that is less likely to proceed to prosecution given the dollar value of the donation against the cost of taxpayer money incurred in proceeding to Court. Consider also the distinction between the role and responsibility of a party agent (or party official) who accepted and/or disclosed a donation that exceeded the cap, and a volunteer supporting the party at a community event (who perhaps inadvertently accepted such a donation because they were unaware of the rules). Both circumstances would constitute an offence; however, it may be impractical to proceed with prosecution against a volunteer. In summary, the prohibition on cash donations exceeding $100 strengthens transparency and goes some way to rebuild public confidence and integrity in the NSW electoral system. However, less severe offences may not warrant the costs and taxpayer expense involved in taking such cases to prosecution. Adopting an approach that allows the NSWEC to issue penalty notices for less severe offences will flag more breaches of donations law that simply may not have been acted upon and ultimately assist political parties to ensure they are compliant with regulatory provisions governing donations. 

The Commission supports legislation to limit cash donations to $100 but makes the following recommendation: 

Recommendation 1 

That the NSW Government amends the Electoral Funding Regulation 2018 to provide for the NSWEC to issue penalty notices for less severe breaches of the prohibition on cash donations under s 50A of the Electoral Funding Act 2018

The management of donations and the NSW Labor governance arrangements 

Political parties are voluntary, not-for-profit organisations that organise themselves in accordance with their own philosophical ideals. Even well-established parties such as NSW Labor tend not to have significant resources and rely heavily on party volunteers. 

The public has an interest in the organisation and practices of registered political parties for state elections, not least because these parties may receive taxpayer funding to subsidise their electoral campaigns and administration. 

At a minimum, the public should expect that parties have proper financial policies and procedures in place to comply with electoral funding legislation. 

In relation to the Administration Fund, the Commission’s aforementioned 2014 report stated that: Even though taxpayers pay both for the parties to administer themselves and the NSWEC to administer the fund, in the end, parties receive the full amount even if their internal controls are unsatisfactory. 

Consequently, the first recommendation in that report was: That the NSW Government amends the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 to convert administration funding from a reimbursement scheme to a grant, contingent on the internal governance capability of political parties. 

The Commission’s recommendation was not adopted. Given the events that took place in this investigation, the Commission reiterates that the rationale behind this recommendation remains sound, and this is reflected in recommendation 2. 

As discussed above, NSW Labor and Country Labor shared the same political ideology, staffing arrangements and governance structures. Importantly, one designated party agent was legally responsible for making disclosures of political donations for the two parties. In effect, a lack of satisfactory governance arrangements in NSW Labor meant a lack of satisfactory governance arrangements in Country Labor. The shortcomings in governance capabilities within NSW Labor’s head office during the period under investigation (2015–16) were made evident during the inquiry. The need to strengthen the systems and processes was particularly apparent, as set out in table 4. 

Legacy of lax governance arrangements 

The lax governance arrangements prior to, and leading up to the time of the event, was a matter that Ms Murnain knew of when she took over from Mr Clements as general secretary. Ms Murnain had conveyed these concerns to Mr Dastyari (predecessor to Mr Clements), who told the Commission: The Labor Party accounts and donations were a ‘shit show’ and she was whinging to me about how everyone had abandoned her and she’d been left alone in the Labor Party office and we all moved on to our other careers and she was there to clean up the mess. 

Ms Sibraa referred to the governance arrangements and process around the handling of donations as “sloppy, poor governance, terrible way of functioning”. Ms Murnain told the Commission that, in 2015, NSW Labor initiated three independent reviews to address the lack of satisfactory governance arrangements:

...the party undertook three different reviews and has undertaken some since as well in relation to procedures on handling donations in particular but also in relation to the way the office is structured. It, it was the case back then that procedures, everyone has a slightly different view of procedures because that’s what happens when things weren’t written down. Some, there were some areas of the office that had procedures but obviously governance was a pretty significant issue in 2015, which has been widely reported, and then we proceeded to make a significant number of changes to improve accountability and governance in the office because of those reviews. So there’s a number of recommendations, rules, changes and processes that have been put in place since then.

As Ms Murnain indicated, several attempts were made to address the problems of governance within NSW Labor’s head office. The Tarrant/Tierney review (2015), the Whelan/Farrar review (2015–16) and the Needham/ Bianchi review (2015) each respectively involved a review of the administrative and finance committees, the head office workplace, and the Australian Labor Party (NSW Branch) Rules 2020. 

Ms Murnain gave evidence that the Needham/Bianchi review in particular tackled the “pretty systemic cultural issues” that beset the working environment. Subsequent to the above reviews, and under Ms Murnain’s leadership, a number of governance improvements were put in place. For example, the role of governance director was created and a ban on cash donations above $1,000 was introduced. Important as those improvements were, the matters exposed in this investigation highlighted the serious shortcomings in the governance of NSW Labor head office. More recent measures have included a staff code of conduct and improvements to IT systems to track and disclose donations. In October 2019, the then NSW Labor leader, Jodi McKay, and federal Labor leader, Anthony Albanese, called for “a new era of transparency and accountability” and announced that a further two-part review of NSW Labor, would be led by former Commonwealth attorney general Michael Lavarch. The focus of the review was on the issue of power within NSW Labor, including: 

Governance shortcomings at the NSW Labor head office 

Accounting for, receipting and banking donations 

There was a lack of clarity around who was accountable for bringing the donations from the fundraising event back to NSW Labor head office. Mr Clements considered this to be Mr Cheah’s responsibility. And, although the financial controller agreed that as a matter of proper practice, tax invoices and receipts (such as the $50,000 in donations made in 2016) should have been issued directly to donors, receipts were sent directly to Mr Wong’s office (in 2016). 

There was also no policy or procedure to prohibit NSW Labor staff taking home large amounts of cash before banking (such as the $100,000 that Mr Cheah took home in 2015). According to Mr Cheah, Mr Wong, Mr Clements and Ms Murnain, the 2015 CFOL dinner was typically “chaotic”. 

The organisation of fundraising events 

Although the 2015 CFOL dinner was organised to raise donations prior to the 2015 NSW State Election, the invitation/reservation forms made no reference to Country Labor for which donations were purportedly made. Any fundraising event, which had the potential to raise money for both NSW Labor and Country Labor, should have ensured that the donation form included an option for donors to clearly indicate to which party they wished to donate. 

Identifying prohibited donors and donations that exceed statutory caps 

There was a due diligence failure to identify that the donor disclosure forms for NSW Labor (in colour) were photocopied (in black-and-white) to produce otherwise identical but false declarations of donations made to Country Labor. This, and the failure to identify the identically handwritten “$5000” on the forms should have alerted those reconciling the $100k cash and the forms to probe deeper and ensure matters were in order. 

The roles and responsibilities of staff, including volunteer staff 

Ms Murnain said that in 2015:

... people had in their heads their roles and responsibilities, but nothing was written down that clearly delineated people’s roles that other people would have access to. No-one really understood each other’s roles other than when they worked with each other to understand it. 

Risk management and internal audit 

Ms Wang, financial controller, agreed that the state of the NSW Labor accounts was in a form that the auditors would query in 2016. NSW Labor’s failure to manage gifts and conflicts of interest Mr Clements received gifts from Mr Huang in a personal capacity but did not disclose this to NSW Labor. During the inquiry, he agreed this to be a potential conflict of interest 

Compliance and ethical obligations of senior party officials 

The integrity of senior party officials is called into question by their failure to meet their compliance obligations. For example, Ms Murnain did not report her suspicions, if not knowledge, that an unlawful donation may have been made, either within the party, or to the NSWEC during its investigation of the event. 

Mr Clements, did not disclose the $10,000 gifted by Mr Huang (to give to a union member) to either NSW Labor or the NSWEC. 

Where power lies within the Branch, how that power is exercised, what are the checks and balances to the use of power and how those entrusted with power are held accountable for using power in the best interests of the Party as a whole. 

The first stage of the review focused on the structural reform of the Administrative Committee of NSW Labor (the governing body). The second stage (report forthcoming) will focus on compliance with electoral and donation laws, including fundraising activities and training provided to NSW Labor officials and candidates. 

The Lavarch review produced the 2019 interim report, titled Review into the NSW Labor Head Office, which made several recommendations for substantial reform of the structure and governance arrangements at NSW Labor’s head office. A key recommendation was to establish an audit and risk committee with a remit to advise a newly created state executive board on matters, including:

• preparing statutory accounts and annual financial statements 

• monitoring and reviewing the external audit process 

• reviewing the risk management framework of NSW Labor 

• recommending any internal audit of NSW Labor’s regulatory obligations under fundraising disclosure or other laws 

• monitoring compliance of all regulatory obligations and advising on continuous improvement of culture of compliance at head office 

• reporting directly to the NSWEC or any other appropriate regulatory authority, any suspected illegalities in NSW Labor’s compliance with regulatory and legal obligations that have not been acted upon by NSW Labor after identification by the committee.  

Notwithstanding the implementation of the Lavarch recommendations or those that may follow from the second stage of the review, the Commission’s recommendations set out below are intended to apply to all political parties in NSW. 

Recommendation 2 

That the NSW Government, in consultation with affected parties, initiates an amendment to the Electoral Funding Act 2018 so that payments from the Administration Fund are contingent on the achievement of acceptable standards of party governance and internal control. A working group should be established to determine the relevant governance and control standards, which could relate to:

• accounting for, receipting and banking donations 

• the organisation of fundraising events 

• identifying prohibited donors and donations that exceed statutory caps 

• the roles and responsibilities of staff, including volunteers 

• risk management and internal audit 

• whistleblowing and complaint-handling 

• management of gifts and conflicts of interest 

• compliance and ethical obligations of senior party officials. 

Given the different governance arrangements in different political parties, and as a matter of good practice, it is reasonable to assume that multiple political parties would be either members of, or invited to, represent their views to the working group. As the independent regulator, the NSWEC would ultimately determine if the parties had met the governance and control standards agreed on by the working group and adopted by government. The intention is for standards to be clearly agreed on, according to the points (and principles) set out in the Commission’s recommendation 3. The working group should also consider whether political parties should be able to request a review, before the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, of the consequences of a decision taken by the NSWEC (for example, withholding administrative funding) as opposed to the decision itself. 

Recommendation 3

That the newly established working group should seek input from the NSWEC to ensure the efficient administration and implementation of standards. That is, consideration should be given to:

• applicable minimum standards 

• whether the standards should take the form of model rules, which an individual party would be free to modify only if the NSWEC agreed that the modified rule did not adversely affect the party’s governance. This would prevent small, or new, parties from incurring the expense of drafting rules from scratch 

 • the limits on the type of standards that could be required. That is, in order to avoid topics and areas that the state has no legitimate interest in regulating (for example, the way a political party formulates its policies) 

• the desirability, or extent to which, the standards take the form of specific rules, so as to meet the reasonable satisfaction of the NSWEC 

• the need for a proportionate approach that does not unreasonably penalise small, new political parties or independents 

• providing political parties with reasonable opportunities to address shortcomings in their governance and internal control frameworks before administration funding is withheld. 

Recommendation 4 

That the NSW Government amends the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to provide the NSWEC with the necessary powers to assess, audit and enforce non-compliance with standards of party governance and internal control. 

Recommendation 5 

That the NSW Government amends the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to require the NSWEC to publish findings regarding political parties’ adherence to established governance and controls standards. 

Penalties and compliance 

In its 2014 report, the Commission raised concerns about the lack of effective penalties and sanctions to act as an effective deterrent against non-compliance with disclosure obligations. That year, the NSW Government established a “Panel of Experts – Political Donations” in response to public concern over the influence of political donations on the integrity of government decisions. 

The panel recommended (among other matters):

• adopting a range of mid-level enforcement options available to the NSWEC, including the ability to withhold public funding entitlements from parties and candidates found in breach of the laws (recommendation 46) 

• increasing the maximum monetary penalty that can be imposed by the Local Court (recommendation 43) 

• simplifying the means by which the prosecution must prove knowledge, awareness or intent for offences in order to maximise the chances of successful prosecution (recommendation 45). 

The Electoral Funding Act 2018 now reflects new penalties for non-compliance with provisions relating to expenditure and donations. Recovery of up to double the value of unlawful donations and criminal prosecution for offences are two non-mutually exclusive enforcement actions available to the NSWEC. Enforcement actions are taken in accordance with the NSWEC’s Compliance and Enforcement Policy. With regard to questions of further policy and law reform arising from issues exposed in its investigation, the Commission focused principally on measures to ensure a higher level of self-regulation and compliance by political parties with the requirements of the statutory election funding, expenditure and disclosure regime. 

In particular, the Commission considered whether the legislative provisions surrounding the duty to report contraventions of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 be modified so that a senior party officer is required to report any reasonable suspicion of a contravention. 

Failure of duty to report offence 

Under s 100(1) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018, “Senior Office Holders” of a registered party are guilty of an offence if they fail to report to the NSWEC any conduct in connection with the party that the office holder knows or reasonably believes constitutes a contravention of the Act without reasonable excuse. The offence carries a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units ($5,500). Section 100(1) of the Act is a new offence that did not exist in the EFED Act and was not in force when the events under investigation took place. Section 100(2) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 states that a reasonable excuse may be if the person knows or reasonably believes a report about the conduct has already been made to the NSWEC. 

There are challenges, however, in being able to prove what a senior office holder should reasonably understand about the lawfulness of the specific conduct. Notably, the Electoral Funding Bill 2018 included a “duty of care and diligence” and a “duty of good faith” provision, which were ultimately not included in the Electoral Funding Act 2018. The intent of the care, diligence and good faith provisions, however, may be approximate to the general intent of a “reasonably suspected” obligation. 

Recommendation 6 

That the NSW Government, in consultation with the NSWEC, gives consideration to: a) amending s 100(1) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to require senior office holders of political parties to report reasonably suspected contraventions of the Act b) increasing penalties associated with the offence under s 100(1) of the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to bring it into line with the penalties set out in sections 141 to 146 of the Act. 

Public statements about NSWEC compliance activities 

The NSWEC is not presently authorised to inform the public of the outcome or conclusion of an investigation, nor to publish identifying information about any investigation. 

In the current investigation, the Commission’s power to hold a public inquiry was critical to obtaining truthful evidence from witnesses. The Commission’s public inquiry exposed the false information given by putative donors and persons of interest to the NSWEC during its investigation of the matter. Additionally, once the NSWEC then referred the matter (as per s13A of the ICAC Act) to the Commission, some witnesses provided evidence in compulsory examinations that the Commission has now found to be false (as set out, for example, in chapters 9, 11, 20, 22 and 23 of this report). 

Given the value of public exposure in this investigation and the more general positive effects of transparency, the Commission considers it necessary for the powers of the NSWEC to be enhanced to authorise it to make public statements about its compliance activities. Subject to ensuring that political parties are afforded procedural fairness, the power to make public statements may create an additional deterrent to persons who might contemplate submitting false information to the NSWEC. 

The NSWEC would require the authority to name political participants as part of any new power to undertake periodic reporting of the outcomes of its regulatory functions. As noted above, the NSWEC is not presently authorised to do this. 

The Commission notes, however, that there may be a public interest in limiting any new reporting power of the NSWEC in the immediate lead up to an election so as to avoid suggestions that the timing of a report inappropriately impacted an election result. 

Recommendation 7 

That the NSW Government amends the Electoral Funding Act 2018 to give the NSWEC power to publish the results of its compliance audits, investigations and regulatory actions.