Crypto

'Crypto is Not Property' by Robert Stevens in (2023) Law Quarterly Review (Forthcoming) is characterised as 'A short paper explaining why "cryptoassets" cannot constitute legal property, despite the academic consensus to the contrary'. 

Stevens comments

That crypto is “property”, has widespread academic support, the endorsement by the United Kingdom Jurisdiction Taskforce (chaired by Sir Geoffrey Vos the then Chancellor of the High Court and now Master of the Rolls) and also that of the Law Commission in its recent consultation paper. The claim of this short article is that it is (dangerously) untrue. As a secondary matter, it is claimed that the case for the legislature recognising cryptoassets as “property” generally for legal purposes is extremely weak, and that for the courts taking such a step non-existent. 

Lawyers should not be bedazzled by new technology, nor by these innovative ways of holding wealth. Almost all cryptoassets are unproductive and many are positively harmful. For most of their forms, our legal system should not be seeking to facilitate them but, alongside other jurisdictions, attempting to eliminate their use where possible.  ...

Within a common law system, what rights (or privilege, powers or immunities) does the correct holder of a key to a Bitcoin wallet have? Do they have a cause of action to enforce a primary right or one to correct any infringement? It is impossible to identify any such claim. No tort applicable to things, such as trespass, conversion or (where still in existence) detinue is operative as these are all dependent upon the claimant having a right in relation to a physical thing that can be possessed. The holder of the key has no contractual rights against anyone, the whole point of the system is to do away with intermediaries such as banks who would owe such a duty. There are no statutory rights of enforcement, such as those of someone who holds a patent, copyright or trade mark. Unlike the holder of a milk quota, the string of numbers that gives access to the Bitcoin wallet does not, without more, acquire a privilege not to perform any duty or an immunity from any suit. 

The holder of a Bitcoin key has no property right, in either of the two senses identified above. It is a form of information, admittedly with special factual features given to it by virtue of the system within which it makes sense. But that is all.

Bafflegab and Caesar's Law

In R. v. Cooper 2023 BCPC 69 the Provincial Court of British Columbia deals with a range of OPCA arguments, pithily dismissed as bafflegab. 

The Court states 

[2] Mr. Cooper represented himself at trial. On the first day of the trial, he advised the Court that, while he was previously known as Kenneth Jeffrey Cooper, he preferred to be called “Tiberius Rex”, or just “Tiberius”. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to him throughout these reasons as the “Defendant”. ... 

[5] On May 24, 2020, the Defendant was behind the wheel of a Mercedes Sprinter panel van, travelling eastbound on Highway 1. He was accompanied by Jennine Davis, who occupied the front passenger seat. The Defendant came to the attention of Cst. Halewood and other members of the Integrated Road Safety Unit who were conducting speed enforcement along the highway. 

[6] Cst. Halewood testified that he measured the Defendant’s speed at 114 km/hr in a portion of the highway that was under construction. The posted speed limit in the construction zone was 60 km/hr. The Defendant was determined to be travelling 54 km/hr over the posted speed limit. 

[7] The officers stopped the Sprinter van, and commenced an investigation. Nearly the entirety of the interaction between the Defendant and the investigators was recorded on a dashcam video recorder mounted in one of the police vehicles. Most of the interaction the police had with the Defendant inside the police vehicle was also audio recorded. As the Sprinter van was travelling at a speed in excess of 40 km/hr over the posted limit, the investigators determined that they must impound it, pursuant to ss. 148 and 251 of the Motor Vehicle Act. 

[8] The Defendant was initially not forthcoming with his name, resulting in some delays and a modicum of acrimony between him and the investigators. Eventually the Defendant provided sufficient information for investigators to determine his identity. 

[9] The Defendant raised three Charter issues at the outset. Firstly, that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when, upon his arrest, he was not provided access to counsel without delay. Secondly, that his s. 8 rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure were violated when the Sprinter van was searched without a warrant. Thirdly, his s. 10(c) rights pursuant to a claim of habeas corpus were violated when he was not transported directly from roadside to appear before a superior court justice to review the lawfulness of his detention. ... 

[13] A further issue was raised during submissions related to the seizure of the Sprinter van’s keys from the Defendant. The Defendant submitted that he did not consent to the keys being taken from him. He said that he was forcefully directed to provide them to Cst. Miller during the vehicle stop. The Defendant submitted that this was an unlawful seizure, and ought to have been considered in the context of the voir dire as a further s. 8 Charter breach. 

[14] There was some contention regarding how Cst. Miller obtained the keys. Cst. Miller testified that he asked the Defendant to provide the keys, and the Defendant did so. The Defendant testified that he was directed to turn over the keys to the van before he was placed under arrest. He said he complied because the officers “had the guns”. 

[15] The Crown argued that the court had already determined that the vehicle search was lawful, given the police officer’s duty to secure and inventory the contents of any vehicle that is subject to impoundment. Mr. Campbell argued that the vehicle could not be impounded or inventoried without the keys. As the search of the van was deemed lawful, so should the seizure of the keys. 

[16] I find the Crown’s argument to be compelling. The vehicle search and seizure was lawful. The officers had determined that the vehicle’s excessive speed would result in impoundment at the time they interacted with the Defendant, if not before. The keys were required to conduct the inventory search, which was lawful. It follows that Cst. Miller’s seizure of the keys from the Defendant was also lawful. ... 

[18] The Crown tendered documentation showing that the Defendant was a prohibited driver on May 24, 2020. These documents were entered during the trial pursuant to s. 82 of the Motor Vehicle Act, and included: 1. A Notice of Driving Prohibition Certificate of Service, showing that the Defendant was served with a Notice of Driving Prohibition by Cst. Behm on April 8, 2015; and 2. A Certificate of Superintendent, confirming that the Defendant was prohibited from driving the entire day of May 24, 2020. 

[19] Csts. Halewood and Shaw searched back of the Sprinter van prior to its impoundment. The officers seized from the van’s cargo compartment 16 cases containing 50 cartons of cigarettes each. The cases were placed in the rear of two police vehicles, and transported to the police detachment. 

[20] Cst. Miller testified that he recognized the cigarettes as being Rolled Gold, a brand with which he was familiar from his former policing duties in Northern Manitoba. He said he understood the cigarettes were made on First Nation reserves in either Ontario or the United States, and that they were illegal to possess in British Columbia because they lacked taxation stamps. ... 

[26] Cst. Grieff confirmed that each master case contained 10,000 individual cigarettes. Therefore, the total amount of tobacco seized from the Sprinter van was 160,000 cigarettes. 

[27] Cst. Grieff testified that none of the tobacco products could be legally sold in British Columbia, even on reserve, because they lacked the required Excise Duty stamps. However, the officer said enforcement action was generally undertaken only when an individual is found with more than five cartons, as was the case here. ... 

[31] Cst. Remming said the cigarettes were produced on a “native reserve”, likely one of several possible reserves in eastern Canada or the United States. He confirmed that many reserves manufacture cigarettes, and that they are legal when manufactured on reserve. He further testified that the cigarettes can be sold to Indigenous people who possess a Status Card. He explained that some First Nation reserves are able to apply for an exemption that allows them to sell the cigarettes on reserve lands exempt of provincial sales tax or any tax that would ordinarily attach to the sale of tobacco. 

[32] Cst. Remming testified that one can purchase these cigarettes in British Columbia, and that some stores selling them are located close to main routes, such as highways. However, they can only be sold lawfully on reserve lands, and to Indigenous individuals who possess a valid Indian Act Status card. 

[33] There was some discrepancy between the evidence of Csts. Grieff and Remming as to whether the seized cigarettes could be sold legally on reserves in British Columbia. Cst. Grieff said it was not lawful to sell or possess this tobacco in British Columbia, as it lacked the requisite Excise Duty stamp. Cst. Remming, however, testified in cross examination that the cigarettes could be sold lawfully on reserve land to First Nations residents who possessed a valid Indian Act status card, if the reserve had an Exempt Sale Retailer Dealer, or ESRD permit. Cst. Rumming did not clearly state that the tobacco was legal to possess on reserve in British Columbia, as he was not an expert in the legality of its possession on reserve lands. However, he did confirm that it was illegal to possess off reserve lands. ... 

[38] The Defendant elected to call evidence. He testified in his own defence, and called two other witnesses. 

[39] Ms. Henson is the Defendant’s mother. She testified that she gave him his birth name, Kenneth Jeffrey Cooper, but that he now goes by the name Tiberius. Ms. Henson was asked question about whether his legal name was registered with all capital letters; Ms. Henson said it was not. ... 

[42] In his testimony, the Defendant admitted virtually all of the essential elements of each of the charges he faced. He acknowledged that he was operating the Sprinter van that was stopped and searched by the police officers. He claimed ownership of the boxes of cigarettes contained in the back of the van. The Defendant’s defence was not based upon a misapprehension of the facts, or strong disagreement with the Crown’s evidence. Rather, it pertained to his interpretation of the law, which involved a perceived authority to operate a motor vehicle while prohibited, and possess items deemed by the government to be unlawful. 

[43] The Defendant described the “journey” he had been on since 2005 or 2006, which began with the bank initiating foreclosure proceedings upon his house. He said he began researching the law, and learned as part of his study that a person does not have to possess a driver’s license in order to operate a motor vehicle. The Defendant focused on the particular definition found in s. 95 of the Motor Vehicle Act. He said that the term “driving” had a specific meaning that did not pertain to him. He said he was not driving, but “travelling”, and therefore the strictures of the Motor Vehicle Act, which describe driving, did not apply to him. He argued that his right to move freely across the country was protected by s. 7 of the Charter. Based on his newfound understanding of the law, the Defendant said he began operating motor vehicles again, and continued to “travel” on roadways and highways. 

[44] On May 24, 2020, the Defendant acknowledged he was operating the Sprinter van, and conceded that he was travelling over the 60 km/hr limit. He said he was only keeping up with other traffic, but for reasons unknown to him, he was stopped by the investigators while the other vehicles continued onward. 

[45] The Defendant agreed that he had been served with the driving prohibition. He asserted that he was prohibited from driving for the province, not in the province. He appeared to draw an important distinction between the words for and in. As I understood it, the Defendant believed that the prohibition would only apply to him if he was a government employee, working and driving for the province of British Columbia. 

[46] Regardless, it did not matter whether he was in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act, because he was not driving while prohibited. He explained that the act of “driving” made the car a vehicle, and therefore subject to the Motor Vehicle Act. He related the act of “driving” to a commercial activity contingent upon an employment relationship. That is to say, those who were driving were doing so as part of their duties as employees. The Defendant alleged that the definition of “driving” found in Black’s Law Dictionary made a clear link between the act of “driving” and the existence of a commercial relationship of one kind or another. 

[47] The Defendant further argued that the only reason the van was searched was that the officers were “bored” while waiting for the tow truck to arrive. This was refuted by the officers who conducted the search, and I have already deemed the search to have been lawful. 

[48] As for the cigarettes, the Defendant submitted that he was a “non-status Native”, and therefore the cigarettes were legal for him to possess. He said he purchased the cigarettes, and indeed the Sprinter van, so he could earn money with “side projects”. 

[49] The Defendant argued that he had every right to purchase and transport the cigarettes, and could have as many as he wanted at one time as a “non-status Native”. He acknowledged that they were unstamped, and described himself as an unlicensed cigarette dealer. 

[50] The Defendant made a further argument that pertained to the capitalization of his name in the information. As testified to by his mother, he said that his former name only had the first letter of each name capitalized. Additionally, six or seven years ago he changed his name to Tiberius. I gather the Defendant’s point was that, as his former legal name was not all capitalized, he should not be liable for the charges when his last name was all capitals in the Information. 

[51] In his closing submissions, the Defendant explained his point of view in more detail. He said that all of Canada and British Columbia is a corporation. The laws and regulations drafted by the management of these corporations only applied to its employees, or those who worked for the government. He was not a government employee, but a private citizen. Therefore, none of the laws pertained to him: not the Motor Vehicle Act, and not the Tobacco Tax Act or the Excise Act. 

[52] The Defendant also argued that he had an “off the books” understanding with a police officer in Abbotsford. He said that officers knew about him, and at least one of them agreed that if he “appeared legal”, the police would leave him alone. He provided no evidence to support this arrangement. Nonetheless, he submitted that, if one officer in Abbotsford allowed him to operate a scooter without complying strictly with the laws pertaining to motor vehicles, then officers throughout British Columbia ought to be bound to the terms of this arrangement, regardless of what motor vehicle he might be found to be operating. 

[53] As for the legality of possessing unstamped cigarettes, the Defendant again asserted that federal and provincial laws bound government employees, not private citizens such as himself. He confirmed that, as a “non-Status Native”, he did not possess an Indian Act status card. When asked to confirm the nature of his Indigeneity (for example, if he was Metis or Inuit), the Defendant declined to answer, arguing that such a question was racist. 

[54] The Defendant further argued that all of Canada was “native land”. He said this was a fact that provided a further defence to the tobacco charges. If it was legal to possess the tobacco on reserve land, the fact that much of Canada was unceded Native territory of one kind or another had the effect of rendering his conduct lawful. He argued that the cigarettes were produced on “native land”, but had to be transported to other places. If transportation of any kind was legal, then it must be legal for him to transport them as well. 

[55] The Defendant submitted that he participated in a kind of shadow economy that operated alongside the government controlled economy, but outside of the strictures of provincial or federal regulation. Unstamped cigarettes were an example of a product that could be purchased within this shadow economy. In exchange for generally lower prices, consumers assumed some amount of risk. For example, there was no guarantee that the cigarette packages purchased in the shadow economy would have a uniform number of cigarettes in them, or that the content would be pure tobacco. 

[56] As a further example, the Defendant suggested that he could legally purchase a pie from his neighbour. However, by agreeing to do so, he was assuming some level of risk, as there were no regulations to ensure the ingredients were uniform or safe. He would have no recourse if he became ill, as he would, had he purchased the pie from a government sanctioned vendor, such as a commercial store. He accepted that risk, and it was his right to do so because he was not a government employee. 

[57] In sum, the Defendant’s position was that he had a right to operate outside the limits of government laws or regulations. He chose to opt out of mainstream laws, and thus they did not apply to him. Laws and regulations were in place to regulate the conduct of government employees, not private citizens such as himself. 

[58] As a final argument, the Defendant stated he had not consented to the prosecution, and once again claimed habeas corpus. He equated the compulsion to participate in the trial to being held against his will. He was advised that the prosecution would continue with or without his participation. The Defendant thereafter continued to participate. 

[59] The Defendant’s position resembles what has come to be known as Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Arguments, or “OPCA”. He says that as a living man and a natural born human, he possesses certain inalienable rights that transcend the rules and regulations thrust upon him by the corporate entities of British Columbia and/or Canada. As I understood him, the Defendant’s position was that he was entitled to behave in any way he deemed appropriate, so long as he did not physically hurt anyone. This included possessing items that he wanted to, whether or not laws, Acts or Regulations deemed it legal to do so. 

[60] The Defendant has been polite and respectful throughout this prosecution. Nonetheless, his position is, at its core, untenable. It is baseless and without merit. I am encouraged to summarily dismiss such arguments as nonsensical bafflegab, and not waste the taxpayer’s money or the court’s time on submissions that have a zero chance of success (see Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571; and R. v Hardy, 2022 BCPC 189 at para. 1, among many other decisions). I feel, nonetheless, compelled to make a few comments. 

[61] Firstly, with respect to the Driving While Prohibited charge. I find it astounding that the Defendant would think it was a useful exercise to argue that he was “travelling”, and therefore not “driving”. 

[62] He relied on an alleged definition of “driving” found in Black’s Law Dictionary to support his position that, by changing the name of the activity, he would avoid liability for it. The Defendant supplied no definition from Black’s Law Dictionary. Nor did he explain how such a definition, if it existed, would impact the Motor Vehicle Act. 

[63] The British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, did grapple with the definition of “driving” as it pertains to the Motor Vehicle Act, in R. v. Steeden, 1995 CanLII 344 (BC CA). The facts in Steeden are dissimilar to those in this case. The issue in Steeden was whether failing to apply a parking brake before disembarking from a motor vehicle which had been parked with the engine off constituted an act of driving. 

[64] Nonetheless, at para. 9, the Court of Appeal referenced Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) in defining driving as follows: To urge forward under guidance, compel to go in a particular direction, urge onward and direct the course of. [65] The Court also referenced the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Ed.) definition of the verb “drive”: To urge onward and direct the course of (a vehicle or the animal which draws it, a railway train, etc.);...to cause to move along. 

[66] The Court discussed these definitions in the context of the Motor Vehicle Act at para. 13, concluding as follows: It is my view, that when it is intended to describe conduct in relation to a motor vehicle, the ordinary meaning which attaches to the verb “drive” in the English language is one that combines the elements of movement and control; movement of the vehicle and control of that movement by the person said to be driving. 

[67] I accept this is a valid definition of driving for purposes of the Motor Vehicle Act, and I consider myself bound to follow it in the circumstances of this case. 

[68] Pursuant to s. 2 of the Motor Vehicle Act, a “motor vehicle” means a vehicle, not run on rails, that is designed to be self-propelled or propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but does not include mobile equipment, a motor assisted cycle or a regulated motorized personal mobility device. Clearly, the Sprinter van was a “motor vehicle” as defined in the Motor Vehicle Act. 

[69] Giving effect to the Defendant’s argument would be the worst example of elevating form over substance. It would render virtually any law meaningless, merely by referring to the prohibited conduct by another name. One could not be convicted of shoplifting when they were simply repurposing unsold goods for personal use. Assault would no longer be criminal, when the Defendant was guilty only of intentional force application absent consent. Murder would be allowed as purposeful non-consensual early life termination. 

[70] I give little consideration to the Defendant’s argument that laws and regulations are only meant to direct the conduct of government employees. That argument falls under the rubric of nonsensical submissions that deserve summary dismissal. Like it or not, one cannot simply “opt out” of the laws and regulations with which one does not agree. 

[71] Society provides many benefits to its citizens, including the construction and maintenance of roadways to allow for free travel. In exchange for so doing, citizens are bound by the rules that dictate how these collectively owned assets are to be utilized. Driving is a privilege, not a pre-ordained human right. That is the cost of society, of technology, and of community. As it has been said at least since the 1930’s, “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.” If one is unprepared to abide by the laws and regulations that govern the privilege of driving, one can simply choose not to drive. 

[72] I further dismiss the following of the Defendant’s arguments on the basis that they are meritless and deserving of summary dismissal because they have no chance of success: 1. That he is not Kenneth Cooper, but rather Tiberius or Tiberius Rex, and by changing his name, he has disassociated himself from the person charged with these offences. I am satisfied that the Defendant is the one who is alleged to have committed the offences. 2. That, because the Defendant’s former name appears in all capitals in the information, and the name given to him by his mother was not so capitalized, somehow this has bearing on the ability of the prosecution to pursue the matter against him. It does not. 

[73] It is clear that the Defendant was driving the Sprinter van on May 24, 2020. He said in his evidence that he was, even though he called it “travelling”. It is equally clear, and admitted by him, that he was prohibited from driving the entire day of May 24, 2020. ... 

[84] Finally, the “due diligence” defence described in s. 233 is inapplicable, as the Defendant exercised no due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. He simply considered himself not to be bound by laws, acts or regulations pertaining to the possession of unstamped cigarettes. ... 

[95] Additionally, the Defendant characterized himself as a “non-Status Native”, and argued that this entitled him to possess unstamped tobacco in any amount he wished. He further argued that all of Canada is “native land”; as such, possession of these products anywhere in Canada is lawful. 

[96] These defences fall under the rubric of specious arguments that ought to be summarily dismissed. It is clear that the Defendant was stopped on Highway 1, in an area that was not part of any designated First Nation reserve. I reject his argument that all of Canada is “native land”, and therefore he ought to be exempt from these charges. If I was to accept this argument, it would render the entire taxation scheme for tobacco products in British Columbia unenforceable. There would be no need for taxation stamps, as there would be no possession off reserve lands. Clearly, that was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting the Tobacco Tax Act or Regulation. It is a philosophical argument put forth for the purpose of shirking liability for these regulatory offences. It is not a defence to the possession charges faced by the Defendant. 

[97] Similarly, the Defendant baldly asserted that he was a “non-Status Native” without: 1. Any explanation as to what that meant; or 2. How his claim of being a “non-Status Native” would impact his ability to possess the tobacco products. 

[98] Section 98(2) of the Offence Act, [R.S.B.C. 1996] C. 338 stipulates: (2)The burden of proving that an exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification prescribed by law operates in favour of the defendant is on the defendant, and the prosecutor is not required, except by way of rebuttal, to prove that the exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification does not operate in favour of the defendant, whether or not it is set out in the information. 

[99] I found no wording in the Tobacco Tax Act or Regulation that referred to exemptions that exist for “non-Status Natives”. Nor was I pointed to any enactment that would indicate such an exemption existed. Given prima facie evidence of unlawful possession, and pursuant to the operation of s. 98(2) of the Offence Act, without any basis to conclude that an exemption exists, I summarily dismiss the Defendant’s claims on the basis that they are devoid of merit. 

[100] The Defendant made a further claim that common law, or Caesar’s law as he called it, operated to overrule any rules enacted by government. Therefore, none of the Acts or Regulations he is alleged to have violated have any force or effect. I dismiss this argument as being simply untrue. 

[101] The Defendant suggested that this prosecution was fundamentally unfair because in some circumstances, some exemptions exist for some people, and not others. He used as an example the fact that individuals devoted to the Sikh religion do not have to wear helmets. Presumably he was referring to Sikh individuals riding bicycles or motorcycles. 

[102] The idea that because some because people are validly exempted from the law, therefore all people should be exempted from the law, is intellectually unsound, patently false and deserving of summary dismissal. 

[103] The Defendant’s claim that his right to travel freely through the country was violated is also dismissed. His travel is subject to the rules and regulations that govern that form of travel, including the Motor Vehicle Act. 

[104] Finally, the Defendant’s argument that since he did not consent to this prosecution, somehow it was unlawful, is summarily rejected. Such a claim is deserving of no further comment. It is not a valid use of taxpayer-funded resources to refute manifestly unsound, baseless conjecture.

Pseudos

Another OPCA judgment in James v District Court at Whanganui [2023] NZCA 181, with the Court referring to the appellant's approach as 'properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments. 

 [1] The appellant, who goes only by the name James, brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court in February 2022 in which he sought an injunction against the Whanganui District Court. The terms of the injunction were directed towards halting or challenging proceedings brought against James in District Court. It is not possible to discern the subject matter of the District Court proceedings with any certainty from the documents James has filed. 

[2] Churchman J struck out the judicial review proceeding as an abuse of process. James filed an appeal against Churchman J’s decision. In a minute, Miller J directed that the Court consider striking the appeal out as an abuse of process under r 44A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 (the Rules). He directed that James be given the requisite notice under r 44A(2) and, on the expiry of the time for submissions, the Registrar refer the appeal to a panel for decision on the papers. This is the issue now before us. 

[3] Rule 44A relevantly provides: (1) In addition to any express power in these rules to strike out an appeal, the court may, on an interlocutory application or on its own initiative, make an order striking out or staying an appeal in whole or in part if— ... (c) the appeal is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. 

[4] In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd, this Court explained that:

... a “frivolous” pleading is one which trifles with the court’s processes, while a vexatious one contains an element of impropriety. ... [One that is] “otherwise an abuse of the process of the court” ... extends beyond the other grounds and captures all other instances of misuse of the court’s processes, such as a [proceeding] that has been brought with an improper motive or are an attempt to obtain a collateral benefit. 

The High Court decision 

[5] As noted, Churchman J struck out James’ proceeding under r 15.1(1) of the High Court Rules 2016.[4] Rule 15.1(1) permits the court to strike out a pleading that: (a) discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (b) is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or (c) is frivolous or vexatious; or (d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. 

[6] In his pleading, James sought to distinguish between “the Man James” and “the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES” and asserted that District Court required the former’s written consent to “conduct any business” with the latter and that consent had been withdrawn. 

[7] It appeared to Churchman J that the form and wording of James’ statement of claim was consistent with that typically advanced by the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Litigants” who adhere to the “Sovereign Citizen movement”.  Essentially, these arguments proceed on the premise that an individual has both a natural persona and a separate legal or “corporate” persona and that the natural person cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the state without their consent. The Court has previously held that this position is untenable. Almost always, it will be viewed as an abuse of process by a litigant. Churchman J concluded that there was no legal basis for James’ claim against the Whanganui District Court and that the proceeding was an abuse of process. ...

[9] Otherwise, James’ submissions in response to Miller J’s minute can be summarised as being that his appeal is not an abuse of the process of the Court because his view of the law is right — that is, the District Court acted unlawfully, the High Court has failed to acknowledge his application for a “Void Order of Court”, and James now has a “fundamental Right of a hearing” in this Court. 

[10] The grounds of appeal, although expressed in a convoluted manner and although denying the concepts of “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and “sovereign citizen”, nevertheless rest on the argument regarding the “separation” between natural and legal persons and the rejection of Acts of Parliament unless consent has been given. They can be summarised as being that the District Court has no jurisdiction over James without him giving his consent, which he has not done, and that Churchman J erred in rejecting this argument. 

[11] The arguments that James relies on are properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments. They cannot succeed. Apart from the sovereign citizen arguments, there is no genuinely identifiable legal or factual error asserted. We are satisfied that the appeal cannot succeed. We consider that it is properly viewed as both vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.

In James v District Court at Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2309 the High Court stated 

[4] The applicant says that his name is James, and I will therefore call him that. His statement of claim seeks an injunction against the Whanganui District Court in the following terms:

Article One; The District Court has proceeded without consent to conduct business with the Legal Fiction JAMES JONES, James JONES, Mr J Jones, and all similar constructs of the Person Registered with Births Deaths and Marriages and having a Birth Date of 8th January 1951. Such action is unlawful. 

Article Two; The District Court refuses to acknowledge the true identity of the Man James as identified in a Statutory Declaration made to the DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS who is an agent of the CROWN CORPORATION OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED. The District Court obstructs the filing of documents which do not admit joinder Man to the Legal Fiction. Such action is unlawful. 

Remedy Sought 

There is a current matter to come before the District Court and the Applicant, because of previous District Court obstruction, seeks the High Court to issue an Injunction: Ordering the District Court to acknowledge that the living body of the Man, as indicated in the Statutory Declaration of Identity is the Man James and not the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES, date of birth 8th January 1951, and That the District Court, having been denied jurisdiction must obtain written consent from James in order to conduct any business with the Legal Fiction JAMES JONES, James JONES, J Jones, Mr J Jones, and all other similar constructs having the name Jones and with a birth date of 8th January 1951. 

[5] From the other documents that have been filed by James, it appears that his claim is based on the assertion that he is not subject to the laws of New Zealand. In an affidavit filed on 22 February 2022, James stated, among other things:

Jurisdiction follows a natural hierarchy. The order of jurisdiction is logical; Nature/God > Man/[Wo]Man > State/Government > Corporate/Person. Man lives in the jurisdiction of the Common Law, which is de jure “in Law”. A lesser creation cannot contradict the higher / creator. Corporations are the construction of Man and cannot rule over Man unless Man consents. Consent makes the law... ... There is no decree that the Office of Parliament can pass that can lawfully force One to consent to be subject to the rules of that Corporation, to argue otherwise would be a legal nonsense. I James, withdrew my consent to be governed by the CROWN on 17th January 2014 by way of a Claim of Right served on the Crown and perfected by my actions and a Default Notice creating an Estoppel by Silence, on the 28th January 2014.

[6] James alleges also that “Governments can never be Sovereign as they are Legal Fictions”, and that he has “never given informed, written consent to be governed or agreed to be Surety for the debt of a corporation”. 

Analysis 

[7] It appears that James has made his claim to the High Court with the goal of invalidating criminal proceedings taken against him in the District Court or various actions taken by the Police. 

[8] James’ statement of claim is made in terms commonly used by the ‘Sovereign Citizen’ movement. Such claims are made in the Courts not infrequently, and have been the subject of previous judicial commentary both in New Zealand and in other common law jurisdictions. They are often made in the context of applications for habeas corpus. 

[9] The Court of Appeal has recently described the Sovereign Citizen movement as:

...an ideology that first emerged in the United States in the 1970s. [The] core belief, for present purposes, is that [Sovereign Citizens are] not subject to the jurisdiction of the State (including legislation enacted by Parliament or decisions made by the courts). This belief is based (at least in part) on the dual persona theory — the proposition that individuals have two personas, one of flesh and blood and the other a separate legal or “corporate” personality that is subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Followers of the Sovereign Citizen movement believe that it is possible to dissociate themselves from their legal or corporate persona, and hence free themselves from the jurisdiction of the State. [They believe they have] successfully done this and, as a result, the State has no authority over [them].

[10] James’ statement of claim seeks to draw a distinction between “the Legal Fiction JAMES JONES”, “James JONES”, “J Jones”, “Mr J Jones”, and “all other similar constructs having the name Jones”. Such a practise is a hallmark of the behaviour described in the Canadian judgment Meads v Meads as being adopted by “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants”. In that case, the Alberta Associate Chief Justice identified three factors that unify such litigants, being:

(a) a characteristic set of variable strategies that they employ; (b) specific but irrelevant formalities and language which they appear to believe are or portray as significant; (c) the sources from which their ideas and materials originate; and (d) that they will only honour obligations created pursuant to law if they feel like it. 

[11] Through these practises, and the idea of the “dual persona” theory, adherents to the Sovereign Citizen movement attempt to argue that the laws and territorial authority of the Crown do not apply to them. James’ claim falls squarely within the types of claims brought by “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants”. 

[12] I adopt the Court of Appeal’s conclusions in Warahi to the effect that such arguments are untenable and without legal foundation. Acts of Parliament are binding on all persons within the geographical territory of New Zealand, and are upheld by the Courts. It is plainly true that “No person within New Zealand is able to dissociate themselves from their “legal persona” so as to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the courts”. 

[13] Further, as stated by Ellis J: ...it will inevitably be an abuse of process for a litigant to attempt to employ [Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument] concepts in seeking to avoid or defeat any state, regulatory, contract, family or other obligations recognised by law. 

Result 

[14] I am satisfied that James’ claims for an injunction against the Whanganui District Court are based on Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments, and that they have no legal foundation.

Vulnerability

'Reasoning From the Body: Universal Vulnerability and Social Justice' by Martha Albertson Fineman in Chris Dietz, Michell Travis and Michael Thomson (eds), A Jurisprudence of the Body (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) states 

This chapter offers a clear roadmap for the application of vulnerability theory. It engages with the ontological body in order to highlight the universality of vulnerability and its implications for law and policy. Embodied vulnerability and the inevitable social dependency it generates provide a clear and unambiguous challenge to [neo]liberal understandings of a legal subjectivity grounded in liberty, autonomy and rationality, as well as rendering incomprehensible models of the restrained state. In the construction of social institutions and relationships, the state is both inherently a primary social actor and the primary instrument of accomplishing social justice. Law and policy represent the ways in which state responsibility is defined and manifested in society. Placing vulnerability and dependency at the center of governance demonstrates the necessity for law and policy that are responsive to the realities of the human condition. Understanding the realities of vulnerability and dependency also reveals the there is an inherent and inevitable inequality of position in many social arrangements to which law must respond. Vulnerability theory helps to formulate the questions that can help us achieve justice through the law and policy that inevitably shapes the contours of these institutions and relationships. 

Reasonable Security

'Locking Down 'Reasonable' Cybersecurity Duty' by Charlotte Tschider in Yale Law & Policy Review comments 

Following a data breach or other cyberattack, the concept of “reasonable” duty, broadly construed, is essential to a plaintiff’s potential causes of action, such as negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and any number of statutory claims. The impact of an organization’s discretionary choices, such as whether to take specific security steps for a system, may result in potential risk to an individual, another organization, or the organization itself. Although organizations regularly engage in cybersecurity risk analysis, they may not understand what practices will be considered reasonable in a court of law and are therefore unable to anticipate downstream legal issues. Attorneys are likewise unable to confidently advise their clients on how to best avoid liability. This Article examines, in detail, potential sources for reasonably defining duty, and how organizations and attorneys might consider legal duty through the lens of cybersecurity risk management. 

Specifically, I call for a two-part cybersecurity duty analytic model: static, or objective duty informed by industry practices, and dynamic, or subjective duty informed by situational risk. For some doctrinal areas, this may work primarily as an analytic model, while for others, such as negligence, this could be formalized as a test. By offering a model for analyzing what cybersecurity duty ought to be, organizations can adequately understand how potential legal risk might be evaluated in order to implement practices that protect would-be plaintiffs and avoid liability. Moreover, courts can use this model to determine whether organizations have made decisions that avoid real, foreseeable risk to the plaintiff. Indeed, amidst an increasing frequency and diversity of cyberliability claims, legal analysis informed by actual risk analysis ensures that reasonable, rather than perfect, cybersecurity practices can be developed precedentially over time. 

Rights

'The Rebugnant Conclusion: Utilitarianism, Insects, Microbes, and AI Systems' by Jeff Sebo in (2023) Ethics, Policy and Environment comments 

This paper considers questions that small animals and AI systems raise for utilitarianism. Specifically, if these beings have more welfare than humans and other large animals, then utilitarianism implies that we should prioritize them, all else equal. This could lead to a ‘rebugnant conclusion’, according to which we should, say, create large populations of small animals rather than small populations of large animals. It could also lead to a ‘Pascal’s bugging’, according to which we should, say, prioritize large populations of small animals even if they have a low chance of being sentient. I suggest that utilitarians should accept these implications in theory but might be able to avoid some of them in practice. ...  

We are currently in the midst of rapid moral circle expansion. Animal advocates have made significant progress over the past fifty years by promoting the idea that we have moral duties to domesticated animals. We are now in the early stages of promoting the idea that we have moral duties to wild animals. Some of us accept that we have such duties because we think that we should help others when we can. Others of us accept that we have such duties because we think that we are harming many of these animals, and that we should reduce and repair these harms when we can. Regardless, the idea that we have duties to many nonhuman animals is fast gaining acceptance. 

This moral circle expansion raises many difficult questions about our moral priorities. For instance, humans are currently harming and killing tens of billions of domesticated animals per year and hundreds of billions of wild animals per year. At least in terms of scale and neglectedness, then, our duties to current and near future nonhuman animals would seem to take priority over our duties to current and near future humans, all else equal. Granted, we might think that we should prioritize humans for other reasons, including reasons involving tractability and indirect effects, as we will see. Still, we are slowly coming to terms with the idea that nonhumans matter much more than we previously thought. 

But as substantial as this moral circle expansion has been, it is not nearly complete. For instance, our discussion of duties to captive and domesticated animals tends to focus on animals such as cats, dogs, cows, pigs, and chickens. And our discussion of duties to free and wild animals tends to focus on animals such as chimpanzees, elephants, koalas, dolphins, and polar bears. While there is no single category that includes all these animals, in general we seem to focus more on large animals than on small animals, on vertebrates than on invertebrates, and on land animals than on aquatic animals. The result is a moral community that is many times larger than it was before, but still many times smaller than, I believe, it should be. 

When we take seriously the possibility of a moral community that includes all sentient beings – large and small, vertebrate and invertebrate, terrestrial and aquatic – we realize that this next expansion might, if anything, be even more transformative than the last one. The world is full of conflicting interests and needs, and it is also full of very different kinds of populations. For instance, if we have to choose between improving the lives of a small number of large animals and improving the lives of a large number of small animals, then which should we choose and why? This kind of case requires us to think not only about what we owe each kind of animal but also about how to compare these duties when they conflict. 

Suppose that we determine that large animals like humans have more welfare on average but that small animals like insects have more welfare in total. What follows for ethics and politics? Which populations should we prioritize within each generation, all else equal? And which populations should we prioritize across generations, all else equal? Suppose further that we determine that many beings, including microscopic organisms and current and near future AI systems, are at least possibly sentient, and that the size of these populations relative to insects rivals the size of insect populations relative to humans. How, if at all, should that possibility affect our moral priorities within and across generations? 

My aim in this paper is to survey these questions from a utilitarian perspective, building on work from Horta, Ng, Tomasik, and others. I will show that utilitarianism implies that insects can take priority over humans and that microbes or AI systems can likewise take priority over insects. Granted, we might still have reason to prioritize humans at present and in the near future, since our duties regarding the distant future outweigh our duties regarding the present and near future, and since improving human lives at present and in the near future is key to improving the distant future. But in this case, what saves utilitarians from one surprising conclusion might be another surprising conclusion. 

To be clear, while I focus on utilitarianism here for the sake of simplicity, I think that other moral theories face versions of these questions as well. Any theory that involves a duty of beneficence or a duty of non-maleficence will have to deal with questions about, say, how to set priorities between small populations of large animals and large populations of small animals, since there might be many cases where we have the power to help or avoid harming either the former populations or the latter populations but not both at the same time. So while my discussion here might focus on how one moral theory might navigate this strange future, we should keep in mind that this strange future awaits us all.

'A novel way of being together? On the depoliticising effects of attributing rights to nature' by Agnese Bellina in (2023) Environmental Politics comments 

The recent trend of attributing rights to nature arguably introduces a novel way of ordering the relationship between humans and nonhumans. But to what extent does it challenge the political, legal, and economic categories of modernity? By analysing the processes that led to the inclusion of the rights of Mother Earth in the Bolivian legal system, I explore whether and how rights of nature express a distinct form of relating to the environment. Using the lenses of juridical symmetry and political conflict, I argue that attempts to ascribe rights to ecosystems can be read as examples of hyperpoliticisation which ultimately result in depoliticisation. I contend that rights of nature bring together the neutralisation of political conflict by extending the logic of juridical symmetry to nonhuman entities. Thus, far from constituting a renewed way of being together, these processes reiterate the aporia of the modern Western conceptual horizon. ... 

In September 2008, Ecuador became the first country to attribute legal rights to nature by incorporating the Derechos de la Pacha Mama (Rights of Nature) into the new constitution (Tanasescu 2013). In January 2009, the Bolivian Constituent Assembly adopted the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, therein constitutionalising the protection of Mother Earth. These initiatives soon gave rise to flourishing global movements, which resulted in a broader attribution of rights to ecosystems around the world. In 2010, the Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature was established to coordinate grassroots initiatives working towards the implementation of rights of nature. In 2014, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Te Urewera Act recognizing the Te Urewera National Park as a legal entity with all the rights, power, and obligations of a legal person (Sanders 2018). In 2017, the Whanganui River in New Zealand and the Indian Ganges, with the Yamuna as its main tributary, became legal and living entities (Kothari et al. 2017). More recently, in April 2020, the municipality of Curridabat in Costa Rica attributed citizenship to pollinators, trees, and native plants (Greenfield 2020). In July 2020, the Spanish municipality of Los Alcazares recognized the Mar Menor lagoon as a subject of rights (Alvarez 2020). 

This trend of attributing rights and legal personhood to ecosystems raises a series of theoretical and empirical questions regarding the stakes of such attempts. The inclusion of a diverse array of nonhuman entities within the modern legal rights framework requires a critical analysis of modern conceptual categories. Existing literature often assumes that ascribing legal rights to the ecosystem expresses a novel way of ordering the relationship between humans and nonhuman entities. Recent debates on the attribution of legal rights to nature have focussed either on the normative foundations and procedural implications of rights of nature (hereafter, RoN) within the legal framework of environmental law (Calzadilla and Kotzé 2018, Kauffman and Martin 2018, Bétaille 2019, Kinkaid 2019), or they have examined the philosophical premises and consequences of the ontological extension which allows nature to be conceived as a bearer of rights. These latter contributions have positioned themselves as partaking in the ontological turn and in the formation of post-humanist, new materialist, object-oriented ontological approaches in contemporary philosophy and social theory. 

They are enthusiastic about attempts to ascribe rights to nature, which is portrayed as a revolutionary means to positively reorient interaction between humans and nonhumans (Burdon 2011, Maloney and Burdon 2014, Demos 2015, Boyd 2017, Puig de la Bellacasa 2017). Some have specifically argued for extending the legal right to own property to wildlife as a way to halt its destruction (Bradshaw 2020, Davies et al. 2021), while others have focussed on the potential of extending agency to nonhuman entities and using RoN as a tool to enhance political change (Winter 2021). However, as I will demonstrate, the above-mentioned streams of literature fall short when it comes to critically analysing the intrinsic aporetic dimension of rights-based claims and their consequent legal recognition. In other words, the literature on attributing rights to nature fails to analyse the extent to which RoN challenge the political, legal, and economic categories of modernity, such as the state’s monopoly of power, individual rights, and private property. 

More recently, increased attention has been directed at the need to problematise the implications of RoN, especially concerning the Eurocentric assumptions and exclusions entailed in such a paradigm. Some scholars within this stream of literature have addressed the overstated identification of RoN with Indigenous knowledge systems and the consequent risk of both depriving them of, and flattening out, their radical political potential (Todd 2016, Rawson and Mansfield 2018, Tanasescu 2020, Celermajer et al. 2021, Fitz-Henry 2021). Others have focussed critically on the political context in which RoN have flourished, raising concerns over the triumphalism often inherent in RoN narratives (Marshall 2020, Reeves and Peters 2021, Tanasescu 2021). This article builds on this latter stream of literature and contributes to the growing chorus of concern about the political implications of RoN. It does so by exploring the (un)intentional consequences of RoN, namely the implicit assumption of modern Western conceptual categories and the levelling of conflictual asymmetries through the positive affirmation of a flat juridical symmetry. When referring to juridical symmetry, I mean a characteristically modern mechanism through which formal juridical equality between equally free subjects is established by the state’s coercive power to found a lasting order (Chignola and Duso 2008, Hobbes 2018). Such a mechanism, which nowadays is extended to nonhuman entities, operates through the progressive neutralisation, and hence depoliticisation, of conflict and the consequent accumulation of a monopoly of power in the hands of the modern nation state (Benjamin 2021). 

My contribution further problematises the conversation about RoN in environmental politics, by exposing the shortcomings of a paradigm that has increasingly been mobilised as a novel way of being together, that is a more equal and just way to engage with and regulate the relationship between humans and nonhumans. I will critically explore a specific case of attributing rights to the ecosystem – the broad processes which led to the inclusion of the rights of Mother Earth in the Bolivian legal system – and consider whether these forms of relating disrupt the dominant socio-ecological arrangements built on individual rights, the state’s monopoly of power, and a proprietary regime of ownership. I scrutinise different gradients of juridical (a)symmetry and political conflict with the aim of tracing their inversely proportional relationship. I argue that attempts of ascribing rights to the ecosystem can be read as instances of hyperpoliticisation (i.e. a monopolisation of the political by the state) which ultimately result in depoliticisation (i.e. the foreclosure of the political). As such, far from constituting a way of challenging the modern logic of individual rights, private property, and the absolutisation of the state’s power, these processes reiterate the aporia of these specific modern Western conceptual categories. 

I conceive ‘the political’ as the conflictual dimension constitutive of social relationships where a given order is rendered visible and contested by those who are excluded from it (Lefort 1988, p. 11, Mouffe 2005 −9; Rancière 1999, p. 11). Conceived as such, the political brings forth the problematisation and disruption of an established configuration of power, and introduces the possibility of radical change in the form of conflicting alternatives. My use of ‘depoliticisation’ refers instead to the attempted neutralisation and foreclosure of conflict by means of displacing it from the field of public dissensus to that of techno-managerial manageable consensus (Rancière 2004, Swyngedouw 2011). By removing the space of contestation and debate, depoliticisation obliterates the possibility of change and thus reduces the political to an administrative instrument devoid of transformative potential (Zizek 2006). These notions of ‘the political’ and the process of depoliticisation guide the analysis of the cases presented here. The rationale for choosing the Bolivian case is that it offers an opportunity to trace the problematic dynamic underpinning the mobilisation of RoN by showcasing both the theoretical and practical implications inherent in such paradigm. I do not mean to universalise the Bolivian example by focussing on one particular case. Rather, I aim to show how a close reading of the legal and political processes through which legal rights have been attributed to nature can be a productive approach for advancing a critique of RoN. Although I can only offer a close reading of one case, this approach may well resonate with similar cases elsewhere. 

Section two of the paper provides an overview of the process that led to the adoption of the two laws that have operationalised the rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia. Section three offers a critical analysis of the text of these two laws and the Draft Law, with the aim of outlining the progressive depoliticisation of the most radical political claims contained within these texts. Section four turns to the TIPNIS conflict as a means to bring to the fore yet another dimension of the weakening of the political linked to a rights-based legal framework. Section five delves deeper into the aporetic implications of attributing rights to nature through the analysis of the homogenising effects of juridical symmetry applied to the cases presented. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of these arguments for environmental politics.

'A Wrong Turn with the Rights of Nature Movement' by Noah Sachs in Georgetown Environmental Law Review (Forthcoming) comments - 

Environmentalists have long dreamed of granting enforceable legal rights to nature, and their vision has recently become reality. Governments in the United States and abroad are enacting Rights of Nature laws, and many scholars have championed this burgeoning movement as one of the best hopes for preserving the environment. 

Legal rights for nature seem visionary, but policymakers and scholars are overlooking considerable problems with this approach. This Article spotlights these problems, including the vague and incoherent content of nature’s rights, the difficulty of defining the boundaries of natural entities, the absence of limiting principles for the rights, and the legislation’s lack of guidance for humans. Because the Rights of Nature movement relies on ad hoc litigation to enforce nebulous rights in court, it will likely lead to arbitrary and oppressive outcomes for humans while under-protecting nature. For these reasons, Rights of Nature is a wrong turn in environmental law and policy. 

While showing why the Rights of Nature project is likely to be ineffective and even unjust, this Article also examines possible reforms to make it palatable. I conclude that none of the reforms are workable. Rights of Nature offers a resonant battle cry for activists, but it is the wrong approach for addressing the global environmental crisis – and it could take us backward to a more polluted, degraded environment.

Licensing

Noting the licensing issue in Cartwright v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 168 where Member Cranwell dealt with a decision by the Queensland Police Service  to suspend the appellant’s firearms licence. 

QCAT's  Additional observations state that there may be some utility in addressing the grounds upon which the licence was suspended. 

 [7] The grounds of suspension were set out in the decision under review as follows:

Correspondence under your hand has been received indicating that you hold Sovereign Citizen beliefs relating to the laws in force in Queensland specific to their non-applicability to yourself. On the 28 December 2021 I note you attended the Rockhampton Police Station front counter asking for their [officer-in-charge] to be arrested. On the 30 January 2022 I note you attended the Rockhampton Police Station to demonstrate your anti- (sic) stance on COVID-19.

[8] The QPS concluded that Mr Cartwright may not be a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence, such that his licence should be suspended. 

[9] Section 28(1)(b) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (‘the Weapons Act’) gives an authorised officer the power to suspend a firearms licence if he or she “considers, on reasonable grounds, that the licensee may no longer be a fit and proper person to hold a licence”. 

[10] Section 10B of the Weapons Act relevantly provides: (1) In deciding or considering, for the issue, renewal, suspension or revocation of a licence, whether a person is, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold a licence, an authorised officer must consider, among other things— (a) the mental and physical fitness of the person; and (b) whether a domestic violence order has been made, police protection notice issued or release conditions imposed against the person; and (c) whether the person has stated anything in or in connection with an application for a licence, or an application for the renewal of a licence, the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular; and (ca) whether there is any criminal intelligence or other information to which the authorised officer has access that indicates— (i) the person is a risk to public safety; or (ii) that authorising the person to possess a weapon would be contrary to the public interest; and (d) the public interest. 

[11] Mr Cartwright has filed voluminous material in these proceedings. It is sufficient for the purposes of these reasons to include a brief extract from a submission filed on 4 June 2022:

The statement that I hold sovereign citizen beliefs is indeed an oxy moronic statement as I do not hold them as Queen Elizabeth the second is the sovereign and holder of all lands in The Commonwealth of Australia being that of we the people and I am just a mere share holder of the true Commonwealth of Australia. If you care to read international law it refers to a sovereign and a national never is the citizen-ship (Corpus Juris) of the trust territory under the Hague and UN charter treaties, being that of the Certificate of Birth Registration being a promissory note to fraudulently turn a child into property of the Reserve Bank and bringing that man or women (sic) into corpus juris.

[12] In Bradley v The Queen [2021] QCA 101 at [2], President Sofronoff described this style of submission as “a confused hodgepodge of confusion”. I am unable to engage with such submissions from Mr Cartwright on the basis that they are incomprehensible. 

[13] What I am more readily able to engage with is Mr Cartwright’s email to the Police Minister dated 21 January 2022, in which he stated:

I Nevin-John ask that you issue me with all classes of weapons ownership ... I also pray for an open and concealed carry permit as the last act with royal accent (sic) was the weapons act of 1973 requiring no licencing for men and women not persons. I Nevin-John ask that a permanent permit to buy be issued with my card that you re-issue as the acts and statutes apply only to legal fictions and as I have left the necromancy. 

[14] Mr Cartwright has evinced a discernible view that the Weapons Act does not apply to him. I do not consider that it is in the public interest to issue a firearms licence to persons who do not consider themselves bound by the Weapons Act, and therefore consider that Mr Cartwright is not a fit and proper person for the purposes of section 10B(1)(d) to hold a firearms licence.