Attention Biopolitics

'Attention as an object of knowledge, intervention and valorisation: exploring data-driven neurotechnologies and imaginaries of intensified learning' by Dimitra Kotouza, Martyn Pickersgill, Jessica Pykett and Ben Williamson in (2025) Critical Studies in Education comments 

Innovations in mobile neuromonitoring and brain–computer interfaces are increasingly used to inform understandings of human brains and behaviours while also catalysing imaginaries of neuroscientifically measured and enhanced economic productivity. In this paper, we focus on neurotechnologies that claim to capture, monitor, measure and train learners’ attention. We analyse a corpus of relevant scientific, governance, and commercial texts to explore how they reconfigure learners’ attention as an object of knowledge, intervention, and valorisation. We demonstrate that outcomes- driven neuroscience research and technological development tends to split attention into optimal and undesirable forms: externally versus internally oriented, and synchronised versus unsynchronised with others, which become the variables of intervention to optimise attention. Commercial wearables, in turn, envelop desirable forms of attention under logics of brain control, social discipline, and valorisation. This process is enacted within an international context of speculation on neurotechnology investments and their anticipated outcome of enhancing future human productivity. Circumscribing desirable forms of learner attention and subjectivity, these technologies provide expanded means to mould and monitor learners’ attention towards performativity regimes of economised education governance while enabling profit-making based on learners’ activity.

They note 

Neurotechnological research and development has received billions of dollars of state funding across the world in recent decades via large-scale brain science projects. This reflects, and further intensifies, a focus on neuroscience as an object of significant social and political investment and concern (Pickersgill, 2023). Today, the increasing portability of neuroimaging and its integration with software allow analysing and visualising ‘millisecond-by-millisecond’ brain data thought to reflect cognitive processes (Davidesco et al., 2021, p. 650). These advances have been hailed as capable of ‘unlocking the secrets of how the human brain works’ (Mathieson et al., 2021, p. 8). 

One focus among many has been the field termed ‘educational neuroscience’. While this has for some years asserted that its epistemic products can provide new insights to teachers (Howard-Jones et al., 2021), well-funded neurotechnological advances enable neuroscience to propose going beyond these founding ambitions. Combined with learning analytics and AI, technologies are anticipated by some proponents to deliver algorithmically personalised education alongside various other tools to enhance learning capacity (Davidesco et al., 2021, p. 650; Edelenbosch et al., 2015). 

Within the US especially, the notion of ‘attention’ in education is emphasised through research, policy, and economic infrastructures that promote neurotechnologies to measure, monitor, and enhance learners’ attentiveness. Research in this area involves tried- and-tested techniques such as electroencephalography (EEG) – which visualises brain electrical activity – and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a technique to represent blood flow as a means of generating information about brain activity. Learners’ attentional control is increasingly presented as a datafied object of knowledge and intervention in the broader context of concern around ADHD and digital distraction. Using fMRI, cognitive neuroscience is said to have revealed the ‘attention networks’ in which children with diagnoses of ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) are thought to have a ‘deficit’ (Posner, 2013, p. 15). Further, various attention-targeting neurotechnologies currently in development promise to improve attention and address ADHD symptoms. Indeed, the relevance of cognitive neuroscience to education has often been advocated in the context of rising levels of ADHD diagnoses and parental concerns that ‘typically developing children’ will not be able to resist the temptations of the ‘digital age’ (Posner, 2013, p. 14). Perhaps ironically, then, social anxieties around attention have shaped interest in, and a market for, neurotechnological interventions within education. Such developments resonate with broader trajectories of governance. Since the 1980s, educational governance internationally has been increasingly guided by economic theories of human capital (Roberts-Holmes & Moss, 2021). This ‘economisation of education’ renders it as the process of individuals acquiring skills and personal qualities to form a productive workforce (Connell, 2013). Subsequently, it also involved economists’ interest in ‘the neuroscience of human capability formation’ (Heckman, 2007, p. 13250). Education is repeatedly submitted to what Foucault (2008, p. 247) has called a ‘permanent economic tribunal’, in which governance structures – such as OECD’s international student assessment – metricise, standardise, and compare schools and educational systems, subjectifying through the proliferation of numbers (Grek & Ydesen, 2021). 

Under this regime, the learning process has become an object not only of economic management but also of the scientific management of learning. This is expressed, for instance, as policy interest in the ‘learning sciences’ and most prominently in educational neuroscience (De Vos, 2016; Pykett & Disney, 2016). Internationally, organisations like the OECD and UNESCO have generated policy- influencing agendas for educational transformation around the promises of neuroscience and neurotechnology. For the OECD, optimised human cognitive performance – figured as ‘brain capital’ – is thought necessary for long-term productivity and economic prosperity, and is to be measured and improved by neuroscientific instruments (OECD, 2021; Smith et al., 2021). Educational neurotechnology, in this policy discourse, is imagined as having an ‘immense potential to improve student learning and cognition’ (UNESCO, 2023, p. 6). 

Anticipatory enthusiasm about the possibilities of neurotechnology in education redoubles existing socio-cultural fascination with the neurological and its attendant subjectivities (De Vos, 2016; Pickersgill et al., 2011; Pykett & Disney, 2016; Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013; Vidal & Ortega, 2017). Neuroscience is expected to help ‘stretch’ children and provide tools to improve their learning outcomes, not least by finding therapeutic solutions to increasing rates of ADHD diagnoses (Cortese et al., 2023). Coupled with the growing market in learning analytics – which monitor university students’ data traces and use algorithms to assess engagement, predict performance and help and prevent lapses and drop-outs (Kotouza et al., 2021) – these technologies enable new ways to directly monitor, assess, and train attention in educational settings. This leads us to ask: what might be the implications for the shaping (and reduction) of students into attentive and productive learner subjects? More specifically, what aspects of this subjectivity are targeted via scientific and economic forms of control, and in what ways? 

This article is a step towards answering such questions, by concentrating on the production of knowledge and technology in neuroscience that addresses attention in education. It is informed by critical studies of the implications of neurotechnologies for knowledge production, governance and contemporary forms of economic organisation (e.g. Pickersgill, 2023), as we outline conceptually in the following section. Specifically, by building on such theorisations of the epistemic, interventionist and economic dimensions of neuroscience, we explore how ‘attention’ is (re)configured as: (a) an object of knowledge, by examining how concepts of attention and distraction have shifted in educational neuroscience studies; (b) an object of intervention, by looking at how those concepts are operant within emerging neurotechnologies used to measure, monitor, and enhance learners’ attention; and (c) an object of valorisation, by tracing how attention neurotechnologies enable learners’ attentional activity to enter, in different forms, circuits of valorisation.

Unjust Enrichment

'Is there an Unjust Enrichment Disaster in Australia' by Luke Bennett and Sagi Peari in (2023) 50(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 240 comments

 Australia presently stands at the crossroads with respect to restitutionary claims. The recent vehement critique of the classical unjust enrichment formula for grasping the nature of those claims deserves attention. It has ignited a new wave of scepticism, challenging the fundamentals of the formula and the very notion of unjust enrichment as a legitimate ground of liability in private law. Does this critique, made primarily in the UK context, apply to Australia? To answer this question this article presents the critique and contemplates whether it applies to the Australian landscape.

 The authors argue

Professor Peter Birks’ four-stage formula of unjust enrichment has been widely accepted as the normative framework for grasping the nature of the restitutionary claims. This formula asks the following four questions:

1. Has the defendant been enriched? 

2. Was the enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense? 

3. Was the enrichment unjust? 

4. Do any defences apply?

The formula requires demonstrating that a plaintiff transfers some economic value/benefit to the defendant (aka ‘enrichment’). The ‘at the plaintiff’s expense’ element requires establishing a causal link between the defendant’s enrichment and the plaintiff. The ‘justice’ element in the formula has been perceived as referring to a broad range of factors or causative events recognised by law, such as mistake or undue influence. Finally, once the plaintiff establishes the first three elements of the formula, the defendant could argue that one of the defences applies. For example, the defendant could argue that they changed their position by spending the received value in good faith. Consider a trivial scenario of a mistaken payment according to which A confuses one of the numbers during an online bill payment process, erroneously paying $100 to C, instead of B. In order to meet the first three elements in this formula, A would need to show that C received the value (i.e. $100) from A and this benefit took place within the context of one of previously recognised unjust factors (i.e. mistake). C on their part could argue that they innocently spent the $100, what could amount to their ‘change of position’. 

The Birks’ four-stage formula has been firmly endorsed by the United Kingdom’s (UK) highest courts. Following a wave of academic and judicial support, unjust enrichment has also been recognised as a separate cause of action in other jurisdictions, such as Canada, South Africa, Singapore, New Zealand, Germany, France and China. While some differences are present amongst the systems, it is clear that the core notion according to which defendant’s unjustified enrichment provides the normative basis for understanding the nature of the restitutionary claims, has been gaining overwhelming support. The law of unjust enrichment claims its distinctive place alongside the traditional categories of private law, such as property, contract and torts. The recognition of unjust enrichment is therefore critical to facilitating the internal rationality and coherency of private law. 

However, unjust enrichment’s role in Australia is somewhat complicated. Australia’s jurisprudence hesitates on this point. Despite the early recognition of unjust enrichment in the seminal Pavey decision, the High Court remained hesitant to substantively engage with and apply the unifying formula; primarily influenced by the reasoning of Justice Gummow and the Farah decision where the brakes on the emerging unjust enrichment jurisprudence were firmly pressed, holding that ‘it was not the place of lower courts to develop or recognise novel forms of claims based on unjust enrichment reasoning that might render established equitable doctrine otiose’. Overall, ‘to read the High Court’s references to unjust enrichment is to appreciate the impressive range over which judicial prose can express disapproval’. 

As it currently stands in Australia, unjust enrichment is not itself a cause of action, but instead functions as an analytical framework for structuring restitutionary claims. The distinction between ‘cause of action’ and ‘analytical framework’ is an obscure one that has only furthered conceptual uncertainty regarding the scope and nature of restitutionary claims in Australia. A solid framework is required to ensure these claims are not based on ‘idiosyncratic notions of what is fair and just’. 

Against this background, the recent vehement critique of the Birks’ four- stage formula by University of Oxford academic, Professor Robert Stevens, deserves attention. Presented in the powerful 2018 article titled The Unjust Enrichment Disaster and more recently in The Laws of Restitution monograph (2023, Oxford University Press), the critique has ignited a new wave of scepticism, challenging the fundamentals of the four-stage formula and the very notion of unjust enrichment as a legitimate ground of liability in private law.29 Clearly, the effect of Stevens’ critique goes beyond fostering increased academic discourse. Thus, Lord Andrew Burrows, a former academic frankly acknowledged that the critique was influential in, and provided the foundation for, the Supreme Court’s decision to overrule Sempra Metals Ltd in Prudential Assurance Ltd in the UK. 

This article has two goals. First, it involves a presentation and examination of the Stevens’ critique. Second, it considers the relevancy of those to the Australian jurisprudence. Accordingly, Part II presents the negative and positive aspects of Stevens’ argument, traces Stevens’ examples made primarily within UK jurisprudence and discusses the possible concerns that have been and could be raised against Stevens’ views. Part III examines the key restitutionary decisions in Australia and contemplates whether Stevens’ argument (and the concerns expressed against it) applies to the Australian landscape. Part IV offers some concluding remarks.

Mortality

'Representations of Immortality and Institutions in 21st-Century Popular Culture' by Devaleena Kundu and Bethan Michael-Fox in Kate Woodthorpe, Helen Frisby, and Bethan Michael-Fox (eds), Death and Institutions: Processes, Places and the Past (Bristol University Press, 2025) 161-175 comments 

This chapter examines how death and institutions intersect in four 21st-century popular cultural representations of immortality. While the routes to immortality in the four texts examined are varied, the chapter shows how powerful and elite institutions are positioned as central in all of these cultural representations of immortality on screen and in literature. Considering one film documentary – Freeze Me (2006), two television series – Torchwood: Miracle Day (2011) and Upload (2020–) – and one narrative fiction novel – Death at Intervals (2008), the chapter shows how a range of popular cultural narratives produced between 2005 and 2020 effectively function as spaces through which to negotiate shifting ‘real life’ anxieties about the medical and political institutionalization of death in the early 21st century. Questions about whether institutions can be trusted and about the roles they play in deciding what life and death are, as well as who gets to live and die, come to the fore across this range of popular cultural examples, demonstrating how popular cultural texts can function as spaces through which to negotiate sociocultural concerns about mortality. The chapter shows how the institutions that feature in these four texts take on a shadowy form with often nefarious motivations and ties to economic and social privilege.

Freemen and a 'nonsensical and harmful mix of legal words, terms, maxims, extracts and statutes'

In Ryan v LVR Capital Ltd [2024] EWHC 1866 (Ch) the Court states

 It is apparent from the evidence that Phil Ryan (who had chosen not to attend court for the hearing of these applications) is influenced by the "freeman on the land" ideology. This pseudo-legal movement holds that individuals are bound by statutes only to the extent that they have consented to them; there is also a belief that people can divide their identities. Those who subscribe to this philosophy may believe, wrongly, that they can avoid legal liabilities by executing transactions or making statements which appear, superficially, to be based on legal principles and language but which have in fact no basis in law. In Stamp v Capital Home Loans Limited [2024] EWHC 1092 (KB), Master Giddens, striking out three claims which also drew on freeman on the land thinking, described the building blocks on which the claims had been erected as:

a nonsensical and harmful mix of legal words, terms, maxims, extracts and statutes which are designed to look and sound good, at least to some. But they stand only as an approximation of a claim in law, a parody of the real thing. 

The same can be said here of many of Phil Ryan's contentions and communications. They comprise legal gobbledegook, a stitching-together of legal-sounding phrases, quotes from cases and names of statutes without any solid basis in legal principle. Phil Ryan's pseudolaw is drawn in part from the USA and contains references to both English and American statutory and other legal texts, particularly the Uniform Commercial Code, which is a set of laws governing commercial transactions in the USA, uniformly adopted into the law of each state.... 

By letters dated 1 May 2023, Phil Ryan wrote to the Secured Lenders, each letter enclosing a promissory note, in purported redemption of Loans 2 and 3. By the first promissory note, Phil Ryan, on behalf of the Company, promised to pay the bearer the sum of £660,108.76 on 1 May 2028. By the second, he (again on behalf of the Company), promised to pay the bearer the sum of £93,785.00 by 1 May 2028. Each covering letter said: "You may not wish to accept this however under Bills of Exchange Act 1882, you lawfully must and the delivery notification is deemed acceptance". 

This statement was legally wrong: the Secured Lenders were not obliged to accept the promissory notes in reduction or satisfaction of the lending. 

On 10 May 2023, letters of demand were sent to the Company requiring repayment of Loans 2 and 3. The Company did not repay the loans. In the period 19 to 23 May 2023, Phil Ryan caused the Company to file a series of MR04 Statement of Satisfaction forms with Companies House. These wrongly claimed that the charges had been satisfied and as a consequence Companies House treated them as discharged. 

In filing the forms, Phil Ryan described himself either as "promissory note issuer" or "secured part creditor" (or "secured party crediroe"). The reference to Phil Ryan as "promissory note issuer" is explained by the letters to the Secured Lenders dated 1 May 2023. The reference to being a "secured part(y) creditor" is probably to an "Omniversal Security Agreement" dated 16 March 2023 and purportedly entered into between "Phil Ryan Government Franchise Bailor" as "Debtor" and "Phil Ryan Non-Adverse, Non-Belligerent, Non-Combatant Party Bailee" as "Omniversal Secure Party" ("the OSA"). Although the OSA is somewhat redolent of a legal document by which one party grants a security interest over their property in favour of another, the language is little more than a meaningless jumble of words closer in nature to a magical incantation than a legal document. For example, it opens with a description of the OSA as being for: 

"the full facilitation by any conveyance through all communications for translation as assimilation of true value and worth in all facets of interstate, global, metaphysical, planetary, spiritual, dimensional, intrastate, domestic, and foreign commerce relations with full protection of God's Light, Truth and Love, Safe Harbour and Sinking Funds Provisions for all accounts, proceeds, property fixtures, product, goods, fixtures, things, signatures written, printed or typed, and services in account science correction techniques as they apply to commercial utility transmitters [commercial transmitting utility] in the modern adversarial opposing and inquisitorial systems" (square brackets in original). 

Phil Ryan sometimes describes himself as trustee of, or acting for, the Phil Ryan Trust. This description appears to derive from a set of documents signed by Phil Ryan and dated 31 May 2023 headed

"Phil Ryan Trust AN INTERNATIONAL IRREVOCABLE PURE COMMON LAW TRUST Pursuant to The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (Hague Conference on Private International Law) and Section 105 of the Uniform Trust Code". This is stated to be governed both by the "law of the state of WEST YORKSHIRE UNITED KINGDOM"

and "governed under Article 1, Second 10 of the Constitution of the United States of America." Again, whilst these documents bear some similarities to a declaration of trust and associated documents, in parts the language is incomprehensible and, taken together, their meaning and effect is wholly unclear. ... 

Phil Ryan responded to service of the Rectification and Appointment Application by sending Brecher a series of curious documents including a "Cease and Desist Order", a "Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure and Contest Acceptance", the promissory notes, an attachment to the OSA, a "Notice of Statement, Affidavit of Truth", a "Certificate of Trust" and a "Power of Attorney General & Hold Harmless/Indemnity Identity's" document. The documents follow the same pseudo-legal style of the OSA and trust documents. Their overall gist was that no money was owed to the Secured Lenders and that the Administrators were acting unlawfully, but the contentions made also included the odd concept of Phil Ryan claiming to be the executor of his own estate. 

On 31 July 2023, Phil Ryan sent further documents by email to Brecher, including: i) a copy of the application notice for the Rectification and Appointment Application with the words "offer to contract declined" added in red; ii) a copy of Brecher's letter serving the application with the same addition; iii) a document entitled "legal notice and demand", apparently addressed to "all City, County, State, Federal and International Public Officials, by and through UNITED KINGDOM STATE" which, though unclear, appears to suggest that the officials may be liable for large sums (payable in gold) for various violations of its provisions; and iv) invoices addressed to the firm and various solicitors in it, each in the sum of £24 million, payment of which was demanded in "physical gold", presumably issued pursuant to the "legal notice and demand" document. 

By order of 4 August 2023, His Honour Judge Hodge KC granted the Secured Lenders the relief sought on the Rectification and Administration Application. In his judgment, he said that the description of the various documents sent by Phil Ryan to Brechers before the hearing as "nonsensical legal notices" was a "restrained way of characterising the documents sent by Mr Ryan". Following service of the order upon him, Phil Ryan emailed the court and Brecher with a copy of the letter of service and sealed order with the words "offer to contract declined" added in red. 

Phil Ryan sought to appeal the administration order, but permission to appeal and permission to rely on fresh evidence was refused by Lewison LJ on 3 May 2024. 

In the meantime, on 20 October 2023 Phil Ryan emailed the Administrators contending that Church Street had been "repossessed pursuant to Common Law" and attaching an unissued claim form contesting the appointment of the adminstrators on various nonsensical grounds, including that it breached the Uniform Commercial Code, Magna Carta, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement. ... 

Notwithstanding the application to set aside the possession order, an eviction was scheduled for 23 May 2024. However, the High Court Enforcement Officer was unable to execute the writ of possession, despite the attendance of two police officers, as four men prevented him gaining access. His report records that Phil Ryan refused to accept the lawfulness of the writ of possession, citing Magna Carta, amongst other defences. The view of the enforcement agent was that Phil Ryan and his associates "were clearly prepared to offer substantial physical resistance if enforcement were to go ahead with notice" and advice from the police is that multiple officers will be required to take possession on a future occasion as a breach of the peace is likely. 

In the meantime, by emails of 14 March 2024, Phil Ryan, as trustee of the Phil Ryan Trust, purported to serve statutory demands, each for £24 million, on the Administrators' company (CG Recovery Limited), MS Lending Group Limited and Brecher and indicated that he was bringing private prosecutions against the Administrators, the directors of MS Lending Group Limited and Ms Gorsia of Brecher. 

In light of the statutory demands, CG Recovery Limited, MS Lending Group Limited and Brecher each applied for injunctions restraining the presentation of winding-up petitions against these companies. ICC Judge Mullen granted interim injunctions on 28 March 2024. In his ex tempore judgment (of which I have an unapproved note compiled by Brecher) ICC Judge Mullen said that the "strong flavour of the matter [was] that Phil Ryan is deeply aggrieved as to a placing of a company he is associated into administration and these statutory demands are made to those who have had a distinct role in putting it into administration…it is abundantly clear, Mr Ryan whether out of malice or being misguided has decided to inflict damage on entities connected to the administration". He also counselled Phil Ryan to think extremely hard as to whether he should continue his actions as there was a concern that he would disappear down a "legal rabbit hole". On 5 April 2024, notwithstanding the interim injunctions, Phil Ryan emailed Mr Robertson saying that winding up petitions had been issued against Brecher, MS Lending Group Limited and CG Recovery Limited and copies were in the post, although no such petitions were in fact received. The injunctions were made final on 11 April 2024 with an order for costs against Phil Ryan.

In  Stamp & Ors v Capital Home Loans Ltd (t/a CHL Mortgages) & Ors [2024] EWHC 1092 (KB) Master Gidden states

These three claims ('the claims') and the applications arising in them were considered together at a hearing at which they were understood to represent a much larger group of claims, ('the large group of claims') , now numbering over two hundred, which are substantially the same and in many instances are identical in the arguments advanced and the language used to make them. ... These applications are representative of similar applications to set aside orders previously made to strike out claims, or for them to be stayed. 

The outcome of the applications now before the Court is that all three claims are to be struck out. This outcome is not just a justification of the Defendants, it is also a mercy to Claimants who appear to have invested much in claims that are founded upon false learning and false hope. No one wants to be taken in by such things any longer than is really necessary. There are often understandable reasons why people are taken in, particularly where their circumstances are difficult and the temptation exists to seek a prize or windfall which others in better circumstances may not be distracted by. But once a deceit is exposed, however disagreeable this may be, it is better to shake dust from feet and move on. In these claims, and the far greater number they represent, the prize has appeared to be to recover compensation equal to the value of a mortgage, and better still the value of the property against which it is secured, as a consequence of a mortgage lender transferring the mortgage debt owed, to them, to a third party. It is to all intents and purposes a 'get-rich-quick' scheme. Only it is nothing of the sort because the arguments that it relies upon, and which have clearly been made available to people to widely adopt, are so misconceived as to be fundamentally wrong. This deceit is all the uglier because the material that forms the building blocks of the claims (and the large group of claims) is a nonsensical and harmful mix of legal words, terms, maxims, extracts and statutes which are designed to look and sound good, at least to some. But they stand only as an approximation of a claim in law, a parody of the real thing. This is not only harmful to those finding themselves relying upon this material but, given the scale of that reliance and the volume of cases generated, it unjustifiably draws heavily upon the resources of the Court. Because these resources are publicly funded they are finite and need to be properly managed so that they are available to all users of the Court, and in fair measure. 

At the hearing two of the Claimants were present and a third, Mr Stamp, was not, having emailed the Court on 23 April 2024 to confirm that he was beyond the seas and that he relied upon the documents he had already delivered to the Court. Those present appeared in person and it is understood that there are no solicitors on record for any Claimant in any of the two hundred or more cases of this sort. This fact tells its own story as will be seen. Reasons were given for striking out all three claims with costs being awarded against the Claimants as not unreasonably sought by Defendants who have been put to task and expense by them. None the less a written judgment was also requested, and for good reason as will be apparent, if it is not already. The claims are an abuse of the Court on a number of levels. 

The Claims 

Mr Stamp's claim was issued on 6 July 2023. His wish is to receive damages of around £265,000 with interest at 8%. 

The claim form is accompanied by separate particulars of claim as well as a witness statement from the Claimant the lucidity of which is rarely matched amongst the other documents that are relied upon. Mr Stamp complains that the mortgage he agreed with the Defendant, CHL, was 'miss- sold' to him because CHL went on to assign or transfer its interest in the mortgage to a third party, a so- called (in banking parlance) Special Purchase Vehicle (the 'SPV'). By this Mr Stamp alleges CHL sought unjust enrichment although no particulars of such, in law or fact, are given. Mr Stamp refers to this activity by CHL as "legal manoeuvres" which is a description we see repeated in other claims. He maintains that the result is that he now has no contract with CHL but only a contract with the SPV. He contends the assignment of the mortgage to have been a 'true sale' of the mortgage and to have been unlawfully concealed by CHL, for tax-avoidance purposes, from both himself as borrower and HM Land Registry. By this concealment "the world remains ignorant of these events" is how Mr Stamp describes this (a description relied upon by all three claimants) and CHL are said to be in breach of section 33 of the Land Registration Act 1925. 

It is further alleged that CHL's conduct has been a "violation of fundamental constitutional rights". This assertion relies upon the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right 1628, the Treaty of Ripon 1640, Habeus Corpus Act 1679, the Coronation Oath Act 1688, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Treason Act 1795, the Judicature Act 1873, and on to the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2010, The European Union Act 2018 and concludes with the flourish Nemo me impune lacessit in a witting, or unwitting, nod to the fearsome history of service proudly borne by the Scots Guards. It is not explained how this long list establishes a violation of Mr Stamp's rights under the mortgage he agreed with CHL. It is difficult to see how mention of so many elderly statutes was intended to persuade the Court to find in Mr Stamp's favour. It is more likely that it was intended to sound credible and to encourage others to rely upon material like it in making a similar claim. If this is so, then the intention is a deceitful one. 

Mr Whitworth's claim was issued on 13 September 2023. His wish is to receive damages of around £712,000. 

The claim was accompanied by Particulars of Claim and supported by a statement that included a statement of truth signed by Mr Whitworth (albeit not in compliance with CPR 22PD.2). Much of the claim form is identical to that presented by Mr Stamp. The Particulars complain of a "true sale of my mortgage" by the Defendant, Lloyds Bank ('Lloyds') by which is meant an assignment of the mortgage by Lloyds, to a Special Purpose Vehicle, a 'securitisation' which Mr Whitworth says was concealed from him; and so "the world remains ignorant of these events". It is alleged that following these "legal manoeuvres" Mr Whitworth, "never had and no longer has", a contract with Lloyds. It is contended therefore that Mr Whitworth's mortgage was thereby "mis-sold" to him and Lloyds proceeded to unjust enrichment, and that he is a victim of an unlawful act with Lloyds having violated his "fundamental constitutional rights". Like Mr Stamp, Mr Whitworth pins his hopes on the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right 1628, the Treaty of Ripon 1640, Coronation Oath Act 1688, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Treason Act 1795, the Judicature Act 1873, and so on to the Human Rights Act 1998. The Defendant points out that there is no obvious connection between this long list of legislation and any dispute between Mr Whitworth and Lloyds. 

The third claim is that of Mr Le Clere. It was issued on 7 December 2023 and accompanied by Particulars of Claim running to 10 pages with a statement of truth. He too complains of the, now familiar, "legal manoeuvres" by the Defendant, the Bank of Scotland ('BoS'), whereby assignments of the mortgage took place to a third party, as part of a securitisation of the debt owed to the bank. It is contended that these assignments were deliberately concealed from Mr Le Clere and HM Land Registry. It is alleged that the assignments that took place were illegal, fraudulent and criminal, or at least that they might have been. But Mr Le Clere, who is clearly a man not short of curiosity or ability, does have to accept that he does not actually know these things to be true. He also accepts that in this regard his claim is a speculative one. He says that he has asked to see the contract, and deed of assignment and indemnity insurance that relate to his mortgage and that he has not received the full provision of documents from the Defendant that he was expecting and that would put his mind to rest. All of this he characterises as a violation of his fundamental constitutional rights and as a failure by BoS to exercise its public duty, or function, thereby "bringing the administration of justice into disrepute". He complains of a decision that was incorrect by reason of procedural irregularity and decision-making that took into account improper considerations and entirely missed relevant ones. The impugned decision itself though is not identified. Among others he relies upon the Magna Carta 1297, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Scottish Claim of Right Act 1689, the Union with Scotland Act 1706, Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the European Communities Act 1972 and Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006. 

Mr Le Clere acknowledges that without the mortgage he had agreed with BoS in 2000 he would not have been able to purchase 35 Gretton Road. He also accepts that the mortgage was indeed a debt he owed BoS and that it was repaid, in full, around 2009 upon his sale of the property. Along the way Mr Clere made all the payments he was required to make to BoS. It seems he was a model mortgagor and the loan transaction worked as it should, for the benefit of lender and borrower. Although Mr Le Clere remains anxious he confirms that since 2009 no further payment in respect of the mortgage has been asked of him. None the less, he sees himself as a victim of an unlawful act and maintains that he has suffered loss. He values this loss at around £1.1m, this being the value of 35 Gretton Road, at an unknown time, plus interest at 8%. He explains this by contending that following the assignments that he worries may have taken place he continued to pay instalments on a mortgage debt to a lender that he worries may no longer have been entitled to receive such payments and that he thereby "lost opportunities to do other things", as he puts it. 

The Mortgages 

Mr Stamp entered into his mortgage with CHL in July 2006. He maintains that this enabled him to borrow £90,000 which is at variance with the Defendant's value of the loan at £265,625. The mortgage, which Mr Stamp agreed to, enabled him to complete the purchase of 2 Victory House for £312,500 which he went on to sell in 2016 for £350,000. He tells us that through the lifetime of the mortgage he paid all the instalments that were due to be paid by him. The Defendant's records show the mortgage to have been redeemed in October 2016 which is now 7 and a half years ago. Mr Kelsall on behalf of CHL tells us that at no time did CHL sell or transfer its legal interest in the mortgage. 

Mr Whitworth initially borrowed £155,000 from the Lloyds in October 2001. This enabled the purchase of a property in Oxfordshire. A further £73,000 was advanced, and secured on this property, in June 2003. Lloyds agreed to receive payment of interest only and regular payments continued throughout the lifetime of the mortgage until 2022. Lloyds say there are now payment arrears of over £16,000. According to the bank's records a securitisation of Mr Whitworth's mortgage took place in October 2018. 

Mr Le Clere applied for a mortgage with BoS, in early 2000 and used the agreed loan of £195,000 in relation to his ownership of a property in Corby. The agreed term was 20 years but in the event the mortgage was redeemed in 2009, some 14 years ago. The BoS evidence is that there is no record of it having assigned the legal title to the mortgage to anyone at any time. 

The proceedings to date 

The first claim in time is that brought by Mr Stamp. It was issued on 6 July 2023. Like Mr Whitworth and Mr Clere he benefitted from the remission of Court fees which means the £10,000 fee to issue the claim was waived or effectively met by the public purse. A great many others amongst the large group of claims have been permitted to do the same. But not all. Some claimants have not been so accommodated and they can rightly feel aggrieved at having been led into significant and wasteful expenditure, and loss, in pursuing forlorn claims that will yield them no return. 

On 12 October 2023 CHL applied for an order striking out Mr Stamp's claim and/or for summary judgment. 

Having been issued in September 2023, Mr Whitworth's claim came before Master Thornett in October 2023 and an order was made that Mr Whitworth's claim be struck out as totally without merit. Mr Whitworth issued an application seeking to set this order aside on 22 November 2023. The application was accompanied by a document headed "Order" which was essentially a witness statement signed by Mr Whitworth but not affirmed by a statement of truth. The Court made a further order on 1 December 2023 requiring Mr Whitworth, and the Claimants in three other claims, to file a statement by 22 December 2023 addressing the Court's concerns that its procedures were being abused. Mr Whitworth has confirmed that he failed to comply with this order. 

By order of 19 December 2023 the Court of its own motion ordered that the claim presented by Mr Le Clere and issued on 7 December 2023 be stayed pending further order. On 20 February 2024 Mr Le Clere filed an application seeking to set aside the order of 19 December 2023 and to lift the stay of his claim. 

Further Common features 

It will already be apparent that there are a number of common themes and features to all three claims. Some have been noted already. In addition each describes the defendant as having failed to make a satisfactory response to a data subject access request, by which each claimant reports having sought signed copies of the mortgage agreement, the deed of assignment and evidence of indemnity insurance. Each claimant concludes that this failure points to the mortgage they entered into having been "mis-sold". To the same effect reliance is also placed on a Memorandum dated 1 April 2009 setting out evidence received by a House of Commons Treasury Committee from a Ms. Carmel Butler. This contains a number of personal observations by the author and general assertions about historic and regulatory issues in the banking sector. It is put forward as being authority for a number of propositions, not least for securitisation "many times" in Mr Clere's claim, but, as the Defendants rightly contend, it has no authoritative status before this Court. Mr Stamp also relies upon Chitty on Contracts. Many people do. This includes Mr Whitworth and Mr Le Clere. The very same extracts in fact, from the 27th (1994) Edition although these add little to build an understanding of the claims the Defendants are called to answer. 

The Strike out application 

The CHL application was to strike out Mr Stamp's Claim Form and the Particulars of Claim under CPR 3.4(2) on the grounds that: i) That the statements of case disclose no reasonable ground for bringing the claim, because they are incoherent and make no sense and/or do not disclose any legally recognisable claim; and/or ii) They are an abuse of the court's process or otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings, being obviously ill-founded and/or vague or incoherent and so badly drafted that they do not make clear the case CHL has to meet; iii) There has been a failure to comply with the CPR, namely the Claim Form and the Particulars of Claim fail to contain a concise statement of the nature of the claim and of the facts on which the C relies (required by CPR 16.2(1)(a) and 16.4(1)(a)). 

Mr Stamp's claim is entirely misconceived. It is difficult to see how an application by a defendant to strike out a claim like this could not succeed. The CHL application is supported by evidence which draws upon the Defendant's computerised records and confirms the relevant details that appeared on the register of title maintained by HM Land Registry and guaranteed by HM Government. In particular, the Defendant was named as the registered proprietor of the charge created by the mortgage which Mr Stamp agreed with CHL. Mr Kelsall's evidence confirms that the Defendant did not sell or transfer its legal interest in Mr Stamp's mortgage at any time throughout the lifetime of the mortgage. In light of this, the fact that the Defendant was registered as the legal owner of the mortgage is all that Mr Stamp or anyone else had to be concerned with. Being registered as the legal owner of the mortgage and remaining registered as the owner is sufficient for CHL to continue as the mortgagee to whom Mr Stamp was required to make all payments that he was contractually obliged to make, and in fact did make. 

Whilst CHL accept that at one stage an assignment of the equitable or beneficial interest did take place this was not a registrable event for the purposes of land registration as a consequence of section 27 of the Land Registration Act 2002 (and section 33 of the Land Registration Act 1925 that it replaced and to which Mr Stamp has referred). This provides that if a disposition of a registered estate is required to be registered, in order to be completed, then it does not operate at law until such time as the requirements of registration are properly met. This reflects the fundamental distinction between legal title and beneficial interest. Until the registration of legal title actually takes place all that can be transferred is a beneficial interest, an interest not in law but in equity, and this in itself is not a disposition or registrable event. This was considered by the Court of Appeal in Paragon Finance PLC -v- Pender and another [2005] 1 WLR 3412 which confirms that as registered proprietor of a mortgage the party registered as such retains legal ownership of it as long as that party remains the registered proprietor. One incident or feature of this, in relation to a legal charge on a property, is the right to receive the payments that the mortgagor or borrower has agreed to make. There is therefore no question of the contract between borrower and lender coming to an end as Mr Stamp has contended or indeed of the lender no longer being entitled to receive payments from the borrower. Even less is there any truth in the lie that consequent upon a lender's assignment of a beneficial interest the borrower may be entitled to compensation equivalent in value to the payments made under the mortgage or to the value of the property against which the mortgage is secured. 

... Another way of understanding this is to recognise that until such time as there was a change in the legal ownership of the mortgage there could be no change in the relationship between Mr Stamp and CHL; they remained the party receiving the loan and the party making it, debtor and creditor, with all the obligations to one another that they had agreed to. Section 58 of the Land Registration Act 2002 makes the matter of registration conclusive by providing that the register of title is conclusive as to the proprietor of a registered legal estate. In other words, a registered legal estate is deemed to be vested in the registered proprietor since the register is conclusive. As noted, this is because the only relevant obligation that arises is to register the assignment of the legal title to the mortgage. There is no obligation to register the agreement to assign that, by itself, remains no more than a beneficial interest in the mortgage since the party to which it is agreed the assignment will be made may not register it or indeed any beneficial interest arising from it. Not attempting to register something which cannot be registered is not, as Mr Stamp alleges, concealment. 

In all the circumstances Mr Stamp's claim ought properly to be described as incoherent and making no sense and/or failing to disclose a legally recognisable claim. For these very reasons CPR 3.4(2)(a) caters for such claims in providing for them to be struck out. Further CPR 3.4(2)(b) provides for a claim to be struck out where the Court considers it an abuse of process or otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. This ground for striking out includes statements of case which are unreasonably vague or incoherent and indeed so badly drafted that they do not make clear the case the defendant has to meet. A claim like Mr Stamp's, that asserts "I exercise my constitutional rights, Magna Carta 1215, Petition of Right 1628, Treaty of Ripon 1640,, Habeaus Corpus Act 1679, Coronation Oath 1688, Bill of Rights 1689, Act of Settlement 1701, Treason Act 1795…", and more, amongst others, is unlikely to pass scrutiny when challenged. Likewise, particulars of claim that contend "the problem is that wartime legislation has not required any change which deals with the Courts and constitution. They still have all the methods of judicial control; what has changed have been the powers of Government", with no reference to the facts or matters supposedly in dispute between the parties. No defendant to a claim like this can reasonably be expected to understand what the relevance of these passages might be and what it is they have to answer. Even less may the Court see a way in which it might begin to justify a claimant who relies upon this. For these reasons the application to strike out the claim must succeed. 

Mr Whitworth's Application to set aside the order striking out the claim. 

There are patently no sufficient or proper reasons to set aside the order already made to strike out this claim and the application must be dismissed. When asked to explain his claim and the various assertions made in it, Mr Whitworth was unable to do so. He appeared to be unfamiliar with a lot of the material that he was supposedly relying upon. Aside from the names of the parties, addresses and dates of birth, and valuation of property, Mr Whitworth's claim form and particulars are identical to those presented by Mr Stamp. Mr Whitworth failed to explain these similarities when ordered to do so in December 2023 but at the hearing conceded he had paid £1,000 to a company known as Matrix Freedom, of which Mr Stamp is apparently a director, to help with the application to set aside the order striking out the claim. It was not clear if Mr Whitworth had made other payments but he explained that he had an agreement with Matrix Freedom to pay them 10% of any compensation that he secured in bringing the claim. The Defendant contends that the claim is an abuse of the Court's process. The force of this is not lost on the Court and echoes the concerns which the order of 1 December 2023 addressed in giving the claimants named therein every opportunity to assist the Court with. None has done so. ... 

In light of this judgment further orders will now be made in the large group of claims. 

Abuse of the Court and its procedures 

The Court has an extensive and inherent jurisdiction to prevent its own procedures being abused. It is in the interests of all Court users that the Court takes proper steps to oversee the efficient administration of justice and to make sure that the procedures for such are not abused. When claims are an abuse this inevitably leads to disruption of the Court and the diversion of its resources. These are things that the Court must be expected to have proper concern for and which those who approach the Court for justice should share a concern for. This is particularly so where, as here, a large number of claims are presented to the Court over a short period of time and where on their face they take hopeless points and advance futile arguments that cast grave doubt on the intentions of those bringing them. Regrettably this is the backdrop to the orders that have been made to date in relation to the present claims and the large group of claims and this remains the backdrop. 

Contempt of Court 

It is a contempt of Court for any person to do any act in the purported exercise of a right to conduct litigation where none exists or has been sought or conferred. It is central to the efficient administration of justice that the Court takes a firm line with any person who appears to offer services to litigants in the higher courts where that person does not have the disciplines and competence of those who are professionally qualified and members of an appropriate professional body. 

The present claims and the larger group of claims feature over two hundred claimants, apparently acting in person and sharing a near miraculous uniformity of common purpose, style and prose. In the absence of greater explanation than has so far been made available, they have the appearance of involving a person, or more likely persons, whose involvement may well amount to the conduct of litigation and a conduct that is likely to be a contempt of this Court. It is worth being clear; this is potentially criminal conduct. 

With such claims there must inevitably be doubts as to the competence of anyone having an unaccounted involvement with, or co-ordination, of them. Such doubts arise in relation to the present claims and the large group of claims of which they are representative. 

Mr Whitworth was one of those who failed to help the Court when asked to do so in December 2023. In his own way he made some amends at the hearing by acknowledging that much of the claim was not his own work, that he did not really understand what he was asked to explain of the claim or his application, and that he had made at least one payment to Matrix Freedom in connection with the claim. 

For his part Mr Le Clere maintained that whilst he had heard of Matrix Freedom, and the Freemen on the Land Movement who appear to share some similarities of approach with Matrix Freedom, his only help had come from another claimant in the large group of claims, Deborah Stone, who had directed him towards templates that could be found on the internet and used to bring his claim. He admitted that the claim form and particulars of claim that he relies upon are two such templates and that when he was shown these he thought them really rather good; all of which reinforces the concerns the Court has. 

Mr Stamp was not present to speak to any of this although it is possible that he may have anticipated having to do so. In separate current proceedings in this Court Mr Stamp describes himself as "the founder, driving force, and Chairman of Matrix Freedom, a private members association with over 50,000 members" and states that he employs "a full-time staff of over forty individuals to support the services required by my members". Mr Stamp has at least four other claims that are currently before this Court. In these he appears to be active in pursuing defendants who hold unfavourable views about the products and services that are available from Matrix Freedom or as to the nature of the business and how it should be treated, amongst other things, for credit and tax purposes. 

In December 2023 five claimants, Stuart Whitworth, Susan Hall, Antony Craig, Elizabeth Craig and Josephine Payge were ordered to file a statement that explained to the Court why the claim form and particulars of claim they relied upon were in identical terms, to identify any person or persons who had purported to provide advice and assistance to them at any stage in preparing, presenting and progressing their claims. No sanction was provided in the order for non-compliance with this direction, as it might have been, since the Court 's intention was to share its concerns and seek assistance from those coming to it for justice. It was explained that the five Claimants were being given an opportunity to help the Court by providing explanation which the Court sought in light of the concerns it had identified and that the Court would take stock of all the information the Claimants helpfully and candidly were able to provide in arriving at such further directions as may then be required. The expectation that parties to justice will help the Court with the work of justice is clearly and simply reflected in CPR 1.3. The Court has its task in these things and the parties have theirs but fundamentally parties should be seeking to be involved in the plans and work towards justice that the Court directs in any given case, and they should be seeking to play their part and to complete the work of justice that they are given to do. Litigants that fail to do this all too often fall into the trap of seeing themselves contesting cases not just with their opponents in the proceedings but with the Court as well. This approach helps no one and the causes it serves have nothing to do with justice. 

The totality of claims that are the subject of this judgment have not revealed the full extent of the source, and nature, of encouragement and co-ordination that lies behind them but there is every appearance of deceit, of abuse and contempt of Court, and it is a matter of time before a full picture of these comes to light. Anyone drawn into bringing claims like this should be cautious. Those that promote them are duly warned. Claims that are presented with these characteristics can expect the Court's mercy and forbearance to be particularly limited. Claimants that are unable to explain the meaning of words that they appear to rely upon can expect to be frustrated and to lose money in the payment of fees that cannot be recovered and in costs ordered against them. Claimants that rely upon stock templates that are purchased by or given to them and that are nonsensical can expect to incur the Court's displeasure. Those indifferent towards wasting the Court's resources can anticipate having claims stayed or struck out and costs ordered against them. Claims listing elderly statutes and home-made legal labels and maxims can expect to be identified as being totally without merit. Those failing to comply with orders directing them in ways clearly aimed at providing assistance to the Court cannot expect to cast themselves in the light of being genuine and credible parties to justice. Those that pursue abusive claims can expect to be made the subject of orders that curtail their ability to adversely impact upon the proper and efficient administration of justice.

Assistance

In Johnstone and National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 106 the Tribunal has considered funding of a subscription to ChatGPT as part of support under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), aka the NDIS. 

The Decision states 

 The issue before the Tribunal is whether the certain supports are reasonable and necessary and should be included in the Applicant’s statement of participant supports (SPS) under sections 33 and 34 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (the NDIS Act). The Applicant is a 57-year-old man who lives with his spouse in Cairns. He is passionate about engaging in outdoor activities such as kite-flying, wildlife photography and bushwalking. He is also a keen volunteer with the State Emergency Services (‘SES’). The Applicant lives with a complex combination of significant physical, psychosocial and medical impairments. 

 As part of the Application for support Johnstone sought 

 a subscription to ‘ChatGPT’, which is the (well known) Artificial Intelligence application developed by Open AI. Mr Widmer, in his report of 23 November 2023, recommends the subscription version, which currently costs around $30 per month. Mr Widmer identified a number of benefits for the Applicant, including:

• Summarising and simplifying complex information; 

• Providing a less overwhelming interface compared to navigating websites and paperwork; 

• Text-to-speech recognition; 

• Offering a consistent and reassuring mode of communication; Facilitating reminders and storing important information; 

• Breaking down larger tasks into more manageable action; 

• Providing on‑demand assistance and information; Providing guidance in emergency situations; and 

• Helping build a support network.[143] 

While there is a free version, the Applicant says that he has trialled this version and it was not sufficient for his needs. The Applicant say that the advantages of the subscription version include:

• Enhanced buffer capacity allowing for more extensive and complex requests; 

• More consistent and reliable responses; 

• Improved leaning and adaption to the Applicant’s communication style; 

• Capacity to access and process external documents; and 

• Support for other Artificial Intelligence tools or ‘plug-ins’. 

The Agency submits that a subscription to ChatGPT is not reasonable and necessary as it is likely to pose a risk of harm to the Applicant and does not represent value for money, relative to the free version.[144] The risk identified by the Agency is that the use of ChatGPT may increase the possibility that the Applicant could be exploited because ChatGPT is still being developed and may not always provide accurate information. I am not satisfied that the risks identified by the Agency mean that the use of ChatGPT is likely to cause harm to the participant for the purpose of Rule 5.1(a) of the Support Rules. I accept that the Applicant is aware of these risks and would be able to respond appropriately. 

In her oral evidence, Mrs Johnstone explained how ChatGPT reduced the burden on her in helping the Applicant to understand documents and write and proof-read responses. Mrs Johnstone added that the paid version of ChatGPT assisted by remembering the history of previous requests. 

The Applicant also referred to the Tribunal’s decision in Gelzinnis,[145] which I have considered. In Gelzinnis the Applicant sought better internet access to implement an assistive technology plan, which was in turn intended to reduce reliance on support workers. The facts in Gelzinnis were quite specific to the Applicant and included poverty, limited internet availability in her accommodation and inability to access free public networks due to concerns with her disassociate episodes. I do not consider that the reasoning in Gelzinnis applies to Mr Johnstone’s situation. 

I agree with the Agency’s contention that the paid version of ChatGPT does not represent value-for-money compared with the free version. I cannot see anything specifically in Mr Widmer’s report that deals with the additional advantages of the paid version. The bulk of the features which would reduce carer burden on Mrs Johnstone appear to be available in the free version. The Applicant’s lived experience with the free version not being suitable is of some weight, but ultimately provides little else to support a finding that the paid version is value-for-money. I am not satisfied that the subscription to ChatGPT is a reasonable and necessary support.

the latest carnival of absurdity

More pseudolaw incidents in Western Australia, Victoria and Queensland

Cousins v WA Police [2025] WASC 39 notes

 On 18 May 2023 the appellant was convicted of three offences, namely speeding, failing to provide personal details, and obstructing a police officer. The convictions followed a hearing at which the magistrate had decided to hear and determine the charges in the appellant's absence under s 55(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). A charge of failing to comply with a direction to stop was dismissed at the request of the prosecutor. The conviction for the obstruction offence was set aside following an application made by the appellant under s 71 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 

The appellant represented herself before the magistrate and conducted her own appeal. The appeal notice contained 74 grounds. Many of the grounds did not raise valid legal arguments. Rather they invoked pseudo‑law concepts. That said, two appeal points could be distilled from the grounds. The first was that it was not open to the magistrate to convict the appellant in her absence and the second was that the prosecution notice was invalid. At the hearing of the application, I granted leave to appeal in relation to the first ground and refused leave in relation to the second. I allowed the appeal and made consequential orders and said reasons would be published later. These are those reasons.... 

The respondent applied for leave to rely on additional evidence on appeal. That evidence included an affidavit affirmed by the Senior Security Coordinator of the Department of Justice attaching two incident reports recorded in relation to the hearing in the Magistrates Court on 18 May 2023. The evidence provided an account of the events that took place at and following the hearing that was relevant to the magistrate's decision to proceed to hear the charges under s 55(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Pursuant to s 40(1)(e) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), I granted the respondent leave to rely upon the additional evidence. 

The appellant also applied for leave to rely on additional evidence on appeal and sought orders as follows:

(2) An Order that the Application in an appeal Dated : 6 September 2024 by the Respondent the Court strike out the Application on the grounds of it is an abuse of process, frivolous, vexatious, scandalous and improper and a witch hunt and has no merit at English Common Law under Chapter III Section: 71 to 80 Constitution Act 1900 UK and the Magna Carta 1215 and the Bill of Rights 1688 and all Imperial Laws and no evidence to the contrary can be fm1h coming by the Respondent, estoppel by acquiescence 

(3) An Order that CITATION: TEY -v- PLOTZ [2010] WASC 163 be enforced that the WA POLICE are not known at Law under the Supreme Court Jurisdiction as this Miscarriage of Justice has been Perverted by the State Solicitor and now committing 'Torture' on the Appellant by the Application in an Appeal of the Respondent. 

(4) An Order by the Supreme Court that Criminal Charges be brought against the State Solicitor Office for 'Torture' under the Crimes (Tortures Act 1988 (Cth) Section : 5. 6. 7. A Public Official or person acting in an official capacity, commits the offence of Torture if in Australia he/she intentionally inflicts suffering on another in the performance or purported performance of his official duties at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or of a person acting in an official capacity immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or mental and whether it is caused by an act or an omission 

In the light of the conclusion I reached as to the strength of the appellant's ground concerning the magistrate's decision to proceed to hear the application under s 55(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was unnecessary to deal with the appellant's application to adduce further evidence and for the other orders sought by her. ... 

Shortly after, the magistrate addressed the prosecutor and said, 'I'm going to have to set another trial date'. This remark prompted the following exchange:

[APPELLANT]: If you cannot hold this hearing here today - - - 

HIS HONOUR: Ms Cousins - - - 

[APPELLANT]: - - then this needs to be fully - - - 

HIS HONOUR: - - - I'm going to ask you to stop speaking and do not interrupt me. 

[APPELLANT]: Why are you shouting over me? This is my courtroom today. You've invited me here. Now you listen to what I have to say. 

HIS HONOUR: Okay. So, Ms Cousins, I'm going to have an adjournment. I'm going to walk out of this court in five minutes. 

[APPELLANT]: No. No, you cannot adjourn this. 

HIS HONOUR: I'm going to have an adjournment, Ms Cousins. 

[APPELLANT]: You cannot keep on dragging this on. 

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Can I speak? Am I - - - 

[APPELLANT]: You are speaking, but don't babble. 

HIS HONOUR: Am I allowed to - - - 

[APPELLANT]: Stick to the law. Stick to the facts and stick to the law. 

HIS HONOUR: Will you do me the courtesy of allowing me to speak, or not? Am I allowed to speak? 

[APPELLANT]: Yes, speak, but don't babble. 

HIS HONOUR: Sit down, please. Sit down, please. 

[APPELLANT]: I don't need to sit down. 

HIS HONOUR: Yes, you do, because I tell you you have to. 

[APPELLANT]: No, I don't. 

HIS HONOUR: Okay sit down 

[APPELLANT]: Where do you tell me I have to sit down? 

HIS HONOUR: Everyone out please. I'm having an adjournment and I'm coming back in. Clear the court. 

[APPELLANT]: You adjourned it last week because you could not - - - 

HIS HONOUR: We're adjourned. Thankyou

The court room was cleared. When the hearing resumed (and I infer from the transcript and the incident reports forming part of the respondent's additional evidence that this was only a matter of minutes later) the appellant was not present in the court room and when her name was called outside the court room she did not respond. I infer that the appellant was aware that she was required to re-enter the courtroom from ground 21 of the appellant's grounds of appeal which records 'the Court Clerk calling out the name of "Carol-Maria Cousins" after we were all removed from the Court Building'. 

Immediately after the adjournment and in the absence of the appellant the magistrate made the following observations:[

HIS HONOUR: ... The matters for Ms Cousins were called earlier. Ms Cousins herself was, in my view deliberately disruptive in her interactions with the court. When the matter was called earlier she had a large number of people who were, broadly speaking, supporters who were in the gallery of the court. They became disruptive and because of the combination of those factors, I adjourned the court. 

I've made a decision on security grounds and to ensure that the court can function as it ought to, that when the matter was recalled, that only the accused, Ms Cousins, would be entitled to enter and appear in the court, that is that the court would, otherwise, be closed. So that directive, I assume, has been communicated to, perhaps, Ms Cousins, perhaps, to others, but I'm now in a situation where Ms Cousins has, apparently, left the court and has not appeared when her names were called, or when her name was called, for the matter to be resumed. So that's for the transcript. That's what has occurred this morning.

In Song v M.T.V. Building & Construction Pty Ltd [2025] VSC 3, an appeal from the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act including attempted late filing of affidavit attaching extensive pseudo‑legal material and a challenge to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria, theCourt states ' Some of the grounds of review were difficult to decipher. I have done my best to make sense of them  ...'. 

 42 During his oral submissions in respect of the second application, Mr T. Mitevski also made submissions seeking to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that the Supreme Court of Victoria is unable to hear matters where a corporation is a party. This challenge was unsuccessful.  ... 

57 At 10:25am on 25 November 2024 (the day before the trial), Mr T. Mitevski filed a notice of appearance for MTV. At 2:20am on 26 November 2024 (the morning of the trial), Mr Mitevski attempted to file a 13‑page affidavit attaching 272 pages of exhibits. A copy of the unsealed affidavit was sent to my chambers’ email inbox at this time. 

58 The content of the affidavit and exhibits was wholly unhelpful. The substance of the material was, as is unfortunately too often the case in recent times,* replete with pseudo‑legalise catch phrases, nonsensical arguments, conspiratorial allegations, and Bible quotes and exhortations. The affidavit sought to invoke a ‘Doctrine of Impossibility’ to locate a public defender or solicitor who would ‘challenge their undisclosed oath’ to ‘Guilds’ and asked the Court to dispense with r 1.17 on the basis that ‘allegiance of solicitors may conflict with their duty to represent clients’ which may lead to unjust enrichment of Bar members. 

59 Attached to the affidavit were exhibits which were manifestly pseudo‑legal in nature. There were documents stamped with a seal of a fictitious court named ‘Themis Court of Natural Law – Terra Australis’, there were documents containing assertions that the Commonwealth Government is a ‘foreign privately owned American Company’. There were also out of context biblical references: ‘Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in the spiritual heavenly realm’. 

60 Needless to say, the material was nowhere near persuasive of why Mr T. Mitevski should be permitted to appear on the company’s behalf. This material alone could be relied on to reject the application to dispense with the r 1.17 requirement. However, Mr T. Mitevski attended the trial and made an oral application to dispense with the requirements of r 1.17. ... 

 64 In the course of making his oral application to dispense with the requirements of r 1.17, Mr T. Mitevski made separate submissions challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this matter. 

65 He stated that he challenged the jurisdiction in ‘a very limited capacity’ and that there was a ‘question mark’ as to the fact that MTV is a ‘company with an ABN and an ACN’ and, as far as his research has indicated, that meant this case should be heard by the Federal Court of Australia, rather than the Supreme Court of Victoria.

66 When questioned about whether he had undertaken legal training, Mr T Mitevski told me ‘I’m a constant student of many facets including the law.’

The reference to the 'unhelpful' material as 'is unfortunately too often the case in recent times' is reflected in note 8:

Most recently the subject of comment in Nelson v Greenman & Anor [2024] VSC 704 at [68]–[73] per Gobbo AsJ. Her Honour describing the pseudo‑legal arguments in that case as ‘nothing more than [a] carnival of absurdity drawn from a mishmash of delusional arguments’, a description which can be adopted here as being apt.

Cartwright v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 178 Cartwright sought to overturn orders made by a District Court judge. The judgment states

 In June 2024, Mr Cartwright attempted to file in the registry of the Court of Appeal what purported to be originating process in the Court of Appeal. The documents included: (a) a notice of appeal; (b) an application to the Court of Appeal; (c) an affidavit of Mr Cartwright; and (d) two documents entitled “Statement of Truth”, which expressed inadmissible opinion evidence from a Mr Evans and a Mr James concerning what I assume must have been the conduct of the hearing before the District Court Judge. The documents which Mr Cartwright sought to file seem to be intended to advance an appeal from the orders made in the District Court on 2 April 2024. ...  The Acting Registrar’s letter also suggested to Mr Cartwright that he might consider seeking independent legal advice on how to proceed. ... 

Mr Cartwright’s second affidavit contains various irrelevant statements of pseudo law somehow founded on the notion that he: ““Nevin John” is the “lawful and rightful owner of the duty bearing entity Nevin John Cartwright sign and all it’s debentures, Bonds, CUSIP numbers, trusts and financial assets created, and we are entitled to a hearing in a chapter 3 court [Forge v ASIC] as equity will not allow a statute to be a cover for fraud.” (d) Other irrelevant material was annexed. (e) The notice of appeal might be the document which one would expect some clarity about the basis on which Mr Cartwright sought leave to appeal from the judgment below. Unfortunately, the notice of appeal did not state the grounds “briefly and specifically” as required by r 747(1)(b). But instead, the so-called “grounds” contained substantive, often unintelligible pseudo-legal argument. How that argument bore on showing error by Clarke DCJ was not apparent. ... 

I make the following observations:

(a) On 25 September 2024 Mr Cartwright filed a third affidavit of his, sworn 12 September 2024. 

(b) Like his second affidavit, it started with the same irrelevant proposition of pseudo law earlier quoted. It exhibited a number of documents which were inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts and opinions there asserted, and, in any event, not relevant to the issues before me. ( 

c) Exhibit A contained the same two statements from Mr Evans and Mr James which expressed inadmissible opinion evidence concerning what I assume must have been the conduct of the hearing before the District Court Judge. 

(d) Exhibit B contained a June 2023 media report concerning political steps taken in the United States of America concerning COVID vaccine, and also what appeared to be a copy of a petition filed in a Kansas District Court about the conduct of the drug manufacturer, Pfizer, in relation to a COVID vaccine. 

(e) Exhibit C contained irrelevant information containing Mr Cartwright’s birth certificate number and “social security” number. 

(f) Exhibit D contained extracts from the Magistrates Court annual report for 2020/2021 said by Mr Cartwright’s affidavit to show “that much of the hearings heard in a Magistrates Court is that of Quasi law”. They showed no such thing. 

(g) Exhibit E was said to be the “life event registration patent which demonstrate in it’s pictograph that life event registration creates a duty bearing insurance bond which the lawyer represents being the person or the ancients referred to as nomen and not the man or woman.” The proposition is unintelligible and the contents of the documents incapable of bearing any meaning in relation to the issue before me. 

(h) Exhibit F contained an extract from a government web writing and style guide manual, and also a partial extract from the case of Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) 34 NSWLR 506. Those documents, too, were incapable of bearing any meaning in relation to the issue before me. 

(i) Exhibit G was an extract from some form of report of a decision by the Lisbon Court of Appeal in Portugal which recorded some expression of opinions recording COVID tests and their significance. That document, too, was incapable of bearing any meaning in relation to the issue before me. 

(j) Having exhibited the documents to which I have referred, the affidavit then proceeded to express two paragraphs of legally incoherent argumentative statements concerning the process adopted by Clarke DCJ, and four paragraphs of legally incoherent argumentative statements addressing something to do with Mr Cartwright’s complaints about how the Government handled the COVID epidemic. 

(k) Exhibit H was a copy of what purported to be the dissenting report of Senator Babet to a Senate standing committee which had been established to understand “excess mortality in 2021, 2022 and 2023”. 

(l) The affidavit ended with the pseudo law assertion: “This is official notice that under a Admiralty Rules 1995 (Cth) we will be applying to the special magistrate of HMAS Creswell for an order for a fair trial to be enforced by the military which will be done this week. Declaring a court of law abolished is a crime against humanity and an international law USC, laws of belligerent occupation and Commonwealth law. If you oppose a fair trial, we suggest you retire like Magistrate Guttridge did.”

The Court was unpersuaded.  

In Cartwright v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 168 the Tribunal dismissed Cartwright's application for review of revocation of his firearms licence, noting  the 'applicant holds sovereign citizen beliefs.

 [7] The grounds of suspension were set out in the decision under review as follows:

Correspondence under your hand has been received indicating that you hold Sovereign Citizen beliefs relating to the laws in force in Queensland specific to their non-applicability to yourself. On the 28 December 2021 I note you attended the Rockhampton Police Station front counter asking for their [officer-in-charge] to be arrested. On the 30 January 2022 I note you attended the Rockhampton Police Station to demonstrate your anti- (sic) stance on COVID-19. 

[8] The QPS concluded that Mr Cartwright may not be a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence, such that his licence should be suspended. 

[9] Section 28(1)(b) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (‘the Weapons Act’) gives an authorised officer the power to suspend a firearms licence if he or she “considers, on reasonable grounds, that the licensee may no longer be a fit and proper person to hold a licence”. 

[10] Section 10B of the Weapons Act relevantly provides: (1) In deciding or considering, for the issue, renewal, suspension or revocation of a licence, whether a person is, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold a licence, an authorised officer must consider, among other things— (a) the mental and physical fitness of the person; and (b) whether a domestic violence order has been made, police protection notice issued or release conditions imposed against the person; and (c) whether the person has stated anything in or in connection with an application for a licence, or an application for the renewal of a licence, the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular; and (ca) whether there is any criminal intelligence or other information to which the authorised officer has access that indicates— (i) the person is a risk to public safety; or (ii) that authorising the person to possess a weapon would be contrary to the public interest; and (d) the public interest. 

[11] Mr Cartwright has filed voluminous material in these proceedings. It is sufficient for the purposes of these reasons to include a brief extract from a submission filed on 4 June 2022: 

The statement that I hold sovereign citizen beliefs is indeed an oxy moronic statement as I do not hold them as Queen Elizabeth the second is the sovereign and holder of all lands in The Commonwealth of Australia being that of we the people and I am just a mere share holder of the true Commonwealth of Australia. If you care to read international law it refers to a sovereign and a national never is the citizen-ship (Corpus Juris) of the trust territory under the Hague and UN charter treaties, being that of the Certificate of Birth Registration being a promissory note to fraudulently turn a child into property of the Reserve Bank and bringing that man or women (sic) into corpus juris.

[12] In Bradley v The Queen [2021] QCA 101 at [2], President Sofronoff described this style of submission as “a confused hodgepodge of confusion”. I am unable to engage with such submissions from Mr Cartwright on the basis that they are incomprehensible. 

[13] What I am more readily able to engage with is Mr Cartwright’s email to the Police Minister dated 21 January 2022, in which he stated:

I Nevin-John ask that you issue me with all classes of weapons ownership ... I also pray for an open and concealed carry permit as the last act with royal accent (sic) was the weapons act of 1973 requiring no licencing for men and women not persons. I Nevin-John ask that a permanent permit to buy be issued with my card that you re-issue as the acts and statutes apply only to legal fictions and as I have left the necromancy.

[14] Mr Cartwright has evinced a discernible view that the Weapons Act does not apply to him. I do not consider that it is in the public interest to issue a firearms licence to persons who do not consider themselves bound by the Weapons Act, and therefore consider that Mr Cartwright is not a fit and proper person for the purposes of section 10B(1)(d) to hold a firearms licence.