'Brexit and the British Bill of Rights' by Tobias Lock, Tom Daly, Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, David Edward, Murray Hunt, Kagiaros Dimitrios, Fiona de Londras, Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Christopher McCrudden and Anne Smith
considers 'the mechanism and consequences
of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (‘Brexit’) and the plan
to establish a British Bill of Rights'.
Its key points are:
- The issue of consent regarding the initiation of
Article 50 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) to formally trigger the Brexit process under EU law is highly complex,
relating to five cross-cutting dimensions:
(i)
the involvement of the UK Parliament in the Brexit negotiations;
(ii)
the consent of the Norther
n Ireland Assembly to Brexit;
(iii)
the consent of the Scottish Parliament;
(iv)
the need for unanimous agreement by all EU Member States should the UK
wish to reverse the triggering of Article 50; and
(v)
the possible need to obtain the consent of the Republic of Ireland to Brexit as
a fundamental alteration of the Good Friday Agreement.
- Brexit presents a clear reduction in formal protection of
fundamental rights in the UK
through discontinued application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms;
- Whether
this reduction in rights protection can be addressed by other measures at
the national level, particularly the inclusion of ‘lost’ EU Charter rights in a British Bill
of Rights, is questionable;
- Brexit, a BBR, and other related policy pledges seeking to reduce the application of
international human rights law to UK actors, taken within the current context and
their likely consequences, represent a weakening of the human rights protection
framework as a whole
–
a certain ‘disentrenchment’ of human rights, reversing the
decades-long trend toward incremental expansion in the right protection afforded to
individuals across the UK.
- Various existing government policy proposals
aimed at ‘freeing’ the UK from
intervention of the European Court of Human Rights
appear
to be rooted in
misconceptions concerning the nature of the ECHR and international human rights
law more generally.
- Regarding plans to repeal the Human Rights Act (HRA) and its replacement by a
British Bill of Rights (BBR), this would not free the UK from
its
obligations
to comply
with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where the UK is
a respondent party. In fact, it might lead to an increase in the number of successful
applications to the Strasbourg Court, diminish the possibility for meaningful dialogue
between the Strasbourg Court and the British courts, and thereby amplify rather
than lessen the impact of Strasbourg case-law. The only viable way to remove such
obligations is for the UK to denounce (leave) the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).
- Repeal of the
HRA,
its replacement with
a BBR, and other related policy pledges
seeking to reduce the application of international human rights law to UK actors,
all
ultimately
appear to set a path toward withdrawal from the ECHR.
- In this connection, it was noted that UK withdrawal from the ECHR system would be
likely to lead to withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which would significantly
undermine the UK’s reputation as a state that cares about human rights protection.
The UK
would be only the second country in Europe which is not a member of the
Council of Europe; the other being Belarus with its very problematic human rights
record.
- Withdrawal by the UK would rep
resent the first time a long-established Western
democracy has
left a major international human rights regime. Such a move would
place the UK in the company of Greece under military rule in December 1969, when
it left the ECHR system and Council of Europe, or more recently, Venezuela under
Hugo Chávez, which denounced the American Convention on Human Rights in 2012
in order to leave the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
- Brexit poses real threats to the fragile peace in Northern Ireland, given that EU
membership is central to the Good Friday Agreement, and given that EU law is dominant in areas that are clear ‘flash points’ for discord between the parties in the
consociational government, such as equality legislation.
- Plans for repeal of the
HRA, its replacement by a
BBR, and other related policy
pledges,
pose
threats not only to rights protection in the UK, but also
to the rights
protection (albeit limited) provided by the ECHR system in other states of the Council
of Europe, given that UK withdrawal from the ECHR would be likely to trigger
withdrawal by other states, such as Russia and Azerbaijan.
- The most fundamental conclusion from the workshop is that the current
governmental approach to Brexit and a British Bill of Rights does not adequately
appreciate, or address, the extraordinary complexity of human rights protection in
the UK, which enmeshes protections across the international, EU, State, devolved,
and bilateral planes. Until, and unless, policy formation begins to fully grapple with
this complexity, serious rule of law and legitimacy questions will hang over the
solutions presented by the Conservative government to the current constitutional
entanglement.
The
Airport and aviation security report by Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee notes concerns regarding the Aviation Security Identification Card, including claims that 20% of airport staff with access to aircraft have criminal convictions (half of those being for serious crimes such as drug trafficking and assault).
It states
Chapter 2 examines the numerous reports and inquiries undertaken since 2002
investigating airport security issues, and the responses and actions that have been
implemented following these reports. Of particular interest to the committee is the
progress and implementation of the 2005 Wheeler Review recommendations.
Chapter 3 examines a number of serious issues around passenger security
screening at airports that emerged from evidence received as part of the inquiry,
including the use of subcontractors for screening services at airports. It also considers
reports regarding security systems in place at Sydney Airport, including potential
vulnerabilities in Australia's aviation security framework.
Chapter 4 examines matters arising from the Seven Network television report
on aviation security that led to the referral of this inquiry. In particular the chapter
considers whether the FOI process that informed part of the media reports led to a
decrease in the voluntary reporting of security incidents to the department by industry
stakeholders. .
Chapter 5 considers the Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC), the
numerous reviews and reforms undertaken of the scheme, and potential shortcomings
of the card, with impacts on airport security. This chapter also examines the related
Visitor Identification Card (VIC) and issues with this program.
Drawing on the evidence received by stakeholders and obtained by the
committee as part of its inquiries, Chapter 6 considers the current programs underway
to secure Australia's airports, and possible future areas for improved security
measures. It evaluates whether, in light of incidents reported in the media and through various reviews of airport security, the current security framework is adequate. It also
considers the costs that may be involved in amendments to that framework.
The Committee recommends that
- any future reviews of and amendments to
aviation security regulation be risk-based and fit for purpose, with consideration
given to the unique challenges faced by regional and rural airports and the
overall diversity of Australian airports.
- the Inspector of Transport Security
complete and publish its review into aviation security training and education as
soon as practicable.
- the Department of Infrastructure and
Regional Development develop a framework to ensure that subcontracted
screening bodies have appropriate employment standards and provide security
training and services consistent with those provided by screening authorities
under the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005. The framework should
take into account any inconsistencies in the training and education as identified
by the Inspector of Transport Security.
- the Australian Government amend the
Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 to make it compulsory for aviation industry
participants to report information currently captured under the voluntary
reporting scheme.
- the Australian Government review the
feasibility of establishing a centralised issuing authority for Aviation Security
Identification Cards.
- the Australian Government consider the
development of a national automatic notification system for aviation-security-relevant
offence convictions of Aviation Security Identification Cards holders.
- the Department of Infrastructure and
Regional Development update the committee early in 2018, on progress and
outcomes, following implementation of Stage Two of the Visitor Identification
Card enhancements.
- the Australian Government consider
mechanisms, including legislative amendment, to strengthen the Visitor
Identification Card process, incorporating appropriate background checking
where appropriate.
- the Australian Government implement
the regional aviation security awareness training package, in accordance with its
2015 commitment.
Senator Xenophon commented
The inquiry drew out a number of issues in relation to aviation security.
The first of these issues relates to security screening of passengers as they
enter the airport. Evidence was presented to the committee that shows that current
screening does detect contraband, but that there are holes. Examples were provided of
prohibited objects discovered after passengers had boarded planes; objects including
knives, tools (such as screwdrivers and pliers), scissors and box cutters, pepper spray,
tasers and bullets. Problems identified by the committee in respect of screening
included screening processes, the use of subcontracted security staff and inadequate
staff training. Mr Kessing indicated that screening also lacks appropriate intelligence
analysis, which has served other countries well.
1.10 The second issue relates to mandatory and voluntary reporting of ‘unlawful
interference’ with aviation safety. The committee was presented with evidence to
show that some in industry had a reluctance to make voluntary reports.
1.11 The third issue relates to the issuing and use of ASICs and VICs. The
evidence provided to the committee, particularly the evidence of Mr Kessing, showed
significant problems in relation to the ASIC and VIC vetting process – with up to
20 per cent of all non-Customs staff (i.e. baggage handling, cleaners, screening staff,
aircraft catering etc.) with access to the sterile areas having criminal convictions, and
about half of those were serious convictions, including drug trafficking, assault and
the other misdemeanours. The vetting process is decentralised and has no notification
scheme for an ASIC holder who may have been subject to a conviction after the card
has been issued.
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