'From Weakling to Superhero: The Economics of Captain America' by 
John Robinson and
William C. Wood 
comments 
We examine economic themes surrounding the superhero Captain America. When Steve Rogers became a super soldier, his production and consumption opportunities were expanded greatly, and yet the effect on his lifetime realized utility seems ambiguous. We explore the possibility that Captain America became wealthy through the power of compound return on investment during his stay of nearly 70 years under the Arctic ice. The society and economy that he returned to were much different from what he left behind, and these differences are used to illustrate the nature of economic growth and dynamism. We also show how Captain America’s story illustrates the nature of inflation and major themes in the provision of public goods and public choice.
The New Zealand domain known as Mount Taranaki is closer to gaining legal personhood alongside Te Urewera under the 
Te Urewera Act 2014 (noted 
here) and Te Awa Tupua, a matter discussed in my doctoral dissertation.
A perspective is offered by 'Juristic Personhood For Sacred Natural Sites: A Potential Means For Protecting Nature' by John Studley and William Bleisch in (2018) 24(1) 
Parks.
The authors comment
 The recognition that ‘other-than-human’ persons can be legal subjects has previously been adopted in forms of
customary law but has been denied in most modern jurisdictions until recently. The legal concept of juristic
personhood is rooted in jus gentium of Imperial Rome, which was also the basis of ‘public trusts’. Juristic
personhood has been expanded in some jurisdictions to include other ‘legal subjects’ with specific rights and
obligations. Judges in India, for example, have recognised enspirited idols as having legal status with the same legal
rights as human beings ever since the nineteenth century. Recently, several additional jurisdictions have recognised
certain spiritual-natural entities as legal persons, making sacred rivers and mountains ‘juristic persons’. In this
article we review a number of recent cases from around the world that highlight this evolution of jurisprudence over
time. The legal regime of juristic personhood may be an effective tactic for safeguarding enspirited sacred natural
sites, because it conceptually resonates with the animistic world-view and relational ontologies of many Indigenous
peoples. Further study (and litigation) is required for such an approach to become widely recognised, but it could
become an effective tool for conservation of nature within community-conserved areas and protected areas. 
 They argue
With the realisation that loss of biodiversity and
ecosystem services have become global crises (Ceballos
et al., 2015; Ripple et al., 2017), there has been a
recognition of the need to vastly increase the area of
most landscapes and ecosystems under conservation
management (Venter et al., 2014; Butchart et al., 2015;
Wilson, 2016). Butchart et al. (2015) and others have
pointed out that this will require approaches that go
beyond conventional Western conservation
frameworks, and have particularly advocated
community-based management. Community-conserved
areas have considerable potential as another form of
area-based conservation, which could be enhanced and
better secured for the long-term if they could also be
endowed with legal recognition. Indeed, the 11th Aichi
Target in the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020,
drafted under the Convention on Biological Diversity,
mentions “other effective area-based conservation
measures” (OECM) as a basis for achieving 2020 targets
of protection for ecologically representative areas (CBD,
2010, p. 9). Jonas et al. (2014) have suggested that these
OECMs should include Indigenous Peoples’ and
Community Conserved Territories and Areas (ICCAs)
that effectively conserve nature, even if that
conservation is an ancillary outcome, not a primary
objective, and only if the governance authority wants
them to be recognised as such. 
Many sacred natural sites (SNS) include biodiverse
habitats or refugia that benefit from ritual protection in
the context of animistic beliefs as distinct from
protection motivated by a ‘conservation ethic’ (Kopnina,
2012) or legal prescriptions. While this may not apply to
most SNS of mainstream religions, these SNS are often
still important for biodiversity conservation. As far as
many Indigenous peoples and local communities are
concerned, the ‘spirits of place’ or numina that enspirit1
most SNS are endowed with certain rights –‘juristic
persons’, in all but name – and these communities regularly invoke the numina enabling them to engage in
‘spiritual governance’ (Studley & Awang, 2016; Studley
and Horsley, 2018). 
SNS would be most effective as conservation areas if
legal recognition was given to complement communitybased
customary ritual protection that is already in
place. One possible nascent approach is to bestow
juristic personhood on selected landscapes. Most
conservation initiatives aimed at the legal protection of
the environment are undertaken by Homo sapiens
acting as the plaintiff (e.g. a person who brings a case
against another in a court of law) and beneficiary.
Under the aegis of juristic personhood, the numina that
inhabit the SNS are themselves granted standing as
plaintiffs in the defence of their domain, represented by
a guardian, agent or ‘next friend’. 
Historically most legal systems have “denied legal
personhood to natural-spiritual entities” (Jonas pers.
comm. 29/6/2017). This article highlights recent cases
and trends in legislation that seem to be reversing that
denial, based on notions of juristic personhood or
nature rights. It can be argued that conceptually juristic
personhood falls under the rubric of animism
predicated on a posthuman world-view and ecocentric
‘rights of nature’ under the aegis of a pan(en)theistic
world-view (Berry, 1988; Berry, 1996; McDermott,
2012; Nash, 1989; Zaleha, 2008).
'Environmental Personhood' by Gwendolyn J  Gordon in (201) 43(1) 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 50 comments
Parks are people too, my friend. So quipped an August 2016
 headline   making   reference   at once    to  Mitt Romney's flip
 commentary on corporations and to recent developments in New
 Zealand law enabling landscapes to be named as legal persons -
 that is, as entities possessing juridical rights akin to those of
 corporations. In the wake of this and other developments of the
 concept, legal personhood has struck observers as a promising tool
 for protecting nature-an idea overdue given the now seemingly
 unexceptional nature of corporate personhood in protecting
 corporate rights.  Far from being the settled, stolid doctrine that
 its long tenure might have it appear to be, however, corporate
 personhood is quicksilver; it seems an endlessly adaptable concept.
 How might we come to understand the environment as a similarly
 flexible rights-holder in a way that is robustly protective of
 environmental interests? This Article argues that, as an example of
 how we came to see a non-human entity as a rights holder,
 corporate personhood may be a useful tool in moving toward
 understanding the environment as a rights holder. 
Legal personhood is not binary; it is not a yes-or-no proposition.
 The differentiation of legal rights and responsibilities starts, not
 ends, at the question of whether something may or may not be
 considered a person in the meaning of a statute.' The real issue
 here is what, given the legal personhood of corporations or the
 environment, that means for how much that legal, practical,
 rhetorical entity-that category-for-legal-convenience-should be
 allowed to claim the rights of other shades of personhood. There is, after all, no such thing as a plain-old person; it is law that defines
 the categories of persons. 
The development of a concept of corporate personhood in
 American law  was anything but inevitable.  Although   we are
 familiar now with "the idea of a corporation having 'its' own rights,
 and being a 'person' and 'citizen' for so many statutory and
 constitutional purposes," the idea was perhaps as unsettling to
 contemporary jurists as that of environmental personhood might
 sound today. Just as "[t]hroughout legal history, each successive
 extension of rights to some new entity has been.., a bit
 unthinkable, so too does their contingency become practically
 unthinkable after they are normalized. Before environmental
 personhood becomes unremarkable, and thus unremarked-upon,
 we would do well to consider some of the contingencies in the
 development of the personhood concept as applied to
 corporations. 
Even among the very few jurisdictions that have developed concepts of environmental personhood, conceptions of that
"personhood" are diverse. In 2014, Te Urewera, formerly a New
Zealand national park, was declared to be a legal entity. The act
making this designation transformed the land from government-
owned national park to freehold land owned by itself.' The
country's Whanganui River followed suit in 2017. Years prior to the movement in New Zealand law, Ecuador proclaimed under its
constitution the rights of nature "to exist, persist, maintain and
regenerate its vital cycles."" Nature here, instead of being named
as a legal person directly, instead is given these rights by analogy to
"persons and people." In Bolivia, nature is defined as a juridical entity that "takes on the character of collective public interest." In  the United States, a number of local governing bodies promulgated ordinances recognizing the rights of nature. 
These new global legal developments arrive alongside what
 appears to be a wholesale re-evaluation of the place of human
 interests in relation to nature. New Zealand's Te Urewera Act in
 particular is seen to be novel for its changes to the very nature of
 property ownership. It is an unequivocal rejection of a human-centered rights regime for protecting nature as property. 
In the end, our capacity to imagine a politics capable of
 encompassing things and places far outside of human lives or
 business interests has more to do with how well legal personhood
 will protect the environment than does any particular deployment
 of legal arguments for environmental personhood-just as has
 been the case in the development of the doctrine of corporate
 personhood in American law. To show why this is so, the Article is
 arranged as follows. Part II describes recent advances made in the
 concept of environmental personhood in locations as varied as
 Bolivia, Ecuador, India, and New Zealand. Part III examines the
 usefulness of corporate personhood doctrine as an analogy for
 proponents of the protection of the environment by means of the
 concept of personhood. Part IV examines the terms of the debate  in more detail, considering the development of rights of nature
 arguments and the stakes of ontological claims regarding divisions
 between nature and people. Part V considers the significance of
 holistic theories of environmental protection to discourses of
 personhood. Finally, the Article offers some conclusions regarding
 the development of environmental personhood. Legal
 personhood may come to be as protective for environmental
 interests as it has been for corporate interests; it can become so by
 referencing the latter's protean, politically fluid nature.
'The Whanganui River as Te Awa Tupua: Place‐based law in a legally pluralistic society' by Liz Charpleix in (2017) 
The Geographical Journal comments
A landmark political decision recognising the legal personhood of a river provides insights into how legal pluralism may evolve and how relationships with non‐human nature may be recognised into the future. The decision in respect of the Whanganui River in Aotearoa/New Zealand, although not a legal precedent, has resulted in a new and vital Māori/Pākehā legal arrangement, which, in addressing the injustices of the country's colonial history, may also address environmental challenges such as resource exploitation. Since colonisation in 1840, the Māori of the Whanganui River have been fighting to assert their rights in relation to the river. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, made between Māori chiefs and British colonisers as the basis of future governance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, was flawed due to differences between the Māori and English versions of the Treaty. Conflicting expectations regarding the constitution and administration of “law” emerged, as did incompatibilities between Māori and English ontologies, particularly involving interactions between humans and (non‐human) nature. In 1975, a tribunal was established to resolve Māori grievances regarding application of the principles of the Waitangi Treaty. In 1999, the Tribunal settled Claim 167 (known as Wai 167, after the Tribunal), recognising Māori ownership of the Whanganui River. Subsequent negotiations resulted in declaration of the river's legal personhood; the enacting legislation was passed on 20 March 2017. An association of place‐based law and the dominant legal system has been instigated. This paper explores how this less anthropocentric approach, in an era commonly called the “Anthropocene” due to the influence of humans on planet Earth, has a critical role to play in environmental management, particularly in relation to water.
'From Inside the Cage To Outside the Box: Natural Resources as a Platform for Nonhuman Animal Personhood in the U.S. and Australia' by Randall S Abate and Jonathan Crowe in (2017) 5(1) 
Global Journal of Animal Law 54 comments
Nonhuman animals are currently treated as property under U.S. and Australian law, leaving them open to various kinds of exploitation. There has been a gradual evolution away from this property paradigm in both countries, but significant work remains to ensure that nonhuman animals are afforded adequate legal protections. This article considers the legal avenues available to protect nonhuman animals in the U.S. and Australia, focusing particularly on the attribution of legal personhood. Section 2 of the article reviews attempts by the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) to establish legal personhood protections for nonhuman animals through writ of habeas corpus petitions under U.S. common law. Section 3 surveys the options for recognition of animal personhood under Australian law, discussing issues of standing, habeas corpus, and guardianship models. Section 4 discusses the growing movement to assign legal personhood rights to natural resources. The article proposes that to the extent that natural resources have received legal personhood protection to recognize their inherent value, similar protections should be afforded to animals. In the meantime, habeas corpus, standing, and guardianship theories provide valuable procedural platforms for incremental progress toward protecting nonhuman animals in both the U.S. and Australia.