21 July 2023

Neurotech

The UK Information Commissioner's Office report on neurotech states 

Neurotechnologies have continued to proliferate in the health and research sector over the past decade and may soon become part of our daily life. Our workplaces, home entertainment and wellbeing services may use neurotechnology to provide more personalised services in the years to come. 

As the UK’s data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) aims to increase public trust in how organisations process personal information through responsible practice. We want to empower people to safely share their information and use innovative products and services that will drive our economy and our society. In our ICO25 strategy, we committed to set out our views on emerging technologies to reduce burdens on businesses, support innovation and prevent harms. 

This report specifically considers gathering, analysing and using information that is directly produced by the brain and nervous system, referred to as neurodata. This ranges from monitoring concentration levels at work, to more distant concepts such as smart prosthetics that can mimic brain patterns for greater responsivity. This report is a short introductory guide for those who wish to know more about neurotechnologies from a regulatory perspective. It does not consider the implications of neurodata inferred from broader biometric information, such as eye movements, gait or heartrate tracking. This formed part of our earlier work around biometric technologies. 

We examine the impact of neurotechnologies and neurodata and analyse their impact on privacy. We explore plausible scenarios and use cases for emerging neurotechnologies, and through these, raise the following issues:

  • a significant risk of discrimination emerging in non-medical sectors such as the workplace, as complex systems and potentially inaccurate information become embedded in neurotechnology products and services. There may also be an increasing risk that unfair decisions could be made even when accurate information is used, discriminating in ways that have not previously been defined; 

  • the need for people to clearly understand the technology and terminology. This enables organisations to meet their requirements for transparency, and enables people to understand their individual rights. Without this, people will be unable to provide clear consent for processing when appropriate and organisations may struggle to address the challenges of automated processing of neurodata; and 

  • a need for regulatory co-operation and clarity in an area that is scientifically, ethically and legally complex.

We will address these areas of concern through:

  • ongoing engagement with key stakeholders across industry, regulation, academia and civil society. This will include inviting organisations to work with our Regulatory Sandbox to engineer data protection into these technologies;  

  • engagement with the public to better understand their knowledge and concerns about neurotechnologies and privacy; and 

  • producing neurotechnology specific guidance in the longer term. This will address the need for regulatory clarity and set clear expectations about the responsible and compliant use of neurodata.

 

We will address some other issues elsewhere, as we build on our Artificial Intelligence (AI) Framework and forthcoming guidance on workplace surveillance. This will include potential neurodiscrimination arising through inaccurate information or inappropriate processing and decision-making.

Discrimination

The NSW Law Reform Commission is reviewing the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). 

Its terms of reference state that the Commission is to consider matters including, but not limited to: 

1. whether the Act could be modernised and simplified to better promote the equal enjoyment of rights and reflect contemporary community standards 
2. whether the range of attributes protected against discrimination requires reform 
3. whether the areas of public life in which discrimination is unlawful should be reformed 
4. whether the existing tests for discrimination are clear, inclusive and reflect modern understandings of discrimination 
5. the adequacy of protections against vilification, including (but not limited to) whether these protections should be harmonised with the criminal law 
6. the adequacy of the protections against sexual harassment and whether the Act should cover harassment based on other protected attributes 
7. whether the Act should include positive obligations to prevent harassment, discrimination and vilification, and to make reasonable adjustments to promote full and equal participation in public life 
8. exceptions, special measures and exemption processes 
9. the adequacy and accessibility of complaints procedures and remedies 
10. the powers and functions of the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW and its President, including potential mechanisms to address systemic discrimination 
11. the protections, processes and enforcement mechanisms that exist in other Australian and international anti-discrimination and human rights laws, and other NSW laws 
12. the interaction between the Act and Commonwealth anti-discrimination laws 
13. any other matters the Commission considers relevant to these Terms of Reference.

In Victoria the Department of Justice and Community Safety is seeking comments on proposed reforms to change Victorian law to strengthen the state’s anti-vilification protections. The proposals are a consequence of recommendations in the 2021 Anti-vilification Protections report from Parliament’s Legal & Social Issues Committee. 

The questions in the associated discussion paper are 

1a. Do you have any views on the current protections for race and religion? 

1b. Government proposes to extend current protections beyond race and religion. What do you think this should look like? 

2. Do you have any views on how the anti-vilification protections should apply to people with disability? 

3. Do you have any views on how the anti-vilification protections should apply to people living with HIV/AIDS? 

4. Do you have any views on how the anti-vilification protections should apply to LGBTIQ+ communities? 

5. Do you have any views on how the anti-vilification protections should apply to protect people based on sex?   

6. Do you have any views on how the anti-vilification protections should apply to protect people who are associated with targeted groups? 

7. Do you have any views on clarifying the law to ensure individuals can make vilification complaints based on one or more attributes? ;

19 July 2023

COVID

Delighting in 'COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates: A Coercive But Justified Public Health Necessity' by Kay Wilson and Christopher Rudge in (2023) UNSW Law Journal. 

The authors comment

 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide introduced vaccine mandates and ‘passports’, creating tension between individual liberties and public health. This article provides an overview of the history of vaccine mandates in Australia and the United Kingdom, before examining the COVID-19 period, when Australian states introduced various conditional mandates while the United Kingdom largely avoided doing so. This article considers several medico-legal and human rights arguments for and against the imposition of conditional mandates. Although this article concludes that vaccine coercion is both legally and morally justified, it acknowledges the right to refuse medical treatment, freedom of thought, conscience, and opinion, and the right to bodily integrity as important precepts deserving serious consideration. In many cases, alternatives to coercion are preferable. This article has ongoing relevance, both for COVID-19 (as new variants and treatments emerge) and beyond, including for the use of coercion in childhood vaccination and future pandemics.

They go on to argue 

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused enormous global disruption. The World Health Organization (‘WHO’) estimates that global excess mortality associated with COVID-19 between 1 January 2020 and 31 December 2021 was in the order of 15 million persons. Many more deaths are expected to occur into the future, together with illness and disability resulting from ‘long COVID’.  In response to this extraordinary health crisis, governments worldwide introduced a range of regulatory measures intended to reduce infection, some unprecedented in modern history. Border closures, quarantine directions, lockdowns, curfews, mandatory testing, contact tracing, self-isolation, social distancing, mask wearing, and mandatory diagnosis reporting have been key examples of newly prescribed conduct. While the actual economic costs of the pandemic to the global economy are incalculable, analysts have proffered eye-watering estimates of between USD5.8 trillion and USD16 trillion (or 90% of the gross domestic product of the United States). Amid the crisis, COVID-19 vaccines became widely accepted as the best ‘way out’ of the pandemic. Rapidly developed and approved through a hitherto unavailable expedited regulatory scheme, these vaccines were distributed around the world in the billions. 

For all the logistical and organisational achievements of managing COVID-19, ‘vaccine hesitancy’ was (and continues to be) a stubborn health and economic problem in many countries. While ‘vaccine hesitancy’ is a contested term, in this article we use it broadly to mean generalised uncertainty or indecision about vaccination as well as refusal of vaccination. We do not use ‘vaccine hesitancy’ to include all instances of under-vaccination caused by external factors, such as lack of vaccine accessibility or convenience, and we acknowledge (and argue in Part V below) that inadequate or poor government information and policy failures also contribute to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. 

In many Western countries, vaccine hesitancy has hovered between 20% and 30%. In September 2021, research published by Imperial College London indicated that some 25% of the United States population were unwilling to be vaccinated, with more than 6% uncertain. The same study confirmed that, in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Sweden, around 20–22% were unwilling to be vaccinated, with 5–6% uncertain. In Canada, Australia and Italy, around 17% were unwilling to be vaccinated, with between 4 and 9% uncertain. That said, in many countries, vaccine hesitancy has tended to reduce over time. As at 11 January 2023, some 96% of Australians over 16 have had two COVID-19 vaccine doses (following the introduction of vaccine requirements). A smaller majority of the eligible population (72.4%) has received a third ‘booster shot’, and only 44.3% of those over 30 have received a fourth. Although the percentage of vaccine-hesitant people remains a clear minority, the total number can be a large cohort: 25% of the US population amounts to 80 million people. 

In response to vaccine hesitancy, governments have considered incentives to encourage citizens to undergo vaccination, ranging from direct payments through to prize lotteries. Commonly, as discussed in detail below, governments also resorted to deploying social and legal coercion. Some required people working in certain roles or in specific age groups to undergo vaccination while others ‘rewarded’ vaccinated persons with ‘freedoms’ from restrictions on travel, movement and everyday activities. Many private businesses, including airlines, also required employees and customers to be vaccinated or risk employment termination or suspension. Administered in a context of legal uncertainty (at least initially), these government and private actions led to multiple legal challenges that continue today (some of which are discussed below). In principle, the use of coercion to compel vaccination stands in tension with the values of individual liberty, personal autonomy and bodily integrity – values that distinguish liberal democracies from totalitarian regimes. But the imposition of coercion also raises more than just questions of principle. In many countries, like the United States, vaccination has become a contentious political issue, sowing division along party lines. While the vaccinated population grew impatient and frustrated with the unvaccinated, some vaccine objectors attacked and harmed medical practitioners, retail workers and others. A minority of unvaccinated people, in countries including Australia, organised in protest against perceived government overreach, some becoming violent. 

This article acknowledges the delicate tension between individual rights and public health control, and analyses arguments both for and against the use of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ coercion by states to address or overcome vaccine hesitancy. Focusing on the contrasting approaches of Australia and the United Kingdom, Part II defines what we mean by coercion. In Part III, we examine vaccine-related coercion in its sociohistorical context, reviewing governmental responses to anti-vaccination movements in 19th century Britain and Australia. Part III also surveys a range of COVID-19 vaccine-mandating laws and summarises select Australian legal cases. In Part IV, we consider the most forceful arguments against vaccine coercion, drawing on concepts from medical and human rights law. In Part V, we review the arguments in favour of mandatory vaccination, underlining the sociocultural lessons of history discussed in Part III. 

Ultimately, this article argues that most forms of vaccine-related government coercion are justified in view of the overwhelming personal, social, health and economic benefits that come with vaccination (especially during a pandemic). But we also contend that coercion is not to be imposed lightly or as a first resort. Thus, our conclusion identifies other approaches to encourage vaccination that may be preferable to coercion. In its consideration of the scope and limits of liberty in liberal democracies, this article is expected to have relevance not just for the immediate crisis (as novel variants and treatments evolve) but for law and policy in the post-COVID-19 period, including for policy on vaccine hesitancy and the use of coercion for routine childhood vaccination, and for future pandemics.

18 July 2023

AI creativity and control?

'Tools Do Not Create: Human Authorship in the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence' by Michael D Murray comments 

 Artistic tools do not create paintings and drawings. Brushes, paint, pencils and pastels, video and photographic cameras, image editing tools such as Adobe Photoshop, and ever increasingly complicated algorithms in neural networks, foundation models, and large language models are not the authors of artworks. Human artists create content. Human artists use tools to create visual art. 

This sketch of the process of creation of art has been blurred in recent months by the advent and rapid adoption of visual generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as DALL-E 2, Stable Diffusion, and Midjourney that inspire magical thinking regarding the creation of artworks. The very name “generative” AI suggests a narrative that the algorithms, programming, foundation models, and transformer technology composing these AI tools are the actual authors of the works produced—that the artworks are “created” in the copyright sense of the word by the AI. Not so. 

The United States Copyright Office has recently issued guidance on the copyrightability of visual works that artists and authors have produced using visual generative AI tools that might be limited in their copyrightability because the works or elements of the works were generated by the AI. Thus, the Copyright office has taken the bait and swallowed the narrative that the magic box of generative AI tools actually performs the steps of authorship of original and creative copyrightable works: the AI somehow “conceives” of the image in its “mind” and somehow “randomly” or “automatically” renders it into existence in a fixed and tangible medium. The radical core of the Copyright Office’s interpretation is sound: randomly or automatically generated works do not have human authorship; they are not conceived of in the minds of human authors and the human authors do not cause their inner conceptions and designs to be rendered into fixed and tangible forms. The error comes in the Copyright Office’s thinking that generative AI systems randomly or automatically create and generate works. 

Contemporary visual generative AI systems can do extraordinary things, but as of yet not autonomously and not automatically. It is a fallacy to view AI systems as the authors of the works they generate. The process of how an end-user of a contemporary generative AI tool creates art and how a human artist goes about the same task are very similar. 

Generative AI systems are tools—highly complex, deeply technological tools to be sure, but tools none the less. And these tools require a human author or artist—the end-user of the generative AI system—to provide the inspiration and design and often the instructions and directions on how to produce the image. An artist working with a generative AI tool is no different from an artist working with a digital or analog camera or with Photoshop or another image editing and image rendering tool.

The South Australian Parliament has appointed a Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence to report on: 

  •  The current state of AI development, deployment and application across various sectors, with a particular focus on the economic, social and ethical implications for South Australia 
  • The potential for AI to transform sectors critical to the South Australian economy such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services and the skills required for this transformation 
  • Issues surrounding the use of AI in the commission of criminal offences 
  • The challenges and opportunities of AI in relation to privacy, data security, and the ethical use of AI, including the risk of bias in AI decision making 
  • The potential for South Australia to develop a competitive advantage in AI, including through the development of a strong AI research and development sector, the attraction of AI investment, and the training and retention of AI talent; and 
  • Any other related matter