Conspiracism, Contract and Sovereign Citizen Claims

'The Social Phenomenon of Romana Didulo: "Queen of Canada"' by Christine M Sarteschi in International Journal of Coercion, Abuse, and Manipulation comments 

Romana Didulo is a conspiracy theorist who claims to be the ruler of Canada, despite all evidence to the contrary. She has a fairly large following in social media. Her movement, though not easily categorized, can best be described as a combination of QAnon, sovereign citizen/pseudo-legal, conspirituality, and anti-vaccination motifs. This overview explores her belief system, her origins, the evolution of her movement, and the behavior of her followers. This review finds that Didulo poses two main kinds of threats. She: 1) encourages followers to engage in vigilantism, and 2) has created a pool of desperate people who have had their utilities shut off, and lost their vehicles and homes. People are suffering as a result of her edicts. ... 

Romana Didulo is a Philippine born immigrant, in her 50s, who contends she is the leader of Canada. She has adopted the titles of “Queen and Commander-in-chief, Head of State and Government, President and National Indigenous Chief of the Kingdom of Canada.” Didulo and eleven of her closest followers are currently on their third tour of Canada. They utilize multiple recreational vehicles (RVs) (see Figure 1) and travel to meet-and-greet locations where Didulo gives speeches, sometimes several times a week. Didulo maintains multiple Telegram channels and has approximately 50,000 followers who cheer her on and fund her travels. The purpose of this article is to expand the knowledge base of this social phenomenon using observation and analysis of Didulo’s social media postings and the content of her speeches. This article tracks Didulo’s rise, describes her belief system, and documents the activities of her and her followers. ... 

Didulo and her followers express beliefs that combine QAnon, sovereign citizen/pseudo-legal, conspirituality, and anti-vaccination motifs. QAnon is a conspiracy-based belief system. Its followers claim that high level Democratic politicians control the government and all media, and are harming children (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021). QAnon followers are highly concerned about the “cabal,” powerful individuals who they believe are working covertly behind the scenes (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021). The cabal, they believe, is also seeking to acquire adrenochrome from the blood of children to extend their personal lifespans (Garry, Walther, Mohamad, & Mohammed, 2021). Sovereign citizens are individuals who reject their respective governments as illegitimate, and do not believe conventional laws apply to them; they instead are subject to a different, superior law (Kalinowski, 2019; McRoberts, 2019; Netolitzky, 2021; Sarteschi, 2020). Conspirituality is a term coined by Ward and Voas (2011) that describes individuals who combine a New Age belief system with conspiracy theories where secret groups control the political and social order. New Age beliefs are characterized by four main elements: 1) “mythical individual transformation;” 2) “awareness of non-material realities;” 3) “the imposition of (a) personal vision onto society;” and 4) “belief in universally invisible but pervasive forms of energy” (Ward & Voas, 2011, p. 106). Research has shown that conspirituality is common among those in the QAnon movement (Robertson & Amarasingam, 2022; Ward & Voas, 2011). Much like QAnon, the conspirituality movement is decentralized and virtual (Ward & Voas, 2011). Finally, individuals who subscribe to anti-vaxx ideology are those who are “... wholly opposed to vaccinations” (Burgess, Osborne, Yongabi et al., 2021, p. 8). Those beliefs, and how they are expressed by Didulo, are described below.

In Ricks v Te Pukenga - New Zealand Institute of Skills and Technology t/a Ara Institute of Canterbury [2023] NZHC 936 the Court states 

 [1] Tahi Ricks successfully completed two years of a three-year Bachelor of Architectural Studies (BAS) degree at the Ara Institute of Canterbury (Ara). He says he did not undertake his final year of study in 2022 because of Ara’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. Under the Policy, Mr Ricks was not permitted to attend campus unless he was fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or had a Ministry of Health approved vaccine exemption. Mr Ricks did not accept the Policy and withdrew from the BAS and has not returned to his studies. 

[2] Mr Ricks seeks declarations that Ara breached a re-enrolment contract with him by changing the conditions of his study without his consent and breached also the Education (Pastoral Care of Tertiary and International Learners) Code of Practice 2021 (the Code). In addition, he seeks a declaration that Ara failed to rebut a “rebuttable affidavit” such that the affidavit has become a “judgement in commerce”. Finally, he seeks an order Ara must pay him $10,522,540 as stated in the unrebutted affidavit. ... 

[20] On 17 March 2022, Mr Ricks sent Ara another document, this time headed “Affidavit of Truth”. This document required Ara to dispute “claims, statements, assertions, facts contained herein” which were said to represent Mr Ricks’ “truth”. There followed 82 matters for Ara to respond to and it was stated that if Ara did not dispute any of the claims that were made within 14 days it would result in an automatic default judgment against Ara and it would be liable to Mr Ricks’ fee schedule. The fee schedule contained amounts payable by Ara totalling more than $10 million said to relate to losses Mr Ricks suffered, including $3 million for harm to his education and $7 million for harm to his future. 

[21] On 4 April 2023, Mr Ricks sent Ara a document headed “Notice of Recognition and Thanks”, noting that Ara had failed to rebut the Affidavit of Truth which “now stands as Truth in Law and a Judgement in Commerce, which no-one can overturn”. He stated that “ultimately, this means you — Darren Mitchell/Ara are now liable to the fee schedule which is remedy for the damages caused to me”. He advised that Ara had a further 10 working days to arrange a meeting with him if it would like to discuss a settlement figure or arrange payment options, otherwise he would pursue collection of the debt for the full amount.... 

Mr Ricks’ submissions 

[26] Mr Ricks seeks summary judgment for payment pursuant to the unrebutted affidavit. He identifies the issue as whether Ara has an arguable defence to overturn an unrebutted affidavit, and submits it cannot do so. Mr Ricks believes there are 10 commercial maxims, which are legal directives that must be upheld by the New Zealand courts and he relies on passages from the Bible in support of his submission that an unrebutted affidavit must stand and he is entitled to judgment accordingly. In a concession to his position, however, at the conclusion of the hearing Mr Ricks advised he was now prepared to accept just $1 million in satisfaction of this claim. 

My analysis 

[27] Mr Ricks’ belief in the efficacy of the Affidavit of Truth document is misguided and his claim for judgment based upon it has no prospect of success. The legal maxims that Mr Ricks relies upon are not legal directives which the courts must uphold regardless of context. Bible passages are not law enforceable in the courts. Further, the law does not recognise a process of entering judgment on the basis of an unrebutted affidavit and certainly not when such affidavit was not issued in respect of any proceeding then currently before the Court. 

[28] The pseudo-legal documents Mr Ricks relies upon are commonly presented to the courts by people influenced by the Sovereign Citizen movement. They have been consistently rejected by the courts. [note: Bank of New Zealand v Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2021] NZHC 3059, Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 at [9]–[11]; Niwa v Commisioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 853; [2019] NZAR 1104; Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 20 ; Rangitaawa v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2013] NZCA 2; Martin v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZHC 2811 at [20]; Wallace v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 1 at [4]–[5]; James v District Court at Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2196; James v District Court Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2309, Baker v Lawrence [2022] NZHC 2734, Brady v New Zealand Police [2019] NZHC 1040.] Mr Peers referred to Warren v Chief Executive of the Stewart which concerned an application for an order adjudicating Mr Stewart bankrupt. Mr Stewart sought to oppose the application on several bases, including that the bank had admitted certain allegations contained in an unrebutted affidavit which became a judgment in commerce. Associate Judge Bell dealt with this matter quickly by stating “[n]ext, Mr Stewart alleges that the bank, by not refuting his allegations, is deemed to have admitted them. That submission is simply wrong.” 

[29] Mr Ricks sought to distinguish the decision in Bank of New Zealand v Stewart on its facts. He is correct that as that proceeding concerned an insolvency matter it arose in a different context than this case but, regardless, the decision demonstrates that an unrebutted affidavit of the kind Mr Ricks relies upon has no legal recognition and is of no legal effect. 

[30] The fact that Ara did not respond to Mr Ricks’ Affidavit of Truth document does not give rise to any cause of action recognised in law. Mr Ricks’ application for summary judgment is therefore dismissed.

Genomics

'Genetic Property Governance' by Shelly Simana in (2023) 25 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 144 comments 

The law governing an “individual genome” (the genetic material and information extracted from a single person) in the United States has two key shortcomings. First, it adopts an absolute conception of ownership, permitting only one entity to claim ownership over an individual genome—either the person from whom it was extracted or someone else, such as researchers and law enforcement officials. Consequently, the law fails to represent and protect the legitimate concurrent ownership interests of multiple entities stemming from, e.g., personhood, labor, and possession. Instead, it prioritizes one interest at the expense of another. Second, the law fails to accommodate the multifaceted and relational nature of an individual genome. An individual genome consists of both genetic material and genetic information; involves personal, familial, and collective aspects; and has varying degrees of excludability and subtractability. The law, however, does not consider these characteristics together. 

This Article offers a new legal framework, “Genetic Property Governance,” which is a form of collective ownership over an individual genome that balances the generation of social and economic benefits with the need to prevent severe individual and social harms. This framework embraces the idea of an individual genome as a commons, incorporating a liberal account of property and reconciling conflicting interests via two principles, proportionality and reasonableness. Overall, under Genetic Property Governance, an individual genome is a shared enterprise that reflects multiple interests and characteristics to yield just and productive outcomes.

Necropolitics

'Bone and Coral: Ossuopower and the Control of (Future) Remains in Occupied Okinawa' by Nozomi (Nakaganeku) Saito in (2022) 74(3) American Quarterly 567-589 at 572-3 comments 

This essay maps the exercise of what I call “ossuopower,” the control over remains. The extraction and excavation of the soil and bones reflect the struc- tures of settler colonialism and settler garrisons, capitalist industrialization, and militarization that shape Okinawa’s past and cast a shadow over its future. Bones bear the material traces of these forces of territorial acquisition that sever the material through-line between the living and the deceased, between human and nonhuman bodies and the ecologies they inhabit. My method focuses on bones in order to “to see objects not just through the lens of human agency but through the lives of nonhuman beings that both shape and are shaped by relationships and processes embodied in material forms is to invite stories—in fossilized bones, decaying tissues, and living flesh.”... 

What I call ossuopower names the exercise of sovereignty as the right to control remains. Here, sovereignty extends beyond death into the subterranean domains of indigenous burial grounds. In emphasizing the right to control remains, I offer a paradigmatic shift for conceptualizing sovereignty’s reach in sites of ongoing militarized occupation. Focusing on both human remains and coral as a stand-in for the nonhuman, my analysis of ossuopower seeks to apprehend how settler colonial power is not only the right to expose to death but also the right to control remains after death. More particularly, I suggest that the right to control remains is part of the expansion of US empire in the Pacific, a process that dispossesses indigenous people of their lands and lays claim to the remains of their past and future. 

The plunder of burial grounds for human remains furthers the settler removal of the Native. Settler colonialism has exercised the control, theft, extraction, exploitation, and selling of indigenous remains since its inception. James Riding In, a citizen of the Pawnee Nation, explains that in the name of Manifest Destiny, “Europeans claimed that they had preemptive rights not only to our lands and resources, but to our dead as well.”  In the process of settlement, European invaders not only stole indigenous lands but also robbed their graves for gold, silver, and other valuable goods, including indigenous peoples’ skulls to sell to researchers of craniology. The process of settler control over remains furthers what Patrick Wolfe calls the “logic of elimination”: in removing the Native from the land, the settlers also erase the material traces of their centuries-long habitation of the land through the theft of indigenous ancestral remains. 

This example of settler violence against indigenous remains suggests the need to reframe the current thinking of death as sovereignty’s limit; as in the structure of settler colonialism, the sovereign power to manage life and expose to death also claims the right to remains. In the framework of biopower, Michel Foucault suggests, “death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it.”  In the context of the will to make live, death itself is an escape from biopolitical management. However, as Achilles Mbembe’s work on necropolitics in the colony has shown, it is not only the injunction to make live but the right to expose to death that characterizes modern state power. Death is an everyday reality maintained through infrastructural warfare, and the full might of the state’s power is on display in the morbid spectacle of skeletal remains:

What is striking is the tension between the petrification of the bones and their strange coolness on one hand, and on the other, their stubborn will to mean, to signify something. In these impassive bits of bone, there seems to be no ataraxia, nothing but the illusory rejection of a death that has already occurred. In other cases, in which physical amputation replaces immediate death, cutting off limbs opens the way to the deployment of techniques of incision, ablation, and excision that also have bones as their target.

Bones become the symbolic objects of state power, a reminder of the immense cruelty it wields and the capacity of the state that not only can kill or let die but also flaunt the evidence of massacre as a lesson for the living. In this geography of death, Mbembe argues, it is only in the annihilation of the body—the dissolution of the bones and entire corporeal being—that the body “escapes the state of siege and occupation.”  Self-annihilation becomes an exercise of agency against the state.

Pseudolegal

In Brown v Hannan (Human Rights) [2023] VCAT 482 yet another pseudolegal proceeding has been struck out as misconceived and as an abuse of process. 

 Brown lodged an application at VCAT under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic), claiming that Judge Lisa Hannan had discriminated against him in the provision of goods and services on the ground of his political belief or activity, inc the comment that 

 Lisa continued to deny my lawful process in obtaining court recordings asking stupid questions designed to incite me to anger, to frustrate me and to conceal, aid and abet members of police who have filed false charges against me and also falsely imprisoned me for charges subsequently withdrawn. Lisa is asking questions which I can prove she does not ask others and provided me hindrance based on my politrical [sic] belief that she and the organisation she works for are engaaged [sic] in acts of treason against people of the Commonwealth of Australia and that she has no lawful standing which is traceable to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution ACT 1900. 

 In response to ‘what kind of outcome do you think might resolve your dispute?’ Brown applied for 

(1) Justice 

(2) Cease and desist in hindering my lawful process 

(3) Compensation for false imprisonment and for the stress and harm I have been caused by her criminal misconduct and discrimination based on my indisputable knowledge that she is engaged in treason against the people of the Commonwealth of Australia 

(4) Lisa sent to prison for life. 

 Brown subsequently claimed 

 This order is in error and demonstrates that [VCAT Deputy President] now appears complicit in the discrimination, unless of course this is merely a demonstration of incompetence. Lisa Hannan is NOT a Judge in the County Court Lisa Hannah is an employee of a trading corporation (HCA 11) The complaint is due to Lisa Hannan discriminating against me based on my lawful beliefs the fact that this is also criminal misconduct is yes a matter for another forum however by no means negates VCATs responsibility to deal with the discrimination Lisa Hannan has discriminated against me in her private capacity and not in the capacity of a Judge or Magistrates as she did not do this in court It now appears that VCAT are likewise discriminating against me and as such it appears that I musty [sic] appeal this “decision” based on fraud and so-called Deputy President to the discrimination. ...

VCAT states 

 As I said to the applicant at the hearing, when a judicial officer is carrying out their duties as a judicial officer, they are not performing a service to any party before them. They are carrying out their duties, whether or not it benefits or serves any particular party. They are obliged to act in accord with the relevant law, and if they do not, their actions are reviewable in various ways, but the EO Act is not one of those ways. 

Further, in relation to a court proceeding, it is at least misconceived and perhaps an abuse of process to seek to review the decision of a judicial officer in carrying out their duties by complaining that the officer discriminated against a party in a proceeding. This Tribunal does not have power to examine the decisions of a judicial officer. It would not be a proper use of the Tribunal’s powers. There are other avenues for review of the decisions of a magistrate or judge. 

In addition, I note that section 14 of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) provides immunity as follows:

14 Protection of magistrates 

(5) A magistrate has, in the performance of his or her duties as a magistrate, the same protection and immunity as a Judge of the Supreme Court has in the performance of his or her duties as a Judge.

It is unnecessary to examine that immunity closely. There are other reasons why Mr Brown’s claim cannot proceed. However, it is relevant and uncontroversial to say that the immunity prevents the magistrate from being personally sued and personally held liable for their actions as a magistrate. 

In this case, the orders sought by the applicant are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. There is no power under the EO Act for the Tribunal to order that a judge ‘cease and desist hindering [the applicant]’s lawful process’ or to order compensation for false imprisonment or for ‘criminal misconduct’ or (self-evidently) to send a judge to prison. 

Neither the EO Act nor the VCAT Act give the Tribunal power to do what Mr Brown has asked.

The Tribunal went on to conclude 

On the information in the application and Mr Brown’s documents and based on what he said at the hearing, I consider his claim as there expressed should not proceed. 

In summary that is for the following reasons. First, this Tribunal has no power to make the orders he seeks. Secondly, his description of events and his remarks to me at the hearing indicated to me that the decisions he complains about were made in the course of the respondent’s exercise of duties as a magistrate and are outside the definition of ‘services’ in the EO Act, so that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider them. Thirdly, it is at best misconceived to seek to review any decision of a judicial nature under the EO Act. 

There may remain a power for the Tribunal to consider whether what happened was a refusal of service by someone not exercising judicial power. Accordingly, the claim is not dismissed, but only struck out. In leaving the claim thus, I do not suggest that Mr Brown should attempt to amend the application in this proceeding and have it reinstated. There is no fee for an application in this jurisdiction. Mr Brown would be better if he wishes to pursue the matter to file a new application setting out what happened, who was involved and why he says the events amount to discrimination against him. 

Finally, I note that the current application contains scant useful information, and is couched in such intemperate language about the respondent and seeks such unattainable outcomes regarding the respondent that it should be given no further airing.

Vaxing

'Learning from five bad arguments against mandatory vaccination' by Maxwell J Smith and Ezekiel J Emanuel in (2023) 41(21) Vaccine 3301-3304 comments 

The suboptimal uptake of COVID-19 vaccines in many parts of the world has prompted unprecedented public debate concerning the ethics of mandatory vaccination. It is imperative we learn lessons from this debate so we are better positioned to navigate policy proposals for mandatory vaccination in the future. Specifically, we should aim to dispense with unsophisticated ethical claims that distract from or otherwise parody more nuanced and forceful arguments and which overshadow other important ethical concerns that have by comparison received little attention. To this end, we identify five ethical objections to mandatory vaccination that are of poor quality but have been frequently raised during the COVID-19 pandemic, including that mandatory vaccination violates the Nuremberg Code, that it is coercive, that it violates informed consent, that it is discriminatory, and that it infringes civil liberties. We argue that, presented as such, each ought to be rejected, allowing future consideration of mandatory vaccination to be focused on concerns more worthy of ethical scrutiny.

In dealing with pseudolaw claims that mandatory vaccination violates the Nuremberg code the authors note 

The Nuremberg Code is a set of principles for the ethics of human experimentation delineated in the 1947 Nazi doctor case of United States v. Brandt et al.. Principle one emphasizes that voluntary consent is essential for human participation in research. Vaccination mandates violate the Nuremberg Code because COVID-19 vaccines are ‘experimental’ and because mandates undermine the voluntariness of informed consent. ... 

Response 

COVID-19 vaccines used in practice and involved in vaccination mandates are either authorized or fully approved by national regulatory authorities. Hence, they are not experimental and not part of research, and thus not covered by the Nuremberg Code. Taking approved medicines prescribed or used as a matter of regular medical or public health practice does not constitute an experiment or research in any common understandings of the terms. 

But what of the fact that COVID-19 vaccines are still being studied? All medicines undergo on-going study without being considered experimental. The study of medicines does not cease once evidence regarding their safety and efficacy has met the standards of regulatory approval and are used in regular clinical and public health practice. For instance, a drug’s effectiveness is often compared to other interventions. But this does not render those medicines ‘experimental’ and subject to regulations for human subjects research. 

Ultimately, whether something is called ‘experimental’ is arguably irrelevant and unhelpful when evaluating the ethics of vaccination mandates because this is a term that could include everything from first-in-human use to off-label use to medicines authorized for emergency use. Each of these has different evidentiary standards, requiring different forms of ethical scrutiny, and so should be assessed accordingly. The mere charge of being ‘experimental’ is therefore of little or no moral importance; instead, what should matter from a moral perspective is whether there is sufficient causal evidence and a positive risk-benefit ratio to justify the use of the medicine in practice. In practical terms, approval or authorization by a national regulatory authority indicate when this condition has been satisfied. 

Finally, this objection seems to be confused because no country has in fact legally recognized the Nuremberg Code for the ethical conduct of research. Consequently, a ‘violation’ of the Nuremberg Code would represent a violation of principles of historical ethical importance, not a violation of a law or regulation (e.g., actual regulations governing research or laws concerning informed consent for vaccination).