Liberty

'Liberty: One or Two Concepts Liberty: One Concept Too Many?' by Eric Nelson in 33(1) Political Theory 58-78 comments 

Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between “negative” and “positive” concepts of liberty has recently been defended on newand interesting grounds. Proponents of this dichotomy used to equate positive liberty with “self-mastery”—the rule of our rational nature over our passions and impulses. However, Berlin’s critics have made the case that this account does not employ a separate “ concept” of liberty: although the constraints it envisions are internal, rather than external, forces, the freedom in question remains “negative” (freedom is still seen as the absence of such impediments). Responding to this development, Berlin’s defenders have increasingly tended to identify positive liberty with “self-realization.” The argument is that such an account of freedom is genuinely “nonnegative,” in that it does not refer to the absence of constraints on action. This essay argues that the claims made on behalf of “freedom as self-realization” cannot withstand scrutiny, and that they fail to isolate a coherent view of liberty that is distinguishable fromthe absence of constraint. 

When Isaiah Berlin unveiled his classic distinction between “negative” and “positive” liberty in 1958, he was making both a historical and an analytical claim. He was not only arguing that nonnegative locutions about liberty could be intelligible but also that such locutions had a significant, if sinister, history. While Hobbes and Mill, Tocqueville and Constant carried the banner for “negative” liberty—freedom as the absence of interference or impediment—the “positive” concept found expression in the writings of such towering eminences as Plato, Zeno, Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx. Since Berlin issued his celebrated formulation, however, his claim for the historical importance of positive liberty has been gravely compromised, as scholars have whittled away at the set of thinkers whose political theories the concept was meant to explain. Gerald C. MacCallum took a significant stride in this direction when he pointed out that Berlin had imposed an arbitrary restriction on the notion of “constraint” in insisting that negative freedom consisted solely in the absence of the “deliberate interference of other human beings.” Persons can be said to be constrained by internal forces or factors as well, MacCallum argued, and the absence of such intrinsic constraints would still count as freedom in its negative sense. Once the category of “constraint” had been stretched in this manner, it became a relatively simple matter to redistrict the province of negative liberty so that it could embrace many of the theorists Berlin had placed in the “positive” camp. Stoics in the tradition of Zeno, for example, preached that man lives according to his nature (and is thus truly “free”) only when his passions are restrained, a straightforward instance of freedom as the absence of internal constraint. Likewise, Plato spoke of freedom from false beliefs, and Kant’s moral agent legislates for himself the law of reason once he has liberated himself from the slavery of passions and sense impressions. All of these putatively “positive” theorists turn out on closer inspection to disagree with Hobbes and Constant, not about the meaning of liberty but about what counts as a constraint. 

MacCallum offered these observations in the service of a broader critique of Berlin’s enterprise. Rejecting Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom, MacCallum maintained that all intelligible locutions about liberty could be subsumed under a single triadic template: freedom is always “of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something.” But even contemporary theorists who dispute MacCallum’s larger claim about a single concept of freedom often accept his narrower argument about internal constraint. Quentin Skinner provides a distinguished example in this respect. He observes that Berlin’s characterization of positive liberty as “self-mastery” seems to have relied in large measure on “the familiar thought — equally familiar to students of Plato and of Freud — that the obstacles to your capacity to act freely may be internal rather than external, and that you will need to free yourself from these psychological constraints if you are to act autonomously.” But, Skinner continues, this claim “fails to capture a separate concept of positive liberty,” since, although we now include psychic, internal forces in the universe of possible constraints, “we are still speaking about the need to get rid of an element of constraint if we are to act freely.” Indeed, Berlin himself seems to have intuited that this particular notion of self-mastery was a nonstarter as a separate concept of “positive” liberty. In his 1958 lecture, he declared, “Freedom is self-mastery, the elimination of obstacles to my will, whatever these obstacles may be — the resistance of nature, of my ungoverned passions, of irrational institutions, of the opposing wills or behaviour of others.” Whether the constraints are internal or external, we are still firmly within the realm of negative liberty. 

Skinner is thus committed to MacCallum’s emptying of the historical population of positive theorists. Plato and Freud must go, as must the Stoics, and presumably the Kantians. But Skinner, whose interest is primarily in elucidating two different understandings of negative liberty, nonetheless accepts that a positive concept exists and is intelligible. When Berlin writes in his introduction to the 1969 Four Essays on Liberty that “for the most part, freedom was identified by metaphysically inclined writers, with the realization of the real self,” Skinner feels that he has at last articulated a concept of freedom that is truly incommensurable with negative liberty. “Freedom,” Skinner explains, “is thus equated not with self-mastery but rather with self-realisation, and above all with self-perfection, with the idea (as Berlin expresses it) of my self at its best.” In making this claim, Skinner suggests that Berlin had in mind chiefly the British neo-Hegelians T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. Certainly, in the descent from Plato and Kant to Green and Bosanquet the concept of positive freedom experienced quite a falling off. But the claim remains that this positive notion is intelligible, and that it was articulated in a particular historical moment. ...

Knutson, Mayan Calendar and Postal Court

In Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 858 Thomas J states 

 [1] James Kenneth Knutson [Knutson] has since 2016 employed a broad spectrum of abusive pseudolegal strategies in his attempts to evade enforcement of his credit card and mortgage debts. His litigation arguments are “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” or “OPCA”, a class of spurious “pseudolaw” concepts which are sold to abusive litigants by conman “gurus” who promise extraordinary but false benefits: Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215. Gurus’ illusionary promises include free money, debt elimination, “get out of jail free cards”, immunity from income tax, and “travelling” - unlimited motor vehicle use. OPCA ideas sound like law and use legal terminology and references, but are universally rejected by Canadian courts. 

[2] All OPCA constitute an abuse of court processes. The employing of OPCA strategies is a basis on which a court may impose court access restrictions through what is sometimes called a “vexatious litigant order”: Meads v Meads; R v Fearn, 2014 ABQB 233 at para 49, 586 AR 182; Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92, 590 AR 288, aff’d 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303. Some OPCA ideas are so notoriously false that simply employing these concepts creates a presumption that a litigant appears in court for an abusive, ulterior motive: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31, 368 Nfld & PEIR 80; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288. 

[3] Knutson’s litigation history in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench amply demonstrates that he persistently employs these false concepts. He has continued with his abusive, futile schemes, despite failing on every occasion where he has attempted to impose pseudolaw on the Courts and opposing parties. ... 

[10]. ... 2. A document dated September 16, 2016 where Knutson demands Brian J. Porter, president of the Bank, do various things including validate the debt, provide a signed contract, and if these demands are not satisfied in seven days that means the debt never existed or has been paid, and that damages and fee schedule charges are due. This document is an exact duplicate of a “Conditional Acceptance” document sold by the UK “Get Out Of Debt Free” OPCA website (see Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771, 603 AR 261, paras 55-73, Appendix “A”), which is the first document in a Three/Five Letters pseudolaw process which is intended to eliminate debts by foisting obligations on lenders. This document is marked by ink fingerprints in the lower right corner of each page, with the annotation “Seal” and “Copy-claim”. Also attached is a second document from the Get Out Of Debt Free website, titled “Common Law Copyright Notice” (reproduced in Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, Appendix “E”), which purports to claim intellectual property interests over Knutson’s name, biometric data, DNA, urine, feces, and other bodily fluids. Any breach of this claimed interest results in a $1 million penalty. This document also sports the ink fingerprint markings, and on its front page a Canadian postage stamp, signed across “by: James-Kenneth: Knutson”. 

3. A further document to Brian J. Porter, dated September 29, 2016, reproduced in Appendix “A”, which in brief says that two attached documents titled “Promissory Note” pay any outstanding debts. The September 29, 2016 letter states that if the “Promissory Notes” are not returned, or if they are returned “... without a legitimate written explanation ...” [emphasis in original], then that means “... my account balance is now zero for both accounts.” [emphasis of original]. The same fingerprint and postage stamp ornaments are present as the previous documents. ... 

5. Last is a letter dated January 1, 2017, reproduced as Appendix “C”, where “Sovereign ©James of the family: Knutson, Authorized Agent and Representative for JAMES KNUTSON™” declares that he is “an endless creditor” thanks to “the birth certificate bond”, “money no longer exists”, and that he has been denied a “Common Law court de jure”. This trial can only proceed if he receives $10 million in gold or silver “paid up front”, he is recognized as an “Ambassador of God”, and “You must verity the [BAR CULT] fiction-code: NO LAW OR FACT SHALL BE TRIED IN COURT.” This document attaches a 20 page “Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right” [NOUICR], which is a document commonly used by persons in the Freeman-on-the-Land movement which purportedly eliminates state authority and fetters the operation of the Court. The document states: ... Free-men-on-the-land do not have earthly masters. I am a Free-man-on-the-land and I do not have a master on planet Earth other than GOD and only from GOD ... This document also includes a “FEE SCHEDULE”, which allegedly sets fines to government actors, for example: FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5000.00) PER HOUR or portion thereof if I am held, handcuffed, transported, incarcerated or subjected to any adjudication process without my express written and notarized consent ... This particular NOUICR is largely identical to a NOUICR filed by Alfred Potvin in Royal Bank of Canada v Potvin, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #1701 01667 and Potvin v Royal Bank of Canada, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #1701 13997: Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652. 

[17] ... In the Affidavit filed by Knutson on March 7, 2017, Knutson indicates “I am a Common Law man , of inherent jurisdiction.”, and attaches as proof his NOUICR and Registration of Live Birth. Knutson continues to say he has sent this lender another set of Get Out Of Debt Free letters, which are attached as exhibits. Knutson claims that proves no debt exists. He also says Charter, s 32 means the law of Canada does not apply to him: “I have never, nor am I now acting as agent of the government.” 

[18] Both the Knutson and MCAP Affidavits include a bizarre, practically indecipherable document, the first page of which is reproduced as Appendix “D”. The content and text of the first page of this document is representative of its entire nine pages. As best I can evaluate this item, I conclude this is a “judgment” of a purported US court, the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”, issued on November 26, 2016 by “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-JUDGE: David-Wynn: Miller. The “judgment” is followed by a “:STUDY-GUIDE” which seems to indicate a strange kind of grammar. For example: ~4 = PRONOUNS = FOR THE SINGLE-ONE-WORD; FOR AN ADJUCTIVE-PRONOUN-OPINION OF THE FACT CHANGES WITH THE FACT INTO THE PRONOUN; FOR AN ADVERB-CONNECTS TO THE PRONOUN BEFORE AND ADVERB. 

[19] The remaining ten pages are the Knutson MCAP mortgage, but that document has been annotated. Each page is marked in thick felt marker “:EVIDENCE:” and stamped with a legend: :Syntax-word-key-meaning: 1=Adverb 8=Past-time 2=Verb 9=Future-time 3=Adjective 0=Conjunction 4=Pronoun NC=No-Contract and is sometimes annotated with other text, such as “:STYLES-Boxing=:OMIT-VOID-CONTENT-FRAUD-SYNTAX-GRAMMER”. All words are then individually annotated with a hand-written number, which appears to correspond to the stamped legend. 

[20] Though my analysis of the meaning of this peculiar item is hampered by its perplexing nature, I conclude the function of the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision and attached annotated mortgage document is that the mortgage contract is being proofread using an abnormal grammar code. The failure of MCAP to format its documents according to this outlandish linguistic system allegedly means the contract is void and fraudulent. 

[21] In support of that interpretation, I note the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench is not the first (legitimate) court to receive a document from the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”. In Gilly v Ocwen, 2016 WL 868167 (Conn Dist Ct), US District Court Judge Meyer reports the local court had received dozens of purported “Certified Copy of Final Judgment, Translation of Final Default Judgements” from the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”. 

[22] Judge Meyer’s subsequent encounter with the “judge” behind this so-called Court is worth reproducing in full: Because of doubts about the validity of the “Federal Postal Court,” I entered an order to show cause for a hearing to learn more about the judgment and the “Federal Postal Court.” Notice of the hearing was transmitted to plaintiff, but she did not communicate with the Court. Two individuals ended up participating in the hearing by telephone from an Arizona telephone number. They identified themselves as David Wynn Miller, who described himself as a judge of the “Federal Postal Court,” and Leighton Ward, who described himself as clerk of the “Federal Postal Court.” These two names appear on the registration documents filed with the Court. Miller told me that Benjamin Franklin opened the “Federal Postal Court” on July 4, 1775. But the court was soon closed in 1776 with the onset of the Revolutionary War. It remained closed for more than two centuries. Then, according to Miller, he and a colleague reopened the court for operation on December 21, 2012 (a day that is otherwise well known as the predicted end of the world according to the Mayan Calendar). Miller explained to me that the “Federal Postal Court” operates on the basis of a sophisticated mathematical understanding of language that proves that certain mortgage documents are fraudulent. According to Miller, the “Federal Postal Court” has been recognized by the United Nations. The “Federal Postal Court” does not have a courthouse or other fixed location; instead, it has transitory jurisdiction with a presence wherever the federal postal eagle symbol may be. A YouTube search discloses numerous videos of Miller and others explaining the operation of the “Federal Postal Court.” A Westlaw search does not disclose any valid judgments or other proceedings involving the “Federal Postal Court.” A Westlaw search for the name of “David Wynn Miller” otherwise reflects a lengthy history of frivolous filings that use the same impenetrable language that appears in the filings in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Pflum, 2013 WL 4482706 (D. Kan. 2013) (collecting dozens of cases and noting that several district courts have imposed pre-filing screening orders to prevent Miller from filing suits in these courts without prior leave of the court). 

[23] Judge Meyer refused to file the purported “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” default judgment, and instead concluded: ... there is no basis to conclude that the purported judgment of the “Federal Postal Court” arises from any valid legal authority at all. So far as I can tell, the “Federal Postal Court” is a sham and no more than a product of fertile imagination. ... I totally agree with this statement. 

[24] Commonwealth authorities have also previously rejected David Wynn Miller and his concepts as an authentic legal authority, for example: National Leasing v Top West Venture, 2001 BCSC 111; CIBC v Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625; Borkovic v Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337; R v McMordie, 2001 BCCA 412, 155 BCAC 21; Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2010] NSWLEC 66; Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2009] FMCA 1204; APD Property Developments Ltd v Papakura District Council, [2009] NZHC 1677. 

[25] The “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision I have reviewed and “Judge” Miller’s statements to Judge Meyer only hint at scope of Miller’s bizarre claims. For example, Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2010] NSWLEC 66 reports representation by “plenipotentiary judge David-Wynn Miller”, who shared “a little secret” with the Court: “Every word that starts in the English language with a vowel, a, e, i, o and u and followed by two consonants is a word that means no contract.” That insight is “astonishing”, or, in “Millerese”, “no contract”. 

[26] Not surprisingly, the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision purchased by Knutson from Miller was of no legal effect. On March 6, 2017 Gill J dismissed Knutson’s appeal and ordered that Knutson must vacate the mortgaged property by March 20, 2017. ... 

[46] Knutson’s litigation to date exhibits a broad range of OPCA concepts, as well as other indicia of abusive litigation. 

A. OPCA Concepts and Strategies 

[47] I have reproduced and described Knutson’s OPCA materials in some detail to provide illustrations of the false concepts he has employed to this point. What follows is an incomplete review of his OPCA strategies, highlighting some of the most egregious misconduct. 

1. “Strawman” Theory 

[48] First, Knutson’s materials indicates he advocates “Strawman” Theory, which was recently summarized by Rooke ACJ in Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-85: “Strawman” Theory claims an individual has two parts, a physical human being component, and an immaterial but legal double. Pseudolaw gurus use many names to identify the latter, but I will refer to this part by one of its more common names: the “Strawman”. The way one tells these two aspects apart is by the letter case of their name. “Alfred Gerald Potvin” is the human half, while “ALFRED GERALD POTVIN” is the “Strawman”. “Strawman” Theory claims that human beings are born without a “Strawman”, but that nefarious government actors trick parents into obtaining a birth certificate, and that attaches the “Strawman” to the infant by a contract. In this scheme governments have no authority over humans, but instead must chain their authority through to the human via the “Strawman” and its secret contract. “Strawman” Theory also often claims that “Strawman” and birth documentation is associated with a bank account or some other form of wealth, and with special techniques that money can be obtained by “A4V” ... See also Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 110-120; Meads v Meads, at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88, [2017] DTC 5024; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 57-70; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134 at paras 10-17, confirmed 2018 ABQB 399 at paras 25-33. 

[49] The “Strawman” scheme is so notoriously bad (“fanciful”, “no rational support”, and “no basis in the law”) that, in Fiander v Mills, at paras 20-21, 40, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal concluded that anyone who even uses the “Strawman” in court is presumed to act in bad faith, and for a “vexatious and abusive” ulterior purpose. A court that encounters the “Strawman” may act pre-emptively to terminate or restrict litigation abuse based on this notoriously false idea. This rule from Fiander v Mills has been subsequently adopted in many Alberta cases, including Re Boisjoli; Gauthier v Starr; Alberta v Greter, 2016 ABQB 293; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency); Re Gauthier, Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 288, decision confirmed 2018 ABQB 399; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 438; Toronto-Dominion Bank v Leadbetter, 2018 ABQB 472, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 611; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 475, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 618; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 834. 

[50] Knutson obviously subscribes to “Strawman” Theories. He self identifies the two halves of himself by the usual language. For example, in the document reproduced in Appendix “C”, he is “James-Kenneth: Knutson”, rather than “JAMES KNUTSON™”, which “James” says is the real party to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench debt collection action. 

[51] In Court he refused to identify himself as James Knutson, instead, he is “James of the Family Knutson”. His NOUICR also makes these distinctions. 

[52] The Affidavit reproduced in Appendix “E” further illustrates Knutson’s spurious belief in the “Strawman”: I James, a minister of GOD, am making a special limited appearance on behalf of the defendant [JAMES KNUTSON]. 

[53] He then indicates he believes the letter case of a name has legal significance: I know the US Printing Style Manual, which explains how to identify a CORPORATION, dictates the use of capital letters. Knutson continues to indicate he identifies JAMES KNUTSON as some kind of trust. He, the physical man, is its beneficiary. 

[54] As was reviewed in Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, OPCA theories put special significance on birth documentation, often associating it with great value. Knutson makes that claim in the August 1, 2017 Affidavit: I know that man's laws are to make money for the Corporation of Canada and to pay back the Interest on the money you the 'de facto government' have borrowed in fraud on my behalf from the I.M.F. in the form of my birth bond #, on my Birth Certificate. 

[55] This related claim that birth documentation has some extraordinary legal significance was also identified in Fiander v Mills, at paras 21, 37-40, as a separate basis for a court to presume that a litigant conducts themselves in bad faith and with abusive and ulterior objectives, see also d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 68-70; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 91-92. 

2. The Three/Five Letters 

[56] Knutson has employed template documents from the UK OPCA website Get Out Of Debt Free in the Bank of Nova Scotia and MCAP actions. These are a Three/Five Letters process: Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, at paras 55-73; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 6-21. Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 68 provides a useful overview of this concept: ... Briefly, a Three/Five Letter process uses a series of documents that are sent to a target one after another. Each says that if the target does not respond, or does not respond in an adequate manner, then certain results automatically occur. These “foisted unilateral agreements” ... are all based on a commonplace pseudolaw fallacy, that in contract silence means agreement or consent. [Citation omitted.] In Knutson’s case, he purports to have eliminated his debts in this manner. 

[57] What is particularly problematic is that the exact documents that Knutson used were reproduced in full and rejected in the Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky decision issued by this Court on December 16, 2014, long before Knutson began sending his creditors these documents in 2016. I draw a strong negative inference from Knutson’s using Get Out Of Debt Free materials after this Court issued an explicit finding that these materials were not merely worthless, but abusive. 

[58] Further, Associate Chief Justice Rooke in Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 6-21 concluded that the Three/Five Letters scheme has been rejected in Canadian courts on so many occasions that, like “Strawman” Theory, as a principle of law, whenever a person uses a Three/Five Letters process that action creates the presumption that OPCA litigant is engaged in a vexatious and abusive argument, and does so for an improper and ulterior purpose. 

[59] I conclude this rule applies to Knutson as well. 

3. Fee Schedules, Copyright in a Personal Name, and Other Threats 

[60] As previously indicated, Knutson’s NOUICR includes a “fee schedule”, which purports to unilaterally set penalties or fines for certain activities which are lawful acts, or duties, of government actors. This is yet another category of foisted unilateral agreement. 

[61] OPCA fee schedules are a form of intimidation: Meads v Meads, at para 527; Fearn v Canada Customs, at para 199; Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, at para 78; Gidda v Hirsch, 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84; R v Sands, 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18, 416 Sask R 279; R v Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46, 450 Sask R 147; Re Boisjoli, at paras 58-69; Allen Boisjoli Holdings v Papadoptu, 2016 FC 1260; Pomerleau v Canada Revenue Agency, at para 135; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, 2017 ABQB 124 at para 28, 276 ACWS (3d) 847; Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 at para 39, 86 CPC (7th) 348; Re Gauthier, at paras 65-66; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 79-80. In Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 80, Rooke ACJ explains: In law (and simple common sense) a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts ... Intimidation is the natural consequence of Mr. Potvin’s illegal and unreasonable fee schedule demands. I therefore presume Mr. Potvin intended exactly that by using these strategies and issuing bills and a counterclaim on that basis. [Citation omitted.] 

[62] I adopt this reasoning, which applies equally to Knutson. 

[63] The Get Out Of Debt Free claim by Knutson that anyone who infringes on his purported intellectual property rights is another attempt at illegal intimidation. There is no legal basis for his claim to have “common law copyright” in his name (Meads v Meads, at para 504), and, generally, this concept “... has an overwhelmingly juvenile character.” (Meads v Meads, at para 502). I conclude that threats of this kind are another example of illegitimate OPCA-based intimidation. 

[64] Knutson also threatens in his August 1, 2017 Affidavit that unless MCAP accedes to his false OPCA-based demands for a free house and nearly a million dollars he will initiate criminal proceedings through the Criminal Code, ss 504, 507.1 private information process. 

[65] All these OPCA intimidation activities are a potential basis for court access restrictions. 

4. Fractional Reserve Banking Theories and Promissory Notes are as Good as Cash 

[66] Knutson also advances two often intertwined but legally false claims that purport to eliminate debts and provide free money. First, he claims there is no such thing as real money (January 1, 2017 Affidavit, Appendix “C”): l know that I am an endless creditor and NEVER a debtor from the birth certificate bond, which I claim fiduciary gent of. I know the corporation known as CANADA is in a 70 year bankruptcy cycle; money no longer exists, since the seizure of gold and there is only charge and discharge of credit. I know banknotes are debt instruments; having people pay debt with debt is enslavement! And I will not participate. 

[67] This and other related claims concerning the operation of banks relate to a conspiracy theory that fractional reserve banking means that mortgages and other debts are a fraud. This concept has been thoroughly examined and rejected in many Canadian decisions, including Dempsey v Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at paras 27, 39, 151 ACWS (3d) 204; Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703 at paras 68-85, 28 Alta LR (6th) 104; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, at paras 51-53. 

[68] Knutson in the Bank of Nova Scotia and Capital One Bank actions argues that his providing of a promissory note which promises that he will at some point pay the outstanding debt fully discharges his obligations. This “a promise to pay is payment” promissory note is cash argument is, in any case, ridiculous, since the end result would be nothing more than “a conga line of promissory notes, each purporting to satisfy the debt of the note one step up the cue”: Re Boisjoli, at para 35. 

[69] Beyond advancing the fundamentally illogical argument that a promise is a payment, Knutson relies on a quotation of Lord Denning from Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar: We have repeatedly said in this court that a bill of exchange or a Promissory Note is to be treated as cash. It is to be honoured unless there is some good reason to the contrary. 

[70] Commonwealth Courts have consistently rejected Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar creates a principle that a debtor may discharge his or her obligations by a paper note that is not backed by actual funds: Re Boisjoli, at paras 32-34; Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, 2015 ABQB 700 at paras 65-68, 7 Admin LR (6th) 700; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, at paras 35-37; Dove v Legal Aid Ontario, 2018 ONSC 17 at paras 4, 8; Bank of New Zealand v Donaldson, [2016] NZHC 1225 at paras 47-52. The modern approach to payment of debt by a promissory note is set in Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Wilson, 2014 SLR 46, [2013] CSIH 95. The Denning rule only applies, and a bill of exchange or promissory note only extinguishes a debt, where the lender has agreed in advance to payment in that manner. 

[71] Knutson’s attempts to ‘miracle away’ his debts by worthless promissory notes or claims he never received anything of value from his lenders is a further indication that Knutson is potentially an appropriate subject for court access restrictions. 

5. The :FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT Judgment 

[72] Knutson’s submitting to this Court and his reliance on the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision of “Judge :David-Wynn: Miller” warrants special comment. This step is serious litigation misconduct. An attempt to impose a fictional court decision into an Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench process is prima facie contempt of court: Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 201-210. 

[73] That is not the only implication of asserting alleged authority of this kind. Pseudolaw is a kind of self-destructive extremist political ideology that is reinforced in highly introspective, introverted community ‘echo chambers’: Re Gauthier, at para 92. As I observed in 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 72-73, people who use pseudolaw are motivated by extremist political beliefs and ideologies:

Judicial and legal academic authorities uniformly identify OPCA narratives and their associated pseudolegal concepts as resting on and building from a foundation of paranoid and conspiratorial anti-government and anti-institutional political and social belief. These individuals are sometimes called ‘litigation terrorists’ for this reason. They may act for personal benefit, but they also do so with the belief they are justified and act lawfully when they injure others and disrupt court processes. Persons who advance OPCA litigation to harm others have no place in Canada’s courts. ... Their next target can be anyone who crosses their path - government officials or organizations, peace officers, lawyers, judges, business employees - and who then offends the OPCA litigant’s skewed perspectives. These individuals believe they have a right to attack others via the courts, they like the idea of doing that, and they view their litigation targets as bad actors who deserve punishment. ... 

[74] That makes “summons”, “orders”, and “judgments” of vigilante fake courts purportedly operating under pseudolegal authority a highly problematic phenomenon. Worse, orders and decisions of vigilante courts are a precursor to illegal actions, including extrajurisdictional vigilante actions against government actors. As Tilleman J observed in Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 201-204:

Another extremely disquieting aspect of certain OPCA movements is a belief that individuals are authorized to take extrajudicial vigilante actions against court actors, including judges. Naturally, these illegal actions are cloaked with some kind of purported thought fictitious authority, most commonly as an expression of the “mutant” common law in a jury or court process. Typical language is formation of “common law”, “people’s” or “de jure” posses, juries, and trials. Other times OPCA litigants announce they are forming their own court, on the spot, using their “personal inherent jurisdiction”. A third related scenario is where an OPCA litigant claims that it is notaries who are the true judges or possess some supervisory, judicial authority ... Othertimes OPCA litigants will threaten judges with sanctions from international courts and tribunals, real or imaginary. ... Freeman-on-the-Land guru Robert Arthur Menard operates a group of self-declared and appointed vigilante “peace officers”, the “Canadian Common Corps Of Peace Officers” (“C3PO”).

[75] The “C3PO” example is not an isolated one. In Alberta a vigilante court which called itself “The Tacit Supreme In Law Court” operated a police force of uniformed “Territorial Marshals”: Donald J Netolitzky, “The History of the Organized Pseudolegal Argument Phenomenon in Canada” (2016) 53(3) Alta L Rev 609 at 628-629. This fictional court claimed to terminate criminal prosecutions of its members. 

[76] In Fearn v Canada Customs, at para 205, Justice Tilleman observed escalation to violence by OPCA litigants is a more common phenomenon in the US than in Canada. That is no longer the case. 

[77] Recently, a Freeman-on-the-Land, Amos Edwin McKechnie went so far as to in court declare he has the right under his law to kill judges, lawyers, police, corrections and government personnel, and he will kill them, except if they act according to his OPCA-based pseudolegal demands: McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 493; McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677. McKechnie has been evaluated as a high threat of violence to any non-compliant justice system participant, and is currently detained facing multiple trials. 

[78] OPCA Detaxer Ian Bush issued a “summons” from the “High Court of Humanitarian Justice” that demanded former Chief Judge Alban Garon appear at a vigilante court process: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 2202 at para 110. Chief Judge Garon did not comply. Ian Bush subsequently conducted a home invasion of Chief Judge Garon’s residence, during which Bush hogtied, tortured, and killed by suffocation Chief Judge Garon, his wife, and an unfortunate neighbor who happened to be in the residence when Bush accessed the residence via subterfuge: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7426 at para 2; R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7050 at para 3. This was only one attack in Bush’s broader plan to rob and murder a list of judges, government officials, lawyers, and human rights activists: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7627 at paras 9, 29-31. 

[79] These are only examples of more violent and dangerous activities by Canadians with OPCA beliefs who exercise what they say is their own authority, or that of vigilante court and police organs: Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments [OPCA] in Canada, an Attack on the Legal System” (2016) 10 JPPL 137; Barbara Perry, David C Hofmann & Ryan Scrivens, “Working Paper 17-02: Broadening our Understanding of Anti-Authority Movements in Canada” (Waterloo: TSAS, August 2017). Vigilante court proceedings, orders, and decisions are a dangerous precursor of elevated illegal activity by persons who have adopted pseudolaw: Netolitzky, “Attack on the Legal System” at 186; Stephen A Kent & Robin D Willey, “Sects, Cults, and the Attack on Jurisprudence” (2013) 14 Rutgers’ JL & Religion 306 at 319-329. 

[80] In light of these facts I conclude that Knutson deploying a fictional decision of a fraudulent vigilante court is a very serious form of litigation misconduct. That, too, warrants investigation of whether Knutson should be made subject to court access restrictions. 

B. Other Indicia of Abusive Litigation 

[81] In addition to the many variations on abusive OPCA concepts that Knutson has employed in his litigation, he has also exhibited other litigation misconduct indicia identified in Chutskoff v Bonora and its successor decisions. 

[82] I conclude that Knutson’s attempt to re-open the Bank of Nova Scotia Default Judgment is a form of collateral attack. His litigation attempts to frustrate the collection of his debts and foreclosure were hopeless. His appeal in the MCAP action had no prospect of success. 

[83] Knutson has also sought impossible or disproportionate remedies, including: 1. $1 million “common law” intellectual property claims on his name, biometric data, and bodily excreta, 2. “four fold” damages “per Luke 19:8”, 3. Charter remedies vs a non-government entity, a bank, and 4. criminal investigation and prosecution in a civil proceeding. 

[84] The multiple orders that Knutson vacate the mortgaged residence in the MCAP action indicate he does not follow court instructions. He refused to comply with instructions to cooperate with the realtor hired to conduct the court-ordered sale. 

[85] As the passages and documents reproduced from Knutson’s materials indicate he has advanced unmeritorious claims of conspiracy, fraud and improper conduct by institutions and lawyers.