McLuhan

From Alan Jacobs' New Atlantis item on Marshall McLuhan -

McLuhan was simply dismissive of such puzzlement [about Hot and Cool media]. In his preface to a later edition of the book, he wrote that "the section on 'media hot and cool' confused many reviewers of Understanding Media who were unable to recognize the very large structural changes in human outlook that are occurring today". His critics, then, are just out of touch with contemporary experience. In a later interview he would add, shifting the ground of his defense, "Clear prose indicates the absence of thought". Any confusion we experience is the inevitable result of McLuhan’s profundity — a claim quite similar to the ones made by Judith Butler when responding to the news that she had “won” the 1998 edition of the Bad Writing Contest sponsored by the journal Philosophy and Literature.

I have been reading McLuhan off and on since, at age sixteen, I bought a copy of The Gutenberg Galaxy. His centenary — McLuhan was born in Edmonton, Alberta on July 21, 1911 — provides an occasion for me to clarify my own oscillating responses to his work and his reputation. I have come to certain conclusions. First, that McLuhan never made arguments, only assertions. Second, that those assertions are usually wrong, and when they are not wrong they are highly debatable. Third, that McLuhan had an uncanny instinct for reading and quoting scholarly books that would become field-defining classics. Fourth, that McLuhan’s determination to bring the vast resources of humanistic scholarship to bear upon the analysis of new media is an astonishingly fruitful one, and an example to be followed. And finally, that once one has absorbed that example there is no need to read anything that McLuhan ever wrote.

Jacobs goes on to comment that -

To today’s reader, McLuhan’s responses to these works resemble nothing so much as a series of blog posts. (As my friend Tim Carmody has pointed out, this is even more true of McLuhan’s first book, The Mechanical Bride [1951], which is basically an anthology of advertisements with brief commentaries, a kind of proto-tumblelog.) He quotes a passage, riffs on it for a few sentences or paragraphs, then moves on to another book: quote, riff, quote, riff. And sometimes just quote: one section consists largely of a lengthy three-paragraph selection from Iona and Peter Opie’s Lore and Language of Schoolchildren (1959), while another gives seven brief paragraphs from Erik Barnouw’s Mass Communication (1956), in both cases with very brief introduction but no comment. As I have noted, the “mosaic” method here is an intentional homage to or imitation of the non-linear structures of the great Modernists. It may even be significant that what Yeats wanted to do, had he been granted the privilege of traveling through time to Justinian’s Byzantium, was to work in mosaic tile, to be absorbed thereby into a great collective endeavor in devotion to which he could forget his own identity. McLuhan’s refusal to produce a consecutive argument might well be an indication of his own mental quirks and limitations, but surely it was an attempt to allow “the Gutenberg Galaxy” — the vast constellation of idea, inventions, and practices that constitute “the making of typographic man” — to speak for itself.

Lords a'leaping

Given my dissertation I have been enjoying the brouhaha over climate change sceptic Lord Monckton, who's been smacked - quite publicly - for inexactitude regarding his identity.

The UK Parliament has published a 'Letter to Viscount Monckton of Brenchley from David Beamish, the Clerk of the Parliaments' [PDF]

The letter states -

My predecessor, Sir Michael Pownall, wrote to you on 21 July 2010, and again on 30 July 2010, asking that you cease claiming to be a Member of the House of Lords, either directly or by implication. It has been drawn to my attention that you continue to make such claims.

In particular, I have listened to your recent interview with Mr Adam Spencer on Australian radio. In response to the direct question, whether or not you were a Member of the House of Lords, you said "Yes, but without the right to sit or vote". You later repeated, "I am a Member of the House".

I must repeat my predecessor's statement that you are not and have never been a Member of the House of Lords. Your assertion that you are a Member, but without the right to sit or vote, is a contradiction in terms. No-one denies that you are, by virtue of your letters Patent, a Peer. That is an entirely separate issue to membership of the House. This is borne out by the recent judgment in Baron Mereworth v Ministry of Justice (Crown Office) where Mr Justice Lewison stated:

In my judgment, the reference [in the House of Lords Act 1999] to 'a member of the House of Lords' is simply a reference to the right to sit and vote in that House ... In a nutshell, membership of the House of Lords means the right to sit and vote in that House. It does not mean entitlement to the dignity of a peerage.

I must therefore again ask that you desist from claiming to be a Member of the House of Lords, either directly or by implication, and also that you desist from claiming to be a Member "without the right to sit or vote".

I am publishing this letter on the parliamentary website so that anybody who wishes to check whether you are a Member of the House of Lords can view this official confirmation that you are not.

Ouch.

The Court in Mereworth v Ministry of Justice [2011] EWHC 1589 (Ch), cited by Beamish, notes that in 2002 -

the present Lord Mereworth succeeded to the title. On 16 August 2010, he wrote to Her Majesty the Queen stating that he was entitled to a Seat, Place and Voice in Parliament and requesting Her Majesty to issue him a Writ of Summons for the Parliamentary sittings in September 2010.

The response of the Crown Office of the House of Lords was that the result of section 1 of the House of Lords Act 1999 was that Lord Mereworth was not entitled to a Writ of Summons because he was a hereditary peer. Lord Mereworth persisted with his request ...

The first declaration that he claims is a declaration that in consequence of the Letters Patent creating the Barony of Mereworth, he possesses and holds a seat and place in the House of Lords and has the right to have a voice in the House of Lords, that he is entitled to demand a Writ of Summons and is entitled, as of right, to receive a Writ of Summons.

The second declaration that he claims is a declaration that the court has jurisdiction to interpret the House of Lords Act 1999 and to determine whether the Act repealed Lord Mereworth's Letters Patent.

The Crown Office says that the court has no jurisdiction to grant this relief because it is within the exclusive cognisance of Parliament; but that if that is wrong, then the claim is bound to fail because the right to a Writ of Summons was removed by section 1 of the House of Lords Act 1999. Logically, the question of jurisdiction comes first because if this court does not have jurisdiction, that is the end of the matter.

Lewison J went on to state that -

In my judgment, the reference to "a member of the House of Lords" is simply a reference to the right to sit and vote in that House. If that were not clear from the Act itself, it would have been made abundantly clear, both by the explanatory notes which accompanied the Bill and by the speech of the Lord Chancellor in support of the Bill. In a nutshell, membership of the House of Lords means the right to sit and vote in that House. It does not mean entitlement to the dignity of a peerage. ...

In my judgment, the right to sit and vote in Parliament by virtue of a hereditary peerage cannot be described as a possession no matter how generously that expression is interpreted. In addition, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in De la Cierva Osorio de Moscoso and Others v Spain, ECHR 1999-VII, decided in terms that a nobiliary title cannot be regarded as amounting to a possession.

Quite apart from that point, on the facts, Lord Mereworth succeeded to the Barony after the House of Lords Act 1999 came into force, so nothing was taken away from him. The fact was that the Barony to which he succeeded no longer carried with it the right to sit and vote in the House of Lords.

Finally, Lord Mereworth argues that the House of Lords Act has not repealed his Letters Patent. In a narrow sense, that is correct, contrary to the rather incautious view expressed by the Treasury Solicitor in an email written long after this claim was issued. The Letters Patent have not been repealed, so Lord Mereworth is entitled to the dignity of the peerage created by those Letters Patent. He is entitled to call himself "Lord Mereworth" but I asked Ms Gore what right attaching to the peerage was being asserted in these proceedings other than the right to receive a writ and the right to sit and vote in Parliament. She said that no other right was being asserted. But what the 1999 Act did do, and did clearly, was to remove one of the former privileges that attached to a hereditary peerage, namely the right to sit and vote in the House of Lords.

In my judgment, even if I had had jurisdiction to decide the case, it was bound to fail. No useful purpose would be served by a trial. There is no need for this case to go any further and every reason why it should not. I will, therefore, strike it out.

A perspective on the Osorio case is provided by Yofi Tirosh in 'A Name of One'S Own: Gender and Symbolic Legal Personhood in the European Court of Human Rights'[PDF] 33 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender (2010) 247-307.

In Osorio the European Court of Human Rights -

discussed jointly the applications of four Spanish women. All four were the oldest daughters in their family whose parent or relative passed away and left a nobility title for which they would have been next in the order of succession had they not been women. According to the Spanish law of title succession, these women were skipped over in the succession line because their younger brothers, being male, had priority over them. ...

At the ECHR, the Applicants claimed that the ruling [by Spain's Constitutional Court] interfered with their family life in violation of Article 8 and constituted discrimination by denying them enjoyment of this right. In establishing their claim that Spain violated their right to respect for private and family life, the Applicants argued that "nobiliary titles constituted the heritage of their lineage’s honour and a blood tie with their ascendants, and that they had been deprived of those attributes solely because they were females, not males." The ECHR rejected this claim, accepting Spain’s argument that "[i]dentity with a family was expressed through the surname and not through a nobiliary title."

Nobility titles, then, do not fall within the scope of Article 8’s protection. Not finding any violation of Article 8, the Court did not examine the discrimination question, since Article 14 protects only the equal enjoyment of rights guaranteed in the Convention. The discussion in Spain’s Constitutional Court illuminates the examination of women’s access to "name longevity." The Constitutional Court described peerage as a historical relic, which may have played a role in the legal, social, and financial status of people in the past, but today had a "purely symbolic value," merely honorary nature, lacking "any substantive content within our legal order." The Applicants, on the other hand, described the titles as not merely honorary in function, but of "pecuniary value, in the form of, for example, social advantages and increased prestige. Furthermore, assets, especially immovable property, from the family estate, frequently reverted in accordance with custom to the holder of the peerage."

Tirosh comments that -

The Court’s reasoning for why prioritizing males is not discriminatory revolves around the impossibility of imposing current principles of equality on a cultural phenomenon that originated in unequal times and reflects unequal hierarchies and value systems. "[T]he social and legal values enshrined in our Constitution ... would necessarily come into play if the legal distinction [between men and women] had a substantive content, which it certainly does not here." Had those titles carried more than symbolic value, or had they any actual legal or material implications, promises the Court, they would have been deemed unconstitutional. ...

At the ECHR proceedings, the Applicants argued that the discriminatory succession rule violated their dignity. The Government [responded]

[I]t would be unacceptable for one group of people to be considered more dignified than others as a result of pure biological accident. Peerages could not be accepted within society unless they were seen purely as 'nomina honoris' belonging to a 'residual institution' of the Old Regime whose recognition by some States was due solely to the fact that they were an historic institution. It would be contrary to the principle of the universality and equality of human rights to regard enjoyment of a nobiliary title as a right to respect for private and family life.

He notes the Constitutional Court's analysis that -

If the nobiliary title is not discriminatory and, therefore, not unconstitutional, the precedence [given to the male over the female line] is not either. In other words, since it is accepted that peerages are consistent with the Constitution owing to their purely honorary nature and their purpose, which is to keep alive the historic memory of their grant, a specific element of that institution — the rules governing their transmission on death—cannot be regarded as being exempt from the conditions laid down in the royal charter of grants.

before commenting that -

Recapitulating this argument somewhat grossly, the Court held that nobility titles are insignificant, they are just titles, and thus it is legitimate to pass them on unequally. And since they don't matter, women shouldn't care about inheriting them.

But titles matter. Even if they matter only as 'nomina honoris' as the Spanish Court itself recognizes, then women should have equal access to whatever meaning and function this honorary name has in Spanish society. The entrance of women into this system of honor would, in the eyes of the Constitutional Court, drain titles of their viability and debilitate titles' ability to carry honor. For women are not of this system; their entrance into it, just like giving boys'’ names to girls, would erode the system by granting titles to those who cannot, are not made to, bear them stably and reliably across generations.

Smelling sweet

'Did Plant Patents Create the American Rose?' (NBER Working Paper No. 16983, 2011) [PDF] by Petra Moser & Paul Rhode comments that -

The Plant Patent Act of 1930 was the first step towards creating property rights for biological innovation: it introduced patent rights for asexually-propagated plants. This paper uses data on plant patents and registrations of new varieties to examine whether the Act encouraged innovation. Nearly half of all plant patents between 1931 and 1970 were for roses. Large commercial nurseries, which began to build mass hybridization programs in the 1940s, accounted for most of these patents, suggesting that the new intellectual property rights may have helped to encourage the development of a commercial rose breeding industry. Data on registrations of newly-created roses, however, yield no evidence of an increase in innovation: less than 20% of new roses were patented, European breeders continued to create most new roses, and there was no increase in the number of new varieties per year after 1931.

The authors conclude -

Did the Plant Patent Act of 1930 help create the modern American rose breeding industry? Using plant patents as the sole indicator of innovation suggests that the answer is yes: large-scale breeding efforts of American firms, such as Jackson & Perkins, Armstrong, Weeks, and Conard-Pyle contribute a staggering share of U.S. plant patents grants between 1930 and 1970, and large commercial breeders dominate the list of the top ten patentees.

A closer look, however, suggests that patents played at best a secondary role, and that U.S. breeders mostly used patents strategically to protect themselves from litigation. Data on registrations of new varieties reveal that only a small share of new varieties, less than 20%, was patented. Moreover, European breeders continued to contribute the large majority of new varieties, and only one U.S. breeder, J&P’s Gene Boerner, is among the top ten breeders in terms of new varieties. In fact, the share of new varieties created by U.S. breeders dropped after the creation of plant patents, from nearly 40% from 1900 to 1930 to slightly over 20% from 1900 to 1970.

Notably, some of the most successful American roses, including Walter Van Fleet’s hardy American climbers, were creations of the pre-patent period. Other prominent American roses such as Conard-Pyle’s Peace rose, or J&P’s Pinnocchio were originally bred by European firms. American breeders began to propagate these roses when World War I suspended European imports and improved them to create the American rose.

Armed Robbery statistics

I've finally caught up with Armed robbery in Australia: 2008 National Armed Robbery Monitoring Program annual report [PDF], a 58 page Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) document by Lance Smith, Kym Dossetor & Maria Borzycki. It was released last month and provides data on armed robberies over several years to 2009.

During 2008 there were 5,686 incidents of armed robbery recorded in Australian states and territories. The AIC suggests that the number of victims of armed robbery has decreased by 28% since 2003, with a smaller decrease of approximately 10% in the number of victims compared with 2007 data (6,427 in 2008 compared with 7,133 in 2007 and 8,865 in 2003). 38% of all armed robberies involving individual victims occurred in a retail setting (inc shopping centres, jewellers, pawn shops and gambling locations such as TABs). 48% occurred in an open setting (recreational space, transport-related, open spaces and street and footpath). The number of service station armed robberies decreased from 34% in 2007 to 32% in 2008.

The average age of a victim was 30 years (66% of male victims and 55% of female victims were under the age of 30 years). Males were more than three times more likely to be victimised than females (33.5 per 100,000 for males versus 9.9 per 100,000 for females).

Knives were the most commonly used weapon (51%). Armed robberies involving firearms accounted for 13% of all weapons used in armed robbery in 2008. Firearms were used in a higher percentage of robberies in banking and financial settings (45%) and licensed premises (39%) than in other locations. Knives were the most common weapon used in the majority of locations (eg corner stores, supermarkets and takeaways 62%; post offices and newsagents 58%; open spaces 58%).

67% of armed robberies occurred between 6 pm and 6 am, with 43% between 6 pm and 12 am.

The most common theft inolved cash (56%), followedby electrical goods (inc mobile phones (16%). Contrary to belief that you can make a fine living from knocking over a bank with a sawnoff (using a keyboard is more rewarding) armed robbery offenders netted an average $1,662 per incident in 2008, up from $1,066 per incident in 2007. The median for the value of what was stolen in armed robbery incidents in 2008 was $270 and the mode (the figure occurring the most often) was $300. The highest average gains for offenders were from incidents where a firearm was used ($4,833). The AIC notes that some of the highest average value gains for a weapon/location combination (with more than one incident) were for 'other' weapon robberies at pharmacies ($28,038) and firearm robberies at licensed premises ($18,777).

What do the offenders look like? The authors drew on data for 3,425 armed robbery offenders involved in 2,157 incidents. The typical incident involved a lone offender (64% of incidents). The more offenders that were involved in an armed robbery, the more likely it was that a firearm was used (incidents involving lone offenders involved firearms 11% of the time compared with 33% for five offenders). The average age of lone offenders was 26 years compared with 19 years of age for groups involving five offenders. The average age of offenders varied with location, with older offenders tending to target banking/financial locations and pharmacies (all 30 years).

IP Valuation

The UK Intellectual Property Office (counterpart of IP Australia) has released several number-crunching studies of note.

The 60 page Trade Mark Incentives study [PDF] considers potential links between trade marks and economic performance in the UK. The document features an overview of corporate trade marking, analyses the role of trade marks in the innovation process for enterprises and discusses branding.

The authors draw on the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Respondent Database (ARD2) for the years 2000-2006, which combines information from ONS business surveys covering all large enterprises and a sample of smaller businesses. That data was related to information on each enterprise’s UK and European Community trade marks and patents.

They conclude that large firms are much more likely to trade mark (12.9%) than smaller firms. 'Micro firms' at 0.4% are the least likely; 1.7% of small and 5.2% of medium sized enterprises trade mark their products and services. The manufacturing, wholesale/retail services, and business services sectors were most likely to use trade marks. As an indicator of each sector’s internationalisation the IPO calculated the ratio of UK trade marks to all trade marks. The most internationalised sector – that with the lowest ratio - is communications (0.439), followed by computer software (0.477) and manufacturing (0.505). The average for all firms was just above half (0.567), reflecting substantial use of the Community trade mark (CTM).

The IPO also classified firms into high - and medium - tech manufacturing groups, along with other and non-manufacturing groups, mainly services. Trade marking by high-tech firms was 9.8%, by medium tech was 7.2%, other manufacturing 7.0% and non-manufacturing 2.2%. The authors ask whether trade marking is associated with higher productivity? They suggest that trade marking firms are 21% more productive than those that do not trade mark. They comment that their analysis -

controls for variables such as workforce size, capital assets, export status and foreign ownership, but not for the extent or nature of innovation, which trade marking may proxy, nor for a wider range of characteristics of the firm that may underlie both its trade mark activity and its productivity performance. For example, when we control for the recent level of advertising expenditure in the firm, the productivity differential for trade marking falls to 7%.

A higher intensity of trade marking (more trade marks per employee) is associated with better productivity.

Do trade mark active firms have higher employment? The report appears to demonstrate that employment is significantly higher in firms that are trade mark active (even when controlling for the size of firms), with the authors commenting that -

The strength of the association is such that a firm that regularly trade marks has a workforce that is 20% larger than a similar firm which does not. This suggests that the activity of developing and offering new products and brands to the marketplace requires more employees.

On average the trade marking firms apparently pay slightly more (a 0.7% premium)to their employees. Findings for employment and wages together suggest that businesses that regularly trademark support more 'good jobs'.

The authors are cautious in drawing conclusions about overall economic growth. They comment that -

analysis shows that firms that were trade marking from 2000 to 2003 saw their employment and turnover both growing at a rate of 6% per annum faster than other firms during 2003-2006. For both the growth of employment and turnover, the regression analysis controls for firm age, industry levels of trade mark and patent intensity, exporter status and foreign ownership. When we add the stocks of advertising and trade marking to this regression in place of the simple trade mark dummy, the differences in growth and turnover are also significant. However, when we add a measure of interaction between the stock of each firm’s trade marks and its advertising stock to both growth models the coefficient is negative, although not significantly so. What interpretation should we place on this finding? It is contrary to our expectations: we expected that joint trade marking and advertising activity might indicate brand building and, if so, these stocks would be complementary and further strengthen a firm’s growth. Having only four years of data for the calculation of stocks may be too short for such synergies to be uncovered. Furthermore, money spent on trade marks cannot be spent on advertising; hence there is an inherent substitution between these activities. However, there is some good news, as it suggests that trade marks are less likely to support anti-competitive brand building by incumbent firms.

Claimed benefits for households reflect suggestions that regular trade marking often signals innovation, sometimes involving -

the introduction of radically new products, adapting new process technology to deliver genuinely new goods and services. Such innovation leads to lower prices, higher quality and a greater variety of products in the marketplace. Consumers will benefit from all three – lower prices increase their real purchasing power; higher product quality at similar prices to earlier inferior varieties gives the customer more value for money; and the increased variety of goods and services is more likely to satisfy customer needs.

The IPO has also released Film, Television & Radio, Books, Music and Art: UK Investment in Artistic Originals [PDF], claiming an upward revision of £3.5bn to the UK stock of artistic originals as recorded in the UK National Accounts in 2008. In essence the document reports on measurement of the economic value of the UK 'creative sector' through "creation of long-lived artistic original assets protected by copyright" (inc new books, art, broadcast programmes, music and films) from 1990-2008. The total value of new artistic asset creation in the UK is likely to be worth £3bn more in Gross Value Added (GVA) than national statistics currently suggest.

The associated report on The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the UK Market Sector [PDF] -

estimates (a) the level of UK market sector investment in knowledge assets protected by Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and (b) the impact of investment in those assets via their contribution to labour productivity growth in the UK market sector. Estimates for investment and the stock of IPR capital are based on previous work and includes new estimates for investment in artistic originals.

The main findings are:

1) On average, between 2000 and 2008, 48% of knowledge investment in the UK market sector was protected by IPRs
2) The majority of IPR investment is on assets protected by copyright and design rights
3) In 2008 approximately 62% of the stock of knowledge assets in the UK market sector was protected by IPRs
4) On average, between 1990 and 2008, 10.6% of growth in labour productivity was due to growth in capital deepening of IPR-protected assets. Comparable figures for ICT equipment and knowledge capital not protected by IPRs are 11.1% and 10.3% respectively.

Let's share

What is it about South Australia, land of problematical restrictions on free speech and association? (I'm assured by several South Australians that the water - undrinkable though it is - is not to blame)

Today's news involves furore over the failure of Medvet ("Vetting your staff and workplace to reduce your risk"), the state government enterprise that is dominant in the workplace drug and alcohol testing industry, to quickly respond to a major data breach.

On Friday Medvet pledged that it was doing everything possible to deal with access via Google to information regarding the paternity, drug and alcohol tests. Conduct a fairly cursory search and you could discern the identities of Medvet test subjects (names, home addresses, phone numbers), the nature of the test and the price.

It is reported that Google deleted the cached information after "a concerned industry figure, unrelated to Medvet" alerted Google that confidential data was online. Google provides scope for removing confidential data (including cached pages). It notes for example that its "URL removal tool is intended for pages that urgently need to be removed - for example, if they contain confidential data that was accidentally exposed". Use of the tool prevents public access to Google's cached pages and takes those pages out of Google's search results (although does not, of course, delete screenshots or other copies that Google's competitors and users have made of the pages). In principle, by acting responsible, Medvet could have deleted all the offending material on Friday.

Medvet's indifference is of concern and raises questions about its overall handling of data.

The South Australian government has announced it will "push for an independent review" into the data exposure and reportedly denies any prior knowledge of Medvet's security problems.

SA Health Department chief executive David Swan reportedly spoke to Medvet chair Terry Evans "several times over the weekend" and confirmed that Medvet will allow external auditors to examine its systems in identifying how the privacy breaches happened, "who saw the data" and when company staff learnt of the problem.

Commonwealth Privacy Commissioner Timothy Pilgrim, acting more quickly than in the past, has reportedly announced that he will investigate both Medvet's original security breach and its subsequent failure to immediately contact Google - and presumably other search engines - about remove information that should not have gone public. (There is, as yet, no announcement on the OAIC or former Privacy Commission site.)

Medvet will reportedly be asked to explain what actions it took when it first became aware in April [!] of a security lapse. It will also be asked to explain what steps were taken last Friday after The Weekend Australian alerted Medvet's managing director that information was online.

Interesting, Medvet apparently still has not contacted people whose information went feral.

Its statement of 2:30pm this afternoon indicates that -

Medvet Laboratories deeply regrets that its web store security has been compromised, as a result of which some clients' delivery addresses and product order details have become available on the internet. No client bank account details or results of any tests have been disclosed.

On becoming aware of this Medvet Laboratories immediately closed the web store and we have initiated the necessary steps to have the information removed from the internet.

All client information has now been removed and is no longer available on the internet.

The Medvet Laboratories board has instructed that an independent investigation is undertaken immediately into how this has occurred, who is affected and what can be done to address it.

Once we have all the facts we will contact the clients whose details have been published to the internet.

We sincerely apologise for this occurring and for any embarrassment this may have caused to our clients.

A more positive stance would involve contacting everyone now, so that they don't have to discover the bad news by reading the newspapers.

Medvet's online Privacy Policy states that -

Medvet Science Pty Ltd (Medvet) ABN 15 008 089 745 is committed to observing the National Privacy Principles as set out in the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000.

Medvet has adopted all principles set forth in the National Privacy Principles that govern the collection, use, disclosure, quality, security, access and correction of information that personally identifies an individual ("personal information"). This Policy Statement applies to all personal information that Medvet may collect, use and disclose, whether that information is manually or digitally processed.

The meaningfulness of Medvet's adoption of the NPP is thrown into question by exposure of the data.

The statement continues -

2. Personal Information

Medvet collects personal information when we provide our services to you. Generally Medvet will tell you why we are collecting information, when we collect it and how we plan to use it or this will be obvious at the time of collection.

Medvet usually collects personal information directly from you although sometimes we may use agents or service providers to do this for us. Medvet may also acquire lists from other sources, both from other companies and from public documents.

3. Use of Information

Medvet usually collects personal information such as your name, address and telephone number. In some instances it may include your date of birth and medical records. When you are online, Medvet collect information regarding the pages within our network which you visit and what you click on. As a general rule Medvet does not collect sensitive information. However, if we do, it will usually be for the purposes of providing our goods or services and if the law requires us to, Medvet will seek your consent to collect it.

Medvet use your information to provide our services to you, to fulfil administrative functions associated with these services, for example billing, to enter into contracts with you or third parties and for marketing and client relationship purposes.

4. Other Disclosure of Personal Information

Medvet does not disclose personal information that it holds about Clients or Recipients to third parties without their consent, unless permitted under the National Privacy Principles or unless otherwise required by law. Medvet respects the privacy of users visiting our website and does not share any personally identifiable information with any third parties. ...

6. Data Integrity

Medvet only uses personal information necessary to perform the Services requested. Occasionally, Clients provide more personal information than is necessary for that purpose (for example, providing us with a name, street address and e-mail address, when only the name and e-mail address are necessary). In such cases, Medvet identifies and utilises the required data. The rest of the data remains secure and unused until it is destroyed or returned to the Client, upon request. Medvet only stores personal information when specifically requested to do so by the Client, or as part of standard back-up/archiving process.

All archived files are stored in a secure facility.

7. Data Security

Medvet utilises reasonable and appropriate protections to ensure that personal information in its care is not misused or lost or accessed without proper authorisation. Access to personal information stored on Medvet servers is restricted to those employees or contractors who require such access to perform a legitimate business purpose relating to the Services, maintenance, internal security or other related issues. All Medvet employees and contractors, as a prerequisite for employment, are required to sign a strict and detailed confidentiality agreement in relation to the personal information that they will have access to.

It's perhaps time to reconsider industry practice regarding "reasonable and appropriate" practice in handling data and responding to instances where information has wandered out of the "secure facility" or where "reasonable and appropriate" demonstrably is not adequate.

The statement continues -

8. Correction of Personal Information

Medvet takes reasonable steps to ensure that all personal information it holds is accurate, complete and up to date. Clients and other individuals should also promptly notify Medvet if any personal information that Medvet hold about them is incorrect or out of date.

9. Access to Personal Information

Individual Recipients seeking access to their personal information that Medvet has received from its Clients should contact the Client directly. Medvet is happy to provide access to such personal information, to any interested Recipient upon request, providing appropriate identification is made available and the Client consents to the release of the information.

12. Review of Compliance

Medvet will review its compliance with the National Privacy Principles on a regular basis and may amend this Privacy Policy Statement from time to time.

Time, obviously, to do that review and to do it properly.

Murdochabilia

With UK, US and Australian expressions of outrage over News Corp in mind it is interesting to recall two 2006 reports by the UK Information Commissioner.

The Commissioner's 32 page What price privacy now? The first six months progress in halting the unlawful trade in confidential personal information report [PDF] updated its exposure in What Price Privacy? [PDF] of an extensive illegal trade in confidential personal information, with claims that there were around 3,000 instances of newspapers - including Murdoch competitors - breaking the Data Protection Act 1998 and other statutes.

Protection under s 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 is founded on an offence (with certain exemptions) of obtaining, disclosing or procuring the disclosure of personal information knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the organisation holding the information. Offences are punishable by a fine only (up to £5,000 in a Magistrates’ Court and unlimited in the Crown Court).

The Commissioner commented that his preceding What price privacy? report -

exposed an extensive illegal trade in confidential personal information and made recommendations to government and industry in an effort to halt a serious threat to individuals’ privacy. Some of the press coverage since the report has highlighted the intrusion into the lives of high profile public figures by the media but it should not be forgotten that this trade also affects the lives of people not in the public eye and is very often unrelated to media activity.

Respect for privacy is one of the foundation stones of the modern democratic state. It is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and is directly enforceable in UK courts through the Human Rights Act 1998. Failure to respect an individual’s privacy can lead to distress and in certain circumstances can cause that individual real damage, mentally, physically and financially.

People care about their personal privacy and have a right to expect that their personal details are and should remain confidential. Who they are, where they live, who their friends and family are, how they run their lives: these are all private matters. Individuals may choose to divulge such information to others, but information about them held confidentially by others should not be available to anyone prepared to pay the right price.

He went on to note that -

Investigations by the ICO and the police have uncovered evidence of a widespread and organised undercover market in confidential personal information. Such evidence formed the core of the report, detailing how the unlawful trade in personal information operates: who the buyers are, what information they are seeking, how that information is obtained for them, and how much it costs.

Among the ultimate 'buyers' are many journalists looking for a story. In one major case investigated by the ICO, the evidence included records of information supplied to 305 named journalists working for a range of newspapers. Other cases have involved finance companies and local authorities wishing to trace debtors; estranged couples with one party seeking details of their partner’s whereabouts or finances; and criminals intent on fraud or witness or juror intimidation.

The personal information they are seeking may include someone’s current address, details of car ownership, an ex-directory telephone number or records of calls made, bank account details or intimate health records. Disclosure of even apparently innocuous personal information – such as an address – can be highly damaging in some circumstances, and in virtually all cases individuals experience distress when their privacy is breached in this way.

The report notes responses to its findings of illegality.

The National Union of Journalists for example wrote to the Commissioner -

stressing their long standing commitment to journalists only obtaining information by straightforward means unless they can demonstrate that they are acting in the public interest. The Union is currently considering an addition to their code of conduct to require journalists not to publish or obtain information directly or indirectly which would breach Section 55.

In addition the Union has supported custodial sentences provided that the higher
penalties are reserved for those who feed and encourage the illegal trade by instructing journalists to break the law when there is no overriding public interest to do so. The Union believes that the illegal trade is encouraged by cost cutting by the industry leading to publications devoting fewer resources to investigative journalism and also because of disillusionment amongst journalists about the Freedom of Information Act 2000 providing a ready source of information.

The Union has stressed that journalists should not be scapegoats for newspaper proprietors and managers who pressure them into breaking the law.

Newspaper proprietors - The Newspaper Publishers’ Association, Scottish Newspaper Publishers’ Association, Newspaper Society, Scottish Daily Newspaper Society, Periodical Publishers Association and Society of Editors - responded "as one" by -

making it clear that no newspaper publisher would condone any illegality. They have stressed that the industry takes the issues reported in What price privacy? very seriously and that they perceive their role as spreading greater awareness and understanding amongst journalists of data protection issues and the potential consequences of breaching the law. Building on the data protection guidance already issued by the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) and working with the Information Commissioner (ICO) they propose to:

1. encourage individual publishers to draw the information contained in ‘What price privacy?’ to the attention of senior management;
2. distribute through industry associations to each of their members simple guidance prepared by the ICO about the terms of the Act, and ask them to disseminate it to their journalists; and
3. assess what further steps need to be taken to publicise this guidance once the exercise has been completed.

The industry recognises that the situation needs constant review and as such has indicated that the Code of Practice Committee of Editors, as mentioned above in connection with the PCC, will keep the terms of the code under review and would be ready to receive further representations from the Information Commissioner.

Attached to the industry’s response to What price privacy? was their submission to the Government’s consultation on increasing penalties for the deliberate and wilful misuse of personal data. While the response was not directed at the Information Commissioner it is useful to note some of its key points here as the industry argues against the introduction of a possible custodial sentence as an addition to the existing sanction of fines.

The industry believes that a custodial sentence will have a serious chilling effect on investigative journalism and that given the importance to democracy of freedom of speech, and in line with the precedent of the European Court concerning the press, an overwhelming case needs to be made for the introduction of custodial sentences. The industry maintains that no such case has yet been made by either the Information Commissioner or the Government.

The industry argues that the introduction of prison sentences would require the existing public interest exemption at Section 55 to be revised. Currently to enjoy the exemption at Section 55(2)(d) journalists have to be certain that they are acting in the public interest before obtaining or procuring any personal information which does not allow for situations where they are acting in the reasonable belief that their line of investigation is in the public interest.

The industry proposes that the problem of journalists’ involvement in the illegal trade in confidential personal information could be addressed by greater fines and more prosecutions in the Crown Court coupled with greater education for journalists about the Data Protection Act 1998.

Sundry other interests put their hands on their hearts and swore that they would never condone a breach of the Act.

We might wonder what a sustained investigation of practice in Australia would reveal. We might also question the ethics of consumers who have, of course, fed on several generations of intrusive print and electronic journalism but now - like Captain Renault in Casablanca are shocked, shocked, to discover that there has been misbehaviour on the premises.

a perspective on demands for money, lots of money (esp for celebrities with the finest legal advice that lots of money can buy) is provided in a cogent item [PDF] by UK QC Nicholas Caddick.