01 March 2012

Classification

The Australian Law Reform Commission has released Classification—Content Regulation and Convergent Media (ALRC Report 118), its ambitious 400 page Final Report for the National Classification Scheme Review.

The full report makes 57 recommendations for a technology-neutral, comprehensive and national regime covering the "convergent media landscape". The recommendations are founded on eight principles -
1) Australians should be able to read, hear, see and participate in media of their choice;

2) communications and media services available to Australians should broadly reflect community standards, while recognising a diversity of views, cultures and ideas in the community;

3) children should be protected from material likely to harm or disturb them;

4) consumers should be provided with information about media content in a timely and clear manner, and with a responsive and effective means of addressing their concerns, including through complaints;

5) the classification regulatory framework needs to be responsive to technological change and adaptive to new technologies, platforms and services;

6) the classification regulatory framework should not impede competition and innovation, and not disadvantage Australian media content and service providers in international markets;

7) classification regulation should be kept to the minimum needed to achieve a clear public purpose; and

8) classification regulation should be focused upon content rather than platform or means of delivery.
Key features of the proposed regime are -
• Platform-neutral regulation - one legislative regime establishing obligations to classify or restrict access to content across media platforms.

• Clear scope of what must be classified - that is feature films, television programs and certain computer games that are both made and distributed on a commercial basis and have a significant Australian audience.

• A shift in regulatory focus to restricting access to adult content - imposing new obligations on content providers to take reasonable steps to restrict access to adult content and to promote cyber-safety.

• Co-regulation and industry classification - more industry classification of content and industry development of classification codes, subject to regulatory oversight.

• Classification Board benchmarking and community standards - a clear role for the Classification Board in making independent classification decisions using classification categories and criteria that reflect community standards.

• An Australian Government scheme - replacing the current classification cooperative scheme with enforcement of classification laws under Commonwealth law.

• A single regulator - with primary responsibility for regulating the new scheme.

29 February 2012

Marriage

'What's in a Name? The Case for the Disestablishment of Marriage' by Carolyn McConnell comments -
The most remarkable social change of the past two decades has been the movement for gay rights focused on the right to marry. The movement for gay marriage has made urgent the question of what the right to marry might be and indeed what marriage is. Marriage is, among other things, a sacred and expressive institution imbued with robust notions of the good life, but it is also a state license. That is, in our society, marriage is established as religion is not.

This paper addresses the question begged by centuries of American jurisprudence: Is marriage after all, as the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States presumed, an institution with 'which government is necessarily required to deal'? To demonstrate the costs that come with state establishment of marriage and to make marriage visible as a system of state intervention rather than a natural fact, I look at marriage through the lens of a largely forgotten piece of American legal history: the Mormon polygamy cases, which vividly demonstrate the contradictions and injustices inherent in the liberal state’s involvement in marriage.

This paper’s claims are that, first, excluding same-sex couples from state-established marriage cannot be defended and violates the Constitution. However, second, this exclusion is specifically a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause, and therefore disestablishment of marriage is constitutionally permissible. Third, establishment of marriage leads to violations of our liberal ideals without corresponding benefit. The state can and should get out of the marriage business.
McConnell asks -
If the state gets out of the marriage business, there remain a number of alternatives. First, the state could abolish marriage. Perhaps that means forbidding people from entering anything called “marriage.” This would be the flip side of what it does now; the state would shift from licensing use of the word to forbidding it altogether. Even more draconian, the state could forbid entering into anything that looks like marriage. These two would have many of the same problems as the system of state licensing of marriage, and then some. It would interfere with a multitude of genuine due process rights: rights of intimate association, of establishing a home and raising children, the free speech right, and freedom of religion. This is a non-starter.

Alternatively, the state could just abandon the field to contracts and religions. People would be free to make whatever arrangements they liked, sanctifying them or not in whatever way they liked. The answer to why this is likely an inadequate solution requires answering the question begged by centuries of jurisprudence and by this paper so far.

Because of the triumph of the romantic idea of marriage over the earlier contractual and authoritarian concept of marriage, and perhaps heightened by the decline in marriage’s cultural centrality, the question what marriage is for is an uncomfortable one in our culture. People now often conceive of marriage as something they enter to seek individual happiness, so it can seem crass to look for an extrinsic purpose to marriage. But marriage as an institution long preceded this romantic ideal (nor is it clear that a uniform societal institution is well-suited to satisfying individuals’ myriad desires). We should look deeper. It is reasonable to presume that such a central fixture of human life, practiced in some form by almost all human cultures, is a response to some feature of the human condition. What is that feature?

Essential to the human condition are our long periods of dependency, on both ends of life. We are not, contrary to Hobbes, mushrooms sprung from the earth, and autonomy, though an ideal, is far from the default. I believe, following Martha Fineman, that marriage is a response to the human condition of dependency. As a species, because of our long infancies and childhood and our potentially long periods of old age, we are characterized by dependency. All of us reached adulthood only after a long stretch of dependency, and many of us will experience dependency later in life due to disability, illness, or old age.

Fineman characterizes this as inevitable dependency, and she identifies a second type of dependency generated by the first type: Those who provide caregiving require resources that they themselves cannot generate because of their caregiving responsibilities. Therefore caregivers are dependent on resources with which to sustain themselves and those they care for. Fineman calls this derivative dependency. Marriage is a response to these two types of dependency. As Fineman puts it, marriage is a “repository for dependencies.” Specifically, it is a way of privatizing dependency, rather than assigning responsibility for both types of dependency more broadly across society. Marriage was once the framework for “protecting and providing for the legal and structurally devised dependency of wives.” Because of that structural dependency, it was nearly impossible for women to care for children outside of marriage. Nowadays, as women’s structural dependency has receded, the barriers to caring for children outside of marriage have receded, as demonstrated in the rates of out-of-wedlock births. Thus, much of dependency has vacated our primary social institution for dealing with it.

Shifting our focus from romantic love to dependency allows us to sort intimate associations into those relationships that can justly be left to contract from those that cannot and in which there is a proper role for the state in creating institutions. Failing to distinguish these categories is where, for example, the Law Commission of Canada, in its otherwise thoughtful and groundbreaking 2001 report on marriage law reform, did not quite get it right. “Recognizing and supporting personal adult relationships that involve caring and interdependence is an important state objective.” Why this focus solely on adult relationships? Romance does not need the state. Contract doctrine presumes relationships between equals who freely consent to agreements that thereby embody and advance their freedom. Intimate associations between able- bodied adults without responsibility for children or disabled or elderly relatives meet these requirements. Current family law implicitly recognizes this, in enforcing premarital contracts for property and spousal support purposes - but not child support.

Relationships between autonomous adults are a small minority of intimate relationships. Other relationships - those involving dependents and caregivers - cannot be conceptualized as relationships between freely consenting equals. Therefore for these relationships, justice requires some other framework besides contract. Furthermore, it is these relationships with which the state is properly concerned because it is through the provision of care that society is reproduced. Caregiving, as the Skinner court did not quite see, is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” Only some persons are derivatively dependent due to providing caregiving, but the entire society depends upon and benefits from their caregiving. Justice therefore requires that the state support and reward the provision of care.

What might an institutional framework for this look like? How would responsibility for caregiving be allocated between state and family? The least revolutionary solution would be to stick close to marriage: civil unions for all. This would look a lot like marriage without the involvement of religion, gender roles, and all the historical freight of the term marriage. It would retain the current allocation of responsibilities for caregiving between state and families and would likely perpetuate nuclear families with a sexual pair at its heart as the default family form.

Perhaps the assumption of a sexual relationship at the heart of our state-recognized unions should be jettisoned. Martha Fineman argues that a focus on dependency and caregiving would shift the focus from the sexual couple dyad to that of mother and child, or more broadly caregiver and dependent. This would suggest that many of the traditional limitations on marriage are irrelevant. If the relationship is not about sex but about caregiving, why shouldn’t two sisters enter the relationship, or four people or five?

Would the institution necessarily even involve more than one adult? That is, if the relevant relationship is between caregiver and dependent, should we jettison the last resemblance to contract and cease thinking of it as a license between adults? Perhaps a single adult might acquire a license recognizing her relationship to her dependents—and therefore, perhaps, her claim to societal support, calling into question the allocation of responsibility for dependency between state and family. I do not presume to have the answer to these questions, but no longer taking marriage for granted opens up our thinking to shape institutions to our real human needs.

28 February 2012

Objects

'First-Class Objects' by James Grimmelmann in (2011) 9 Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law 421 asks
What is the difference between "James Grimmelmann" and "@grimmelm" and why should we care? Some computer systems, like Facebook and credit reporting agencies, are inherently "about" people. Others are not. This essay argues that the key technical difference is whether they use unique identifiers to refer to people in their databases. From this single distinction, a host of social and humanistic consequences follow. The essay taxonomizes them and teases out some of their implications for privacy law.
He goes on to state that -
How should we think about privacy in a digital age? One approach is to focus on how people use computers: how what we choose to share about ourselves changes when we go online. But we could also focus on how computers use people: how flows of personal information are transformed by technology. Just as email is different from mail, a spycam is different from a spy.

This brief essay will examine a seemingly technical question: how are people represented within computer systems? The essay will argue that that there are two possible ways to do it, and that the choice between them has important technical, social, and humanistic consequences. It won’t say much new about those consequences — instead, it will show how closely linked they are. ...

the transition from unstructured data to structured data is of critical importance for thinking about privacy and social interactions. There are echoes of at least three previous shifts in this transition: the introduction of print, the growth of bureaucracy, and the rise of digital media. All three of them have reworked the relationships of individuals to each other, and to the larger institutions that make up their worlds: communities, companies, and countries. The use of unique identifiers as the keys to structured databases about people will have its own dramatic consequences.

Another computer science term, this one from the field of programming languages, is suggestive of the values at stake. One sometimes says that a system which directly represents certain things treats them as “first-class objects.” One computing website explains that an element in a programming language is first-class “when there are no restrictions on how it can be created and used.”

For example, in some programming languages, like C, functions are not first-class. Any subcomputation that the program will carry out must be specified in advance by the programmer, and there are significant limits on how functions can be stored, modified, and passed around. In other programming languages, like Scheme, functions are first-class: the computer treats them just like it would any other kind of data, like a number or a binary true/false. This leads to great flexibility. Scheme programmers can add new functionality on the fly as the program runs; they can do clever things with functions that C programmers can only mimic imperfectly and at much greater length. It is easier to work with and reason about functions in Scheme than in C, because functions are first-class in Scheme and not in C.

People are first-class objects on Twitter: it has the capacity to distinguish and reason about them. The same is true in the many other systems that give people unique identifiers as a way of representing them in databases. Both halves of the phrase are illuminating. On the one hand, people are truly first-class: this representation enables useful features that connect directly to these individuals’ wants and needs. On the other, people are also objects: when these systems represent people, it is often without their knowledge or consent.

... treating people as first-class objects - representing them with digital identifiers - has significant technical and social consequences. Perhaps it should have legal consequences as well. We should expect the creators of these first-class objects to take care to treat people with the respect and concern the name suggests they deserve.

Capacity

Last year I noted D Borough Council v AB (Rev 1) [2011] EWHC 101 (COP), in which a UK High Court judge acting as the Court of Protection under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 banned a man with a "moderate learning disability" from having sex.

"'All His Sexless Patients': Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex" (NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/12 #26) by Michael Perlin comments that
Few questions of competency are as befuddling or as controversial as the question of a person’s competency to consent to sexual relations. Any consideration of this question necessarily implicates issues of law and clinical assessment, and analyses of this question are usually conflated with discussions of politics, social mores, and “morality.” This inquiry is further complicated by the fact that there is no unitary definition of “competence” in the law in general.

To seek to formulate even a tentative answer to this question, it is necessary to examine overlapping areas of civil and criminal law, including:
• definitions of “statutory rape,” including the use of dyadic “blanket” statutory categories of exclusion based on age, and the use of indeterminate (both statutory and caselaw-derived) categories of exclusion based on mental status

• the right of persons with mental disability to engage in consensual sexual relations in outpatient facilities, halfway houses, group homes, civil hospitals, forensic facilities, and

• the resolution of liability issues arising from tort suits alleging incompetence to consent (most frequently arising in cases in which the plaintiff alleges that an inebriated state robbed him or her of the power to consent).
Case examples illustrate critical issues involved in determining competency to consent to sexual relations in individuals involved in both criminal and civil matters including those diagnosed with intellectual disabilities. Specific emphasis is placed on utilizing assessment strategies that correctly identify cognitive, neuropsychological and psychiatric disorders that could influence competency.

This presentation considers these questions, seeks to identify the factors that must be considered in determining “sexual competence,” learns why this is such an underdiscussed area of discourse in the legal and behavioral communities, and assesses whether it is good law, mental health and/or policy to attempt to craft a unitary standard in this area of social behavior.

27 February 2012

Lags

The Australian Bureau of Statistics reports on a 'Drop in defendants finalised by Australian courts' -
The Higher, Magistrates' and Children's courts of Australia all saw a decrease in finalised defendants in 2010-11, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).

The number of defendants finalised by Magistrates' courts has decreased for all states and territories except Tasmania and the Northern Territory. The largest decreases were seen in Victoria, Western Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, with a decrease nationally of 12% in 2010-11. This is the largest decrease in the Magistrates' courts in the past 6 years.

There was a decrease of 12% for defendants finalised in the Children's courts from 2009-10, and a decrease of 3% in the Higher courts.

In the Magistrates' courts, traffic offences continued to be the most common offence type, accounting for 43% of defendants, followed by acts intended to cause injury (11%) and public order offences (8%). Those aged under 35 years accounted for over half of the defendants, with 79% of these being male.

For the Higher courts 53% of defendants were males aged under 35 years. In the Children's courts, 79% of defendants were male. The main offences were acts intended to cause injury (22%) and illicit drug offences (19%) in the Higher courts and theft (21%) and acts intended to cause injury (20%) in the Children's courts.
The ABS indicates that in 2010-11 there were 586,391 defendants finalised in Australia's criminal courts -
- 16,298 in the Higher Courts;
- 533,857 in the Magistrates' Courts; and
- 36,236 in the Children's Courts
Between 2009-10 and 2010-11, the number of defendants finalised across all criminal courts decreased by 11%, resulting from decreases in all three court levels. In 2010-11 the number of male defendants decreased by 12% (from 512,278 in 2009-10 to 452,491). The number of emale defendants decreased by 11% (from 139,610 in 2009-10 to 124,993).

Of those defendants adjudicated, 97% were proven guilty, of whom 11% (55,663) were sentenced to a custodial order, the same proportion as 2009-10. At the state and territory level, Queensland contributed the most to the defendant population with 28% (164,367), followed by New South Wales with 27% (155,630) and Western Australia with 17% (97,483). The proportions of defendants who were male ranged from 81% in South Australia to 75% in Western Australia.

Stigma

The National Centre for Vocational Education Research (NCVER) has released a 39 page study on Unfinished business: student perspectives on disclosure of mental illness and success in VET.

The Centre comments that -
To date there is very little local or international research that captures the voice of VET students with mental illness. Such research requires sensitive strategies to safeguard student vulnerability. We reflect on the strengths and challenges of research with vulnerable populations and discuss the issues, strategies and student responses relating to participation in the study.

Twenty VET students with a diagnosed mental illness and 20 VET staff from four institutes were recruited to the study. Students were enrolled in courses at certificate III or above. Only five of these students had disclosed their mental illness at the time of enrolment. Staff participants comprised 11 teaching staff and nine staff classified as access, disability or support workers.
In addition to interviews with students and staff, site-specific documentation relating to enrolment, disability supports, reasonable adjustments and other relevant information available in the public domain provided the data for analysis.

Students articulated the factors they believed contributed to successful course completion and progression as: regular attendance, timely submission of assessment tasks, receipt of constructive feedback from teaching staff and multiple opportunities to accept support with study. Students and staff agreed on the importance of being in the right course, having clear goals and support strategies in place outside VET. They also agreed on the need for clearer organisational processes relating to support services.

The place of disclosure of mental illness in course success and the linking of disclosure to study supports produced the greatest divergence of opinion — staff and students did not agree.
In discussing the student perspective on 'Enabling success' the report comments that -
Students identified self-reliance as central to course success and placed great emphasis on their own capacity to manage their mental illness in the VET environment. They were prepared to take full responsibility for their educational success or failure. Students wanted to blend in with other learners and not be identified as ‘the depressed guy’, with their illness dominating the perceptions held of them by peers and teachers. This meant that most students did not disclose their mental illness.
Staff indicated that they
also expected students to take responsibility for their academic performance, and for the vast majority this was evidenced by a student’s willingness to disclose their illness. They considered learner reluctance to request special attention or assistance as a disinclination to be responsible and to work with staff to ensure their educational success. For staff, the likelihood of success correlated strongly with disclosure.

Support mechanisms for VET students with a mental illness are based on disclosure and many previous studies have focused their recommendations on ways to maximise student disclosure. We found that this focus is problematic. Students usually do not disclose their illness at the outset for the following reasons: they want to be self-reliant and to protect their sense of self as a coping person; they fear stigma, prejudice and rejection; and they don’t consider an episode of psychosis or depression as a ‘disability’. But the risk is then that students are often too ill and too vulnerable to seek help when they need it the most. If, out of desperation they do disclose, support is not necessarily forthcoming or useful.

Meanwhile staff expect that students will disclose and use the disability services. However, many teaching staff work part-time and don’t have the time, skills or resources to manage students who disclose their mental illness.VET organisations have paid little attention to suitable organisational responses to students with mental illness and so are unable to deal effectively with disclosure when it occurs.
The report refers to the 'risky business of disclosure', commenting that -
When students spoke of the meaning and experience of disclosure in terms of course completion and progression, their language was peppered with concepts of risk, regret at past rejections and the need for reliance on self. Students in this study were very clear that the act of disclosure had consequences for their integrity and confidence. It was usually only when the risks associated with non-disclosure outweighed the inherent risks of disclosure that students declared their mental illness.

While staff acknowledged the risks inherent in disclosure and conceded that many students may have had negative experiences in the past, there seemed to be a fundamental belief that disclosure of a mental illness in their organisation would be the ‘right’ thing for the student. This belief was linked not only to the recognition that provision of study supports could be available upon disclosure, but also to the prevailing view that disclosure indicated a student’s acceptance of the presence of mental illness in their lives. For many staff, acceptance of the illness appeared to be linked to a willingness to seek support, thus demonstrating a commitment to academic success. There were however discernible differences in the views and experiences of teaching staff and specialist equity and disability staff. Teaching staff were less confident in the capacity of the organisation to respond effectively to disclosure of mental illness. Interestingly, all staff were adamant that they would not disclose a mental illness themselves.

It was clear that the kind of response a student received to the disclosure of a mental illness influenced whether the student sought and/or accepted study supports during the course. It was also evident that the response to the disclosure influenced students’ intentions vis-a-vis future decisions on disclosure. Of significance, only one student participant reported with any certainty that he would disclose in the future. The other 19 students explicitly stated they would prefer not to disclose infuture. Yet the organisational supports are structured in such a way that they can only be provided when students disclose their mental illness.
The report concludes that -
At the point of enrolment a VET student has the opportunity to disclose their mental illness and to request some assistance. Students reported that the absence of space in which to describe their condition, the location on the form where disability information is sought, the very use of the term ‘disability’ and the lack of clarity around information management did not encourage disclosure of mental illness. Students made an assumption that disclosure on the enrolment form would lead to some assistance being offered and enable teachers to be aware of their needs. This was not the case.

Staff acknowledged these concerns and suggested that the collection of disability information related more to the reporting requirements of VET organisations and their obligation to operate in accordance with the Disability Discrimination Act than it did to addressing student needs.

Analysis of the organisational documentation available to enrolled and enrolling students revealed a lack of clarity and transparency and suggested that organisational responses to students with mental illness have been given little attention. The key finding reported by students and supported by staff is that disclosure at enrolment usually leads nowhere.
Staff and students spoke of the need to close the gap between student expectations of support and the organisational capacity and intention to provide such services. Clear and transparent processes and the adoption of inclusive teaching practices were identified as central.
It recommends that -
 Information about, and the formal provision of, study supports and reasonable adjustments be available to all students, if needed, and not be predicated upon the disclosure of mental illness.
 Student attendance, accountability (timely submission of assessment tasks) and academic performance are monitored and offers of study assistance are made repeatedly and in a timely manner.
 Changes are made to the way institutes collect health/learning/disability information to ensure a transparent separation between the data collected for organisational reporting purposes and that designed to identify student needs for support.

26 February 2012

Fake fashion

The Full Federal Court's decision in Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 9 (aka the G-Star Case) concerns the importation into Australia of infringing branded clothing. The judgment includes a useful discussion of damages for passing off and of additional damages under s 115 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).

In Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 290 Bromberg J considered the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), Trade Marks Act 1990 (Cth) and Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), finding that the first and second respondents infringed the applicant's Trade Marks and Copyright Works, contravened ss 42 and 44 of the Fair Trading Act, contravened ss 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act, and engaged in conduct which constitutes the tort of passing off. They were ordered to pay costs and to pay damages of $20,213.

Rifai, an Australian clothing manufacturer and retailer, had purchased and offered for sale counterfeit GStar jeans, belts, handbags, t-shirts and other items (ie goods featuring unauthorised use of G-Star trade marks). Rifai had been alerted that the goods were counterfeits (for example in connection with seizure by the Australian Customs & Border Protection Service of a shipment from Thailand) and had made an undertaking to "cease from manufacturing, importing and selling infringing products". However it continued to sell the infringing goods, resulting in an Anton Piller order covering its premises.

Bromberg J referred to the articulation by Gordon J in Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633 of principles for the award of damages under s 115(2) of the Copyright Act. He commented that -
Rifai Fashions and Mr Rifai admit that the applicants had established a substantial, exclusive and valuable reputation and goodwill in Australia by reference to the G-Star Trade Marks and the G Logos. They further conceded that the G-Star Trade Marks and G Logos are, and have been at all material times, known to be distinctive of and signify exclusively the business and goods of the applicants.

I would infer that, as the exclusive distributor of G-Star Products in Australia and given the evidence as to its very substantial turnover, G-Star Australia has a valuable reputation or goodwill which is, to a significant degree, generated by and reliant on the reputation of the “G-Star” brand. I would therefore agree that the value of the goodwill attached to the business of G-Star Australia will be affected by damage sustained to the “G-Star” brand, including because G-Star Australia:
Loses some sales of G-Star Products, because counterfeit products are available at cheaper prices; and 
Loses customers because some customers no longer purchase G-Star Products, as that apparel is no longer considered exclusive.
In relation to the loss suffered by G-Star International, the damage to reputation was pressed on the basis that, as the owner of the copyright in the G Logos, loss of reputation is manifested in the probable diminution in the value of the copyright as a chose in action. I accept that, as a chose in action, the G Logos are likely to hold significant value.

The basis upon which Facton claims damage by way of lost reputation was not identified, despite the claim that Rifai Fashions had damaged the reputation of each of the applicants.

The applicants jointly seek general damages to reputation in the amount of $100,000. The applicants made no attempt to distinguish between the goodwill or reputation held respectively by each. Nor was any attempt made, either by way of evidence or even submission, to identify the value of the reputation or goodwill concerned. The value of the reputation or goodwill held by each of the applicants is clearly a matter in relation to which evidence could have been called by each of the applicants. In the absence of that evidence, the Court is left to wholly speculate as to the value of the goodwill held by G-Star Australia and as to the commercial value of the G-Star Logos as a chose in action. If the Court had been provided with that evidenciary starting point, it may then have been possible to quantify, with some degree of speculation and guess work, the loss that may have been occasioned by reason of the infringing conduct. However, without evidence as to the value of the reputations concerned, I have no capacity to measure loss.

Whilst I accept that some degree of speculation and guess work may be appropriate in assessing the diminution of an asset by reason of infringing conduct, that task needs to be performed on the basis of a secure foundation. If the Court is left to do nothing but guess at the value of the intangible asset involved, the task of assessing the diminution in value of that asset becomes wholly speculative. In circumstances where the applicants could have adduced, but have failed to adduce, evidence to demonstrate the value of each of their goodwill or reputation, I am not prepared to wholly speculate as to that value. I have no basis from which to assess any diminution in that value resulting from the infringing conduct of Rifai Fashions and Mr Rifai. In those circumstances, I am not able to award damages for loss of reputation.
In discussing the application for exemplary damages, or alternatively additional damages under s 115(4) of the Copyright Act he went on to comment that -
I have no hesitation in finding that Mr Rifai’s conduct (and thus that of Rifai Fashions) was knowing and deliberate. It can be said that the continued selling of a small number of counterfeit goods after the giving of undertakings involved wilfulness. However, the conduct was not wanton, there was no malice or insolence or the like disclosed. Whilst there was conscious disregard for the applicants’ rights, that disregard was not both conscious and contumelious. This is not one of those rare occasions where an award of exemplary damages is appropriate.
In relation to additional damages the Court held that -
Where an infringement of copyright is established a court may, in assessing damages, award additional damages if it is satisfied that it is proper to do so having regard to the matters referred to in s 115(4)(b): Aristocrat at [40]. As Black CJ and Jacobson J said in Aristocrat at [43]: “the objectives of an award of additional damages include deterrence”, and “an element of penalty”. One of the purposes of an award of additional damages is to strip the infringer of the pecuniary benefits received from the infringement: Aristocrat at [44] and [48]. There is no need for any proportionality between the amount of compensatory damages awarded under s 115(2) and any additional damages ordered: Aristocrat at [45].

I am satisfied that it is proper to award additional damages. My satisfaction, in particular, is based upon the need to strip Rifai Fashions and Mr Rifai of the pecuniary benefit likely to have been obtained as a result of their infringement and also because of the need to punish and deter. There are however militating factors which, whilst not negating the need for an award of additional damages, significantly diminish the amount that might otherwise have been awarded.

Mr Rifai claimed that he had made less than $10,000 from selling G-Star branded counterfeit goods. No substantiation was given and because of my view that Mr Rifai tended to play down the level of his wrongdoing, it is likely that the profits made were significantly larger and in the order of twice the amount that was actually conceded. An award of damages totalling $20,000 would likely strip Rifai Fashions and Mr Rifai of all pecuniary benefits received by reason of their infringements. Given the amount of compensatory damages which I intend to award, that analysis suggests that a further sum of $11,000 be awarded by way of additional damages.

There are factors that militate against a larger award of additional damages. Firstly, because I intend to require the respondents to pay the applicants’ costs of this proceeding, there will be a substantial impost upon the respondents which will likely substantially exceed the damages awarded. Secondly, I take into account that a significant and costly lesson would have been learnt by Mr Rifai when the goods purchased in Bangkok were forfeited by Customs, at a cost of some $32,000. Thirdly, the need for deterrence is diminished by Mr Rifai’s acceptance of his wrongdoing and that of his company. Rifai Fashions admitted liability at a very early stage of the proceedings. Mr Rifai admitted that he was a joint tortfeasor when that allegation was first raised. Other appropriate admissions and concessions have been made and together with the cooperation shown, the apology given, and Mr Rifai’s candid acknowledgment of his foolishness, I have come to the view that any need for punishment or specific deterrence which remains is already addressed by the damages and costs orders that I intend to make. I have, in relation to deterrence and punishment, also taken into account Mr Rifai’s evidence as to the respondents’ poor financial position.
On appeal the Full Court ordered that
the first and second respondents pay the appellants’ damages in the sum of $14,213;

The first and second respondents pay the second appellant’s additional damages in the sum of $25,000.

The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
It stated that -
The appellants sought compensatory damages, including reputational damages and additional damages under s 115 of the Copyright Act. They also sought damages, including exemplary damages, in the tortious claim for passing off.

Although the tort of passing off is quite distinct from the statutory remedies that are given under the Copyright Act, in this case and often where a claim is made both in tort and under the Copyright Act, the same facts support both the tort and the statutory cause of action, and any damages which flow in respect of both causes of action.

Therefore, it seems that, and we do not understand the appellants to contend otherwise, if the appellants receive both compensatory damages and additional damages under s 115 of the Copyright Act, they should not receive any further damages, including exemplary damages, for the tort of passing off.

Because we think the appellants should receive an award of damages under s 115(2) and s 115(4), there is no need to consider further the tortious claim or the appellants’ claim for exemplary damages. It is only necessary to address the appellants’ claim under s 115 of the Copyright Act.
In a useful discussion for law students about damages as distinct from account of profits the Court commented that -
In this case it seems that the appellants advanced a case in which they sought both damages and an account of profits. They did so by claiming the profits made by the respondents as additional damages. That course was in our opinion impermissible, and led to the error made by the primary judge in awarding $11,000 by way of additional damages pursuant to s 115(4).

If the sum of $9,213 compensated the appellants for their loss or damage they were not entitled to the further sum of $11,000 on account of the respondents’ profits. It might be, and probably is the case, that the sum of $9,213 does not accurately reflect the damage suffered by the appellants. The real damage suffered by the appellants probably included the loss of the profits that the respondents made on the various counterfeit items: Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd at 32 per Windeyer J. However, there was a lack of clarity about the way in which the appellants put their case in relation to damages, and it is not possible to go behind the award of damages under s 115(2).
The judgment goes on -
The appellants also claim they are entitled to two other heads of damage under the Copyright Act. First, they claim they are entitled to reputational damages. Secondly, they claim they are entitled to additional damages under s 115(4) apart from those already awarded.

The primary judge declined to award the appellants reputational damages on the basis that they had not made out their case on the evidence because they should have identified the value of the appellants’ reputation as an “evidentiary starting point”.

An owner’s loss of reputation sounds in compensatory damages and may be awarded under s 115(2) of the Copyright Act if the evidence justifies such an award. Damages would flow if the owner establishes that the infringement has caused a depreciation in the copyright as a chose in action: Sutherland Publishing Co. Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co. Ltd [1936] Ch 323 at 336 per Lord Wright MR; Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633; (2009) 81 IPR 378 at [31]- [34] per Gordon J. The evidence in this case did justify an award of reputational damages under s 115(2). On the primary judge’s own findings the appellants established a substantial, exclusive and valuable reputation in Australia in relation to their trademarks, brand and goods. He also found that the brand would be diminished by the sale of counterfeit items, and that customers would be lost because the goods are no longer considered exclusive.

However, his Honour declined to include in the award of compensatory damages a sum to reflect reputational damage because, as we have said, he found that the appellants had failed to adduce evidence to demonstrate the value of the goodwill or reputation, and in those circumstances he was not prepared to speculate as to that value.

We cannot agree with that conclusion because we cannot think of any further evidence that the appellants could have adduced in relation to the damage to their reputation.

It is not easy in any given case to establish a reputation and to identify in monetary terms the value of the loss of that reputation. However, in our opinion the appellants established the former, and the Court was obliged to consider the latter: Enzed Holdings Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd [1984] FCA 373; (1984) 4 FCR 450. In The Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 54; (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 83, Mason CJ and Dawson J said:
The settled rule, both here and in England, is that mere difficulty in estimating damages does not relieve a court from the responsibility of estimating them as best it can. Indeed, in Jones v. Schiffmann Menzies J. went so far as to say that the “assessment of damages ... does sometimes, of necessity involve what is guess work rather than estimation”. Where precise evidence is not available the court must do the best it can. And uncertainty as to the profits to be derived from a business by reason of contingencies is not a reason for a court refusing to assess damages.
It is a matter of judgment as to the loss of value in a party’s reputation. Although at first blush we would have thought the damages would have been higher than that arrived at by Gilmour J, we do not disagree with his Honour’s award of $5,000.
In considering the additional damages Lander J and Gordon J stated that
The pecuniary benefits which flowed to the respondents in this case were relevant in assessing the additional damages which were to be awarded, but there were other factors to be taken into account, all of which have been referred to by Gilmour J, and all of which in our respectful opinion are relevant.

If the primary judge was of the opinion that a pecuniary benefit of $11,000 had accrued to the respondents or either of them, he was wrong in our respectful opinion to limit the additional damages to that amount. To do so meant that there was no recognition of punishment in the award and no element of punitive damages at all.
Lander J and Gordon J concluded that
We think the factors which have been identified by Gilmour J cause s 115(4) to be engaged in this case. We think the respondents acted in flagrant disregard of the appellants’ rights in infringing the copyright. We think the respondents’ breach of the respondents’ own undertakings demonstrates the flagrancy of that conduct. The respondents need to be deterred from similar conduct. There is a need for general deterrence to deter like-minded people who would act in the same way as the respondents and infringe other owners’ copyrights.

We think the respondents’ conduct after the proceeding was brought, and during the proceeding, ought to be taken into account, much like it would for an award of aggravated damages in a defamation case. It was only at the last minute that the respondents acknowledged their wrongful conduct, and they denied the infringement until that last minute.

The amount which ought to be awarded for exemplary damages is not easy to fix. The appellants sought an award of $500,000 at trial and $200,000 on appeal. We think both of these sums are significant overstatements of the award that ought to be made. Although there need not be any proportionality between the amount of compensatory damages awarded under s 115(2) and the amount of additional damages awarded under s 115(4) (Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd at 571 per Black CJ and Jacobson J), the sums sought by the appellants both at trial and on appeal are so disproportionate to the damage suffered that the claims must be rejected.

Because this aspect of the award is meant to act as a punishment, the individual circumstances of the respondents must be taken into account, and the award must be tailored to reflect those circumstances: Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd [1992] FCA 542; (1992) 24 IPR 461 at 479 per Wilcox J.

... we do not think the sum of $11,000, which the primary judge ordered for additional damages, was in fact additional damages. However, because there is no cross appeal this Court cannot ignore that assessment, although the Court can take into account the fact that that sum is payable by the respondents in assessing the overall amount to be awarded under s 115(4).

In our opinion an appropriate award of additional damages under s 115(4) would be in the order of $25,000. Such an amount would reflect the purpose of s 115(4) and would include the figure of $11,000.

In the end, the total figure that we fix is only marginally higher than the figure Gilmour J would fix, but we have reached that conclusion for different reasons.