Mohammed Tabibar Rahman has been declared a vexatious litigant, joining 11 other people on the NSW vexatious litigant register.
Rahman has reportedly responded "This is a crime against humanity, I will take them to the International Criminal Court if I have to".
The
Daily Telegraph states that Rahman has featured in "50 cases in just 10 years". AustLII provides 43 judgments.
The
Telegraph states that
Rahman’s
legal battles began when he failed an English exam to allow him to teach in NSW in 2001. When his complaint of racial bias was rejected by the Anti-Discrimination Board, Mr Rahman began legal proceedings.
Since then he has commenced numerous cases in NSW courts and tribunals, the Federal Court, and appealed to the High Court. He has taken legal action over social security payments, speeding tickets, a failed job interview with the Department of Immigration and his 12-month suspension from studying law at the University of Technology.
On one occasion he even took his legal team to court to challenge them over their bill — and ended up paying even more.
Mr Rahman, who blames his epic losses on a “corrupt” and “racist” judicial system, is paying a high price for his doomed legal battles. With estimates that his litigious excursions have cost anywhere between $500,000 and $1 million, his bank account has been stripped of $57,000 and his two homes at Holsworthy, valued at about $980,000, are now at risk.
Rahman appears to have taken action - unsuccessfully - against at least two law firms that had previously acted on his behalf.
In
Rahman v Director-General of Dept of Education and Training [2006] HCATrans 188 Gummow J states
The applicant’s special leave application to this Court is embarrassing, vexatious, abusive and very difficult to follow. It is not directed to the two reasons given by McKenna C for dismissing the original application, and it does not expose any error of jurisdiction. It has no prospects of success.
In
Rahman v Institute of Languages New South Global Pty Limited [2007] HCATrans 174 Gummow J stated
The applicant's draft notice of appeal in this Court is largely unintelligible and is embarrassing in the technical sense. There would be no prospect of success on any appeal to this Court against the orders of the Court of Appeal. Special leave is refused.
Rahman v Ashpole [2007] FCA 883 concerned Rahman's complaint to the Privacy Commissioner that the Commonwealth Bank had disclosed his personal information to Centrelink.
Rahman v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 1013 indicates that his parenting payment was cancelled by Centrelink in February 2006 because his assets had been assessed as exceeding the assets value limit. That decision was affirmed by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Moore J commented that
The notice of appeal in this case falls well short of those requirements. What the applicant has done is to identify various legislation which may be relevant to his application, set out at some length certain provisions of that legislation, and to make some assertions and general complaints about the decisions of the Centrelink, the SSAT and the AAT. To the extent that the applicant has attempted to identify any appealable errors on the part of the AAT, they were in terms verbose, repetitive and difficult to understand. In other respects, they were in terms so general as to be meaningless (as in the case of those mentioned at [18]), at least in the absence of any intelligible grounds having been identified.
Some allowance must be made both for the fact that the applicant is not legally represented (although he claimed at the hearing that he had legal training) and for the evident fact that his first language was not English. However, even allowing some latitude in these respects, there is nothing in the material the applicant has filed that can sensibly be accepted as a question of law upon which an appeal might be founded, nor grounds linking the questions of law to the facts, such as to satisfy the requirements of the Rules.
More bad news for Rahman in
Rahman v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCAFC 187, with Emmett J stating
Mr Rahman filed extensive written submissions, running to some 14 pages. They do not address grounds of appeal. I find them quite incomprehensible. They do not address the grounds to which Mr Rahman alluded in the course of oral argument this afternoon. I endeavoured to explain to Mr Rahman that the primary judge’s conclusion was based on the proposition that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with an appeal from the Tribunal, except on a question of law. Mr Rahman was unable to formulate or identify the question of law that he says he wishes to raise. The reference to s 192 of the SSA Act is meaningless because that is not a provision to which the primary judge referred in the course of his reasons.
Back to the High Court, where in
Rahman v Dayeh & Ors [2008] HCASL 23 Kirby J stated
The applications to this Court are embarrassing in a technical sense. For the most part they are not intelligible, other than so far as they contend that the court below pre-judged the applications. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the Federal Magistrate exhibited actual or ostensible bias against the applicant. Nor is reason shown to doubt the correctness of Madgwick J's refusal to grant an extension of time within which the applicant could apply for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court. The first application relates to nothing more than a simple interlocutory question. No issue of principle requiring the intervention of this Court is demonstrated. Similarly, the second application is devoid of demonstrated legal merit. There are no reasonable prospects of success in either matter, were special leave granted.
We have endeavoured to understand the substance of the applicant's complaints, realising that as a self-represented litigant, he is at a disadvantage in prosecuting legal proceedings. However, he is now seeking to enter this Court, which is the final court of this nation. He has not made out a case to warrant the grant of special leave. Specifically, his argument that costs were ordered below as a punitive measure, is not correct, given the law and normal practice on costs in this country. The applications fail.
Rahman v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1634 refers to rejection of Rahman's application for Austudy assistance - in relation to undertaking the Graduate Certificate of Australian Migration Law and Practice at the Australian National University. Cowdroy J stated
The applicant has provided written submissions to the Court which, together with his application, raise numerous matters. The applicant claims that an ‘unlawful act, transgress and abuse of power’ has occurred; that the rules of natural justice have been breached; that the respondent made the decision of 27 March 2008 ‘based on forgery and false instruments’ relating to the applicant’s financial assets; and that the decision of 27 March 2008 ‘involves an error of law and must be void as the determination was affected by into [sic] corroboration of false instruments’ relating to the financial assets of the applicant. The applicant also submits that the respondent’s decision constitutes an attempt to disadvantage the applicant’s Austudy claim ‘by making a statement known to be false or misleading "in a material particular" or made with reckless disregard as to whether it is’.
McCallum J in
Rahman v Bimson [2010] NSWSC 338 regarding a speeding ticket somewhat tartly stated that It is not clear from that assertion whether any decision of the Magistrate in respect of the subpoena is intended to be included in Mr Rahman’s farrago of complaints. That is but one example of the confusion generated by the difficult language of the summons. It is impossible to understand the claim as it is presently articulated.
Back in the High Court in
Rahman v Riordan & Anor [2011] HCASL 16 Heydon J stated
Nothing in the papers filed in support of the application for special leave to appeal calls that conclusion into question. If special leave were granted the appeal would have no prospect of success.
In
Rahman v Riordan [2011] NSWCA 54 MacFarlan JA stated
Much of what Mr Rahman has said and written in support of his notice of motion is difficult to understand. It is at times unintelligible. As best I can determine, the effect of his contentions is as follows.
First Mr Rahman alleges that one or more of the courts that made the earlier decisions or orders was not properly constituted under the provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1970. I can discern no sensible argument to support that contention.
Secondly Mr Rahman contends that one or more of the judges concerned has participated in more than one decision concerning Mr Rahman. However, Mr Rahman has not identified any arguable basis upon which any such judge should have disqualified himself.
Thirdly Mr Rahman contends that "judicial racism" has infected the decisions. There is no basis for this allegation.
Fourthly Mr Rahman contends that in a variety of ways the judges hearing his applications have failed to perform their duties or committed errors in reaching their decisions. To a large extent these contentions concern matters raised and rejected in previous decisions of this Court. In any event Mr Rahman has not persuaded me that it is arguable that any of the previous decisions were erroneous or decided by courts that were not properly constituted, nor, to use the words of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules r 36.15 upon which Mr Rahman relies, that any of the decisions were made "irregularly, illegally or against good faith".
In these circumstances Mr Rahman's notice of motion should be dismissed with costs.
Tobias JA in the same judgment stated
I agree and would simply add this. As I understand Mr Rahman's argument today, or the essential part of it, it is, first, that the bench that is now sitting to hear his notice of motion is illegally constituted under the Supreme Court Act and, second that he has no confidence in any decision that this Court may make.
So far as the first matter is concerned, there is no rational basis whatsoever for the assertion that this Court is improperly or illegally constituted for the purpose of hearing the notice of motion. So far as Mr Rahman's lack of confidence in this Court giving him a fair hearing and giving him what he refers to as justice, then all I can say is that we do our best to carry out our duties and if he has no confidence in us then that unfortunately is regrettable but a matter for him.
Further downhill, in
Dubs v Rahman [2012] FMCA 664 Raphael FM states
On 25 June 2012 this matter came before me in the Bankruptcy Duty List. The applicant sought a sequestration order against the estate of respondent. The respondent came to court with two documents filed on 7 June 2012. The first purported to be a notice stating grounds of opposition to the application. The second was an affidavit in support. Both documents remain in the file. Both documents are embarrassing as that term is known to the law. An extract will give the flavour:
“I, Mohammad Tabibar Rahman, a Juris Doctor, Post Graduate , Final Year Law student, University of Technology, Sydney –UTS as claimed alleged ‘Debtor’ by the alleged ‘Rosalind V Dubs, [false personification] ... pursuant to a decision made by a Statute body – University of Technology, Sydney for relief and compensation for infringement of educational rights to be qualified for Solicitor/Barrister specialised in the modern Jurisprudence of :-f Administrative Law, International law, Human Rights law and International Treaties and not Rosalind v Dubs, Non- Executive Director, Norton Rose Australia , a false personification. And as such the applicant do not owe any money and not a Bankrupt.”
In
Rahman v Dubs [2012] FCA 849 Jacobson J states
Mr Rahman addressed me at great length during which he made a number of very strong, if not scandalous, allegations against the judgment creditor and the solicitors who represent the judgment creditor. He did not put anything to me today to suggest other than that the issues which he wishes to agitate on the appeal are identical to those on which he lost comprehensively before the Federal Magistrate. Notwithstanding the fact that the appeal in the Supreme Court appears to be ongoing, nothing has been put before me today to show why I ought to grant a further stay of proceedings under the sequestration order.
I note that Mr Rahman told the Federal Magistrate that the matter was before the Supreme Court on the day after his Honour delivered judgment. It does not seem to me that anything which was put to me today shows any prospect of success on that appeal, or at least sufficient prospect to warrant the grant of a stay. I do not need to say anything about the notice of appeal, but the observations made by the Federal Magistrate as to the difficulties in understanding the documents and the submissions put by Mr Rahman apply equally to today’s application.
For law academics the comments by Garling J in
Rahman v Dubs [2012] NSWSC 1065 are of particular interest.
In
Rahman v Lombe [2013] NSWSC 1416 Lindsay J states that
Both documents are incomprehensible.
The plaintiff's basic complaint (a complaint that lies at the heart of all other complaints) is that he disputes the validity of a sequestration order made by the Federal Magistrates' Court on 19 July 2012 that declared him bankrupt.
He has unsuccessfully challenged the validity of that order in the Federal Court of Australia and in the High Court of Australia.
On 13 March 2013 the High Court dismissed his application for special leave to appeal.
The present proceedings must be characterised as an abuse of the processes of the court on three bases. First, they seek to re-litigate an issue previously litigated to finality in the Federal Court and the High Court. Secondly, they disclose no reasonable cause of action or claim to relief. Thirdly, they are frivolous and vexatious.
An opportunity has been given to the plaintiff in the course of the hearing of the present notice of motion to adduce evidence and make submissions. That opportunity has been taken up, inter alia, in the form of written submissions handed up to the court and the tender of a bundle of documents.
Neither the submissions nor the evidentiary material can reasonably be taken as elaborating any form of relief independent of, or going beyond, the plaintiff's challenge to the sequestration order made against him.
In
Attorney General of New South Wales v Rahman [2014] NSWSC 42 the Court stated that
Mr Rahman has instituted a large number of proceedings, both in the New South Wales and Federal jurisdictions. It was submitted by the plaintiff, generally speaking, that these proceedings demonstrated several consistent elements and themes. In many of them, Mr Rahman sought to re-litigate issues that had previously been determined. Mr Rahman also instituted proceedings to harass, annoy or achieve another wrongful purpose. Some were instituted after being ordered by the Court not to do so without first obtaining leave of the Court or a Registrar.
Furthermore, the plaintiff submits, in many cases, Mr Rahman made outrageous allegations and offensive remarks concerning members of the judiciary, members of the AAT and the ADT, government bodies, his opponents, and practitioners of the Court, all of which have been considered utterly baseless and without foundation. ...
Mr Rahman made extensive written submissions in this proceeding. They deal, directly or indirectly, with the particular cases or decisions relied on by the plaintiff, sometimes in general language that, so far as I can discern, is intended to apply to all those matters. I have quoted some parts of these submissions to demonstrate what Mr Rahman wishes to say about the litigation but I have not set out the entirety: they are rambling, repetitive and, on occasions, incomprehensible. However, I have given careful consideration to everything he has said. It is fair, I think, to characterise them as a robust defence of his conduct in commencing and maintaining every piece of litigation to which the plaintiff has referred. That defence has included not only insisting that each adverse decision was wrong, not only for legal reasons but also was motivated by bias against him, incompetence and, in some cases corruption. ...
In this case I have reached the conclusion, which I think is inevitable, that Mr Rahman has habitually and persistently instituted and conducted proceedings that are an abuse of process and have been conducted without regard to the real issues. Furthermore, it is evident from his submissions in this case that he has no insight into his behaviour and no intention of changing his approach to the institution or conduct of proceedings.
An example of Rahman's drafting
follows.
