17 August 2016

Tarnished Trade Marks

'What Can Harm the Reputation of a Trademark? A Critical Re-Evaluation of Dilution by Tarnishment' by Michael Handler in (2016) 106 Trademark Reporter 639-692 comments
“Dilution” remains one of the most controversial concepts in trademark law throughout the world. However, while dilution by “blurring” has received sustained criticism for decades, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the other limb of dilution, namely “tarnishment”. It is perhaps easy to see why. The concept of tarnishment has a stronger intuitive appeal than blurring; it has seemingly clear parallels with other areas of the law involving harm to reputation; and the relatively few tarnishment cases around the world have tended to involve unsavoury uses of famous marks.
In this article I critically re-assess dilution by tarnishment, addressing three related issues. First, I explore the historical origins of the tarnishment action in both the United States (focusing on mid-twentieth century State dilution statutes and earlier case law) and Europe (looking at developments in the Benelux from the 1960s). This investigation reveals that the type of injury against which such early laws were designed to protect was more limited than “dilution by tarnishment” as currently conceptualized. Second, focusing on more recent case law, I will investigate the ways in which famous marks’ reputations have been constructed in tarnishment actions, and show that there has been insufficient engagement with the complex, multivalent notion of brand “reputation”. Third, looking to literature on consumer psychology, I will consider whether, in the absence of consumer confusion, unauthorized uses of famous marks in fact create reputational “harm”, at least of a type and magnitude that might justify the current levels of legal intervention under United States and EU law.
Taken together, these issues show that tarnishment raises as many complex and unresolved issues as blurring in relation to the “harms” against which dilution laws are designed to protect. This should give us cause to reconsider whether the dilution action is really about preventing cognizable harm at all, or is ultimately concerned with the morality of trade behaviour, and what the consequences of such a reconceptualization might be.

Law Students

'Law Student Lifestyle Pressures' by Alex Steel and Anna Huggins in Rachael Field, James Duffy and Colin James (eds) Promoting Law Student and Lawyer Well-being in Australia and Beyond (Ashgate, 2016) comments
One significant factor influencing student wellbeing is the degree to which their studies are subject to external lifestyle pressures. These pressures are relieved or exacerbated by choices students make around their approaches to study, and the amount of time they devote to work and leisure. This Chapter considers results from a 2012 survey of law students at the University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sydney, Australia. Those results are compared to results from a similar US law student survey, and comparable data from the UK and Australia more broadly. In addition, the UNSW study compares key lifestyle choices of undergraduate (LLB) and graduate (JD) law students. The significance of the analysis in this Chapter for understanding law students’ wellbeing is that comparing American and Australian law students’ lifestyle patterns provides insights into contextual variation between both groups, which is important to bear in mind when comparing American and Australian research on law students’ wellbeing, and appreciating the limits of such comparisons. In particular, much of the wellbeing literature to date has focused on course-based stressors, but in light of recent research indicating that improvements in students’ course-based experiences may not have a direct effect on law students’ elevated levels of psychological distress, it is important to understand the broader life pressures and stressors that may be impacting law students’ wellbeing.
'How should academia, the practising profession and the courts assist each other in the education of Australian lawyers?' by Ailsa McKeon in (2016) 90 Australian Law Journal 355 identifies
four proposals for increased engagement between academia, the practising profession and the courts for the furtherance of Australian lawyers' education. These proposals are, in sum: increased involvement between professional regulation bodies and university students; greater emphasis on critical thinking and problem-solving skills through taught law courses and pro bono activities; greater student engagement with the operation of courts and tribunals; and the training of solicitors from law firms by those within community legal centres in relation to their pro bono activities. The philosophical foundations of the law support such steps, which would be of direct advantage to students and broader benefit to the community.
 McKeon argues
Voluminous amounts of literature already exist around law school education. This is partly due to the fact that law schools have faced a number of challenges in recent decades, including the proliferation of their number, differing funding models, and the demands of a changing marketplace. There is less material on the continuing education of legal professionals, [1] despite the fact that all Australian practitioner regulation bodies require continuing professional development for practitioners' ongoing certification. [2] For their part, members of the judiciary receive the benefit of a number of institutions dedicated to the education and training of judges throughout their tenure. Domestically, these include the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, the National Judicial College of Australia, and the Judicial Conference of Australia.
To the outsider, or even the law student, it is easy to perceive law school, the legal profession, and the courts as discrete units. However, these units are necessarily connected: for example, the practitioner regulation bodies and the courts control admission to the profession, partly on the basis of university qualifications. Yet on a daily basis, these linkages are largely invisible. In the author's view, this has played a role in the apparent transition of the practice of law from being a profession to a vocation.
This claim is not founded in elitism. Rather, it reflects the fact that the law is fundamental to a just and democratic society and that as such, a life in the law requires commitment to particular values. Testament to this is the fact that admission to the ranks of legal professionals as an officer of the court requires, first, that an applicant be of "good character"; and secondly, that the applicant give an oath or affirmation to the effect that she or he will "truly and honestly conduct [herself or himself], in the practice of a lawyer of this court, according to law to the best of [her or his] knowledge and ability". The particular ethics of law are also vital to its proper practice; jurisprudence too, connects law with philosophical notions of the "good life" and how this may be achieved in society. Returning to the central question, this article makes four recommendations – three focusing on law schools and the fourth on the legal profession – aimed at enhancing the education of Australian lawyers through increased emphasis on professional ethics and a holistic understanding of the law and legal process. The first recommendation is of increased involvement between professional regulation bodies and university students. The second is a greater emphasis on critical thinking and problem-solving skills, both by embedding these skills within taught law courses and through pro bono activities. The third encourages greater student engagement with the operation of courts and tribunals. The fourth, related to continuing legal education of legal practitioners, is the training of solicitors within law firms, in relation to their pro bono activities, by those within community legal centres. Each of these is addressed in turn.

Occupation

In Nowak & anor -v- Residential Tenancies Board [2016] IEHC 471 Humphreys J in the Eire High Court has commented on procedure and identity.

The judgment states
1. The applicants seek leave to apply for judicial review in order to quash a determination of the Private Residential Tenancies Board dated 12th February, 2016 in an application between the applicants and their landlords, Andrea Hogan and Sinead Rossiter (necessary parties, not joined by the applicants), which fixed a market rent for their tenancy and deal with other related matters. The determination was communicated to the first named applicant under cover of a letter dated 19th February 2016, which he says was received on 22nd February, 2016. ...
The applicant’s affidavit of 15th July, 2016.
4. The applicant also sought to put in further evidence and swore an affidavit on 15th July, 2016 which begins as follows: “I, Peter Nowak, A DISCIPLE OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST of [address] aged 18 years and upwards MAKE OATH and say as follows…”.
5. The Central Office declined to accept this affidavit, on the grounds that it did not comply with rules of court.
6. Order 40, r. 9 provides in pertinent part that “Every affidavit shall state the description and true place of abode of the deponent”. This reflects an approach going back to that pursuant to the Rules under the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 (see Wylie Judicature Acts (1881) under O. XXXVI, r. 5 (p. 432)). The term “description” means “occupation”. Spaddacini v. Treacy (1888) 21 L.R. Ir. 553 is an interesting decision, involving the description and abode of two plaintiffs, the first a struck-off solicitor resident in Stillorgan Castle (now St. John of God’s) describing himself as “Esquire” and the other a grocer describing himself as a “gentleman”. Albeit in the context of a statutory requirement to specify trade, profession or occupation, Porter M.R. held that “gentleman” was not a sufficient description of a person (such as a grocer) who actually had an occupation. He observed that “No one has suggested that ‘human being’ would be the proper description” (at p. 559). Of course he had not met someone of Mr. Nowak’s inventiveness.
7. To my mind, fanciful descriptions such as “a disciple of the Lord Jesus Christ” do not constitute a description (in the sense of occupation) envisaged by O. 40, r. 9. If such a mode of description were permitted, one could not stop the next deponent describing themselves in the opening of an affidavit as a “Guardian reader” or the one after that as a “keen golfer”, and so on. No reductio is however required because we are firmly in absurdum from the off. It is hard to know which the applicant’s affidavit trivialises more, religion or court procedure.
8. The Central Office was entirely correct in refusing to accept this affidavit. The solicitor who took it should not have allowed it to be sworn in that form. I trust that the message will get through in order to avoid a repetition.

Health Practitioner Revalidation

The Medical Board of Australia has published a discussion paper and the interim report of its expert advisory group on on practitioner revalidation, concerned with what should be done "to make sure that medical practitioners in Australia maintain and enhance their professional skills and knowledge and remain fit to practise medicine".
Regulation is about keeping the public safe and managing risk to patients. Part of this involves making sure that medical practitioners keep their skills and knowledge up to date. ... We are committed to finding the most practical and effective way to do this that is tailored to the Australian healthcare environment. 
The interim report proposes a ‘two by two’ approach to revalidation
  •  Two parts: Strengthened CPD + proactive identification and assessment of ‘at-risk’ and poorly performing practitioners 
  • Two steps: Engage and collaborate in 2016 + recommend an approach to pilot in 2017. 
The Board states
This ‘two by two’ model represents evolution, not revolution, in the requirements for doctors to make sure they provide safe care to patients throughout their working lives, the report states. ‘An integrated approach will be most effective. CPD alone, however rigorous, may not identify the practitioner who may be putting the public at risk. A regulatory approach, however thorough, cannot reliably, single-handedly improve the quality of care provided by most competent doctors,’ 
In discussing Strengthened CPD the Board states
Evidence-based approaches to CPD best drive practice improvement and better patient healthcare outcomes. Strengthened CPD, developed in consultation with the profession and the community, is a recommended pillar for revalidation in Australia. 
Identifying and assessing at risk and poorly performing practitioners: A small proportion of doctors in all countries is not performing to expected standards at any one time, or over time. Another group of practitioners is at risk of poor performance. Developing accurate and reliable ways to identify practitioners at risk of poor performance and remediating them early is critical, with considerable transformative potential to improve patient safety. It is equally critical to identify, assess and ensure there is effective remediation for practitioners who are already performing poorly. 
The report recommends guiding principles should apply to all potential approaches:
 Smarter not harder: strengthened CPD should increase effectiveness but not require more time and resources 
Integration: all recommended approaches should be integrated with – and draw on – existing systems and avoid duplication of effort, and 
Relevant, practical and proportionate: all recommended improvements should be relevant to the Australian healthcare environment, feasible and practical to implement and proportionate to public risk.
The Interim Report comments
Part two: Identifying and assessing practitioners at risk of poor performance and poorly performing practitioners A small proportion of doctors in all countries is not performing to expected standards at any one time, or over time. Many practitioners found to be under-performing self-remediate or return to safe practice with local support. This is the preferred approach. Another group of practitioners, however, is at risk of continued poor performance. To improve patient safety, improve practitioner performance and reduce the adverse impacts of patient complaints on complainants and doctors, it is critical to develop accurate and reliable indicators to identify at-risk and poorly performing practitioners, and when necessary, to intervene early with improved remediation processes. It is equally critical to improve our ability to identify, assess and effectively remediate practitioners who are poorly performing, including those who are the subject of multiple complaints or notifications and are already at a high predicted risk of continued poor performance. We do not know enough about the extent of ‘at-risk’ and poorly performing medical practitioners among those undertaking different types of CPD programs in Australia. The EAG proposes that strategies to effectively identify and assess ‘at-risk’ and poorly performing practitioners should apply across all categories.
Practitioners at risk of poor performance
Identifying risk factors
Prevention is better than cure. Developing indicators to identify ‘at-risk’ practitioners and being clear about actions to effectively assess them is critical, so effective interventions can follow.
The strongest risk factors associated with an increasing regulatory risk profile that have been identified and replicated both nationally and internationally are: • age (from 35 years, increasing into middle and older age) • male gender • number of prior complaints, and • time since last prior complaint. 
Additional individual risk factors found in certain studies include: • primary medical qualification acquired in some countries of origin • specialty • lack of response to feedback • unrecognised cognitive impairment • practising in isolation from peers or outside an organisation’s structured clinical governance system • low levels of high-quality CPD activities, and • change in scope of practice. Based on available evidence, the EAG believes that the time has come to deepen our understanding of factors that most reliably and practicably indicate practitioners at risk of poor performance that are relevant to medical practice in Australia.
We propose that there is now enough evidence to trigger discussion and draw on insights available about how various risk factors might be used to proactively identify practitioners at risk of poor performance in the Australian healthcare environment. Doing this could enable early intervention to protect the public and individual doctors from ongoing risk and improve the performance of these doctors. Deepening the understanding of the risk profiles of doctors who are already the subject of complaints or notifications using existing regulatory databases will provide a more accurate picture of risk indicators, improve ways to predict risk, and suggest the optimal timing and avenues for intervention.
Assessing individuals
Having identified the cohorts, or groups of practitioners at most risk of poor performance, it is important to then assess the identified individuals to determine whether and how the individuals actually pose a risk to public safety. Not all individuals in at-risk groups will be underperforming. Some practitioners who are identified as underperforming will return to safe practice simply through the process of being assessed and receiving feedback.
Robust early detection and remediation processes are anticipatory and preventive. They should be non-punitive, individualised and educational, designed to return the doctor to safe practice as soon as possible. The level of assessment of at-risk practitioners should be proportionate to the level of risk, consistent with the guiding principles. Examination-style assessment will not be effective in this task.
Tiered assessment
The EAG supports a tiered approach to assessment of performance, scaled to match the level of potential risk. A tiered, multi-faceted assessment strategy could start with multi-source feedback for low-risk cases, escalating through peer review and feedback processes, to more thorough in-situ evaluation to fully determine the nature of serious underperformance in doctors as required by the regulator. Cost-effective, early interventions should escalate only as needed.
1. Specialty-specific multi-source feedback (MSF) is the recommended starting point to assess whether practitioners in at-risk groups are performing safely, or are underperforming, or are poorly performing. The available evidence indicates that it is an effective and practical performance appraisal tool. MSF gained from colleagues, co-workers, and patients may provide a practical, cost-effective and efficient pathway for the early detection of doctors at risk of poor performance. It is consistent with the guiding principles outlined on page seven. Used effectively in CPD programs, it has been shown to identify gaps in both clinical and professional performance, to trigger self-reflection and to improve practitioner performance. It has also been used to help identify doctors who are not performing to accepted standards. 2. The next level of assessment – for doctors who may pose more serious risk – involves more intensive peer-mediated processes. This could include peer review of medical records, peer review of performance in practice, and/or facilitated feedback based on practice or outcomes data. 3. The highest level of assessment would align with extensive performance assessment, as can be mandated by regulators. Comparing the results of MSF from ‘at-risk groups’ with results of MSF from practitioners not in at-risk categories will be important for benchmarking.
Poorly performing practitioners: identifying, assessing and remediating individuals
International research indicates that about six per cent of medical practitioners are poorly performing at any one time. No Australian research has yet reliably identified how many medical practitioners in Australia fall into this category. Future Australia-specific research should confirm this number. In the meantime, the EAG believes that action is required to identify, assess and where possible remediate all of these practitioners, in the public interest.
Responsibility for identifying and remediating under-performing and poorly performing practitioners in Australia needs further development and consensus.

15 August 2016

Qld Adoption Regime

The report by the Queensland Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services of the Review of the operation of the Adoption Act 2009 provides
an overview of the review of the operation of the Adoption Act 2009 (the review) and outlines the results of the public consultation process that may inform proposals to amend adoption legislation, policies and practices in Queensland.
The report states
Section 327 of the Adoption Act 2009 (the Act) requires the Minister administering the Act to review its operation, as soon as practicable, five years from commencement of the Act. The review must examine the effect of the Act on parties to adoption and their families. The review comprised a range of information sources, including adoption statistics, community correspondence, advice from Queensland Government departments on the day-to-day practical application of the Act and approaches in other states and territories. The review was supported by a comprehensive public consultation that enabled individuals and stakeholders to provide feedback through an online survey, written submissions, interviews and focus groups. A total of 356 individuals and organisations participated in the public consultation, including:
  • 216 individuals who responded to an online survey 
  • 77 written submissions, provided by: 46 individuals 31 organisations 
  • 63 individuals who participated in interviews or focus groups.
Participants included individuals from a range of age groups and geographic locations, and with varying adoption experiences. Of the total number of participants, 12 per cent identified as an adopted person, 16 per cent identified as an adoptive parent and 3 per cent identified as a birth parent affected by the repealed Adoption of Children Act 1964.
The most common issues raised during the public consultation were suitability and assessment of applicants, consent and dispensation requirements, timeframes in administering adoption processes and eligibility criteria.
The results of the review indicate that the Act is operating as intended. However, some aspects of the Act could be enhanced to ensure Queensland is doing its best to promote the wellbeing and best interests of adopted persons throughout their lives. A small number of operational improvements have also been identified to strengthen Queensland’s adoption practices, ensuring that the needs of children requiring adoption continue to be met now and into the future.
The Department states that
Responses received from consultation on the review indicate that the Act is operating as intended. However, there is an opportunity to enhance aspects of the legislation to allow for a contemporary and flexible legal framework for adoption in Queensland.
A small number of operational improvements have also been identified, which have the potential to further develop Queensland’s adoption practices, to ensure that they continue to meet the needs of children requiring adoption now and into the future.
Changes are proposed to:
  • broaden eligibility criteria to enable single persons, same-sex couples and persons undergoing fertility treatment to have their names placed on the expression of interest register 
  • remove the offence for a breach of contact statement for adoptions that occurred before 1991 while retaining departmental obligations as a safeguard 
  • enable the chief executive to consider the release of identifying information to persons under 18 years of age in exceptional circumstances, without consent from adoptive or birth parents, and broaden the definition of ‘relative’ to include future generations of kin 
  • require the court to be satisfied that exceptional circumstances apply to allow a change of a child’s first name in a final adoption order 
  • enable the chief executive to facilitate contact between parties to an adoption, during interim orders 
  • streamline processes for adoption by step-parents 
  • make minor technical amendments to clarify the intent of existing provisions and make consequential amendments based on the endorsed policy objectives 
  • require a further review of the Act in five years’ time.
In discussing adoption contact the report states
A total of 105 individuals and stakeholders who contributed to the review through the Get Involved survey or a written submission provided feedback on adoption information and contact. Of these, the majority (80 per cent or 84 respondents) provided feedback regarding contact, breaches (59 per cent or 62 respondents), access to information (27 per cent or 28 respondents) and open adoption (14 per cent or 15 respondents).
Contact statements
The review examined if there should continue to be restrictions on how parties to the same adoption make contact with each other and, if so, whether those restrictions should have penalties attached for a breach.
There were mixed responses to this issue, with many individuals expressing a preference for continuing to have some way to record their preferences for contact. Of the 216 individuals who responded through the Get Involved survey, approximately 50 per cent (102 respondents) believe there should be restrictions in how people involved in an adoption make contact with each other, approximately 35 per cent believe there should be no restrictions, while 15 per cent did not respond.
Participants of the targeted consultation sessions with the external specialist expressed strong views about contact statements. Participants reported that the offence provision and its penalties cause considerable trauma and fear, because they imply individuals cannot be trusted and would not do the right thing. Having penalties in the legislation is felt by some to be another rejection and inappropriate state intervention in the life of adoptees and birth families.
Feedback from targeted consultation sessions also revealed that other legal avenues, such as offences for stalking and provisions in privacy legislation, are adequate to avoid unwanted contact, and that specific offence provisions about adoption are unnecessary and traumatising.
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, there were 2970 contact statements in place in Queensland, as of 30 June 2015. Of these, 1708 contact statements were put in place by adoptees and 1249 by birth mothers. Birth fathers have lodged 11 contact statements. The overall number has reduced by 19 contact statements since the previous year.
Penalties for breaches of contact statements
Approximately 55 per cent of respondents from the Get Involved online survey supported penalties for breaching contact statements, with 25 per cent not supporting the penalties. Two stakeholder groups and an individual provided written submissions in support of removing the penalty for a breach of contact statement.
In Queensland, if a person makes contact with the person who put in place a contact statement relating to a pre-June 1991 adoption, in a way that breaches the contact statement, the person may be charged with an offence.
In discussing access to adoption information the report comments
Access to adoption information was a common theme in the views expressed by individuals and stakeholders who participated in the consultation. There were 105 responses, including written submissions and comments on the Get Involved survey, and six written submissions from stakeholder groups, that emphasised the importance of access to adoption information.
Participants of targeted sessions with the external specialist supported open adoption as a way of maintaining a child’s access to their identity. In at least seven interviews, there was specific reference to wanting improved access to information and support about birth fathers.
There was broad agreement that accessing information had improved since the repealed Adoption of Children Act 1964, but more could be done to further support people to gain as much information as possible about their identity and circumstances surrounding an adoption. Comments regarding specific changes to access to adoption information varied greatly. However, suggestions were made about extending the provisions to include family members more broadly.
There was a focus on the need for improving provisions to enable the timely release of medical information, and routine practices of seeking medical information on behalf of adoptees at the time of birth. This is viewed as a natural extension of focusing on, and prioritising, the needs of the child.
Adoption legislation in all state and territories of Australia contain provisions for access to pre-adoption and/or identifying information. According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014–15, 2602 applications for information were made in Australia between 2014 and 2015, of which 414 were made in Queensland.
All states except South Australia allow for adoptees under the age of 18 years to apply for this information in varying degrees. However, each state also requires consent to be obtained from the adoptive parent/s and/or birth parents. Unlike the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales and Western Australia, there is no discretionary power in Queensland to release information to an adopted person under the age of 18 years if a person required to give consent under the Act cannot be located.
New South Wales, Victoria, the Northern Territory, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory have legislative provisions that regulate access to information and apply similar definitions for the term ‘relative’. All definitions include grandparents, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, aunts and uncles. Western Australia includes ‘descendants’, ‘siblings’ and ‘grandparents’, but makes no reference to aunts and uncles, while Tasmania does not explicitly define the term ‘natural relative’. No state or territory specifically allows cousins, relatives under traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander custom or other significant persons in their definition. However, New South Wales does allow a person who had a close personal relationship with the birth parents or adopted person to apply for adoption information, after the death of that birth parent or adopted person. Queensland is the only state to exclude grandparents and include spouses in its definition of ‘relative’.
Under access to information provisions in the Queensland legislation, a man is an adopted person’s biological father if:
  • he is shown as such on the birth register 
  • the man consented to the adoption 
  • the chief executive holds a record or sufficient evidence that the man accepted paternity of the adopted person before or at the time of the adoption 
  • the chief executive is otherwise satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the man is the adopted person’s father. This allows a man, determined to be the birth father under these provisions, to apply for the release of pre-adoption information about other parties.
The most comparable definition and process for determining a ‘biological father’ is applied by New South Wales, who use the term ‘presumptive father’. Victoria and South Australia use similar processes, however each also make use of definitions or provisions in other legislation, to establish the birth father. The Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and the Northern Territory do not specifically define a birth father or biological father, making reference only to ‘natural parents’ or ‘relinquishing parents’. Western Australia does not specify who is a biological father in access to information provisions, however, does so in provisions relevant to consent to adoption, and this definition and process is similar to that of Queensland.

11 August 2016

Surveillance

The ACT Justice and Community Safety Directorate is conducting a community consultationn on recommendations in the report of the Review of ACT Civil Surveillance Regulation Report.

That Review was announced in May this year (and noted here). It is described as "an independent review into the regulatory framework for non-government surveillance in the ACT".

The report makes ten recommendations for improving the regulation of surveillance in the ACT, including generally prohibiting surveillance by any device unless for the purpose of protecting an individual’s lawful interests or for a purpose in the public interest. The Review was to consider the following issues and make recommendations for options to improve regulation of civil surveillance:
1. the occurrence and use of surveillance in civil litigation claims in the ACT;
2. the extent of existing regulation of surveillance activities, including regulation of surveillance businesses;
3. whether the Listening Devices Act 1992 should be expanded to capture video surveillance and electronic monitoring;
4. the ability of existing legislation to respond to emerging surveillance technologies and practices, such as smartphones, fitness trackers, geo-tagging and drones; and
5. the interaction of provisions regulating surveillance with other ACT legislation, including the Information Privacy Act 2014, the Workplace Privacy Act 2011 and the Human Rights Act 2004.
The summary states
Surveillance brings with it the potential to interfere or intrude on a person’s privacy. Developments in surveillance technology and increased use by individuals and organisations outside of government have increased this potential harm and exposed gaps in current regulation. Recent reviews in a number of jurisdictions have highlighted the importance of getting the balance right in protecting against interferences with privacy and other harms that might arise without undermining the legitimate uses of surveillance.
In the ACT, the Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) provides for various offences involving the use of listening devices to listen to or record private conversations. However, it doesn’t cover forms of surveillance involving use of optical, tracking and data access devices. It is increasingly possible to use these devices without interfering with property rights and related protections against nuisance and trespass. The availability of an action for breach of confidence to protect against disclosure of private information is still largely uncertain. While collection, use and disclosure of personal information is regulated by the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), acts of surveillance nor all information which might be considered private are not included. The Privacy Act also has limited application beyond practices of government and large businesses. The Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) also provides for a number of offences relating to serous harms to privacy, but are limited in their application and nature of the harms protected against.
The Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT) regulates the collection and use of surveillance information in workplaces in the ACT. It fills the gaps left by the Listening Devices Act by protecting against the use of data, optical and tracking devices, but only in relation to the workplace or purposes related to employment. Other legislation also regulates surveillance in particular workplace contexts, and a variety of codes, guidelines and standards influence use of surveillance.
These other forms of regulation have an important role in protecting against the harms that might arise from surveillance by non-government bodies. In most other States and the Northern Territory, surveillance legislation has been extended beyond use of listening devices. Different approaches remain, however, on issues including how to define privacy outside of a connection with property or premises, recognition and definition of the public interest in surveillance and its product, whether workplace surveillance is subject to distinct regulation, and the use of surveillance evidence in court proceedings. The common elements across these approaches, along with the recommendations of review bodies and other responses to recent developments suggest that the ACT Listening Devices Act is in need of reform.
This review therefore makes the following recommendations in relation to amendment of the Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT):
(a) The Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) be renamed the Surveillance Act and amended to include restrictions on other forms of surveillance activity, including visual observation, tracking and data collection;
(b) The Surveillance Act should make it clear that private conversations or activities are limited where the parties can reasonably expect to be overheard or observed by others;
(c) Any exemption allowing surveillance or communication of the results of surveillance for the reasonable protection of a person’s lawful interests requires an objective evaluation of the purposes for which surveillance or communication is carried out, and whether that surveillance or communication was necessary and proportionate;
(d) The Surveillance Act should allow surveillance when it is carried out to protect a public interest and the surveillance activity is necessary and proportionate. Communication of the results of surveillance should require a court order unless the communication is to a media organisation subject to an appropriate code of conduct;
(e) Consent in the context of surveillance or communication of the results of surveillance requires the individual giving consent has the capacity to understand and communicate their consent, be adequately informed, consents voluntarily, and the consent is current and specific;
(f) Any prohibition on surveillance should not extend to the inadvertent observation of a private activity, including through use of drones or other unmanned aerial vehicles. Communication or publication of the results of inadvertent observation however should be regulated through requiring a court order or as a proportionate response to the public interest;
(g) Any prohibition on tracking the geographical location of any person or object include the use of a network or computer system, including access to metadata or other information, and not require the use of a distinct device which can be used for that purpose. Any prohibition on tracking activity should include circumstances where the person whose location is able to be tracked has not consented to the making available of the information through the network or computer system in question;
(h) In the absence of an effective licencing system being introduced in the ACT, private investigators or others who carry out surveillance activities for remuneration should not be the subject of exemptions to surveillance offences or allowed to communicate or publish the results of surveillance;
(i) A court should retain a discretion to admit evidence obtained through use a surveillance device where the recording was intended at the time of the recording, whether reasonably or not, to be used to protect a principal party’s lawful interests;
(j) That consideration be given to expanding the range of remedial options available for contravention of the Surveillance Act, including allowing access to the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal to seek monetary compensation.
Importantly, the Report offers the following comment
The recommendations set out amendments to the Listening Devices Act in the ACT. In doing so they propose reforms directed specifically to non-government surveillance activities and the various harms that activity gives rise to. However, given the nature of the privacy and other interests affected by surveillance, and the diverse range of other legislation and common law regulatory measures which affect this area, a number of other reform options might also be considered. These alternative options for reform include:
(a) extension the requirements of the Information Privacy Act to all private organisations and individuals operating within the ACT;
(b) establishing a tort for serious invasions of privacy;
(c) extending the cause of action for breach of the Human Rights Act to activities carried on by private organisations or individuals.
Each of these options would have implications beyond surveillance and as such are beyond the scope of this review.

31 July 2016

Precariat

'Academic critique of neoliberal academia' by Andrew Whelan in (2015) 12(1) Sites: a journal of social anthropology and cultural studies comments
Academic critiques of neoliberalism do work: positioning their authors and their readers as subjects invested in the moral logic the critique establishes, and thereby moralising the collaborative accomplishment of the reader-writer relation. This relation and its constitution is a feature of contemporary leftist academic culture, and of the mechanics of critique as a social or ‘solidarising’ form of writing/reading. The academic critique of neoliberal academia warrants scrutiny particularly, given the casualisation of academic work and the emergence of a majority precarious academic labour force. Attending closely to it highlights some vulnerabilities of the academic critique of neoliberal forms, and illuminates the extent to which it constitutes its object in problematic ways: in terms of the political consequences or otherwise of critique as intellectual practice, of the model of subjectivity posited by the critique, and of the historical relations between academic practices and neoliberalism itself.
Whelan argues
If academic labour is going to be conceptualised, conducted, and described as a kind of critical struggle against the logics of ‘neoliberalism’ (or at least, as a presumably meaningful and consequential element to such struggle), there are a variety of specifics which need to be very clearly delineated, lest the endeavour remain at a somewhat general and unfocussed level. The costs of remaining at this level are high, intellectually and politically, and I aim to show how these costs are borne by some confusion as to the political and affective implication of academic work and academic writing and reading as social practices, and, when it comes to the critique of neoliberalism inside the university, a muddled and inconsistent account of academic subjectivity.
Better delineating these specifics would also go some way to clarifying the is sue as to whether this is what academic labour-as-critique is, does, or should be – that is, as to what it would mean to say that academic work can be described as a critical struggle against the logics of neoliberalism. By extension, this involves calling for greater reflection on the contemporary politics of intellectual work in the institution that is the university, an institution not separate from, but thoroughly and intimately bound up in fantastic variants of the processes marshalled under the sign of neoliberal optimisation.
The site of the critique, the institution variously colonised by and to be defended from neoliberalism, has been ‘ruined’ for some time now (Readings 1996). The challenges are complex: diminishing budgets, multiplying audit mechanisms ensuring ‘accountability’, technological developments that appear to throw traditional teaching practices into question, closed publishing models, spiralling student-staff ratios, student loan debt crises, increasingly rigid and competitive research funding mechanisms, and perceived threats to academic freedom and independence. There is, consequently, a burgeoning literature in ‘critical university studies’ (zombieacademy 2010).
For the purposes of this article, the most salient issue in this context is the sustainability of the academic profession: the casualisation of academic work and the emergence of a majority academic ‘precariat’. It is not easy to come by robust quantitative measures of the scale of this issue, but in Australia, for example, over half of all university teaching is provided by casual staff (Rea 2012). By head count, over sixty per cent of academic staff are casual (Hil 2013). There are an estimated 67,000 casuals employed in the sector in Australia; the majority of these are women (May 2011, 6). Almost half of all university staff are employed on fixed term contracts, and on average seven out of any ten new roles are casual positions (Lane and Hare 2014). Effectively, ‘“the full-time, permanent, centrally-located teaching/research academic” is no longer the norm around which policy and practice can be formed’ (Percy et al. 2008, 7).
Casual or sessional academic staff – ‘para-academics’ – are normally paid on an hourly rate under fixed term contracts, commonly of a semester’s duration, though they are commonly re-hired every semester, often for a number of years (these are ‘YIYOs’ – ‘year in, year outs’). They work with limited resources and no access to professional development, no job security, no entitlements t eave or sick pay, and no say in decision-making regarding how their work is structured, conducted, or assessed. Their pay ceases when the semester comes to an end. The summer recess in Australia is ordinarily of four months duration. It is common for sessional teaching staff to work at more than one university in order to make up sufficient income to survive, as there are limits to how many hours can be offered at an institution before the employer is obliged to provide benefits. Working hours routinely balloon beyond the nominal rate, particularly where there is an impression that student surveys and a good reputation with continuing staff impact on hiring decisions in the following semester. A significant component of core university work is thus conducted unpaid, on ‘volunteer’ labour. This presumably has some bearing on teaching ‘quality’ and ‘standards’, although this is not something senior university representatives are often noted drawing attention to. One interesting implication of this situation is how it articulates into the standardisation of assessment tasks, which now often requires setting particular word counts. The word count is a proxy for the piece rates the sessional staff receive to mark the student work. The tail of a ‘flexible’ workforce, a consequence of quite rapacious cost- efficiency logic, thus wags the pedagogical dog.
What follows is broken up into four sections. An account of academic culture as a culture of practice, which valorises intellectualism of specific kinds and in specific forms, is followed by a summary of the common themes and approaches in the academic critique of neoliberalism. The third section synthesises these accounts by way of a discussion of how academic critiques of neoliberalism in the university express the relationship between the reader and the writer, and thereby, how an under-articulated and contradictory model of subjectivity can be shown at the textual level in these critiques. The final section describes and problematises the neoliberal subject posited by the critique, before suggesting some alternative strategies to think through and with.