05 February 2025

Disease Testing

The NSW Ombudsman report Mandatory disease testing in NSW: monitoring the operation and administration of the Mandatory Disease Testing Act 2021 - in part informed by a submission from myself - comments 

The Mandatory Disease Testing Act 2021 (the MDT Act, or the Act) came into effect in July 2022. It provides for the mandatory blood testing of a person whose bodily fluids have come into contact with a worker from certain government agencies in NSW, including law enforcement, corrective services, and health and emergency services workers. The NSW Ombudsman has a statutory role to monitor the administration of the Act. We are required to prepare a report to NSW Parliament after 12 months of commencement of the Act and every 3 years after the first report, including information about our monitoring of the scheme and the exercise of functions under the Act. 

This is our first report following commencement of the Act, covering the first 18 months of the Act’s operation, from 29 July 2022 to 31 December 2023 (the reporting period). The report comprises 3 parts: • Part A is an overview of the Act and its operation during the reporting period. • Part B provides our overarching comments and key recommendations. • Part C provides our detailed comments on specific legal and operational issues. 

Operation of the MDT scheme during the reporting period (Part A) 

A mandatory testing order (MTO) can be made only where contact with a person’s bodily fluids has occurred ‘as a result of a deliberate action’ by the person and where the making of an MTO for the testing of their blood is ‘justified in all the circumstances’. A worker can apply for an MTO only after consulting a ‘relevant medical practitioner’. 

An MTO can be made by a ‘senior officer’ from the worker’s agency. The senior officer must first seek the consent of the third party to voluntarily provide blood for testing, unless it appears to the senior officer that the third party is a vulnerable third party (defined as a person with a mental health impairment or cognitive impairment affecting their capacity, or a child aged 14 to 17 years) in which case the senior officer may apply to the court for an MTO. The senior officer’s determination (to make an MTO or refuse the application) is reviewable by the Chief Health Officer (CHO). 

Failing to comply with an MTO is a criminal offence. 

Use of the Act 

During the reporting period, staff from 3 agencies made MDT applications: (a) (b) (c) NSW Police Force (the NSWPF): 106 applications Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW): 32 applications NSW Ambulance Service: 1 application. 

Of the 139 MDT applications made during the reporting period: • 33% (46) proceeded by way of testing by consent • 22% (31) were refused by a senior officer. In approximately half (16) of these refusals, the senior officer recorded that they considered the person to be a vulnerable third party • 18% (25) were approved by a senior officer • 17% (24) were withdrawn or cancelled • 7% (10) were the subject of court applications. Of those, 7 MTOs were made by the court and 3 were refused. 

Key statistics 

• Most incidents that led to an MDT application being made involved either spitting or biting. Eighty- four per cent (117 of 139) of all agency applications recorded exposure to saliva. Of those, 26% (30 of 117) indicated a concern about potential exposure to blood in or with the saliva. • Relative to the general population, MDT applications disproportionately related to young people – people aged 14 to 17 comprise 4.8% of the general population but comprise 7.2% of third parties (10) subject to MDT applications. People aged 18 to 24 comprise 8.4% of the general population but comprised 33% of third parties (46) subject to MDT applications. • Males are overrepresented in total applications made by all agencies – over two-thirds (68% or 95 of 139) of third parties were male. • Females are significantly overrepresented in CSNSW MDT applications – 25% of third parties in CSNSW MDT applications were female, but females make up around 6.7% of the inmate population. This suggests that female inmates are just under 4 times more likely to be subject to an MDT application than male inmates. • In 24% (33 of 139) of MDT applications, senior officers recorded that the person to be tested appeared to them to be a vulnerable third party. Of those 33 applications, 10 proceeded to court. Seven of these resulted in the court making an MTO. • MDT applications have disproportionately related to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people comprise 3.4% of the general population but were the subject of 28% of MDT applications. Third parties who are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had a higher rate of MDT applications dealt with by consent (41% compared with 29.7%) and were less likely to be assessed as vulnerable. • No worker whose MDT application was refused applied for a review of that decision by the CHO during the reporting period. One review application was made by a third party who was subject to an MTO – the CHO upheld the decision to make the MTO. • No judicial review proceedings were commenced in respect of a decision made under the MDT Act during the reporting period. • The NSWPF and CSNSW have not reported any use of force in connection with administering an MTO during the reporting period. • It is a criminal offence to fail to comply with an MTO without reasonable excuse. During the reporting period, one person was charged with ‘fail to comply’. 

Overarching comments and core recommendations (Part B) 

The Act is mostly being used in cases where there is no real risk of a worker contracting a blood-borne disease 

Most MDT applications (at least 87 of 139, or 62.6%) involved the exposure of a worker to saliva only. Of these, 52 (60%) resulted in a senior officer making an MTO, applying to the court for an MTO or testing by consent of the third party. 

Guidance from the CHO is that this type of exposure carries no real risk of transmission of any relevant blood-borne disease. Given that one of the objects of the Act is to encourage workers to seek medical advice and information about the risks of contracting blood-borne disease, as well as to protect and promote their health and wellbeing, the high proportion of applications being made with no risk of contracting a blood-borne disease suggests that the Act is not working as intended. 

We saw no evidence that the Act is improving the health and wellbeing of workers 

A survey of workers we conducted indicated that, of those who responded: • no worker had their treatment changed following the third party being tested • no worker felt that the scheme promoted their wellbeing • some workers felt that the process of applying for an MTO added to their stress and anxiety. 

We share the concerns of some stakeholders that the Act itself – for example, by including saliva as a relevant bodily fluid – may be contributing to misinformation and misunderstanding among workers of the risk of transmission of blood-borne diseases, and therefore contributing to their stress and fear. 

Protections for third parties are ineffective 

While the Act contains a range of provisions which aim to protect the rights of third parties and afford them procedural fairness, they are largely ineffective. • The test for vulnerability (ie whether the third party is under 18 or has a mental or cognitive impairment) is subjectively applied and conceptually confusing, providing no guidance as to indicators of vulnerability. • Blood test results of third parties are given to workers and there appears to be no legal restriction on the worker’s ability to disclose those results. • The third party’s right to make submissions before an MDT application is determined is ineffectual in practice due to the short timeframe involved and the fact that the third parties are generally not given a copy of the worker’s MDT application. • There are significant practical barriers to a third party seeking external review of decisions by the CHO (the only review mechanism in the Act). • Protections against the use of information in other proceedings against the third party are ambiguous, inadequate and poorly drafted. 

The Act is disproportionately impacting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 

The disproportionate impact of the scheme on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is even greater than can be explained by their disproportionate involvement in the justice system. For example, while Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people make up 3.4% of the general population and 31% of the inmate population, half of all CSNSW’s MDT applications concerned an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person. 

There are legal complications with testing by consent 

Before determining an MDT application in respect of a non-vulnerable third party, the Act requires the senior officer to seek the consent of the person to voluntarily provide blood. Almost half of all MDT applications in respect of non-vulnerable people proceeded to testing by consent. 

If consent is obtained, the MDT application must be refused. If consent is obtained, testing proceeds entirely outside the framework of the MDT Act. This leaves gaps because: • there is no mechanism to deal with what happens if the person, having given consent, then fails or refuses to provide a blood sample • provisions within the Act which require testing to occur ‘subject to an MTO’ are not enlivened, including: − the authorisation (and restriction) on the pathology laboratory to send the results to relevant medical practitioners and the CHO (and to no one else) − the entitlement of the third party to cost reimbursement − the non-disclosure of information gathered under the Act − the requirement for the agency to notify the NSW Ombudsman when a determination is made on an MDT application. • the Act requires consent to be sought by the senior officer, and so this is occurring in a non-clinical context, and without the person having the opportunity to obtain medical, legal or other advice before making the decision to consent • in some cases involving the NSWPF, we observed pressure being applied when consent was sought • even when overt pressure is not applied, there is an inherent power imbalance between senior officers and third parties that may lead to doubts as to whether consent is being provided on a free and fully informed basis. 

Senior officers of agencies are ill-equipped to be making determinations about MTOs, and decision-making processes within the NSWPF seem particularly poor 

The Act confers decision-making power on senior officers, who are generally non-experts – either as administrative lawyers or as medical clinicians. This includes the decision as to whether a third party ‘appears’ to have a mental health or cognitive impairment which would qualify them as a vulnerable third party. 

The Act provides extremely broad discretion to these decision makers, who can make an MTO if they consider it to be ‘justified in all the circumstances’. Although reasons are required to be given, in practice documented reasons are perfunctory and, in the case of the NSWPF, are entered using a structured decision-making tool that functions largely as a check-a-box. 

Core recommendations 

In light of the observations above, we recommend that consideration be given to whether the Act should be continued at all (recommendation 1) and whether the administrative resources currently applied to the scheme would be better directed toward providing better avenues of advice and support directly to frontline workers exposed to bodily fluids in the workplace. 

There were, at most, only 47 MDT applications during the 18-month reporting period where there existed even a low risk of blood-borne disease transmission to a worker. In any case, the existence of a testing window (that is, a gap in time between when a person contracts a disease and when they develop the antibodies that show up in testing) applies to the third party as well as the worker. As such, when there may be a transmission risk, a negative result returned from the third party is no assurance against transmission. 

Given the lack of clear and measurable benefits to workers, it is questionable whether the significant and complex legislative and administrative burden of the MDT scheme is warranted for such a small number of exposures. 

The Act attempts to balance important competing policy priorities, including: • a scheme that will operate on a fast enough timeframe to make third party testing at least potentially relevant to a worker’s medical treatment • protections and procedural fairness rights for third parties. 

It may be that these competing policy concerns are irreconcilable. Workers who responded to our survey generally told us that the scheme did not support their wellbeing, and they found that the process added to their stress. On the other hand, as noted above, the legislative safeguards for third parties are also ineffective and often inadequate. 

If recommendation 1 is not accepted and the Act is continued, we suggest that the different pathways that currently exist based on whether a third party appears to the senior officer to be vulnerable or non-vulnerable be removed. 

Given the inadequacies in identifying vulnerability, the problems with decision making by senior officers alone and ineffective procedural fairness mechanisms, it is our view that all applications, if supported by the worker’s employer, should be determined by the court (recommendation 2). 

Detailed comments on legal and operational issues (Part C) 

Part C contains our observations and analysis on the legal and operational issues we identified during our monitoring of the operation and administration of the Act. In this part of the report we have made recommendations on how the Act should be amended, it if it is to remain in effect. Part C also contains recommendations to make changes to the CHO guidelines and to agency policies and procedures, and for the increased publication of MDT-related data. 

MDT applications 

Under the Act, a worker can only apply for an MTO where bodily fluid contact has been caused as ‘a result of a deliberate action’ – however, this phrase is undefined and ambiguous (see recommendation 3). Although the MDT Act requires ‘a detailed description of the contact, including the date, time, place and surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the worker’s contact with the third party’s bodily fluid’, applications often only included only brief or minor details. 

Consultation with a relevant medical practitioner 

The Act requires workers to consult a ‘relevant medical practitioner’ with specialist qualifications or experience in blood-borne diseases before an MDT application can be made. There is no mechanism that allows us to determine the extent to which workers have attempted to do this. From what we can ascertain, it does not appear that workers are obtaining advice from medical practitioners with specialist expertise in blood-borne diseases (see recommendation 4). It is also apparent that the medical advice that workers are obtaining is not comprehensively addressing the requirements prescribed in the Act (recommendations 5 and 6). 

Worker experience and wellbeing 

It has not been possible to assess the extent to which (if at all) the medical treatment of workers following an exposure incident has been affected by the testing of third party. The majority of workers who responded to a survey we conducted about their experience of the MDT process said they would have sought medical advice following exposure even if the MDT Act had not been in place. Survey results did not suggest that a worker’s decision to receive treatment (that is, post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)) was affected by third party testing under the Act. Worker survey results also indicated that workers generally did not feel that the MDT scheme had promoted their health and wellbeing. 

Chief Health Officer reviews and court submissions 

Reviews of MTO decisions are undertaken by the Chief Health Officer (the CHO). The CHO advises that, as it lacks legal expertise, it considers that it cannot be expected to conduct an administrative ‘merits’ review. If senior officers are to remain the decision maker under the Act, a proper merits review mechanism should be integrated into the scheme (see recommendation 7). There is also a lack of clarity around what happens if the CHO’s review decision is to set aside the making of an MTO (see recommendation 8). 

We identified operational flaws in the Act’s review mechanism, including the following: • The Act requires workers and the third parties to make any application for review within 1 business day of ‘being notified’ of the senior officer’s decision – but it can be unclear when ‘notice’ of a senior officer’s determination decision has been given (see recommendation 9) – and notice to a third party about their review rights is typically given after the review application period has already expired (see recommendation 10). • The Mandatory Disease Testing Regulation 2022 (the Regulation) requires a third party’s application for review to include a copy of the MTO, but they typically do not have it at that time (see recommendation 11). • There is no clear power for the CHO to accept a late review application (see recommendation 12). • It is difficult and impractical for people to obtain advice (including legal or medical advice) within the 1 business day timeframe in which they may apply for review (see recommendation 13). • Third parties do not have a fair opportunity to make submissions to reviews of MTO decisions (see recommendation 14). • There is no reasonable justification for requiring testing to proceed pending the outcome of a review, as currently occurs under the Act. Stakeholders raised significant opposition to this aspect of the Act, one noting that it ‘wholly negates the purported safeguard against arbitrary bodily interference’. The Act’s prohibition on disseminating test results during review is also ineffectual (see recommendation 15). 

No worker applied for a review during the reporting period. Potential reasons for this include the limited timeframe for applying for a review (1 business day following notification of the senior officer’s determination), lack of awareness of review rights, and a perception that the review may be futile. The CHO may make submissions to the court in relation to an application for an MTO, and the court must take these submissions into account. However, it notes that it has historically faced barriers to doing so (see recommendation 16). Even when it is notified of a court application, the CHO is not given all the information needed to make an informed submission (see recommendation 17). 

 Vulnerable third parties 

Assessment of the vulnerability of a third party is subjective, and it appears that the senior officer is not required to make any inquiries to assess vulnerability. Unless the Act is amended to provide that all MTOs should be made by the court (recommendation 2), the test for vulnerability should be amended so that the presumption is that a person is vulnerable unless an assessment is made otherwise (see recommendations 18 and 19). 

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander third parties have been assessed as vulnerable at a lower rate than non-Indigenous third parties. The number of third parties recognised as vulnerable by the NSWPF generally appears surprisingly low. Twenty-three per cent (33 of 139) of all third parties were identified by a senior officer as appearing to be vulnerable. 

Senior officers also do not typically include a record of the enquiries made or reasons for their assessment of vulnerability (and such records are not currently required by the Act) (see recommendation 20). 

The current test of vulnerability is based on the incapacity of the third party to consent, which is a narrow concept. We suggest that the threshold of ‘significant impact on capacity to consent’ should be removed from the Act’s test of vulnerability, and instead the test should be extended to include an inability to understand the nature of the decision or to make proper submissions. Several submissions recommended widening the definition of vulnerable third party to include Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. We agree that this would be appropriate. The timing of the application of the test of vulnerability is also ambiguous. In our view, if a person has a relevant impairment at any relevant time, that should result in the person being considered vulnerable. 

We recommend Government amend the Act’s definition of vulnerable third party to address these issues (recommendation 21). 

Chief Health Officer guidelines 

The Act requires the CHO to issue guidelines to assist senior officers, relevant medical practitioners and persons taking blood from third parties under an MTO. The MDT Act does not specify any mandatory content requirements for the CHO guidelines. Some of the information they contain could be made clearer for senior officers (see recommendation 22). The CHO guidelines will also need to be updated if other legislative amendments recommended in this report are implemented (see recommendation 23). Police-developed training materials do not reference the CHO guidance on transmissibility risk, nor do they include training on how to consider and apply the CHO guidelines more generally (see recommendations 24 and 25). 

Decision making and determinations by senior officers 

The MDT Act confers a wide discretion on senior officers to make an order if subjectively satisfied that it is ‘justified in all the circumstances’. The NSW Crown Solicitor's Office (the Crown Solicitor) has advised that a senior officer must take into consideration the worker’s MDT application (as well as the CHO guidelines and any submissions). Senior officers should be required to form a view that the worker is eligible to make an MDT application before it is determined (see recommendation 26). 

The Act is ambiguous as to whether it is necessary for there to be at least some transmission risk for an MTO to be made, even though a key object of the Act is to provide for blood testing where ‘the worker is at risk of contracting a blood-borne disease’ (see recommendation 27). Given there is no real risk of transmission, saliva should be omitted from the MDT Act (recommendation 28). The MDT Act defines bodily fluids to include those prescribed by regulation. Additional bodily fluids should not be able to be included unless they carry a real risk of transmission of a relevant blood-borne disease (recommendation 29). 

Senior officers appear to be making inconsistent decisions about similar incidents or risks. Unclear advice about the possibility of blood in saliva increases inconsistencies in decision making and heightens the likelihood that MTOs are being made where there is no real risk of transmission. 

Records of decisions by CSNSW senior officers do not suggest that the CHO guidelines are being routinely considered. 

It also appears that senior officers are not consulting workers’ medical practitioners before making determinations, even in cases where no written medical advice was provided (see recommendation 30). Senior officers may need to consult with medical practitioners and access records beyond what is contained in the written medical advice. Currently their ability to do so applies only in the case where no written medical advice has been obtained, and it is unclear why this is the case (see recommendations 31, 32 and 33). Although the NSWPF guidelines advise NSWPF workers to seek written medical advice and attach it to their application, written medical advice is not always obtained for the senior officer to consider. Thirty- nine per cent of NSWPF MDT applications (41 of 106) did not contain written medical advice. A high proportion of these applications resulted in blood testing, either by way of an MTO or by consent. Third parties are often not given sufficient opportunity to make a submission (see recommendation 34), and it appears that NSWPF senior officers use their consent form as the third party’s opportunity to provide a submission, effectively conflating the Act’s requirement to provide an opportunity to make a submission with the requirement to seek consent (see recommendation 35). 

Enforcement 

There is ambiguity in the Act around whether force can be used against a person who is arrested and detained for failing to comply with an MTO (see recommendation 36). 

Testing with consent 

As noted in part B, a high proportion of blood tests (47%) are being conducted by consent – and it is likely that these reported numbers are understated. There are inconsistent practices between and within agencies about how applications are to be finalised if consent is obtained – the Act does not specify what senior officers may or must do in relation to the MDT application when consent has been obtained, and senior officers from the NSWPF and CSNSW have demonstrated differing approaches. 

The Crown Solicitor has confirmed that, if consent is obtained, the senior officer must refuse the application (see recommendation 37). It may be necessary to amend the MDT Act to explicitly set out what is to occur if a third party consents, given the risk that they might later withdraw consent (recommendation 38). 

Some provisions of the MDT Act are predicated on testing being undertaken subject to an MTO – meaning they will not be enlivened if the testing occurs by consent (see recommendation 39). While there is no express prohibition in the Act, it is clearly not intended that senior officers would seek consent in respect of vulnerable third parties. However, in a small number of cases this has occurred, and in (at least) 2 cases with some pressure applied. We also have concerns that in some cases senior officers have already decided that they will make the MTO when they approach a third party to seek consent – meaning their decision would be contrary to law. 

In most cases, there is little or no documentation recording the contact made by senior officers with the third party during which consent was obtained. This has made it challenging for us to consider the extent to which consent is being obtained in accordance with the Act, and whether it has been provided on a free and informed basis. Although the CHO guidelines recommend that they do so, agencies rarely record any reasons as to why a third party has not consented. This information is important for purposes of transparency (see recommendation 40). It is also apparent that the obtaining of consent by the NSWPF is not routinely captured on body-worn video (BWV) (see recommendation 41). 

If consent is obtained before an MDT application is made, the MDT Act does not apply. 

Blood samples and test results 

Although the Act requires it, pathology laboratories are not always providing blood test results to the CHO when the third party has not nominated a medical practitioner. This may be due (at least in part) to a lack of knowledge on the part of pathology laboratories about this obligation (see recommendations 42 and 43). When undertaking a test under an MTO, pathology staff are made aware that testing is subject to an MTO but are not provided a copy of the MTO itself. This is in contravention of the Act. It also appears that the applicant worker can legally nominate more than one medical practitioner for dissemination of blood test results. The disclosure of a person’s health information to anyone without consent violates the person’s health privacy and should be permitted under the Act only where absolutely necessary (see recommendation 44). 

Neither the Act, the Regulation nor the CHO guidelines set out what information must be included with the test results when sent to medical practitioners (see recommendations 45 and 46). Further, it appears that workers may be under no legal obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the third party’s test results. The Act provides that the recipient medical practitioner may disclose the blood tests to the applicant worker, but it does not provide any guidance as to what the worker may (or may not) do with those results (see recommendation 47). 

The MDT Act appropriately does not authorise the senior officer to seek out, request or obtain the third party’s test results. The pathology laboratory should be required to notify the senior officer in writing as soon as practicable after blood has been taken from the third party, without notifying them of the actual results (see recommendations 48 and 49). One of the exceptions to non-disclosure of third party health information is ‘in other circumstances prescribed by the regulations’. Allowing additional exceptions to the disclosure of third party health information to be prescribed by regulation is justified (see recommendation 50). 

We have not identified any impermissible attempts to use blood test samples for other law enforcement purposes – however the statutory protections in this regard appear inadequate (see recommendations 51 and 52). The Act only authorises (but does not require) blood test samples to be destroyed when no longer required for MDT purposes (see recommendation 53). 

Ombudsman monitoring and reporting 

Limitations on the Ombudsman’s information gathering powers under the Act are problematic (see recommendation 54). Additionally, the Act does not expressly prevent agencies withholding information required by the Ombudsman on the grounds of public interest or other privilege (see recommendation 55). 4 There may also be a question as to whether, at that time, they had also considered the CHO guidelines (which are also mandatory considerations). 

The powers of the Ombudsman to compel agencies (and others if necessary) to produce information remain limited. We are currently unable to assess the number of third parties who, following a mandatory test, actually returned a positive result for blood-borne diseases. This information would be valuable in assessing whether the MDT Act may provide some benefit to workers (see recommendation 56). Agencies are required to notify the Ombudsman when senior officers make determinations of MDT applications. This does not encompass all MDT applications that are made to agencies, such as those that are withdrawn. To address this, mandatory notification requirements should be expanded (see recommendation 57). 

The NSWPF’s use of a structured decision-making tool through BluePortal to both make and record decisions by senior officers has led to the recording of inadequate ‘reasons’ for decision, that impede any such assessment. Senior officers should make and provide full and proper reasons for their determinations, including what was considered and relied upon in making the decision and a clear statement of the reasoning process (see recommendations 58 and 59). 

Detailed demographic data also cannot currently be reported as agencies do not routinely collect and retain it. Agencies need to be directed to make and keep a record of the demographic information that Parliament intends to be reported (see recommendation 60). 

The Act provides for the Ombudsman to report every 3 years on its monitoring of the MDT scheme. Going forward, we intend to publish (at least annually) a report on our monitoring, including non- identified, non-health, statistical data on the operation of the MDT scheme (recommendation 61). BOCSAR could also report MDT activity of the NSWPF on their public platform, including information about the number of applications and orders made (recommendation 62). 

Recommendation 1 That consideration be given to whether the Act should be continued at all, and whether the administrative resources currently applied to the scheme would be better directed toward providing improved avenues of advice and support directly to front-line workers who become exposed to bodily fluids in the workplace. That could include establishing and funding a panel of specialist blood-borne disease clinicians to be available for immediate consultations with workers (and their general practitioners) if required following a workplace incident of exposure to bodily fluids. 

Recommendation 2 If the Act is to be continued, the Act be amended to provide that, in all cases, MTOs may only be made by the court, on application by the worker’s senior officer. If this recommendation is implemented: a. Consideration should also be given to all of the recommendations set out in the next part of this report (other than those expressly stating that they do not apply if this recommendation is implemented). This includes that: i. A panel of relevant medical experts should be made available to workers (recommendation 4) and their written medical advice should be put before the decision maker. b. ii. The criteria for making an MTO should include that there must be a real risk of transmission of a blood-borne disease and that testing of the third party may affect the treatment of the worker (recommendation 27). In addition (and although the concept of ‘vulnerable third party’ can otherwise be omitted from the Act), consideration should be given to amending the Act to explicitly deal with how, prior to an MDT application being determined by the court, consent may (or may not) be obtained in the case of a minor or other person who lacks capacity to consent. 

Recommendation 3 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to clarify whether the requirement that contact with bodily fluid be a ‘result of a deliberate action’ by the third party means that: a. b. as indicated in the second reading speech for the Bill, the third party engaged in the action with the intention of causing contact between their bodily fluid and the worker (the narrower view), or as per the Crown Solicitor’s preferred construction of the MDT Act currently, the third party need only have intended to engage in the action which caused the bodily fluid contact, without necessarily also intending to cause contact between their bodily fluid and the worker (the broader view). 

Recommendation 4 That agencies work with the CHO to put in place arrangements with a list of relevant expert medical practitioners for workers, including those in regional areas, to have rapid telehealth consultations (including outside normal business hours) following an exposure event. 

Recommendation 5 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that a worker’s medical practitioner must, both during the consultation and in written advice, inform the worker about all of the following: a. b. c. the medical practitioner’s assessment as to: i. whether there is any risk of the worker contracting each blood-borne disease ii. if so, the level of such risk. the appropriate action (if any) to be taken by the worker to mitigate that risk to the extent (if any) to which testing the third party’s blood: iii. will assist in assessing the risk to the worker of contracting each blood-borne disease iv. may affect the appropriate action (if any) to be taken by the worker to mitigate that risk v. may affect the worker’s mental health or wellbeing the risk that the third party test may return a false result. 

Recommendation 6 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO develop a form for workers to provide to their medical practitioner, addressing each of the matters referred to in recommendation 5, and which upon completion would constitute written medical advice for the purposes of the MDT Act. This proforma could be contained in the Regulation, or in the CHO guidelines and each agency’s MDT policy. 

Recommendation 7 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the Act be amended to provide that decisions of senior officers to make or refuse to make an MTO, are subject to a review: a. by NCAT, the Local Court, or other relevant court or tribunal with expertise in reviewing administrative decisions b. c. which permits the reviewing body to consider whether the senior officer’s determination was the correct and preferable decision which, if the senior officer’s decision is overturned, permits the reviewing body to make the correct and preferable decision. 

Recommendation 8 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the Act be amended to clarify that if, on review, the CHO [or other review body] sets aside a decision to make an MTO, they may then: a. b. c. decide to refuse the MDT application in the case of a person who is not a vulnerable person, make an MTO (in different terms to that made by the senior officer) in the case of a person who is a vulnerable person, apply to the court to make an MTO 

Recommendation 9 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to make clear that ‘notice’ in s 23 means the written notice of determination required to be given under s 13. 

Recommendation 10 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the NSWPF, CSNSW and other relevant agencies include information in any notice of determination about workers’ and third parties’ review rights, and that the Act be amended to make this a requirement. 

Recommendation 11 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that Government amend the Regulation to provide that an application for review from a third party must include either the MTO or a copy of the senior officer’s notice of determination and reasons for determination. 

Recommendation 12 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the Act be amended to provide that the CHO [or other review body] may accept an application for review out of time in exceptional circumstances. 

Recommendation 13 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that the period within which an application for review must be made is 3 business days from notification of the decision. 

Recommendation 14 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that both the third party and the worker are to be given an opportunity to make submissions on any review, and the CHO [or other review body] is to consider any submissions received. 

Recommendation 15 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that testing in respect of an MTO is not to take place until whichever is later of the following: a. b. the expiry of the time within which an application for review may be made the finalisation of any review. 

Recommendation 16 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO adopt the practice of always making submissions to assist the court in determining MDT applications. Recommendation 17 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to require that a senior officer must provide the CHO with a complete copy of the court application, including all filed documents, at the same time as the application is made. 

Recommendation 18 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the Act be amended to provide that a third party is to be taken to be a vulnerable person unless the senior officer is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the person is not a vulnerable person. 

Recommendation 19 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the CHO revise the CHO guidelines to include advice to senior officers about assessing whether a third party is or is not a vulnerable person, and to provide that, if senior officers assess that a person is not a vulnerable person, they should record what enquiries were made and what factors were taken into consideration. 

Recommendation 20 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the NSWPF amend its guidelines to require that senior officers record what, if any, enquiries were made concerning vulnerability, and what factors were taken into consideration when assessing vulnerability – see recommendations 18 and 19.   

Recommendation 21 If the Act is to continue and recommendation 2 is not adopted, that the Act be amended to change the definition of vulnerable third party to include, in addition to children aged 14 to 17 years, any person: a. who has, or at the time of the contact incident had, a cognitive impairment or mental health b. c. impairment, or whose English language proficiency prohibits them from, or who is otherwise unable to, understand the nature of the decision to be made or to properly make submissions or otherwise represent themself in respect of that decision, or who is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person. 

Recommendation 22 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO review the CHO guidelines in consultation with agencies to consider whether advice on the transmission risk (or lack of risk) associated with contact types can be made clearer to non-expert readers. 

Recommendation 23 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO promptly review and update the CHO guidelines accordingly following the passage of any legislative amendments as recommended by this report. 

Recommendation 24 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that: a. b. a senior officer must complete a course of training, delivered or approved by the CHO, and determinations of MDT applications (including, if recommendation 2 is adopted, applications to the court) may only be made by a senior officer who has completed that training. 

Recommendation 25 If the Act is to continue, that all agencies ensure that the CHO guidelines are the primary reference source for any MDT-related policies and training material developed or used by agencies under the Act, including for the purpose of training senior officers on the risks (if any) of transmission. 

Recommendation 26 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to make it clear that a senior officer may only make an MTO (or apply to the court for an MTO, including if recommendation 2 is adopted) if satisfied that the worker making the application was eligible to do so under s 8. This would mean that the senior officer must form a view on the following before making a decision on an MTO determination: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. the worker came into contact with bodily fluid of the third party the contact occurred in the execution of the worker’s duty the contact was the result of a deliberate action by the third party the contact was without the consent of the third party the third party is over the age of 14 the worker has consulted a relevant medical practitioner the application is made within 5 days of the contact. 

Recommendation 27 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that, to make an MTO the decision maker (including the court if recommendation 2 is adopted) must be satisfied, having regard to the CHO guidelines and medical advice, that there is a real risk that the worker has contracted a blood-borne disease from the contact incident. 

Recommendation 28 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to omit saliva as a ‘bodily fluid’ (noting that, if contact is made with both saliva and blood, the Act could still apply in respect of that contact as blood is a bodily fluid). 

Recommendation 29 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to omit from the definition of ‘bodily fluid’ the regulation-making power to prescribe any ‘other bodily fluid or substance’ as a bodily fluid, or alternatively to put in place a safeguard that a bodily fluid is only prescribed following certification by the CHO. 

Recommendation 30 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to require that all MDT applications must include written advice from the worker’s medical practitioner. (See also recommendation 5 as to the required content of that advice). 

Recommendation 31 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that a worker’s statement(s) consenting to the senior officer consulting their medical practitioner and accessing their medical records extends to the case of an MDT application that is determined by the senior officer deciding to apply to the court, to the extent necessary for the purpose of pursuing court proceedings.  

Recommendation 32 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that, in all cases, a worker’s MDT application must include statement(s) of consent to the senior officer accessing their relevant medical records as necessary. 

Recommendation 33 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO review and revise the CHO guidelines to provide guidance to senior officers as to how and when they should be consulting with a worker’s medical practitioner. 

Recommendation 34 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to require that, for the purpose of affording third parties an opportunity to make a submission: a. b. c. the senior officer must provide them with a redacted copy of the MDT application immediately, and in any case no later than 1 business day after the MDT application is made, and should they indicate that they wish to do so, third parties be given the opportunity to obtain medical and/or legal advice to assist with the decision to make (or not make) a submission, and to assist in the making of that submission. Pending any change to the legislation, this practice should be adopted by agencies as a matter of policy. 

Recommendation 35 If the Act is to continue, that the NSWPF review its policy and practices to ensure that third parties are genuinely provided an opportunity to make a submission on any matters relevant to the determination of an MDT application, and not merely on their reasons for not consenting to provide a blood sample for testing. 

Recommendation 36 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that the powers of law enforcement officers in respect of a detained third party provided by s 21 do not apply if the person has been detained only in connection with an offence under the Act. 

Recommendation 37 If the Act is to continue, that the NSWPF, CSNSW and other relevant agencies amend their policies to include a direction that, if a non-vulnerable third party consents to providing a blood sample for testing after an MDT application has been made, the senior officer must proceed to determine the application by refusing it, and giving notice of that determination in accordance with s 13 of the Act. 

Recommendation 38 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that, in respect of an MDT application about a non-vulnerable third party who has consented to voluntarily provide a blood sample for testing: a. b. c. the application is to remain on foot (and not be determined) until the blood sample for testing is provided - even if this is outside the 3-business-day timeframe within which a determination must ordinarily be made once the blood sample has been provided, the senior officer is to determine the application by refusing it but if the blood sample is not provided voluntarily (ie consent is withdrawn), the senior officer (or the court, if recommendation 2 is adopted) may proceed to determine the application by either making an MTO or refusing the application. 

Recommendation 39 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that the following provisions also apply where, following the making of an application for an MTO, testing is conducted with consent: a. b. s 22 (Results of blood test) s 29 (Disclosure of information) c. s 34 (Costs). 

Recommendation 40 If the Act is to continue, that the NSWPF, CSNSW and other covered agencies review and if necessary, revise their policies and procedures to provide that: a. b. c. d. a form is provided for completion by any non-vulnerable third party to allow them to indicate whether they will or will not consent the form includes a specific field inviting the third party to provide reasons for not consenting, if they do not consent returned forms (where consent has not been provided) are considered by the senior officer before determining an MDT application (or provided to the court if recommendation 2 is adopted), and otherwise kept on the relevant file if a third party does not complete a form, this is noted on the relevant file. 

Recommendation 41 If the Act is to continue, that the NSWPF, CSNSW and other covered agencies review and revise their MDT policies and procedures to include directions to senior officers that they: a. b. are to seek consent by asking whether or not the person will consent are to give the third party a reasonable opportunity to consider (including after seeking legal or other advice, if necessary) whether they will consent  c. d. e. are not to apply pressure in seeking consent - including that they must not imply that, if consent is not provided, an MTO will necessarily be made are to make a record of the manner in which consent was sought and, if relevant, obtained on the MDT application file (in the case of the NSWPF and CSNSW) are to record on BWV any conversation in which consent is sought. 

Recommendation 42 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO take steps to ensure that pathology laboratories are aware of their obligation to provide a copy of blood test results to the CHO if no medical practitioner has been nominated by the relevant third party. 

Recommendation 43 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO be funded to develop and deliver training for NSW pathology staff in relation to the operation of the MDT Act, including their obligations concerning the dissemination of blood test results and treatment of blood test samples, and risk mitigation for staff who administer tests under an MTO. 

Recommendation 44 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that a worker may nominate only one medical practitioner to receive the third party’s blood test results on the worker’s behalf. 

Recommendation 45 If the Act is to continue, that the Act (or the Regulation) be amended to provide that, when blood test results are to be disseminated to a medical practitioner: a. b. c. The pathology laboratory is to contact the medical practitioner to confirm that they are authorised and willing to receive the results on behalf of the relevant person The results are to be marked as confidential for the personal attention of the medical practitioner, and The results are to be accompanied by the following information: i. The fact that the test was undertaken under an MTO ii. iii. iv. The names of the relevant worker and third party A list of all persons who are receiving the results and why A copy of, or a reference to a public website that includes, the CHO guidelines. 

Recommendation 46 If the Act is to continue and subject to recommendation 45 being adopted, the CHO should issue advice to pathology laboratories with instructions to the above effect. 

Recommendation 47 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to: a. b. provide that any person who receives the health information of a third party, including a worker and any person to whom the worker then discloses the information, is also subject to the prohibition on disclosing the information unless one of the exceptions in s 29(1) apply, and add exceptions for the disclosure of information where reasonably necessary for the purpose of: i. the worker informing a spouse, intimate partner or other person in respect of whom the third party’s health information may be relevant to that person’s own health or safety, or ii. the worker or a person referred to in paragraph (i) above for the purpose of seeking medical, counselling, legal or other professional advice. 

Recommendation 48 If the Act is to continue, that the CHO guidelines and the NSWPF, CSNSW and other agencies’ policies be amended to state clearly that the third party’s blood test results should not be disclosed to the senior officer, and the senior officer must not request those results. 

Recommendation 49 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that, at the time of disseminating the blood test results under s 22, the pathology laboratory is to notify the senior officer that the test was successfully completed in accordance with MTO. 

Recommendation 50 If the Act is to continue, that s 29(1)(e) of the Act be repealed. 

Recommendation 51 If the Act is to continue, that the Act (s 7) be amended to provide there is an absolute prohibition on the use of blood samples for any purpose not authorised by the Act, and that this applies to any law enforcement agency and any other person. 

Recommendation 52 If the Act is to continue, that the Act (s 31) be amended to provide that the prohibition on the use of samples and information as evidence applies to all proceedings and administrative decisions or assessments (other than if adduced by the third party themselves). 

Recommendation 53 If the Act is to continue, that (subject to consultation with the CHO to confirm that there is no impediment under national pathology standards to doing so) the Act be amended to provide that the sample must be destroyed by the pathology laboratory as soon as it is no longer required for the purposes of the Act. 

Recommendation 54 If the Act is to continue, that the Act (s 36) be amended to provide that the Ombudsman’s power to require information can: a. b. be exercised for the purpose of any Ombudsman function under the Act (and not just for its function of preparing a report) relate to any information relevant to the Act (and not limited to information relating to an MDT application) c. be made to any person (and not just to senior officers or the Commissioner of Police). 

Recommendation 55 If the Act is to continue, that the Act (s 36) be amended to provide that no Act (including any other provision of the MDT Act) or law prevents a person complying or affects a person’s duty to comply with a requirement of the Ombudsman to provide information, except that the Ombudsman must set aside a requirement to produce information if: a. b. c. the person is not a public authority, the person has a ground of privilege that would entitle them to resist such a requirement in court proceedings, and the person has not waived that privilege. 

Recommendation 56 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended (subject to consultation with the CHO to confirm that there is no impediment under the relevant health privacy laws and standards) to provide for the CHO to receive and collate: a. b. c. the result of pathology tests administered on third parties under the Act the PEP treatment of workers, including whether this changed following receipt of the third party test results data to the Ombudsman in deidentified and aggregated form for the purposes of our monitoring and reporting functions. (This should include in respect of all MDT applications, including where testing was done pursuant to an MTO and where testing was done by consent). 

Recommendation 57 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to include (in addition to the requirement to give notice to the Ombudsman of any determination under s 13) that agencies must report annually to the Ombudsman on the number of MDT applications received and the outcome of those applications, including those that proceeded to determination, those that were withdrawn, and those that were dealt with by consent. 

Recommendation 58 If the Act is to continue (and to the extent necessary if recommendation 2 is adopted), agencies should ensure, and the Act should be amended to require, that the notices of reasons provided under s 13 are adequate, including by ensuring that they describe with appropriate specificity: a. the decision b. c. d. the findings on material facts the evidence or other material on which those findings are based the reasons for the decision. 

Recommendation 59 If the Act is to continue (and to the extent necessary if recommendation 2 is adopted), agencies should ensure – and the Act should be amended to require, that notices given to the Ombudsman under s 13(1)(d) of the Act are accompanied by: a. b. references to any information considered in making a decision, including a copy of all relevant (non-public) documents where the decision is to apply to the court for an MTO, a copy of the court application documents (and subsequently, once the court proceedings are finalised, notice of its outcome). 

Recommendation 60 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to prescribe demographic information about third parties that agencies are required to seek and, if provided, to keep. This may include information about: a. age b. gender (including trans, intersex and non-binary) c. local government area of residence d. Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status e. cultural and linguistic diversity f. sexual orientation g. disability. 

Recommendation 61 If the Act is to continue, that the Act be amended to provide that: a. b. in addition to the full 3-yearly report required under the Act, the Ombudsman is to include in its Annual Report under the Ombudsman Act a report on its monitoring activities during the year, and this report may include de-identified, aggregated data, including demographic data, in relation to MDT applications and orders. 

Recommendation 62 If the Act is to continue, NSWPF enter into an arrangement to provide BOCSAR with data on key MDT Act activities of the NSWPF that it can include in its NSW Policing activity dashboard, including information about the number of applications and orders made.

AI Infrastructure

'The Steep Cost of Capture' by  Meredith Whittaker in (2021) 28(6) interactions 50–55 comments 

In considering how to tackle this onslaught of industrial AI, we must first recognize that the “advances” in AI celebrated over the past decade were not due to fundamental scientific breakthroughs in AI techniques. They were and are primarily the product of significantly concentrated data and compute resources that reside in the hands of a few large tech corporations. Modern AI is fundamentally dependent on corporate resources and business practices, and our increasing reliance on such AI cedes inordinate power over our lives and institutions to a handful of tech firms. It also gives these firms significant influence over both the direction of AI development and the academic institutions wishing to research it. 

Meaning that tech firms are startlingly well positioned to shape what we do — and do not — know about AI and the business behind it, at the same time that their AI products are working to shape our lives and institutions. 

Examining the history of the U.S. military’s influence over scientific research during the Cold War, we see parallels to the tech industry’s current influence over AI. This history also offers alarming examples of the way in which U.S. military dominance worked to shape academic knowledge production, and to punish those who dissented. 

Today, the tech industry is facing mounting regulatory pressure, and is increasing its efforts to create tech-positive narratives and to silence and sideline critics in much the same way the U.S. military and its allies did in the past. Taken as a whole, we see that the tech industry’s dominance in AI research and knowledge production puts critical researchers and advocates within, and beyond, academia in a treacherous position. This threatens to deprive frontline communities, policymakers, and the public of vital knowledge about the costs and consequences of AI and the industry responsible for it—right at the time that this work is most needed. 

'Why ‘open’ AI systems are actually closed, and why this matters' by David Gray Widder, Meredith Whittaker and Sarah Myers West in (2024) 635 Nature 827–833 comments 

This paper examines ‘open’ artificial intelligence (AI). Claims about ‘open’ AI often lack precision, frequently eliding scrutiny of substantial industry concentration in large-scale AI development and deployment, and often incorrectly applying understandings of ‘open’ imported from free and open-source software to AI systems. At present, powerful actors are seeking to shape policy using claims that ‘open’ AI is either beneficial to innovation and democracy, on the one hand, or detrimental to safety, on the other. When policy is being shaped, definitions matter. To add clarity to this debate, we examine the basis for claims of openness in AI, and offer a material analysis of what AI is and what ‘openness’ in AI can and cannot provide: examining models, data, labour, frameworks, and computational power. We highlight three main affordances of ‘open’ AI, namely transparency, reusability, and extensibility, and we observe that maximally ‘open’ AI allows some forms of oversight and experimentation on top of existing models. However, we find that openness alone does not perturb the concentration of power in AI. Just as many traditional open-source software projects were co-opted in various ways by large technology companies, we show how rhetoric around ‘open’ AI is frequently wielded in ways that exacerbate rather than reduce concentration of power in the AI sector.

31 January 2025

Governance

The Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee has launched an inquiry into governance at Australian higher education providers. 

The Terms of Reference are 

 The adequacy of the powers available to the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency to perform its role in identifying and addressing corporate governance issues at Australian higher education providers, with particular reference to: 
a. The composition of providers' governing bodies and the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of their functions and processes, including in relation to expenditure, risk management and conflicts of interest; 
b. The standard and accuracy of providers' financial reporting, and the effectiveness of financial safeguards and controls; 
c. Providers' compliance with legislative requirements, including compliance with workplace laws and regulations; 
d. The impact of providers' employment practices, executive remuneration, and the use of external consultants, on staff, students and the quality of higher education offered; and 
e. Any related matters. 

The committee will present its report on 4 April 2025, with submissions due by 3 March 2025.

30 January 2025

Faith

In R v Struhs [2025] QSC 10 the Supreme Court has found that numerous defendants are guilty of manslaughter of a child as part of the expression of their faith, which included expectations that the child would undergo resurrection. 

The judgment states 

After the Crown opening at the commencement of the trial, I invited all accused to make an opening statement. Only one accused spoke, although he purported to speak on behalf of all. That was Brendan Stevens, the spiritual leader of a small, home-based Church of which each other accused was a member at the time of Elizabeth’s death. He asserted, amongst other things, that the trial was “just a religious persecution”, that the accused did not “have any particular care” amongst themselves how they were judged by the court and that they did not “come to fight the charge”. Despite that, most accused progressively engaged in one way or another with the trial process and, by its conclusion, all 14 accused stood to address the court. Their addresses occupied a whole sitting day on the last day of trial and most accused advanced submissions to the effect that he or she should be acquitted of any wrongdoing. ... 

Until her death, Elizabeth Rose Struhs was a vibrant, happy child with, of course, her whole life ahead of her. She left a lasting impression on many with whom she came into contact on the outside, whether through her schooling or during the treatment and control of a medical condition she was first diagnosed with in 2019 – Type 1 diabetes. It cannot be doubted that she was lovingly cared for in almost every way by her parents, Jason and Kerrie Struhs , or that she was adored by every member of the Church including all other accused. However, due to a singular belief in the healing power of God which, to the minds of her parents and the other members of the Church left no room for recourse to any form of medical care or treatment, she was deprived of the one thing that would most definitely have kept her alive – insulin. Her death was inevitable once the administration of that drug was abandoned and when, encouraged and supported by the other accused, her parents refused to seek any medical assistance in the days and nights which followed until her death. ... 

The Crown case against all accused was premised on the duty owed under the law by Jason and Kerrie Struhs to provide Elizabeth with such medical care and treatment as was necessary for the preservation of her life. Each had been previously dealt with by the courts for failing to do so. Each, the Crown contended, failed to do so again with the inevitable consequence that Elizabeth died. 

[22] All accused, except for Jason Struhs , held to a fervent belief in the healing power of God of the kind already mentioned, that is to say, a belief that left no room for recourse to any form of medical care or treatment. This was a core belief of the Church, and no suggestion was made by the Crown that it was not genuinely held by its members. However, the Crown alleged that, when Jason Struhs joined the Church after 17 years of staunch opposition, he was persuaded by all other accused to adopt, and then act on, that core belief with the consequence that he ceased the administration of insulin to Elizabeth and, further, that they aided him through encouragement and support not to resume insulin or to seek any other form of medical care or treatment for her in the intervening days and nights before she died. 

[23] In the cases against Jason Struhs and Brendan Stevens, the Crown maintained that, not only was each criminally responsible for Elizabeth’s death, but they acted in circumstances where they were recklessly indifferent to human life. This was because, it was alleged, both knew that, by ceasing insulin and shunning any other form of medical intervention, Elizabeth would probably die. Each was accordingly said to be guilty of murder because they acted (or omitted to act) with reckless indifference to Elizabeth’s life. 

[24] The case against Kerrie Struhs for manslaughter was based on her refusal to fulfill the duty owed by her to provide Elizabeth with such medical care and treatment as was necessary for the preservation of her life. 

[25] All other accused were said to be criminally responsible for Elizabeth’s death because, by their words and actions of encouragement and support, they both counselled and aided the unlawful killing of Elizabeth by intentionally encouraging Jason Struhs to cease providing insulin as well as medical care and treatment to Elizabeth, and by intentionally supporting his choice to continue to do so. This, it was said, amounted to manslaughter. ... 

Reference has already been made to the opening statement delivered by Brendan Stevens. He emphasised that all accused were within their “rights to believe in the Word of God completely” and that they had chosen to “follow God”, echoing remarks made by Kerrie Struhs in her closing address to the jury at her trial in 2021. Mr Stevens asserted that the prosecution against all accused was a prosecution for believing in God. 

[27] By the end of the trial, all accused continued to maintain the position that they were entitled to their particular belief in the healing power of God, even if that conflicted with the laws of the world. However, in addition, many accused submitted they played no role in the decision Jason Struhs made to cease the administration of insulin to Elizabeth. Similarly, it was submitted they played no role in Mr Struhs ’ choice not to resume insulin or seek any other form of medical care or treatment. All they had done, it was submitted, was to encourage Mr Struhs to believe in God. To the point, they submitted they had done nothing to persuade, encourage or support Mr Struhs in the decision and choice he made. Any influence in those respects, it was said, must have come from God, and Mr Struhs agreed with that proposition in his closing address. 

1.5 Overview of the Verdicts 

[28] Regardless of whether the other essential elements of the offence of murder were proved by the Crown, unless I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, at some point between the time when the decision was made by Jason Struhs to cease the administration of insulin to Elizabeth (Monday, 3 January 2022) and the time when she died (Friday, 7 January 2022), he knew his failure to provide her with insulin and/or medical care and treatment would probably cause her death, Mr Struhs could not be guilty of murder. In this respect, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt Mr Struhs knew of the probability, as opposed to the possibility, of death. Nothing less than a full realisation on his part that Elizabeth would probably die as a consequence of his failure to act would be sufficient to establish murder in this way, that is, murder by reckless indifference to her life. 

[29] Whether this element of the offence was proved to the requisite standard depended on an assessment of the subjective state of mind of Mr Struhs , and not on what a reasonable person might or would have foreseen as a probable consequence of his omission. As such, the test is not objective, and it does not matter that a reasonable person in Mr Struhs ’ position would have known Elizabeth would probably die. 

[30] For the reasons set out in Part 7.3, after a consideration of the whole of the evidence admissible against Mr Struhs , there remained a reasonable possibility that, in the cloistered atmosphere of the Church which enveloped Mr Struhs , and which only intensified once he made the decision to cease the administration of insulin, he was so consumed by the particular belief in the healing power of God promoted by its members that he never came to the full realisation Elizabeth would probably die, believing instead that God would not allow that to happen.  

[31] I was therefore not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of proof of this essential element and, because all elements of the alleged offence must be proved before a guilty verdict may be returned, Mr Struhs must be acquitted of murder. I was, however, satisfied that Jason Struhs was guilty of manslaughter, for the reasons set out in Part 7.3. 

[32] Similar considerations applied in the case against Brendan Stevens for murder. Again, in his case, I could not be satisfied after a consideration of the whole of the evidence admissible against him that Mr Stevens was possessed of the requisite state of mind at any point between the time when the decision was made by Jason Struhs to cease the administration of insulin to Elizabeth and the time when she died. In that regard, proof was required that, at some point over the period under consideration, Mr Stevens knew that Mr Struhs knew that the failure to provide insulin and/or medical care and treatment would probably cause her death. As with Mr Struhs , whether this element of the offence was proved to the requisite standard depended on an assessment of the subjective state of mind of Mr Stevens, and not on what a reasonable person might have known about Mr Struhs ’ state of mind. My reasons for coming to that conclusion are set out in Part 7.4. The Crown not having proved that element of the offence of murder, Mr Stevens must be acquitted of that charge. I was, however, satisfied that Mr Stevens was guilty of manslaughter, again, for the reasons set out in Part 7.4. ... 

[106] Unsurprisingly, the duty owed by a parent to provide any child in his or her care with the necessaries of life is one of long-standing and, although there have been different formulations of the duty over time, the meaning has always been plain. 

[107] To take one case from England which was decided in 1898, The Queen v Senior, the accused was a member of a sect known as the “Peculiar People”. They were opposed on religious grounds to any recourse to medicines or medical treatment, believing that to do so would “indicate a want of faith in the Lord”. The accused’s child, an infant eight or nine months old, died of pneumonia. The accused, although a “good and kind father in all other respects”, refused to arrange assistance in the form of medicine or medical treatment for his child. The child’s life would have been prolonged, and likely saved, if medical assistance had been provided. The accused was convicted in the Central Criminal Court of manslaughter by criminal negligence. His conviction was based on a breach of a duty under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894 which made it an offence to wilfully neglect a child in a person’s care in a manner which, relevantly, resulted in injury to health. On a case stated to the Queen’s Bench Division, the conviction was affirmed. In the course of doing so, the court rejected the notion that a conscientious objection on religious grounds could afford a defence and also emphasised that the standard of care required of a parent will vary as access to medical treatment improves. Lord Russell CJ stated:

Neglect is the want of reasonable care – that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind – that is, in such a case as the present, provided the parent had such means as would enable him to take the necessary steps. I agree with the statement in the summing-up, that the standard of neglect varies as time went on, and that many things might be legitimately looked upon as evidence of neglect in one generation, which would not have been thought so in a preceding generation, and that regard must be had to the habits and thoughts of the time. At the present day, when medical aid is within the reach of the humblest and poorest members of the community, it cannot reasonably be suggested that the omission to provide medical aid for a dying child does not amount to neglect. 

[Counsel] contended that because the prisoner was proved to be an affectionate parent, and was willing to do all things for the benefit of his child, except the one thing which was necessary in the present case, he ought not to be found guilty of the offence of manslaughter, on the ground that he abstained from providing medical aid for his child in consequence of his peculiar views in the matter; but we cannot shut our eyes to the danger which might arise if we were to accede to that argument, for where is the line to be drawn? In the present case the prisoner is shewn to have had an objection to medicine; but other cases might arise, such, for instance, as the case of a child with a broken thigh, where a surgical operation was necessary, which had to be performed with the aid of an anaesthetic; could the father refuse to allow the anaesthetic to be administered? Or take the case of a child that was in danger of suffocation, so that the operation of tracheotomy was necessary in order to save its life, and an anaesthetic was required to be administered.”(Emphasis added).

[108] Grantham J, agreeing with Lord Russell CJ, added:

It may be asked, why should the line be drawn at drugs? A case might arise where it was necessary to apply an instrument where an injury had been suffered. To omit to do that would be wilful neglect. Or take the case of a fever, where quinine was necessary, or ice. Suppose the doctor were to say, ‘I know that if ice is applied the fever will abate’. Could the father refuse to allow the application of ice without being guilty of wilful neglect?” ... 

[642] It will be seen from what has already been covered in this Part that the belief held by the accused in the healing power of God went through quite a rapid revision as the circumstances changed around them. On Sunday, 2 January 2022, Jason Struhs declared Elizabeth had been healed as God had promised. His misinterpretation of her blood glucose results the following morning only served to reinforce his belief, and that of the other members of the Church, in that regard. Then, when Elizabeth fell ill the next day (Tuesday, 4 January 2022), and although there was speculation about the cause (some suggesting she was suffering insulin “withdrawal symptoms” and others maintaining they were witnessing “another little trial” by God), all members of the Church were united in the belief that Elizabeth either had been or would be healed, and that is in fact what they prayed for in the days and nights which followed. Then, when Elizabeth died on the morning of Saturday, 7 January 2022, they could of course no longer maintain a belief that Elizabeth would be healed. Instead, in the 36 hours they had available to them for contemplation, all appeared to pivot to a belief that God had “allowed” Elizabeth to die so that He could raise her from the dead and, in that way, show them a miracle to re-affirm their faith. However, by the end of that period, they came to the view that God must have instead intended for Elizabeth’s death and resurrection to have a much larger audience, and, for that reason, it was necessary to bring her death to the attention of the authorities so that they, too, could bear witness to her resurrection. This would, in turn, bring the miracle of Elizabeth’s death and resurrection to the attention of the World which was, many of them contended, in such a state of faithless degeneration. Ever since, the members of the Church have proclaimed Elizabeth will be raised from the dead in their lifetime. ... 

[683] I approached the assessment of the honesty and reliability of the versions provided by the accused to investigating police – whether in a recorded conversation or interview or in a police witness statement – with a degree of circumspection. There were a couple of reasons for this. 

[684] First, throughout the trial, I encountered several recurring themes in the versions provided by the accused and their closing addresses about significant events in the life of the Church. When asked about these events, several accused related them in a remarkably similar way, almost as though the event had become something of a parable to be revisited and retold as part of their faith as members of the Church. So, for example, the fact Elizabeth emerged from her hospitalisation and treatment in 2019 without some form of permanent disability was held out as the work of God and a miracle. Similarly, the prosecution, conviction and imprisonment of Kerrie Struhs in 2021 was seen as the work of God because it resulted in Jason Struhs joining the Church and being “healed of all his anger”, something that was also recounted as a miracle. Likewise, many accused spoke of Jason Struhs ’ decision to cease the administration of insulin as a “step in faith” and the hope for healing of Elizabeth as a “victory”. The point here is not only that these views were widely held, but they were held and spoken about in the same terms by many of the accused. The result was often a generalised account, easily digested and just as easily recalled. Although what one accused told police was not admissible in evidence against any other accused, this phenomenon of speaking in parables emerged clearly enough from a consideration of evidence admissible against all accused such as the s 93A interview of REK and, it might be added in the case of all accused other than Jason Struhs , the Tripodi evidence. I was therefore careful to ensure as best I could that I was acting on the particular accused’s genuine recall as opposed to something that was merely part of a narrative developed within the Church. 

[685] Second, there was a marked commonality in the justifications sought to be advanced by the accused for their conduct. One common justification was that Elizabeth did not want to be on insulin and they were, in that sense, acting in accordance with her wishes. It scarcely needs to be said that the wishes of an eight-year-old child, whatever they may have truly been, were entirely irrelevant to the proof of the charges before the court. Another was the fiction which was advanced to the effect they had done nothing other than encourage Jason Struhs to believe in God or, to like effect, that Jason Struhs was his own man and decided of his own accord to cease the administration of insulin. Those claims were made by several accused and rose to prominence in many of the closing addresses. The other frequent claim was that they were the subject of a religious persecution, despite the whole case being concerned with the refusal on the part of Jason and Kerrie Struhs to fulfil a duty cast on every person in this State who has the care of a child under the age of 16 years. Again, the point is not that many of the accused advanced the same justifications; it is that those justifications might have come from a jointly arrived position and, as such, may not have had a proper foundation in the evidence admissible against the individual accused under consideration. ... 

When assessing whether Elizabeth’s death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the failure to provide insulin and/or medical care and treatment to Elizabeth, I assessed what a reasonable person would have foreseen in the position of Mr Struhs , that is to say, a reasonable person of the same age, experience and knowledge of the same facts or circumstances as Mr Struhs , with ordinary fortitude and strength of mind (excluding attributes of a purely subjective type such as his religious beliefs). 

[766] Otherwise, the proven facts speak for themselves. Mr Struhs ’ failure constituted such an egregious departure from the standard of care a reasonable member of the community would observe in the same circumstances as to amount to a crime against the State that is deserving of punishment. Mr Struhs ’ complete abdication of the duty he owed to his child, viewed objectively, involved grave moral guilt and disregard for human life. It constitutes, at the very minimum, criminal negligence. Lastly, for the reasons previously expressed, Mr Struhs ’ failure was unlawful, no defence having been raised on the evidence. 

[767] Having already found to the required standard that Elizabeth is dead, I was for these reasons also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Struhs caused her death in circumstances where: (1) he had a duty to provide medical care and treatment to her necessary for her life; (2) he breached that duty by failing to provide insulin and/or medical care and treatment to her; (3) her death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that failure; and (4) his failure was such as to amount to criminal negligence. Lastly, I was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Struhs ’ failure to provide Elizabeth with insulin and/or medical care and treatment was unlawful. 

Conclusion [768] Jason Struhs is not guilty of murder but he is guilty of manslaughter.

Mountain

The Explanatory Note for the Te Pire Whakatupua mō Te Kāhui Tupua/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Bill in New Zealand - likely to be much misreported - states 

 Te Pire Whakatupua mō Te Kāhui Tupua/Taranaki Maunga Collective Redress Bill (the Bill) gives effect to certain matters contained in Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo/the Taranaki Maunga collective redress deed signed on 1 September 2023 by the Crown and Ngā Iwi o Taranaki, the collective of the 8 iwi of the Taranaki region. The Bill contains provisions relating to redress that require legislation for their implementation. Other aspects of the arrangements are provided for only in the collective redress deed because they do not require legislative authority. The Bill comprises 9 Parts and 5 schedules. The Bill and the deed speak of the iwi of Taranaki and the origins of Taranaki Maunga: Ko Taranaki, ko Pouākai, ko Kaitake, koia te puna i heke mai ai te tangata. Koia ko hō mātou nei okiokinga, ko mātou nei tō rātou okiokitanga. (Taranaki, Pouākai and Kaitake are a reflection, and the source, of our existence, in life and in death.) 

Legal personality 

The concept of legal personality for Te Kāhui Tupua is primarily concerned with giving legal status to the tūpuna maunga of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki within the national park. The land in the national park owned by the Crown is to be vested in the legal personality. The land will also be inalienable (not able to be sold or otherwise disposed of), except in a very narrow set of circumstances. A similar legal personality has been delivered in Treaty settlements in respect of Ngāi Tūhoe (Te Urewera) and the Whanganui River (Te Awa Tupua). In each case, the legal personality requires an entity to act on its behalf. In the case of Te Kāhui Tupua, that is Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi. The land to be vested in the legal personality will continue to be a national park administered under the National Parks Act 1980 as amended by this Bill. The general principles of the National Parks Act, including free public access, will be protected alongside Ngā Pou Whakatupua (the Maunga values). The collective redress legislation will also repeal the Mount Egmont Vesting Act 1978. The recognition of Te Kāhui Tupua as a legal person aligns closely with Ngā Iwi o Taranaki understanding of the maunga being tūpuna, requiring care and protection now and into the future. 

Te Kāhui Tupua status 

The arrangements provide for a status statement for the legal personality. The status statement expresses the meaning of the legal personality and explains what the legal personality is intended to represent. Similar statutory recognition statements have been included in the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River) and Ngāti Rangi (Te Waiū-o-te-Ika arrangements over the Whangaehu River) Treaty settlements. The status statement, alongside Ngā Pou Whakatupua, will have the same effect as a general purpose under section 4(1) of the National Parks Act 1980 and will form the foundation for the ongoing administration and management of the national park. 

The recognition statement provides that the concept of the legal personality extends beyond the national park boundary into the surrounding lands, although with no direct legal effect. This extension aligns with the Ngā Iwi o Taranaki understanding of their tūpuna, which does not stop at the national park boundary. The Bill includes protection of all land within the national park from all commercial mining activities. ... 

Clause by clause analysis 

Clause 1 sets out a dual-language Title for this Bill, providing also that the Act may also be cited either by the te reo Māori Title or by the English Title. Clause 2 provides that the Bill, except for clause 125, comes into force on the day after the date on which it receives Royal assent. Clause 125 comes into force on the latest of the 5 events specified in clause 120(1). 

Part 1 He kupu wāwahi—Historical matters and preliminary provisions 

Clause 3 provides a statement by Ngā Iwi o Taranaki, Te Iho Tāngaengae, as acknowledged by the Crown, of the connection and relationship of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki with their Tūpuna Maunga and Te Kāhui Tupua. Te Pūeatanga ki te Ao Clauses 4 to 6 record in te reo Māori and English the summary of the historical account, the acknowledgements by the Crown, and the apology given by the Crown to Ngā Iwi o Taranaki in Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo, the collective redress deed. Purpose provision Clause 7 states the purpose of the Bill. 

Interpretation provisions 

Clause 8 provides that the Bill is to be interpreted in a manner that best furthers the agreements set out in Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo. Clause 9 defines certain terms used in the Bill and clause 10 defines Ngā Iwi o Taranaki, the group of iwi with whom the agreements have been made that are set out in Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo and this Bill. 

Other matters 

Clauses 11 to 14 provide for the following matters relevant to the interpretation and implementation of the Bill: the Bill when enacted will bind the Crown (clause 11): the provisions of the Bill take effect on the effective date, unless a provision of the Bill states otherwise (clause 12): the Bill overrides the rule under trust law that limits the life of a trust and of any documents that give effect to an agreement (clause 13): the Bill requires the chief executive of the Office for Māori Crown Relations—Te Arawhiti to make copies of Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo available for inspection free of charge, and for purchase at a reasonable price, at the head office of the Office for Māori Crown Relations—Te Arawhiti in Wellington on any working day. Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo must also be made available free of charge on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Office for Māori Crown Relations—Te Arawhiti (clause 14). In clause 15, the Bill sets out the limits to the effect of the Bill and Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo, including that neither the Bill nor Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo, unless expressly provided otherwise,— limits the relationship of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki in respect of Te Kāhui Tupua, including in relation to any extant customary rights; or displaces or diminishes the role of an iwi or a hapū of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki in relation to Te Kāhui Tupua; or applies to the coastal marine area, except as provided in clauses 3, 17, 19, and 52; or limits any existing private property rights, or affects rights or interests in water, wildlife, fish, aquatic life, or plants, or affects the application of any legislation. Clause 16 excludes the jurisdiction of the courts, tribunals and other judicial bodies to inquire or further inquire into, or make finding or recommendations in relation to Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo, the Bill, or the recress provided under either. this does not exclude the jurisdiction in relation to interpreting or implementing the redress provided under those instruments. 

Part 2 Te Kāhui Tupua 

Subpart 1—Te Kāhui Tupua and Ngā Pou Whakatupua Subpart 1 (clauses 17 to 21), recognises the status of Te Kāhui Tupua as a legal person, its rights, powers, and duties being exercised and performed on its behalf and in its name by Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi. Clause 19 sets out Ngā Pou Whakatupua, the intrinsic values associated with Te Kāhui Tupua. Clauses 20 and 21 provide for the relationship of the Bill and Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo with the National Parks Act 1980, Conservation Act 1987, and Resource Management Act 1991, and for the status of these when persons are acting under conservation of other legislation in rleation to land in Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki or the surrounding land (as defined in clause 17). Subpart 2—Official geographic names Clauses 22 to 26 provide for the official geographic name of the national park in which ngā maunga are situated to change to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki and the names Mount Egmont and Mount Taranaki to change to Taranaki Maunga. 

Part 3 Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi 

Subpart 1—Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi: establishment, purpose, functions, and powers Clauses 27 to 30 establish Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi as a statutory body, with the purpose of being the human face and voice of Te Kāhui Tupua. These clauses set out the capacity and powers of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi for the purpose of achieving its purpose. The essence of its functions (clause 29) is to act and speak for Te Kāhui Tupua, upholding the status, values, and interests of Te Kāhui Tupua. Clauses 31 to 34 set out the requirements for the membership of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi and for the decision-making powers of its members. Clauses 35 and 36 deal with where responsibility lies for certain liabilities arising in respect of Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki, and clause 37 establishes, in Schedule 2, further provisions relevant to the establishment and administration of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi. Subpart 2—Name of Te Kāhui Tupua protected Clause 38 makes provision for the protection of the name Te Kāhui Tupua, and any intellectual property in the name. Subpart 3—Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki place section in conservation management strategy Clauses 39 and 40 make provision for the conservation management strategy relating to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki to acknowledge and uphold the status of Te Kāhui Tupua and Ngā Pou Whakatupua (values). 

Part 4 Asset management 

The scheme for asset management (clauses 41 to 51) supports the right of Te Kāhui Tupua to own assets. The Bill requires assets owned by Te Kāhui Tupua to be managed on behalf of Te Kāhui Tupua by an asset management company, which Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi is empowered to set up under the Companies Act 1993. In the operation of the company, Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi must act as the representative of the sole shareholder, Te Kāhui Tupua. The constitution will have to meet the requirements of the Companies Act 1993 and the matters itemised in clause 44. Clause 45 provides that Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi does not need to comply with certain requirements of the Companies Act 1993. Other matters covered include how assets are to be administered, how funding is to be applied, and the reporting and accountability requirements (clauses 46 to 50). Clause 51 sets out the process to be adopted if the asset management company is dissolved under the Companies Act 1993. 

Part 5 Standing, status, and taxation matters applying to certain entities under this Act 

Part 5 covers the standing of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi and the trustees of Te Tōpuni Ngārahu as having an interest in Te Kāhui Tupua in relation to matters arising under the Local Government Act 2002 or the Resource Management Act 1991 for purposes such as making submissions or the right to be heard, or in relation to matters arising under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 or the Charities Act 2005 (clauses 52 to 54). Clause 55 provides for the taxation status of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi and any asset management company set up and operating in accordance with this Bill. Clause 56 amends the Income Tax Act 2007 by inserting 4 new sections into that Act. New section CH 11B states that a tax liability arises if Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi incurs expenditure on behalf of Te Kāhui Tupua for purposes outside the scope and effect of Part 3 of the Bill (unauthorised expenditure). A tax liability arises under new section CH 11C for the asset management company in respect of expenditure outside the purpose of the company (unauthorised expenditure), as provided for in clause 42. New sections CW 40D and CW 40E of the Income Tax Act 2007 provide an income tax exemption for each of the 2 entities, Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi and the asset management company. The exemption applies to income, except to the extent that the income is applied (referred to as “expenditure” in new sections CH 11B and CH 11C) for, or to, a purpose that is outside the scope of Part 4 (in the case of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi) or clause 42 in the case of the asset management company. Expenditure applied for purposes outside those set in Part 4 or clause 42 is to be treated as income in the hands of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi or the asset management company respectively. 

Part 6 Land and minerals 

Clause 57outlines the contents of Part 6. Subpart 1—Vesting of land and minerals Vesting of Te Whenua Taketake Clause 58 vests the Crown-owned land in the existing national park (as described in Schedule 1) in Te Kāhui Tupua and declares that land, when vested, to be a national park with the official geographic name Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki. The land is to be held as Te Whenua Taurikura (that is, land held in the name of Te Kāhui Tupua as part of the national park). Clause 59 provides that Te Whenua Taurikura is inalienable, unless provided otherwise in the Bill. 

Vesting of certain minerals 

Clause 60 overrides section 11 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 to provide that the vesting of Te Whenua Taketake by clause 58 includes Crown-owned taonga tūānuku and industrial rocks and building stones (“certain minerals”) within that land. Clause 61 provides for the registration in the name of Te Kāhui Tupua of the land vested by clause 58, subject to the completion of any necessary survey. The record of title must be created within 24 months of the effective date (40 working days after the Bill comes into force). Subpart 2—Acquiring land for, and adding land to, Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki Land or interests in land acquired for Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki Clauses 62 and 63 set out the process to apply if the Director-General of Conservation is considering adding Crown-owned land to, or acquiring private land or an interest in private land for, Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki. Clause 64 provides for the vesting of Crown-owned land in Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki by Order in Council. Clause 65 provides for the discontinuance of the official geographic names of Crown protected areas whose fee simple estate is vested in Te Kāhui Tupua. Clause 66 enables Te Whenua Tupu (land held in the name of Te Kāhui Tupua but not part of Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki) to be added to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki by Order in Council and held under the Bill as Te Whenua Taurikura (land held in the name of Te Kāhui Tupua as part of Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki). 

Minerals 

Clause 67 provides for certain Crown-owned minerals that form part of the land vested under clause 64 or added to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki under clause 66 to be included in that vesting or addition. 

Registration 

Clause 68 provides for the registration of any land to be added to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki, as described in an Order in Council under clause 64 or 66. Subpart 3—Te Whenua Tupu Clauses 69 to 73 provide for the asset management company to exercise the role of the registered owner of Te Whenua Tupu including, in clauses 71 and 72(2), the company’s role in acquiring or alienating any land within the meaning of Te Whenua Tupu or transferring such land to the Crown or a third party. Subpart 4—Land excluded from Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki Clauses 74 to 77 provide for the exclusion of land from Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki, vesting of that land in the Crown or a third party, and for its registration, including requiring a new record of title. Subpart 5—Provisions applying to certain land and improvements Land or interests in land not added to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki Clause 78 covers how land or interests in land are acquired for, but not added to, Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki. Clauses 79 to 82 set out the effect on existing interests in, and improvements on or attached to, land that becomes part of Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki under the Bill. Clause 83 preserves the effect of existing bylaws and other statutory requirements applying to Te Whenua Taketake. Those matters apply subject to this Bill and the National Parks Act 1980 on and after the effective date. Clause 84 provides for the instruments documenting interests in land to be registered. Subpart 6—Protections under Crown Minerals Act 1991 Clauses 85 to 89 set up certain protections applying to Te Whenua Taurikura under the Crown Minerals Act 1991. Clause 89 requires joint decision making by Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi and the Minister of Conservation (the Minister) for decisions on interests in Te Whenua Taurikura that would otherwise be made by the Minister under Part 3B of the Conservation Act 1987 or under the National Parks Act 1980. Subpart 7—Miscellaneous Clauses 90 and 91 deal with the application of certain enactments to Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki and to Te Whenua Taketake. Clause 92 provides that certain statutory memorials are not to be entered on the record of title for Te Whenua Taurikura. 

Part 7 Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki 

Subpart 1—He Kawa Ora mō Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki Clauses 93 to 95declare Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi responsible for overseeing the preparation and approval of a national park management plan, He Kawa Ora, for Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki. The plan must be consistent with the National Parks Act 1980. Subpart 2—Operational management of Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki This subpart (clauses 96 to 107) sets out the matters relevant to the management of the park, including how the operational management of the park must meet the aspirations of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki for enhancement of the iwi capability to meet their responsibilities as uri of Te Kāhui Tupua. The subpart sets out the responsibility of the Director-General of Conservation to undertake management activities consistently with this Bill, Te Ruruku Pūtakerongo, the National Parks Act 1980, He Kawa Ora, and other relevant legislation or planning documents. The aspirations of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki to participate in the operational management of Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki are also acknowledged, including in relation to the tendering of contracts and the granting of concessions within Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki. Particular requirements are set out in relation to new roads, biological control organisms, the introduction of live aquatic life, and specially protected areas within Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki. Clauses 108 and 109 provide for certain decisions made under the Conservation Act 1987 that, despite provisions in the Bill requiring joint decision making by the Minister and Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi, are the sole responsibility of the Minister. 

Part 8 Redress to assist Ngā Iwi o Taranaki to reconnect with Tūpuna Maunga 

Subpart 1—Taonga tūturu Clauses 110 to 112 provide for how newly found taonga are to be dealt with for the purposes of the Protected Objects Act 1975. Subpart 2—Cultural materials This subpart (clauses 113 to 119) provides for members of Ngā Iwi o Taranaki to be authorised to take or possess certain cultural materials. It requires the trustees of Te Tōpuni Ngārahu and the Director-General of Conservation to work together to prepare and review a cultural materials plan that regulates the taking and possessing of cultural materials. However, the Crown’s powers, functions, and duties under the Crown Minerals Act 1991 are not restricted by the provisions of the subpart. 

Part 9 Governance and other matters 

Subpart 1—Dissolution of Taranaki Māori Trust Board Clauses 120 to 123 provide for— the Taranaki Māori Trust Board (the Trust Board) to be dissolved on the latest of 5 specified events; and the Taranaki Māori Educational Trust to be dissolved on the same day as the Trust Board is dissolved; and the reporting requirements for the Trust Board; and the matters not affected by the provisions of this subpart. Subpart 2—Repeals and consequential amendments Clause 124 repeals the Mount Egmont Vesting Act 1978 on the day on which the Bill comes into force under clause 2. Clause 125 amends the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955 by providing for the removal of a reference to the Taranaki Māori Trust Board from that Act. Clause 126 provides for the consequential amendment of certain legislation in the manner set out in Schedule 5. 

Schedules 

There are 5 schedules as follows: Schedule 1 records the legal description of Te Whenua Takatake: Schedule 2 sets out provisions relating to the establishment and administration of Te Tōpuni Kōkōrangi: Schedule 3 sets out further requirements for preparing and approving He Kawa Ora for Te Papa-Kura-o-Taranaki: Schedule 4 deals with how decisions are to be made on applications for concessions and other authorisations relevant to interests in Te Whenua Taurikura: Schedule 5 provides for how certain legislation is to be consequentially amended.