Liberties

'The Last Chapter?' by Steven D. Smith in (2014) 41 Pepperdine Law Review 903 comments

In November 2011, Stanford law professor (and former federal judge) Michael McConnell debated Harvard law professor Noah Feldman at Georgetown University on the topic “What’s So Special about Religious Freedom?” McConnell reminded the audience that the First Amendment singles out religion for special protection, and he argued that this treatment continues to be appropriate today. For his part, Feldman conceded the first half of McConnell’s argument: the First Amendment provides, and framers like Madison supposed, that religious freedom is deserving of special protection. But that supposition is no longer justified, Feldman argued. The Constitution’s special treatment of religion was based on historical conditions and theological commitments that happened to prevail at the founding. But conditions are different now, and in a modern liberal state it is unacceptable for government to act on theological rationales.

Feldman’s position did not appear to be driven by any animosity toward religion. Nor is any such animosity evident in his other work. Religious belief and expression should still be protected under other constitutional provisions, he insisted, such as freedom of speech. But there is no longer any warrant for singling out religious freedom as a special constitutional commitment.

Ordinary citizens might suppose that Feldman’s position was radical, perhaps calculated to provoke (as academic positions sometimes are). Is it really plausible that we would repudiate what many have long regarded as “the first freedom”– one that, by Feldman’s own admission the framers favored and gave pride of place in the Bill of Rights? Far from being audacious, though, in an academic environment Feldman’s argument might more accurately be characterized as ho-hum. In recent years scholars and theorists have increasingly gravitated to this conclusion in one form or another. A few of these scholars are pretty plainly disdainful of religion, but others (including Feldman) are not; indeed, some think they are acting and arguing in the interest of religion.

Thus Douglas Laycock, himself a leading scholar and litigator of religious freedom, reports that “scholars from all points on the spectrum now question whether there is any modern justification for religious liberty.” Nor is it only academics who are skeptical of special protection for religious freedom. The Obama Administration’s positions in the much discussed “contraception mandate” controversy and in the less prominent but (for present purposes) more pointed “ministerial exception” case strongly suggest that the Administration is similarly disinclined to favor special legal protection for religion. In general, the administration argued in the ministerial exception case, churches and religious associations should enjoy the same freedom of association that nonreligious associations have—no less, but also no more. There should be no special constitutional protection covering the right of churches to select ministers according to their own faith-based criteria and judgments. (We will look more closely at the “ministerial exception” case in due course.)

Professor Laycock, himself a vigorous proponent of religious liberty, worries that “[f]or the first time in nearly 300 years, important forces in American society are questioning the free exercise of religion in principle– suggesting that free exercise of religion may be a bad idea, or at least, a right to be minimized.” Once again, though, the argument usually is not that religion or religious freedom should be suppressed – as they were in, say, the Soviet Union, or in the Mexico depicted in Graham Greene’s The Power and the Glory — but only that there is no justification for singling out freedom of religion for special recognition. Think of it this way: In the American constitutional tradition, we sometimes talk generically about “freedom” or “liberty” — and this generic liberty receives minimal constitutional protection — but we also have a list of particular and especially cherished freedoms that enjoy special judicial and political solicitude: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and so forth. Traditionally, freedom of religion has been on that list — even at the top of the list. Challenging this tradition, Feldman and like-minded thinkers want to take freedom of religion off the VIP list, so to speak, while allowing that religious people and groups should receive the same protection that others receive under the other freedoms.

If this proposal comes to be accepted, the outcome would be in one sense the last chapter of the story of American religious freedom. The story would then tell how, building on themes that had developed over the past two millennia, founding-era Americans conceived of religious freedom as deserving of respect and legal protection, how this commitment informed commitments to other rights, such as freedom of speech, and how those other rights eventually displaced the ancestral commitment to freedom of religion. It is not self-evident that this denouement would be tragic: after all, ancestors are pretty much progenitors who are remembered, even revered, but who are not around anymore. So it would be in this case. Religious freedom RIP.

And yet there are those, like McConnell and Laycock (and also — full disclosure— myself) who are not enthused about ending the story now or in this way, and who would view such an ending as premature and deeply unfortunate. Those who are not ready for the story to end seemingly include (for now, in alternate terms anyway) the Justices of the Supreme Court.

Thus the Court rejected the Obama Administration’s Feldman-like position in the ministerial exception case — and not in a 5-4 conservative/liberal split, but unanimously, and emphatically. So it seems the story is not necessarily winding down.

And indeed, one might ask: If the founders favored a special commitment to religious freedom, expressly writing it into the Constitution, and if many Americans still favor that position, why amend constitutional jurisprudence to strike freedom of religion from the list of specially preferred liberties? It is a formidable question, I think, and it will reappear from time to time in this chapter. But it is also a real question, not a rhetorical one: it is not a question calculated to intimidate opponents (like Feldman) into embarrassed submission. On the contrary.

So in this chapter we will look at two large-scale historic developments that have combined to make religious freedom a vulnerable constitutional commitment. Edward Gibbon famously argued that the Roman Empire fell as a result of one internal development (the rise of Christianity) and one more external development (the incursions of the so-called “barbarians”). In an analogous way, the regime of religious freedom is currently in jeopardy through the convergence of one development that is partly internal to the tradition of religious freedom and a different development that is mostly independent of that tradition. The internal development is the erosion of the rationales for religious freedom by a secularism that, ironically, can be seen as an implication or at least an offshoot of religious freedom itself. The mostly independent development is the impressive advance of a formidable political and cultural movement that marches under the banner of “equality” and that bids to become a new national orthodoxy with features reminiscent of those that characterized state-supported orthodoxies during the centuries of Christendom.

Factoids

Lies, damned lies and marketers' statistics? UK telco O2 has announced that "Brits are a Nation of Eavesdroppers", claiming -

• Over 80 per cent of Brits admit to eavesdropping on other people’s phone conversations while on a train or platform 
• Nearly 9 in 10 think that people have no reservations while talking on the phone in public 
•  60 per cent of Brits think people would benefit from some kind of etiquette guide when it comes to talking on the phone whilst using public transport 

Never fear, the oh so generous O2 has produced what it describes as "the very first public transport mobile phone etiquette guide to help Brits use their phone considerately".

The research - of course no specifics about size of the population or other potential bias supposedly reveals -

we are a nation of eavesdroppers, with 84 per cent of people admitting to listening in on their fellow commuters’ phone conversations while on a train or platform.

The discussions taking place can be so intriguing that six out of ten (59 per cent) Brits would rather eavesdrop than listen to music or read.

Furthermore, 10 per cent of respondents have actually missed their stop because they were so engrossed in what they were overhearing. ...

The survey revealed that callers often unwittingly reveal some of the most intimate details of their lives to perfect strangers around them – everything from the details of their salary through to their personal lives.

Top 5 phone conversations most likely to be overheard

• Discussing work gossip or salary (48 per cent) 

• Closing an important business deal (35 per cent) 

• Talking about hospital or doctor results (23 per cent) 

• Relationship breakups (17 per cent) 

• Intimate details of their personal life (13 per cent)

As a result of overhearing something they shouldn’t have, almost three quarters (74 per cent) of people admitted to sharing the conversation with their friends, with 40 per cent going as far as publishing a social media post revealing the details.

So, 33% of Britons on public transport are posting on SNS about what they overhead? Really? Posting once in a lifetime, once a year, once a day?

O2 goes to claim that

Despite this, a small but significant attention-seeking 6 per cent of people actually like the idea that other people can overhear their conversations.

Only 14 per cent decide to ask their caller to call them back to avoid having to talk loudly on the train, while three quarters (75 per cent) decide to take the call regardless.

Consequently, 88 per cent of the British public believe that people have no shame while talking on the phone, and 3 out of 5 Brits (60 per cent) believe we would benefit from some form of etiquette being put in place regarding phone use on public transport.

88% of people think that their peers have no shame but 80% exempt themselves from that shame? Will they be guided by that "very first public transport mobile phone etiquette guide to help Brits use their phone considerately"?

Where is this coming from? "O2 commissioned the survey to help the UK use apps such as TU Go, which enables O2 customers to text, call and check your voicemail over Wi-Fi without the need for phone signal, in a considerate and responsible manner". Just another marketing exercise.

Cameras

Yet another illicit domestic surveillance incident, with the Age reporting that Ballarat Magistrates Court has heard that a man allegedly concealed surveillance cameras in skirting boards at his ex-wife's home and attached a GPS tracker to her car.

 The man was accused of installing a camera in the bathroom and  bedroom at the family home, reportedly telling police "it was for his own safety". The Court was told that the surveillance cameras were  linked to a VCR recording device. 

The cameras were found in June 2014 after the former couple's daughter found a listening device in the house, a discovery that allegedly caused an argument that ended the relationship. The recording device was placed in the house to hear what the victim was "saying to people about him behind his back". The man admitted ownership of the GPS tracking device, allegedly discovered after the victim took her car into an electrical specialist in Ballarat,  but denied attaching it to the victim's car. The Age reports that an envelope with five GPS coordinates of five locations recently visited by the woman, allegedly in the man's handwriting, was also found.

The man is charged with recklessly causing injury, stalking, use of a listening device and contravening an interim family violence intervention order.

He allegedly entered the house on June 12 and attacked the woman in her bedroom, jumped on her chest and tried to tape her mouth.  The court heard that after a short struggle the man allegedly tried to place a pillow over the woman's face before she broke free and calmed the accused down, forcing him to leave the property.

Magistrate  Holzer commented that the "bizarre, sophisticated and protracted" allegations, if proven, could potentially attract a jail term.

Vulnerability

'Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government' by Nina A. Kohn in (2014) 26(1) Yale Journal of Law & Feminism comments -

In a political climate in which the role of government is actively being questioned, Martha Fineman’s “vulnerability theory” is rapidly gaining momentum as a justification for expansive social welfare laws. Despite the growing body of literature applying vulnerability theory to a broad range of legal problems, scholars have yet to critically explore the theory’s limitations. This article fills that void by analyzing the theory’s utility and scope. It shows how examining vulnerability theory through the lens of old-age policy reveals the theory’s limited prescriptive value and its tendency — as currently articulated — to promote unduly paternalistic policies. It then describes how vulnerability theory could be refined to provide greater respect for individual liberty and to enhance its value as a tool for defining the appropriate role of government. Finally, it argues that, although Fineman’s theory of vulnerability does not indicate how to allocate resources among vulnerable individuals, vulnerability may nevertheless be a useful construct around which to design social policy.

Kohn states -

The government’s role in allocating resources among the populace has long been a source of contention. Questions are raised not only about how the government redistributes resources, but also, more fundamentally, about the extent to which and even whether government should do so. The United States Supreme Court and mainstream political discourse have historically answered such questions by suggesting that the scope of the government’s responsibility is limited: although the government may choose to redistribute resources through taxation and the creation of social welfare policies, the government is generally not obligated to do so. Rather, the government’s primary social welfare obligation is to protect individuals against wrongful discrimination and ensure that all individuals are treated alike in the eyes of the law.

This “formal equality” approach to understanding the role of government has been heavily criticized for failing to achieve substantive equality. The primary thrust of this critique has been that the formal equality approach fails to achieve substantive equality: when pre-existing advantages and disadvantages of social groups differ, merely applying the same legal rules to those groups often produces unequal results.

Like treatment under the law therefore does not guarantee social equality.

Out of this debate, Martha Fineman’s “vulnerability theory” is emerging as an influential and powerful new critique of formal equality and as an alternative framework for understanding substantive equality. It proposes that vulnerability is inherent to the human condition, and that governments therefore have a responsibility to respond affirmatively to that vulnerability by ensuring that all people have equal access to the societal institutions that distribute resources. The theory thus provides an alternative basis for defining the role of government and a justification for expansive social welfare policies.

Vulnerability theory is rapidly gaining acceptance within the legal academy as progressively-oriented scholars rush to apply the theory to a broad range of legal problems. The theory is attractive not only because it helps explain the basis for broad social welfare policies, but also because it suggests that vulnerability can replace group identity (e.g., race, gender, poverty) as a basis for targeting social policy. At a time when legal scholars are increasingly questioning the law’s use of identity-based criteria such as gender and race, in part because of greater appreciation for the impact of “intersectionality” (i.e., the way an individual’s multiple identities interact to shape his or her experiences), Fineman’s claim of creating a “post-identity” approach is provocative and attractive.11 Despite an emerging body of literature applying vulnerability theory, the theory has just begun to be substantively critiqued by other scholars.12 Moreover, to date, no scholars other than Fineman have attempted (at least in published form) to refine it. As a result, current applications of the theory tend to proceed in a manner that is less critical and less nuanced than might otherwise be possible.

This article attempts to fill that void by examining the theory’s utility and limitations and then suggesting how the theory could be modified to enhance its value as an intellectual underpinning for social welfare law. Specifically, it argues that vulnerability theory provides a helpful framework for understanding social responsibility and the role of the state. However, it also shows how Fineman’s own work applying vulnerability theory to old-age policy reveals the theory’s limitations as a prescriptive tool and its tendency—at least as currently articulated—to promote excessively paternalistic laws and policies. Finally, it argues that, although Fineman’s theory of vulnerability does not indicate how to allocate resources among vulnerable individuals, vulnerability may nevertheless be a viable basis for policy intervention.

The article proceeds with five major parts. Parts II and III describe vulnerability theory and its value to those designing social policy. Part IV discusses how Fineman’s application of vulnerability theory to old-age policy reveals the underlying limitations of vulnerability theory, and raises serious concerns about its potential impact. Part V suggests how vulnerability theory could be refined in order to remedy its current tendency to promote unduly paternalistic laws, and to enhance its value as a framework for defining the role of government. Finally, Part VI explores how a vulnerability-based approach to social policy might serve as an alternative to an identity-based approach

SCADA

Not quite cybergeddon.

The NSW Auditor-General's Office has produced a report on Security of critical IT infrastructure, examining whether the systems used to operate and manage critical infrastructure in the Sydney metropolitan water supply system and the NSW traffic signal network are secure and, if systems go down, whether there are sound recovery arrangements in place.

The report notes

Systems used to control critical infrastructure are known as process control systems or operational technology. Previously, these types of systems were isolated from other networks and the security of these systems depended largely on restricting access to their physical infrastructure. However, in the last two decades their interconnectivity with other networks, for operational purposes, has increased the risk of unauthorised users obtaining access to these systems and disrupting reliable operation of critical infrastructure.

To illustrate, in June 2010, an anti-virus security company reported the first detection of malicious software (malware) that attacks process control systems. The malware is called Stuxnet and it has been found on hundreds of systems internationally. In August 2013, a security research company in the United States created a decoy water utility system; it experienced 74 security attacks from more than 16 countries. Ten of the attacks were deemed to have the ability to take complete control of the mock system. In 2000, a disgruntled former employee compromised a control system and caused the dumping of 800,000 litres of untreated sewage into waterways in Maroochy Shire, Queensland.

It goes on the conclude

Roads and Maritime Services 

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) have deployed many controls to protect traffic management systems. However the systems in place to manage traffic signals are not as secure as they should be. Established controls are only partially effective in detecting and preventing incidents and are unlikely to support the goal of a timely response to limit impacts to traffic management.

A range of risks are adequately managed, however, there are other risks where control improvements are recommended. For example, there is a potential for unauthorised access to sensitive information and systems that could result in traffic disruptions, and even accidents in one particular section of the road network.

Management has designed and tested an emergency response capability for the Traffic Management Centre (TMC) for some disaster scenarios and has recently identified and initiated improvements for responding to IT related disasters.

Until the IT disaster recovery site is fully commissioned, a disaster involving the main data centre would have traffic controllers operating on a regional basis without the benefit of intervention from the TMC in managing traffic coordination, which means higher congestion is likely in the short term.

Sydney Water Corporation

Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) is well equipped to deal with the impact of security incidents. It has developed and tested procedures for security incidents and major outages and has provided relevant training to staff. It has established a back-up operations centre which is tested on a regular basis, and also established redundant systems such as additional control units and backup power supplies for selected key facilities.

Whilst SWC’s response capability is good, it is limited by its inability to detect all security breaches. Controls to prevent and detect breaches are not as effective as they could be. Controls have been implemented to limit a number of risks, however, the protection environment requires improvement to defend against targeted attacks. For example, any malicious activity on most of the corporate network is blocked from accessing the process control system environment but control level access is possible from selected low security workstations on the corporate network.

Key recommendations are

RMS and TFNSW, by July 2015, should:

1. Extend the Information Security Management System (ISMS) to oversee the security of the complete traffic management environment, including operational level risks.

2. Develop a comprehensive security plan for the whole environment.

3. Improve the identification, assessment and recording of security risks.

4. Improve logging and monitoring of security related events regarding access to applications, operating systems and network access.

5. Improve security zoning to better protect the system from potential threats.

 SWC, by July 2015, should:

6. Extend the Information Security Management System (ISMS) to oversee the security of the process control environment, including the management of operational level risks and controls.

7. Develop a comprehensive security plan for the whole environment (building on SWC’s SCADA security policy).

8. Document and undertake additional risk mitigation to reduce risks to acceptable levels, and clearly document what levels of risk can be tolerated.

9. Obtain current documentary evidence to indicate that the risks associated with the security of process control systems at Prospect Treatment Plant are mitigated to acceptable levels.

10. Determine the appropriate controls to limit unauthorised access to computer accounts including SCADA application software and computer operating systems.

Other government agencies with critical infrastructure should seek to determine whether there are lessons from this audit that may apply to their area of government services/business. This includes ensuring: 

11. The organisation’s ISMS covers business processes and technology including systems used to control infrastructure.

12. Compliance with the NSW Government Digital Information Security Policy (DISP). For State Owned Corporations, this requirement should be incorporated into their Statements of Corporate Intent.

13. A comprehensive security plan is maintained for technical systems supporting critical government services where the system requires additional protection above the baseline controls utilised for the remainder of the agency’s systems.

14. Management receives and acts on information security/availability risk assessments that define the current and target risk levels.

 The Office of Finance and Services, NSW Treasury, should:

15. Ensure lessons learnt in this audit are communicated to all relevant government agencies

16. Undertake regular reviews to ensure that relevant agencies are complying with the Digital Information Security Policy and that the policy is meeting its objectives.

AI and Personhood

'Machine Minds: Frontiers in Legal Consciousness' by Evan Joseph Zimmerman argues that

Research is at the point where we might have to confront the possibility of what computer scientists call “strong AI” in the coming years. A strong AI could be intelligent by most reasonable definitions of the word, and possibly have a subjective experience. It stands to reason that we must seriously consider whether such a machine should have its will recognized, protected, and enabled. That is to say, such a sufficiently advanced machine might be said to carry responsibilities, and rights, on its own, as a legal person.

This question is wrapped up in significant philosophical and technical questions of acceptability and feasibility. The novelty of this Essay is that it provides a positive reason to grant such rights with a basis in technical law, along with a concrete definition and justification for personhood. The organizing principle this Essay arrives at is: Personhood exists to protect conscious individuals from suffering and allow them exercise their wills, subject to their intelligence.

This Essay examines several documents across a variety of fields, as well as historical records. Examples such as corporate law, personhood law, slavery law, and standing law demonstrate that the story of person-hood is a history of grappling with what is fully conscious, and how to allow these consciousness’s to exercise their will and avoid pain. However, because law was made by and for humans, by examining the law surrounding animal welfare and humans in a vegetative state, one finds that the law privileges humanity. Hence, our laws imply that a computer, if it is intelligent enough, should be considered conscious; however, our laws as they are would arbitrarily not provide it personhood simply because it is not made of flesh and blood.

Zimmerman states -

In one episode of that ever-prescient television show, Star Trek: The Next Generation, the android Data’s right to refuse to be dismantled for research purposes is questioned. Data is an android that is one-of-a-kind in its (the crew calls it “his”) intelligence, and is treated by his crew as a living being with feelings. Despite this, a scientist wants to dissect Data despite the fact that this could destroy data’s personality, which causes Data to refuse the procedure. In response, the scientist claims that as a robot, Data is Star Fleet’s property, and thus has no rights to refuse any procedure. A court case ensues, in which one side appeals to, essentially, a form of species solipsism; organic beings are known to be life, and as Data is an android, he is thus clearly not alive. The opposing side argues that Data has feelings, and that his consciousness is as difficult to prove as any other person’s. At stake is the potential destruction of Data’s soul, which is not likely to survive the procedure. The argument, of course, is over whether such a thing even exists.

The complexity of computers, particularly with their potential to become intelligent, raises profound legal questions. Although computers may not become brilliant overnight, several observers of the field consider such a thing a serious possibility, and technology has shown itself to be unpredictable. Despite the quip that artificial intelligence is always ten years away, a breakthrough may be just around the corner, and the law should be prepared. It is extremely important that this matter is treated wisely, carefully, and with an eye on the emerging future moving at the speed of light and imagination. Proper care depends on our ability to abstract beyond our own experiences, as a being need not think like us for it to be said that it is thinking. It also requires knowledge—though not necessarily expertise!—of difficult technical issues.

Those in software circles are fond of saying that “Technology moves fast, and the law moves slow.” The likes Europe’s Luddites litter the 19th century. Yet, in the 21st, it seems impossible to avoid the fact that machines outfitted with advanced computational power form an increasingly large part of our lives and are changing more quickly than ever: in homes, in vehicles, at work, in the air. Many in the technology industry believe that machines have changed in front of our eyes as the law seems to have hardly noticed. Often the technologies are so complicated that the regulations, may seem to our tech observer as built on an incomplete or faulty understanding, inadequate, cumbersome, outdated upon pronouncement, and obstructionist in the reality. Whether or not this is true, outside of a few articles in the past two decades, the literature has mostly not addressed the issue of artificial intelligence and personhood.

Any such judgment(s) will have to hinge on consciousness. The point of the law is not to protect tools. It is to ensure the protection and allow the full life of those who can feel, even if, like for animals, in degrees, and even if those feelings are alien yet almost inconceivably compared to our own. A different type of being need not think the same way as a human being for it to be said that it is thinking, and consequently to be deserving of privileges and protections. Surely it carries obligations and liabilities; so, why not rights? Consequently, consciousness is the key factor in determining the legal status of intelligent computers. A recognition of this requires a willingness to admit that there are serious philosophical questions that the law may not be able to address, but be forced to consider anyways. It is important to address these issues long before we have to scramble to piece together a last-minute solution, while we have years to consider the question. These are very pressing concerns that address the core of our legal system, and by highlighting and thinking about them now, perhaps for the first time in a long time, the law can be prepared for when technology arrives.

Unlike the previous literature, instead of negating reasons for denying personhood, it discusses an affirmative reason to grant it, and instead of approaching it philosophically, this Essay considers the technical legal standpoint. I examine case law and influential historical conceptions of personhood, including corporate personhood, and liability to determine that personhood is intended to privilege consciousness, as it has a will and can feel pain. By examining case law and statute for such issues as slavery, women’s suffrage and education, corporate personhood, vegetative state humans, children, and animals, to conclude that personhood exists in a tiered form, even if sometimes we dare not speak its name. Furthermore, popular historical justification is used to suggest that the basis for such stratification is the level of intelligence, i.e., the complexity and depth of the subjective experience of, the persons in question.

In Section I, this Essay frames the issue for future scholars considering such cases by explaining how these sophisticated machines work with a technology primer. In Section II, this Essay provides working legal definitions for terms like “intelligence” and “consciousness” that a court could use without forcing it to take a position in perhaps the most significant and ancient debate in human society, that is, how to assess consciousness. In Section III, this Essay examines the historical record, statutes, and case law to assess what personhood really is, and then whether machines should be granted personhood, and contrasts my conclusion with the existing literature. The main thrust of this Essay is ultimately to answer this question: Could a machine be a legal person, and is the law currently able to withstand the intellectual challenge of an intelligent machine?

Psychological Disability

The Australian Bureau of Statistics has released a report on data from the 2012 ABS Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers (SDAC).

The SDAC is

designed to measure the prevalence of disability in Australia, as well as inform around the socio-economic characteristics and the need for support by people with disability. 

It deals with psychological disability in terms of people who reported:

• A nervous or emotional condition which causes restrictions in everyday activities that has lasted, or is expected to last for six months or more; or 
• A mental illness for which help or supervision is required that has lasted, or is expected to last for six months or more; or 
• A brain injury, including stroke, which results in a mental illness or nervous and emotional condition which causes restrictions in everyday activities. 

The ABS indicates that key results were -

• Of all people with any type of disability, 18.5% had a psychological disability. 
• 3.4% of Australians (770,500 people) reported having a psychological disability, with similar rates for men and women. This was an increase from 2.8% (606,000 people) in 2009. 
• For women, the prevalence of psychological disability increased steadily with age, with a rate of one in every five women aged 85 years and over (20.2%). Although prevalence generally increased with age, there was a significant decrease for women aged 65-74 years (3.3%) whose rate was on par with women aged 35-44 years (2.9%). 
• For men, there was a higher prevalence (compared with women) in the younger age groups, with boys aged 0-14 years three times as likely as girls of a similar age to have a psychological disability (2.2% compared with 0.7%), attributed to the higher prevalence of autism in males in this age group. Overall, the prevalence for men also increased with age.
• Of those people with a psychological disability,  four in ten reported profound levels of core activity limitation, and a further two in ten reported severe core activity limitations. 
• A wide range of long-term health conditions and impairments coexist with psychological disability -  the majority of people who reported a psychological disability reported having one or more other disabling conditions. 
• 96% of people with psychological disability reported needing assistance or experiencing difficulty in at least one of the broad activity areas of everyday life. 
• 1.8% of people with psychological disability who reported needing assistance did not have their need met at all.
• There is lower participation in education and employment for people with psychological disability, compared with those with no disability.