Senator Ludwig commented that
Many of our electoral laws originate from a time before computers or modern communications. It's important we take stock of the laws so we have a system that makes sense for the 21st Century.Issues for public comment include:
The options raised in this paper aim to deal with the changes occurring in our electoral environment, including changes in population and technology and opportunities for streamlining laws between the Commonwealth and the states and territories.
* current arrangements for elections in Australia;The 255 page paper includes a discussion of identity verification issues, for example commenting
* the definition of who is entitled to vote in Australian elections, including suggestions that the threshhold for voting should be lowered from 18 years to 16 years;
* maintenance of the electoral roll and close of roll provisions;
* arrangements for casting of votes at elections; and
* processes for the counting of votes and determination of election results.
7.42 To protect the integrity of the electoral roll, measures may need to be put into place to verify the information received from other government sources. The information received by many government agencies is based on an address for contact rather than a place of residence. Given the importance of ascertaining an accurate place of residence for determining the electoral division in which a person is entitled to vote, there may be a risk that an incorrect residential address may be provided to the AEC; processes would need to be implemented to address this risk. The information provided to the AEC would also need to be sufficiently comprehensive to enable the AEC to ascertain a person's entitlement to be added to the electoral roll; for example, it would need to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, and provide accurate date of birth information.It goes on to note that
7.43 The importance of identity to the integrity of the electoral roll would also require that data used for the purposes of establishing identity was obtained from agencies with sufficiently rigorous processes for establishing, verifying and maintaining proof of identity. For example, the AEC has noted that to receive benefits and services from Centrelink, clients are required to provide documents which establish a client’s identity and establish how it is used, and a physical signature. Motor authorities often require documents to support a person's claim of identity and a photograph and/or signature. Processes to obtain signatures for the AEC's records could be established if necessary.
7.67 Options for 'proof of identity' (POI) requirements might be considered in the context of the extent to which they enable universality and integrity. That is, it might be argued that POI provisions should not put people on the roll who are not qualified to enrol, but neither should they prevent people from enrolling who are qualified to enrol. In considering the current situation and the options for automatic and online enrolment discussed above, various options for POI can be examined.The report accordingly identifies options regarding POI -
7.68 The AEC advises that under the existing arrangements more than 90% of electors provide a driver’s licence number on their enrolment form as proof of their identity ('tier 1'); approximately 8% show an approved document to an authorised person ('tier 2'); and approximately 2% have their enrolment form countersigned by two electors who are enrolled, who have known the person for at least one month ('tier 3').
• The tier 1 provisions could be expanded to allow for other identity documents to be used as an alternative to a driver's licence, without compromising the integrity of the roll. Documents which are broadly available, and may meet appropriate identity integrity requirements, could include Australian passports (regardless of whether a person is resident in Australia or overseas), Medicare cards or proof of age cards.
• Tiers 2 and 3 could be simplified into a single tier which requires only that the form be witnessed by another person on the electoral roll, which would effectively be a return (for those who do not have a driver's licence) to the scheme which applied prior to the introduction of the current POI regime.
• 'Once only' POI could be considered, which would require that proof of identity be substantiated when a person initially enrols to vote, but would not apply the same POI requirements when a person updates their enrolment details. This would still meet the primary aim of the POI system, which is to verify through data external to the AEC that electors exist. It could also align enrolment processes with the practices of other organisations which require POI, such as banks. Once only POI could be beneficial if a system of automatic update or online update of enrolment details were adopted.
• The current provisions could be repealed, reverting to the previous process in which no documentary evidence of identity would be required to enrol or re-enrol.
