Just because the microscopic world governed by the laws of quantum mechanics has some counter-intuitive features does not provide a license for people to insert mystical ideas in order to satisfy their metaphysical desires.Or, from my perspective, by all means relish natural law - there is indeed much to be said for figures such as Aquinas and Finnis - but do not claim that mysticism is "hard science".
Mumbo jumbo such as reincarnation, remote healing, precognition, the A Field and other claims recently derided in this blog are in my opinion not "hard science", unless "hard science" is read down to mean mere hypothesis and is accompanied by a value system that - however sincerely - seems to confuse correlation with causation, conflates hypothesis with proof and disregards alternative explanations, especially legally credible explanations for supposed quantum phenomena such as reincarnation or psychic messages from the dead.
It is difficult to see an Australian QC getting very far in the High Court with claims that people actually do get messages from the dead via valve radios, that mass meditation changes the weather, that those attuned with the infinite can levitate, or that the brains of true believers have indeed become "quantum wave transceivers". I continue to wonder what most senior lawyers would say in response to suggestions that 'recollections' from people who have been fed LSD by their physician authoritatively prove the truth of reincarnation. "Communication with entities that are no longer living in the familiar form in this world but are alive nonetheless"? Not very persuasive once you escape from the wacky world of quantum mysticism and other pseudo-science. (A "health warning" regarding that horrid, horrid scepticism is here.)
In my opinion there is much to be said for rationality, modesty (for example a wariness about a totalising 'Theory of Everything' such as that espoused by Ervin Laszlo and presented by some fans as fact rather than a deliciously zany hypothesis) and clarity.
Professor Cornel du Toit of the Research Institute for Theology & Religion, University of South Africa, in a (2009) 35(2) Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae (2009) review of Robert Park's snappy Superstition: belief in the age of science Princeton University Press, 2008), comments that -
Some readers may find it a sobering book, while others may have a sense of self-humiliation. Very few of us can describe ourselves as free from all superstition or some form of wishful thinking. But what harm is there in superstition? More than that, why is superstition so popular and pertinacious? Why does it make us feel good? Unfortunately, these are philosophical and sociological questions that exact physical scientists never ask. To them, as to the author of this book, it is purely a matter of upholding "pure" science in the face of quasi science – in itself no doubt an honourable enterprise, but to my mind too narrow.Aaron Rappaport of Hastings College of the Law at the University of California meanwhile offers a provocative - and to my mind largely unpersuasive - 68 page paper on 'Conceptual Analysis in Science and Law'.
The question of the possible harm that superstition entails is important, however. Alternative medicine, for example, robs people who pay fortunes to obtain a placebo effect. Superstition is certainly exploited to make big money. It is a multi-billion dollar project. In the case of religion it nurtures the belief that the things that befall people are punishments for sin or lessons that they need to learn. This inevitably determines the "victim's" relationships with others, usually to his or her detriment. Superstition is not always innocent. It is part of social systems of exclusion and inclusion, acceptance and rejection. It influences the respect/disrespect accorded to others and, of course, has a definite influence on various human rights issues. Underlying superstition is also the issue of fundamentalism – a topic necessarily associated with the operation of superstition if one is to understand it. Understanding the function and role of superstition in our lives deepens our self-understanding.
He suggests that -
Ever since HLA Hart's magisterial work, The Concept of Law, conceptual analysis has been viewed as the dominant method of doing jurisprudence. Far less appreciated is the fact that it is also a central tool in the field of cognitive science. That may be surprising to some, given the differences in these disciplines’ mission: Legal theorists struggle with abstract questions about the “nature” of Law and Justice; cognitive scientists explore the workings of the human mind. If cognitive scientists and legal philosophers are doing different things when they do conceptual analysis, how do they differ?Rappaport goes on to indicate that his paper -
offers the first full-scale comparison of the way conceptual analysis is used in these two fields. The paper’s conclusion is provocative and striking. It argues that cognitive scientists employ an appealing and coherent form of this key methodology, while legal theorists employ an approach that might be fairly characterized as a methodological muddle. The implication for legal theory is profound: If legal theory hopes to be a relevant and coherent discipline, it must re-imagine its methodological commitments and seek out a more appealing set of tools and methods. The concluding section of the paper grapples with that challenge, offering some thoughts on how jurisprudence can be placed on a more solid and appealing foundation.For another view of the Hartian enterprise we might turn to Simpson's comments noted here or Mark Burton's perceptively irreverent article 'The Song Remains The Same: The Search for Interpretive Constraint and Rhetoric of Legal Theory in Hart and Hutchinson' in (1997) 20(2) UNSW Law Review 407-442.
