In Robin George Le Strange Meakin v BBC, Paul Smith, Celador Productions, Martin Scott [2010] EWHC 2065(Ch) the English High Court (Chancery Division) has held that copyright could exist in a TV game show format.
In this instance summary judgment was granted to the defendants, with the Court finding that on the facts there was no derivation of the defendants' work from the claimant's and that the defendants had not taken a substantial part.
Robin Meakin claimed that game formats he had developed (eg 'Cash Call Millions Live') had been used by the defendants to develop and produce a series of programs ('Come and have a go if you think you are smart enough') that infringed his copyright and were based on confidential information that he had disclosed. He sought damages of up to £20 million.
Unauthorised exploitation of 'pitches' seems to be a perennial complaint, judging by interviews with independent program developers quoted in Georgiana Born's Uncertain Vision: Birt, Dyke and the Reinvention of the BBC (Secker and Warburg, 2004). They have featured in cases such as Green v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand [1989] RPC 700. Works on rights in program formats include'Format Rights: Opportunity Knocks' by Smith in (1991) 3 Entertainment Law Review 63, S Lane 'Format Rights in Television Shows: Law and Legislative Process' by Shelly Lane in (1992) 13(1) Statute Law Review (1992) 24, 'A Case for the Federal Protection of Television Formats: Testing the Limit of 'Expression'' by Frank Fine in (1985) 17 Pacific Law Journal 49 and 'Free to Air? Legal Protection for TV Program Formats' (John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 513, 2010) by Neta-li Gottlieb.
Meakin communicated his proposal to Celador in November 2002 and to the BBC in September 2003. His game show format involved contestants at home using phones (alongside studio contestants) to win prizes on a live TV quiz though cumulative scores. Perhaps not the most original of concepts, albeit I'm unqualified to assess on the basis that Ii avoid game shows the way that vampires avoid holy water and bright sunlight. Inconveniently, competitor CHG communicated a similar proposal to the BBC in May 2002, the same month that the Beeb broadcast Test the Nation - a quiz program which featured participation via studio contestants and contestants at home via SMS and the net.
In considering the claims Arnold J (no relation) indicated that the Court was prepared to assume that there may be literary and dramatic copyright in the works in question, at least for the purpose of a summary judgment application.
In finding for the defendants the Court unsurprisingly held that Meakin had to show a real prospect of success regarding reproduction of a substantial part and derivation, concluding that Meakin's evidence of derivation concerned alleged similarities: "common features that are really in the nature of very general abstract similarities" that were evident in earlier works and were insufficient to give rise to an inference of copying. They were "no more than general ideas of a fairly high level or abstraction and, moreover, commonplace ideas in the field of television game show formats". The Court referred somewhat tartly to Meakin's claims embodying "a series of conspiracy theories" and that there was no realistic prospect of him successfully establishing that a substantial part of the expression of his proposals had been taken.
For a non-specialist much of the fun lies in the corporate names: Cat and Mouse Ltd ("a specialist IT supplier"), Chatterbox Partnership, Zeal Television, Talent Television ...
There is amusement of a bleaker sort in two recent 'sovereign citizen' disputes: Van den Hoorn v Ellis [2010] QDC 451 and Wollongong City Council v Dr Masood Falamaki [2010] NSWLEC 66.
In Van den Hoorn the Court states -
This is an appeal by a person who has described himself in the Notice of Appeal filed 18 June 2010 as “Sovereign Freeman JOHAN”, an agent and a “Freeman on the Land” appearing on behalf of “J. H. VAN DEN HOORN”. The appeal, which I have taken to be against both conviction and sentence – although that is not immediately clear from the Notice of Appeal – concerns convictions made on 16 June 2010 at the Magistrates Court at Cleveland pursuant to four charges brought concerning: using on a road a vehicle that was not a registered vehicle; driving an uninsured vehicle on a road; without reasonable excuse, using on a road a vehicle whilst a number plate attached to it was cancelled; and driving a motor vehicle on a road while not being at that time the holder of a driver licence.
The appellant, who appeared in person, while conceding that I could address him as Mr Van den Hoorn, asserted, as he had done in the Magistrates Court, that he was merely the “owner of the created fictions known as JOHAN HENDRICK VAN DEN HOORN and JOHN HENRY VAN DEN HOORN, being created fictions fraudulently owned and controlled by legal fictions” which included “australia inc” and “queensland inc”, as well as “queensland transport inc” and “numerous other incorperations and deciets”: see Exhibit 10 (filed in the lower court at trial).
I have, as Greenwood J did in Skyring v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1526 at [5], closely examined the evidence, the appellant’s written submissions, the content of the constitutional and other legal points that he made, as well as his oral submissions concerning his arrest by one of the investigating police officers, subsequent “injustice” and other “exceptional” circumstances.
Constitutional notices
In conformity with the approach adopted by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Kobylski v Queensland Police Service [2007] QCA 50, since there is vexation in the appellant’s pursuit of unmeritorious constitutional arguments, it is appropriate that no notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cwth) were given in relation to this appeal. As noted by Mullins J, with whom McMurdo P and Keane JA expressly agreed, s 78B operates “only when the circumstances in which it applies appear to the Court to be present and not because a party asserts that those circumstances are present”: at [10], relying on earlier cited authority. In Kobylski, reliance had been placed upon, among other laws and sources, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Magna Carta , the Bill of Rights, and the Bible: at [6].
Grounds of appeal
The grounds of appeal stated in the Notice of Appeal require reference to an attached list, while expressly stating in the Notice that they include jurisdiction, standing, authorisation, false imprisonment and errors in law. The attached list, of 7 pages, contains mainly grounds that are unintelligible without reference to other documentation (to which I will presently refer). It includes asserted reasons for the purpose of justifying a general grant of leave in circumstances where no such grant of leave is necessary, although special grounds for leave to adduce new evidence would be necessary: see s 223(2) of the Justices Act 1886. Lastly, for present purposes, it states that, on the hearing, the appellant intends to rely upon various documents including “a trial notice”, “documentations posted on the web” and, after noting “this free man cannot swear” in reference to an affidavit to be sworn (but which was not), refers to various passages from the New Testament (King James version).
The additional documents mentioned earlier, were, first, some 18 pages contained in a document entitled Certificate of Readiness, filed 29 September 2010, and, earlier, and secondly, an Outline of Argument (although otherwise described) the appellant had filed on 1 July 2010. That document comprises 245 pages. It provided the basis for the appellant’s oral submissions before me.
Because I will deal with, mainly, the Outline of Argument, the document which comprises the Certificate of Readiness has not been the subject of much further consideration. This is not only because it is essentially incomprehensible in isolation but also because the much more detailed Outline of Argument appears to better encompass the notion of what is attempted to be described in the former document.
Respondent’s contentions
Although it may be seen to be somewhat unusual to address the respondent’s arguments at such an early stage, besides contending that the learned Magistrate did not fall into error and that the decision reached was open on the evidence and not contrary to law, it states – importantly for the present consideration - that the appellant’s Outline of Argument is “incomprehensible” and shows no reason why any statute in Australia should be constitutionally invalid (specifically, with respect to the reference to the Magna Carta , contending that this was an area of “settled law”).Further
Insofar as it is discernible, particularly from the Outline of Argument of the appellant, the constitutional arguments are centred on what has been termed an “assumed” jurisdiction “over a free man” because the magistrate “lacked lawful standing to judge a free man” who was “in good standing”. The apparent basis for this lack of jurisdiction is that the Constitution (Cwth) accords sole relevant legislative powers to the Federal Government or, alternatively, that any adverse (to the appellant) precedential authority, if it previously has existed, ended when the Constitution (Qld) was rewritten in 2001. Additionally, there was the puzzling contention that, before the lower court, the appellant was assumed to be a “corperation [sic]” by the fact of the court accepting the alleged “capitalisation of (his) family name” which so led to him being deemed to be a “corporative fiction of limited liability” when he was “a living/breathing soul ... of full liability”. Its “liability” relevance, if any, seems to be limited to the statutory requirement of mandatory third party personal injury insurance for motor vehicles. The “person” aspect will be canvassed when discussing the relevant Queensland legislation.
This constitutional argument is a variant on those constitutional arguments that have been soundly rejected in previous appellate and other decisions. The variation is the bringing into play of the Constitution of Queensland 2001, which commenced on 6 June 2002. Before turning to its effect, if any, on the arguments previously rejected, it is necessary to turn to the consideration of those earlier arguments.
Concerning Magna Carta , the Queensland Court of Appeal decision in Carnes v Essenberg; Lewis v Essenberg [1999] QCA 339 obliges me to conclude that it is “completely inaccurate” to say that colonial parliaments, or indeed the Parliament of Westminster, could not alter, modify or even repeal the provisions of centuries old legislation: see Chesterman J (as he then was) at p 4. Accordingly, after the Australian Courts Act 1828, enacted by the Imperial Parliament, became part of the law of Queensland upon its separate establishment in 1859, the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, also passed by the Imperial Parliament, removed doubts about the extent to which Australian Colonial Parliaments could alter imperial legislation as it applied to the colonies: at p 5. This had the consequence that no colonial law was void on the ground that it was repugnant to the fundamental principles of English law: also p 5. As Chesterman J goes on to note, the matter is made even more explicit by s 3(2) of the Australia Act 1986, which provides that no law and no provision of any law made after it by the Parliament of a State shall be void or inoperative on a ground that it is repugnant to the laws of England or to the provisions of an existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom: also p 5.
Thus, as is clearly concluded in Carnes (supra), both Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights are not untouchable and unalterable sources of private rights or immunities. As for the Bible, it never has had civil effect in this State. This has the result that the legislation in Queensland which was the subject of consideration by the learned Magistrate at first instance, as well as the Justices Act 1886, are Acts that have both abrogated the rights of citizens to do as they wish and have changed the manner in which prosecutions may be brought. Thus, where, as here, the appellant was charged with offences for which he may be summarily convicted by a Magistrates Court [s 3(4) of The Criminal Code], he had no right to a trial by jury, being subject to that specific legislation that was referred to in the Reasons for Judgment at first instance.
As for the authority of Queensland Courts, the Queensland Court of Appeal decision in Clampett v Hill and Ors [2007] QCA 394 binds me to conclude that, since the respective Queensland Courts were duly constituted by the Queensland Parliament when it passed their constituting legislation, the commissions given to judicial officers, under the hand of the Governor, are valid because the authority of the Governor has been unaffected adversely by Acts such as the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld): at [14]. As the Court there unanimously remarked, any such argument so agitated had been previously rejected in Sharples v Arnison and Ors [2001] QCA 518: also at [14].
Hence, it is now appropriate to consider the effect, if any, on the above conclusions, of the Constitution of Queensland 2001. As stated in s 3 of that legislation, the Act declares, consolidates and modernises the Constitution of Queensland, though noting that certain earlier Constitutional provisions, because of their special additional procedures - including approval by the majority of electors at a referendum - that such may require were they to be so consolidated, in addition to ss 30 and 40 of the Constitution Act 1867, were not consolidated.
It is difficult, of course, to fully comprehend what particular argument was presented on this front. The appellant pointed to the fact that the Act does not include the word “Act” in its title, that a referendum had not been held and that the Act refers to the Queen or King “for the time being”: see, for instance, s 4. Further, it is elsewhere contended that it has “never been ratified by HRH”. Necessarily, if it is contended – which is not clear – that this particular Act was invalid (for one, or some, or all of those reasons), it is difficult to see how it could possibly affect the continuance of the application of the conclusions just canvassed as outlined in those Court of Appeal decisions. Beyond that, to the extent to which the “grounds of appeal” refer to the issue, they appear to assert that the very enactment of the Constitution (Qld) had the effect that any authority that the learned Magistrate had then lapsed. But it is impossible to see how that could possibly occur because of that particular Act. As is clear in merely stating the three arguments presented, none of them have the effect of invalidating the Constitution of Queensland 2001. First, there is no requirement for this legislation to have the word “Act” in its “title”. Secondly, the reason that a referendum was not held is that it was not required (as is obvious from the Note to s 3). Thirdly, the reference to the Queen or King “for the time being” does not offend any legal principle, or at least one that has any effect on the validity of this particular legislation. The mere fact that the earlier constitutional Act in 1867 did not recite such words is irrelevant. As for “ratification”, even if it was the case that the present Queen were personally to have a role in enacting present Queensland legislation, there was no evidence led concerning any relevant failure by Her or Her Governor.
Lastly, to the extent to which any issue was raised that there are no valid Queensland Acts because the Constitution (Cwth) does not allow such acts to have validity, in a case which specifically refers to the Constitution of Queensland 2001, the Queensland Court of Appeal in Barton v Beattie and Ors [2010] QCA 100 concluded that the Queensland Parliament is empowered to make “laws for the peace, welfare and good government” of Queensland, as provided for by s 8 of the Constitution of Queensland 2001, s 2 of the Constitution Act 1867, and s 107 of the Constitution (Cwth): at [9]. As the Court of Appeal there stated, that legislative power undoubtedly comprehends legislation which amends existing State legislation concerning, there, the system of local government: also at [9]. Analogously, such legislative power undoubtedly comprehends the legislation in question here.
In Wollongong City Council v Dr Masood Falamaki [2010] NSWLEC 66 the Court refers to claims by Falamaki's representative David-Wynn Miller.
Miller, referred to in another of the Falamaki judgments, is an exponent of sovereign citizenship, aka OPCA. In the current judgment the Court states -
[35] I invited Mr Miller to focus the submission that he would give on 15 April upon the rule that Dr Falamaki invoked, namely Pt 36 r 15 and the cases that inform the operation of such a rule. It is appropriate for reasons which I will next make apparent, that I quote from the transcript both my observation to Mr Miller and his response.
“HIS HONOUR: At 2 o’clock tomorrow the arguments will conclude, the hearing will conclude within that two hours and can I respectfully remind you that your focus would and should be upon the particular rule that authorises or rather provides to me a discretion to set aside perfected orders. There are a large number of decided cases that relate to that.
MILLER: Conclusionary law not based on now time jurisdiction under rules of evidence are void for one thing. Two, I’ll give you a little secret. Every word that starts in the English language with a vowel, a, e, i, o and u and followed by two consonants is a word that means no contract. If you’re arguing a condition, a negative condition which can’t be proved under a seal which says syntax would be used in its correct format then the technology of writing will be syntaxed accordingly. The words will be identified for their true syntax and the value of that word will be brought to this court so if you have a rule our syntax can tell you exactly what it means frontwards and backwards because the order of operations of syntax are one and the same planet- wide in all five thousand languages, just like as a track multiplying and dividing for the operations of numbers. It is universal communication issues. Closure has to be on the table here for everything under maritime law of commerce because a piece of paper is a vessel in a sea of space and vessels must give closure for their movement between point A and point B and I’m a past master and as a plenipotentiary judge of 75,000 hours of training and 30 years I know how to dissect all this. There hasn’t been anything put in front of me in 30 years that I haven’t been able to dissect to its syntax.
[36] Mr Miller appeared for Dr Falamaki at the resumed hearing of the matter on 15 April. He proceeded for almost one and a half hours to make submissions in terms similar to those that I have quoted in the preceding paragraph. When, after listening to his philosophical discussion as to grammar and syntax, I sought to direct him to the orders which were the subject of Dr Falamaki’s application, the following exchange took place:
“HIS HONOUR: This case is not about sentence structure and syntax. It’s about orders which I’m sure Dr Falamaki can read and understand.
MILLER: Actually, he doesn’t.
HIS HONOUR: I see.
MILLER: Because when he looks up the definition of the words, he can’t find them. They don’t exist and there was no closure put on the documents for the modification of language and if you don’t show your closure, what the volition is of the content of the moving party under maritime law, that document is moot.
HIS HONOUR: We’re not dealing with maritime law here.
MILLER: That’s a maritime vessel. It’s got a stamp on it. It’s a vessel. All paper is a vessel in a sea of space and therefore it has to fly a vessel. It has to pay its postage to go between point A and point B. The bailiff over here is actually the letter carrier to transport the letter from myself to you. The postage has been paid on my letter, to go to you so that you could mark it as evidence. The postage has been paid for me to bring it from the street. Dr Falamaki has also signed it. To transport the vessel from the street to the port of the court. Have it filed and filed stamped. The clerk of the court file stamps the document and received the vessel into the port of the court and signs their name across the received stamp and I also cancel that stamp as well and then it goes to you for adjudication.
I know the procedures of how vessels flow through the court but that shortcut, everybody likes to take the shortcut and skip over those things. I don’t take shortcuts, I follow all the rules and regulations that are correct to move that vessel as correct evidence into this court. You’ve received it as correct evidence, it was carried to you by the bailiff or a tipstaff. So the documents are delivered to you and now it’s your choice to make a determination and if you have a problem with what syntax is and how it works on the back of the cover of my book we have a complete outline that took six years to research as to the accuracy of how syntax functions so that the information that I bring to this court, I can back it up and you have your styles manual that Australia publishes, we have a styles manual that the United States government, that China, Russia, all the other countries of the world have their style manuals to communicate under a standard of styles and a standard of syntax and mathematical procedures otherwise we wouldn’t have communications.
When those styles are violated and the modifications are allowed to go unchecked we have chaos and so I brought the mathematical interface on April 6 1988 when I broke the code and I was able to mathematically certify it is what has created this book to advertise how the math interface of language now functions in now time. Not only that all judges worldwide and attorneys worldwide have been asked to try and defeat this and find out if this is a lie and they’ve all come back to certify the fact. This is required study at Scottsdale Arizona and Reno Nevada at the judge institutes. I have been teaching there for 15 years now. Universities that teach law for lawyers are required to study this book so that they understand what syntax means. We’re in a changing world. You can call my government, you can call the United States Supreme Court, your judge can call your High Court down here, you don’t think they haven’t contacted Washington and talked with the Supreme Court to compare notes as to what’s going on and how big this things has gotten and how many cases are involved with this worldwide? I invite you to do it, take my passport number, run my passport and check the 38 pages of information, credentials I have on that as to my travels around the world to educate.
When I was invited to this case I looked at the paperwork and I said, this is all wrong, it’s impossible for a case to run as long as it has but because that nothing has been said, I said show me the first piece of paper, the first day of trial and when that first day of trial was handed to me I said I syntaxed it and said it’s in a box, it’s written in adverb/verb, there’s no correct sentence structure, therefore it’s mute. If you build a case on a lie, it’s a lie. From what I understand you’ve just been brought in as a judge to sit on this case after all the other judges have recused themselves because they know it’s a fact. I don’t know what your position is or what the politics are going on behind the scenes here but I can pretty well put the pieces together, I’ve been around the court system for 30 years.
Craig J's comment is
[37] Regrettably, I did not find the submissions helpful in addressing Dr Falamaki’s claim.
