Disability

'Participating in Political and Public Life: A Challenge for We Persons with Sensory Disabilities' by Ronald McCallum in 36(2) Alternative Law Journal (2011) 80 examines the right of persons with sensory disabilities (ie who are blind or deaf) to vote and to serve on juries in Australia. The article argues that the right is enshrined in article 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

After noting use of electronic voting in Australia, with particular reference to the new I-Vote system in New South Wales, McCallum discusses jury service. The article comments that -

Article 29 of the CRPD does not mention jury service, possibly because in many countries juries are unknown. However, paragraph B of Article 29 says in part that countries must:

Promote actively an environment in which persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in the conduct of public affairs, without discrimination and on an equal basis with others, and encourage their participation in public affairs.

In Australia, the practice in all jurisdictions appears to be that blind and deaf persons are automatically excluded from jury service. In New South Wales, for example, section 14 of the Jury Act 1977 requires the Sheriff to delete from the supplementary jury roll persons who the Sheriff determines are ineligible to serve. Item 12 of schedule 2 of the Act provides that the following classes of persons are ineligible for jury service: "A person who is unable, because of sickness, infirmity or disability, to discharge the duties of a juror." Pursuant to this item, the practice is to automatically exclude blind and deaf persons from jury service.

McCallum notes that the 2006 report of the NSW Law Reform Commission recommended

that we should be enabled to sit, provided that trial judges are given a discretion to exclude persons in appropriate situations. Furthermore, it was recommended that interpreters and stenographers who assist blind or deaf jurors, after swearing an appropriate oath, could go into the jury room to render further assistance. In relation to the judicial discretion to dismiss a juror, it would be confined to situations where even with reasonable accommodation the person cannot perform the functions of a juror in the circumstances of the trial. For example, in my view it would be appropriate to exclude a blind person from a jury in a murder trial where the primary evidence related specifically to eyesight identification of the accused.

Regrettably McCallum does not provide a substantive examination of principles and practicalities beyond reference to the Law Reform Commission's recommendations.