'Maturity' by Jonathan Todres in 48
Houston Law Review (2012) 1105-1163
comments that -
Across numerous areas of the law — including family law, criminal law, labor law, health law, and other fields — when children are involved, maturity determinations are pivotal to outcomes. Upon reaching maturity, an individual has access to a range of rights not previously available and is expected to fulfill certain duties. Despite the central importance of maturity, the law’s approach to it has been to consider the concept in a piecemeal and issue-specific fashion. The result is a legal construct of maturity that is anything but consistent or coherent. For example, every state has a minimum age below which a child is considered not mature enough to consent to sex. However, if money is involved, more than forty states deem that child mature enough to have consented to sex for money and be charged with the crime of prostitution (even if the money is paid to a pimp and the child never sees it). This Article seeks to undertake a holistic assessment of the law’s approach to maturity.
Markers of maturity in the law frequently occur at different points in time. An examination of key indicators of maturity under the law reveals that the law is inconsistent, not only across issues but also within the same issues. Children are deemed mature enough to participate in the polity (e.g., vote) at a different age from when they are deemed mature enough to exercise independent economic power (e.g., work), control their own bodies (e.g., engage in consensual sex), or assume adult social responsibilities (e.g., drink alcohol in public places).
In short, the law provides little clear guidance on how maturity should be understood and treated. Recent research on brain development and the work of cognitive psychologists provide some answers. To date, however, a significant consideration has been largely overlooked: cultural conceptions of maturity. Thus, this Article seeks to incorporate cultural perspectives on maturity into the dialogue. More broadly, this Article aims to bring some clarity to the issue of maturity and examine whether cultural practices can inform the legal, policy, and moral questions in the law’s approach to maturity.
Todres argues that -
There are many lessons to be drawn from the experiences of cultural approaches to maturity. Societies rely heavily on coming-of-age ceremonies and rituals to mark a young personís transition to maturity. This public component of coming of age serves important signaling functions to both the adolescent and the community. In many cultures, maturity is achieved significantly earlier than under law, suggesting that with proper guidance and structure, adolescents can and do exercise rights responsibly and take on adult-like responsibilities. On this latter point, cultural approaches conflict with what recent brain research suggestsóthat is, that full development occurs only later. A possible explanation for the disconnect is that maturity is a cultural concept and thus, in certain communities, youth are groomed to take on rights and responsibilities associated with maturity even though their brains might still be developing. This brings to the forefront one theme in particular from cultural conceptions of maturity that might offer a potential starting point for developing a better approach to maturity under the law. In cultural practices related to maturity, the community is tasked with significant responsibilities to ensure that when a child reaches the right age or the threshold of his or her coming-of-age ceremony, the family and community have prepared and equipped that child with all that is needed to evidence maturity, realize his or her rights, and contribute in a meaningful way to his or her community.
Much of that preparation comes naturally through parenting, schooling, and other aspects of cultural life. However, this different approach raises the issue whether the law could foster better-prepared young adults through a graduated, supportive approach to maturity. Such an approach would be consistent with research on adolescence and scholarsí understanding that maturity occurs on a continuum. As identified in prior sections of this Article, the law adopts a variant on this approach, for example, with driverís license requirements and employment. GDL requirements, however, emerge more out of an effort to limit the driving rights of young persons. Employment law in nonagricultural settings might offer a better model, as it allows children to enter the workforce for limited periods, while preserving their educational opportunities and long-term prospects.
Other models need to be explored. Some scholars might suggest that a parallel exists with recently adopted laws that impose criminal liability on parents for the actions of children. Such an approach does not address the experience of minors with the law, but only imposes additional criminal sanctions on other members of the family. Rather than seeking to use the law only as a stick with youth (e.g., criminal liability at young ages, or for parents), better models need to be developed that offer youth and their families a carrot, incentivizing more responsible behaviors by children and creating opportunities for youth to engage in meaningful activities that develop their capacities.
"[L]essons in accountability benefit young offenders ..." The concern is that the law governing childrenís rights and responsibilities today focuses primarily on teaching accountability through criminal sanctions and restricting rights, while offering few, if any, positive incentives for responsible behaviors. Instead, youth might respond better in certain circumstances if the legal framework also provided an opportunity for them to earn expanded rights by achieving certain benchmarks or acting in a responsible manner with respect to particular issues. If an adolescent demonstrates she can exercise economic power responsibly, why not gradually introduce limited rights so she can further develop the ability to exert independent economic power in a responsible manner? Some years ago, the National Basketball Association started mandating a life-skills course for rookies because they realized that top rookies were signing multi-million dollar contracts and yet had received little guidance on even the most basic aspects of financial management and other essential life skills. They are not the only ones. If adults want youth to achieve maturity, adults need to ensure that they do what is needed to foster that successfully, and legal frameworks are part of that equation.
States could develop a graduated scale for participation in the polity. One could envision creating positive incentives for early voting rights in local elections (including perhaps a graduated approach that would eventually grant responsible youth the right to vote in all elections). Following the cultural coming-of-age preparation approach, the general voting age could remain eighteen, but a young person could vote earlier if he or she had demonstrated readiness, or maturity, to do so, perhaps by completing particular coursework and meeting other relevant criteria. In fact, a member of parliament in New Zealand proffered such an approach in 2007. The proposed bill sought to allow youth sixteen years of age or older to vote while introducing a mandatory civics education into the school curriculum. As the member of parliament who proposed the bill explained, 'Lowering the voting age and teaching them civics can help young New Zealanders get on track to being better informed, more engaged citizens'. Citing adverse reaction to her idea (from adults), she abandoned the bill about a month later.
Drawing on the approach used in cultural coming-of-age practices, law could be developed to positively foster an adolescentís capacity to exercise independent political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights. Such efforts would restore equilibrium in the balance between rights and duties of adolescents and other children and in the positive and negative incentives and messages adults give to them. Moreover, as adolescence is a period marked by instability, providing more positive structures might help youth in finding more meaning in their lives during this challenging transitional phase of life. Ultimately, improvements in this area would have benefits for the broader community. Effectively incentivizing positive youth behavior could reduce the incidence of youth crime, drunk-driving accidents, and other negative outcomes that we currently seek to control largely, if not exclusively, through criminal sanction.
Todres concludes that -
Maturity determinations are central to the lives of children. The lawís current approach to maturity is inconsistent both within and across issues affecting children, ranging from political and economic participation, to criminal justice, to family rights and bodily integrity. Moreover, legal conceptions of maturity fit awkwardly, and sometimes conflict, with cultural norms related to maturity. Today, the piecemeal approach to maturity has created a framework for young people whereby they are deemed immature persons with respect to most rights while simultaneously often being held to account for wrongdoing often as adults. That should be reexamined.
"[T]he long term interests of adolescents converge with the interests of society." These convergent interests of adolescents and society suggest the need for a more holistic approach to maturity under the law. In developing a more cohesive construction of maturity, lawmakers should also look to cultural conceptions of maturity and include them in the discourse on maturity. Doing so might help foster the development of law that better prepares youth for adulthood, by allowing them to find meaningful ways to exercise their rights, assume responsibilities, and contribute to their communities. It might also help create a more sensible legal framework on maturity, one of the defining milestones in the life of every individual.
