As the process of creation in the age of digital media becomes more fluid, one pervasive theme has been the desire for attribution: from the creator’s perspective, to receive credit for what one does (and to have credit not falsely attributed) and from the audience’s perspective, to understand the source of material with which one engages. But our norms of attribution reflect some inconsistencies in defining the relationship among name, identity, and authenticity. A blog post by a writer identified only by a pseudonym may prove to be very influential in the court of public opinion, while the use of anonymous sources by established journalists may be viewed as unethical. Supreme Court jurisprudence both touts the benefits of anonymity and decries it as a barrier to the free flow of information. In the commercial realm, consumers file suit when the memoir they have purchased turns out to be largely fiction but seem far less concerned when a company emerges from a public relations disaster with a new name, leaving its old one to the dustbin of history.
This conflicted response may be further complicated by the fact that we think about names in a very personal way, as a core part of our identity. But names are not, strictly speaking, our identity - they are merely symbols of our identity that denote a particular set of characteristics at a particular time. Indeed, as naming theory tells us, the denotative function of a name is what makes a word a name at all. It is for this reason that an individual or a corporation can adopt a new name without being accused of fraud and why a company can sell products under more than one trademark.
Naming law - whether the law of personal names or the law of trademarks - tends to reflect these principles of naming theory. In large part, the law focuses on a name or mark’s denotative effect, interfering only when confusion or changes to the essential nature of the referent renders the name’s identifying function uncertain. And, indeed, in the instances when the law is inconsistent with naming theory - attempting to regulate the connotations associated with names rather than their denotative function - we might question whether it is achieving an appropriate goal. Confining naming law to this important but limited function achieves a balance between respecting the autonomy of individuals and entities to choose the names with which they represent themselves to the public and ensuring that such choices do not significantly frustrate the flow of information that allows the public to engage in decision making.
In 2010 I noted Williamson v Hodgson in the WA Supreme Court, featuring pseudolegal claims. In an unrelated judgment last month Williamson has again unsuccessfully advanced such claims.
The Court in Maxwell (also known as Hartley Robert Williamson) v Bruse [2012] WASC 12 states
[18] The appellant asserts that at no time did he acknowledge or admit that he was a person named Harley Robert Williamson, or, indeed, a person by any name at all. He did not enter a plea to the charge and never accepted that he was the person with whom Mr Street had dealt. This issue was dealt with by the magistrate in his reasons.
[19] At the commencement of the trial, leave was granted to the prosecution to amend the name on the prosecution notice from Harley Robert Williamson to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell. In support of this change, the prosecution tendered a number of documents which established that the appellant had been born on 18 September 1946 and had been registered with the name Robert Paul Bailey. He changed his name by licence on 30 November 2000 to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell. He subsequently changed his name again on 13 January 2006 to Harley Robert Williamson. A further licence document was produced showing that he changed his name back to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell on 1 May 2007.
[20] The appellant was identified by a number of the witnesses, including, most significantly, Mr Street. Other witnesses identified the appellant in court as the person that they had dealt with and who they knew either as Harley Williamson, Tumeke Maxwell or Mack. Unsurprisingly, the magistrate had little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the person before the court, however he described himself, was the person who had committed the offence. His findings in that regard are unimpeachable.
[21] Notwithstanding the amendment to the prosecution notice made at the trial, the appellant commenced these proceedings in the name of Harley Robert Williamson. On the basis of the evidence that was before the magistrate, it would seem that his legal name, at least at that time, was Tumeke Robbie Maxwell. There is nothing before this court to show that he has reverted to the name of Harley Williamson. In the circumstances, the appellant's name should be amended to Tumeke Robbie Maxwell, also known as Harley Robert Williamson. There can be no doubt on the evidence that they are one and the same person.
The 'corporate being'
[22] The appellant raised another argument which sought to draw some distinction between the natural person who was before the court and some other legal entity that utilised the name Harley Robert Williamson. He referred to this other entity as a 'corporate being' or an 'admiralty vessel'. These arguments were manifestly absurd and should not be dignified with detailed consideration. The magistrate came to the inevitable conclusion that the appellant was a natural person and was not capable of being a registered corporation. There was simply no basis for suggesting that the appellant was not liable for his acts because he was acting in some other capacity.
Claim of right
[23] The appellant claimed that he had a security or lien over the vehicle. His basis for this claim was an undated document which he had prepared and signed in or around August 2008. That document was not signed by Mr Street. Mr Street did remember being shown the document but said that he did not take it seriously and thought that it 'seemed to be a bit ludicrous' (ts 28).
[24] The document purported to be authorised by the legal authorities of something referred to as the 'principality of Pentecost'. This, apparently, is a reference to the appellant's property in Toodyay. The appellant's claims to have created a separate foreign state by seceding from Australia have been raised and dealt with in previous proceedings: Williamson v Hodgson [2010] WASC 95. It is unnecessary to deal with them again here other than to say they are entirely without merit and afford no valid basis for claiming that the laws of Western Australia have no application to the appellant. Nor does the document provide lawful authority to retain the vehicle or any basis for an honest belief in a right to do so.
