The delicious 'Death and Taxes and Zombies' by Adam Chodorow in (2012)
Iowa Law Review comments that -
The U.S. stands on the precipice of a financial disaster, and Congress has done nothing but bicker. Of course, I refer to the coming day when the undead walk the earth, feasting on the living. A zombie apocalypse will create an urgent need for significant government revenues to protect the living, while at the same time rendering a large portion of the taxpaying public dead or undead. The government’s failure to anticipate or plan for this eventuality could cripple its ability to respond effectively, putting us all at risk.
This article fills a glaring gap in the academic literature by examining how the estate and income tax laws apply to the undead. Beginning with the critical question of whether the undead should be considered dead for estate tax purposes, the article continues on to address income tax issues the undead are likely to face. In addition to zombies, the article also considers how estate and income tax laws should apply to vampires and ghosts. Given the difficulties identified herein of applying existing tax law to the undead, new legislation may be warranted. However, any new legislation is certain to raise its own set of problems. The point here is not to identify the appropriate approach. Rather, it is to goad Congress and the IRS into action before it is too late.
In
Kryziak v McDonagh [2012] WASC 270 the Court dealt with a 'sovereign citizen', who in a previous matter claimed not to have a name -
By charge PE 26728 of 2011 Tadeusz-Edmund Krysiak was charged with the offence of driving without authority on 15 May 2011 a Mazda sedan, registered number 1DPC-205 on Eastbourne Crescent, Nollamara, whilst not being a person authorised by pt IV A of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) and whose authority to drive at the time was suspended, contrary to s 49(1)(a) and s 49(3)(c) of the Road Traffic Act 1974.
Before the hearing in the Magistrates Court the applicant had filed by post a document entitled Notice of Reservation of Rights, which can only be described as an extravagant and disjointed polemic asserting that he reserved his exclusive and ancient rights, including a right to jury trial, asserting that all statutes should be in harmony with the common law, and asserting that he could best be described as an authorised agent of the entity 'TadeuszEdmund Krysiak' with limited liability. He asserted that the court had no jurisdiction and that the charge should be dismissed as invalid and that there was evidence of inherent fraud ab initio. This notice asserted a series of discredited and exploded fallacies about legal and constitutional rights see Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASC 14; Glew v White [2012] WASCA 138 and Hedley v Spivey [2012] WASCA 116 and, on any view, was a misguided, illinformed and preposterous collection of meaningless protests.
His case came on for hearing before his Honour, Mr G N Calder in the Magistrates Court at Perth on 26 July 2011. When the case was called a person, presumably the applicant, came forward but upon being asked to identify himself he refused, preferring instead to make submissions to the effect that he reserved all his rights and again refusing to identify himself, saying, 'I reserve all my rights and I am best described as the authorisation to the accused with limited liability'. His Honour refused to allow this person to speak further unless and until he clearly identified himself and directed him to sit in the back of the court. Again, but with some protest, the person who had come forward did so. Then his Honour, having observed that there was no person in the court who had identified themselves as having the name Krysiak and being the accused, directed that the case should proceed in the absence of the accused under s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), it having been established that notice to the accused had been given under s 75.
At this point, his Honour announced, obviously speaking to the person at the back of the court, that if he were Tadeusz-Edmund Krysiak and identified himself as that person he could participate in the proceedings but, if not, he would not be allowed to participate and the matter would be dealt with under s 55. At this point, Mr Krysiak identified himself and when asked who he was said, 'I am commonly known as TadeuszEdmund Krysiak' and when asked if that was his name he said, 'I don't have a name, sorry, your Honour' and at that point his Honour decided to proceed under s 55 as previously proposed. ...
Further
In both appeals the applicant asserts that the learned magistrate erred by contravening s 115 of the Constitution by making an order for a monetary penalty in Australian dollars knowing that there was no gold or silver coin available as legal tender in payment of a debt and, further, by issuing a monetary penalty in terms of Australian dollars, being Australian currency, payment of which cannot be made as it would breach the Currency Act 1965 (Cth), as there is no currency in circulation above $2 and no valid promissory notes available to discharge debt (see grounds 6 and 7 of SJA 1083 of 2011 and grounds 11 and 12 in SJA 1085 of 2011).
These are, possibly, the most egregious of all of the applicant's contentions. Arguments to this effect were roundly rejected in Re Skyrings Application (No 2) (1985) 58 ALR 629; (1985) 59 ALJR 561. In that case, Deane J said that there had been:
... a submission that the combined effect of a number of sections of the Constitution is to erect a barrier against the issue by the Commonwealth of paper money as legal tender. The sections of the Constitution upon which particular reliance is placed are ss 51(xii), (xvi) and (xvi) and 115. Mr Skyring also referred to ss 105 and 105A. Additionally, reference was made to the provisions of the Currency Act 1965 (Cth) dealing with coins. The argument, if accepted, would result in the invalidity of s 36(1) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) which provides that 'Australian notes are a legal tender throughout Australia'.
Similar arguments were also addressed by the Supreme Court of Queensland in Lohe v Gunter [2003] QSC 150 where Holmes J said:
[8] The respondent argued that there was no means by which he might lawfully pay fines or costs because of the failure of the Crown to provide currency as prescribed by the Currency Act 1965, s 16 of that which provides for coinage as legal tender. There was, he said, no legal sanction for the issue of paper money; and there was a lack of correspondence between the face value of coins and the price at which they may be bought using paper money. (He referred to a particular example of a set of gold coins being bought for an amount far in excess of its face value.)
[9] As to the first part of the respondent’s argument, Deane J in Re Skyring’s Application (No 2) reached the conclusion that there was no constitutional bar against the issue of paper money as legal tender, a view which has been confirmed subsequently on a number of occasions. [Re Skyring (1994) 68 ALJR 618; Skyring v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (Unreported, Court of Appeal No 176/1993, 12 May 1944); Owen v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Unreported, Full Court of the Federal Court, Qd 132, 1995. As to the second aspect, in Cusack v Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1012; [2002] ATC 4676, Cooper J considered an argument which turned around the difference between money as a unit of value and money as currency by which obligations are discharged. There was, he said, a presumption given statutory effect in provisions of the Currency Act and the Reserve Bank Act 1959 that parties contracted and parliament legislated with reference to the nominal value of money as expressed by legal tender; currency when used as legal tender was valued at its face value without regard to its intrinsic worth. The value of coins departed from their face value only when they were not being used as currency and were regarded simply as a commodity. The weight of authority is thus against the respondent’s first point, and the reasoning of Cooper J is persuasive against the second.
