The 34 page 'Aiding Surveillance: An Exploration of How Development and Humanitarian Aid Initiatives are Enabling Surveillance in Developing Countries' by Gus Hosein and Carly Nyst
argues that
Information technology transfer is increasingly a crucial element of development and humanitarian aid initiatives. Social protection programmes are incorporating digitized Management Information Systems and electronic transfers, registration and electoral systems are deploying biometric technologies, the proliferation of mobile phones is facilitating access to increased amounts of data, and technologies are being transferred to support security and rule of law efforts. Many of these programmes and technologies involve the surveillance of individuals, groups, and entire populations. The collection and use of personal information in these development and aid initiatives is without precedent, and subject to few legal safeguards. In this report we show that as development and humanitarian donors and agencies rush to adopt new technologies that facilitate surveillance, they may be creating and supporting systems that pose serious threats to individuals’ human rights, particularly their right to privacy.
The authors comment that
The
deployment
of
surveillance
technologies
by
development
actors,
foreign
aid
donors
and
humanitarian
organisations
is
conducted
in
the
complete
absence
of
any
public
debate
or
deliberation.
The
development
discourse
rarely
considers
public
opinion
of
the
target
populations
when
approving
aid
programmes.
Even
the
availability
of
countervailing
perspectives
is
surprisingly
low.
Seminal
strategy
documents
like
the
UN
Office
for
Humanitarian
Affairs’
Humanitarianism
in
a
Networked
Age or
the
UN
High-Level
Panel
on
the
Post-2015
Development
Agenda’s
A
New
Global
Partnership:
Eradicate
Poverty
and
Transfer
Economies
through
Sustainable
Development, pay
scant
attention
to
the
potential
impact
of
the
adoption
of
new
technologies
or
data
analysis
techniques
on
individuals’
privacy.
In
sum,
there
are
four
major
problems
arising
from
the
increased
use
of
development
aid
to
advance
surveillance
in
developing
countries.
First,
technologies
are
being
deployed
that
raise
significant
concerns
with
regards
to
privacy
and
other
human
rights.
Second,
such
technologies
may
not
necessarily
be
appropriate
for
achieving
development
goals
or
may
have
undesirable
side
effects.
Third,
these
technologies
are
already
seen
as
legally
and
technologically
problematic
in
more
developed
countries.
Fourth,
these
technologies
are
deployed
in
the
absence
of
relevant
and
adequate
legal
frameworks,
in
contravention
to
international
human
rights
and
national
constitutional
requirements.
Too
often
these
are
the
missing
dynamics
in
modern
development
discourse
around
the
deployment
of
technological
solutions.
They conclude -
The
recent
landmark
UN
report,
Humanitarian
in
a
Networked
Age,
recommended
that
organisations
should
protect
individuals
through
the
adoption
of
“Do
No
Harm”
standards
for
the
ethical
use
of
new
forms
of
data,
including
protocols
for
protecting
privacy,
and
develop
frameworks
to
hold
practitioners
responsible
for
adherence
to
ethical
and
technical
standards.
It
is
the
contention
of
this
paper
that
a
far
more
active
approach
is
needed
to
ensure
that
the
adoption
of
new
technologies
in
development
and
humanitarian
initiatives
do
not
imperil,
but
rather
promote,
the
human
rights
of
those
they
purport
to
benefit.
The
cases
and
examples
presented
in
this
report
show
that
technologies
are
indeed
a
key
component
of
modern
development
and
humanitarian
policies
and
programmes,
and
will
continue
to
inform
development
policy
as
technologies
improve
and
enable
development
actors
to
not
only
be
more
effective
but
also
to
monitor
and
assess
their
own
effectiveness.
With
increased
pressures
on
aid
agencies
to
improve
their
monitoring
and
evaluations
and
to
ensure
the
efficient
disbursement
of
aid
funds,
there
will
be
ever
increasing
pressure
to
collect
data
and
replace
expensive
human
resources
with
cheaper
technological
solutions.
Yet
it
is
also
clear
from
this
review
that
increasingly
the
technologies
and
techniques
adopted
by
bilateral
donors
and
international
funding
agencies
are
often
supporting
surveillance
and
undermining
individual
liberties.
They
are
achieving
development
at
the
cost
of
human
rights,
particularly
the
right
to
privacy
and
protection
of
personal
information.
The
technologies
identified
in
this
report
not
only
facilitate
surveillance
far
beyond
that
which
would
be
acceptable
and
lawful
in
more
developed
countries,
but
they
do
so
in
contexts
in
which
adequate
legal
safeguards
are
all
but
absent.
Introducing
technologies
to
solve
complex
social
problems
in
resource-poor
environments
without
strong
democratic
institutions
is
thus
an
exercise
fraught
with
new
types
of
risks.
It
is
essential
that
the
development
and
humanitarian
community
has
informed
and
realistic
debates
about
whether
a
technological
system
should
be
developed,
and
deployed
in
a
particular
context.
This
debate
is
not
about
anti-technology.
Technologies
undoubtedly
have
the
potential
to
dramatically
improve
the
provision
of
development
and
humanitarian
aid
and
to
empower
populations.
The
expectations
that
are
placed
on
technologies
to
solve
problems,
however,
need
to
be
significantly
circumscribed,
and
the
potential
negative
implications
of
technologies
considered.
Biometric
identification
systems,
for
example,
may
assist
in
aid
disbursement,
but
if
they
also
wrongly
exclude
whole
categories
of
people,
then
the
objectives
of
the
original
development
intervention
have
not
been
achieved.
Border
surveillance
and
communications
surveillance
systems
may
help
a
government
improve
national
security,
but
are
equally
likely
to
enable
the
surveillance
of
human
rights
defenders,
political,
immigrants,
and
other
groups.
Beyond
an
ethical
debate
about
whether
surveillance
technologies
should
or
should
not
be
employed,
there
are
extensive
legal
debates
about
the
compatibility
of
such
technologies
programmes
with
national,
regional
and
international
human
rights
instruments.
Privacy
is
of
course
recognized
at
both
the
international
and
regional levels
as
a
fundamental
human
right.
The
right
to
privacy
is
enshrined
by
the
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
(Art.
12),
the
International
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
Rights
(art.
17);
the
International
Convention
on
the
Protection
of
All
Migrant
Workers
and
Members
of
Their
Families
(art.
14);
and
the
Convention
on
the
Rights
of
the
Child
(art.
16).
At
regional
level
privacy
is
protected
by
the
African
Charter
on
Rights
of
the
Child
(art.
10),
the
American
Convention
on
Human
Rights
(art.
11),
the
Arab
Charter
on
Human
Rights
(art.17).
The
recently
adopted
ASEAN
Human
Rights
Declaration
also
explicitly
applies
the
right
to
privacy
to
personal
data
(Art.
21).
Many
more
countries
have
legislation
providing
for
data
protection:
at
last
count
there
are
at
least
100
countries
with
data
protection
laws.
Importantly,
the
vast
majority
of
developing
countries
also
have
explicit
constitutional
requirements
to
ensure
that
their
policies
and
practices
do
not
unnecessarily
interfere
with
privacy.
In
fact,
only
five
Medium
and
Low
Human
Development
Index
countries
do
not
have
explicit
mentions
of
privacy
in
their
constitutions
(Cameroon,
Comoros,
India,
Indonesia,
and
Samoa).
The
benefits
of
development
and
humanitarian
assistance
can
be
delivered
without
surveillance.
The
choice
between
privacy
and
development
creates
a
false
dichotomy
and
spurs
over-simplified
arguments
about
the
role
of
technology.
The
discussion
reveals
no
nuance,
no
consideration
of
the
values
and
priorities
tied
up
in
privacy
and
development,
no
reference
to
the
potentials
of
technology
or
the
changing
nature
of
threats
and
security,
and
no
indication
of
the
other
choices
that
exist.
The
challenge
is
to
improve
access
to
and
understanding
of
technologies,
ensure
that
policy
makers
and
the
laws
they
adopt
respond
to
the
challenges
and
potentialities
of
technology,
and
generate
greater
public
debate
to
ensure
that
rights
and
freedoms
are
negotiated
at
a
societal
level.
Technologies
can
be
built
to
satisfy
both
objectives.
Even
if
privacy
was
deemed
to
be
secondary
to
the
building
of
effective,
modern
and
secure
States,
and
to
the
provision
of
basic
aid,
the
moral
question
still
arises:
if
the
purpose
of
development
is
to
empower
those
in
developing
countries
to
have
access
to
the
same
rights
and
capabilities
as
those
in
the
developed
world,
and
if
the
transfer
of
knowledge
and
technology
is
essential
to
that,
then
why
diminish
those
very
same
people
by
granting
them
lesser
human
rights
protections?
If
privacy
and
the
protection
of
personal
information
are
essential
as
constitutional
and
human
rights
protections
in
developed
societies,
this
must
also
be
true
in
developing
countries.
