19 September 2018

ICAC Qualifications Report

The NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) report on an investigation of Eman Sharobeem notes concerns regarding her qualifications.

The report states
Those entrusted with public funds should use those funds for the public purposes for which they are provided. Unfortunately, on occasion public funds may be misused for personal gain rather than the public good. This investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (“the Commission”) concerned such a case. The investigation primarily concerned allegations that Eman Sharobeem, when service manager or chief executive officer (CEO) of the Immigrant Women’s Health Service (IWHS) and the person in day-to-day charge of the Non-English Speaking Housing Women’s Scheme Inc (NESH), misused public funds entrusted to those agencies for the financial benefit of herself and members of her family. 
Other matters investigated included whether Ms Sharobeem falsely claimed certain academic qualifications and then used them to obtain employment as a part-time commissioner and board member of the Community Relations Commission (CRC) and member of the Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB) NSW. 
The Commission found that, between 2007 and early 2016, Ms Sharobeem improperly exercised her official functions at IWHS and NESH to misapply public funds to benefit herself and members of her family. Up to $773,000 was misused. The Commission was not able to identify the precise amount of funds misused because, as noted in chapter 2 of this report, while over $443,000 in IWHS funds were transferred from the IWHS bank account to Ms Sharobeem, the Commission could not preclude the possibility that some of that money was reimbursement for work-related expenses. Given the limited funding received by both organisations, the misuse of funds represented a substantial amount of public funds entrusted to those organisations for public purposes. 
The Commission also found that Ms Sharobeem knowingly falsified information provided to funding bodies, improperly arranged for a family member to be employed at NESH and have personal use of a NESH vehicle, falsely represented herself as a qualified psychologist and provided psychological treatment to IWHS clients and others, and used false academic qualifications to obtain paid employment with the CRC and the ADB.
 The Commission found that Ms Sharobeem engaged in serious corrupt conduct by:
Between 2009 and 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself by arranging to obtain up to $443,000, through transfers to her bank account, from IWHS by way of reimbursement for the cost of goods and services she had purchased for personal use, knowing that she was not entitled to such reimbursements (chapter 2) 
Between February and June 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself by arranging for the transfer of funds totalling $13,500 from IWHS to Andrew’s Designer Jewellery, knowing that the payments related to the purchase of jewellery for personal use and that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for that purpose (chapter 2) 
between 2010 and 2014, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself by arranging for the transfer of funds totalling $3,850 from IWHS to a wardrobe supplier, knowing that the payments related to the purchase of wardrobes for personal use and that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for that purpose (chapter 2) 
In about December 2013, improperly excercising her official functions by submitting an invoice for $210 to IWHS, which she knew to be false, in order to obtain payment from IWHS of $210 for pest control services at her home, knowing that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for such a purpose (chapter 3) 
In about June 2015, improperly excercising her official functions by submitting an invoice for $3,878 to IWHS, which she knew to be false, in order to obtain payment of $3,878 from IWHS for the purchase of a gate at her home, knowing that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for such a purpose (chapter 3) 
In March 2014, improperly excercising her official functions by submitting a receipt for $489 to IWHS, which she knew to be false, in order to obtain payment of $489 from IWHS to reimburse her for payment for a Classic Holiday Club VIP membership pass for herself, knowing that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for such a purpose (chapter 3) 
In June 2015, improperly excercising her official functions by submitting an invoice for $6,900 to IWHS, which she knew to be false, in order to obtain reimbursement of her personal credit card expense of $5,900, and to cover the use of the IWHS credit card to pay $1,000, for the purchase of a massage chair for her personal use, knowing that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for such a purpose (chapter 3) 
Between January 2009 and February 2016, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself or members of her family by using the IWHS credit card to pay $35,211.39 for personal goods and services, knowing that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for such a purpose (chapter 4) 
Between 2007 and 2016, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself or members of her family by causing payments totalling $31,157.87 to be made to Sydney Water Corporation and the State Debt Recovery Office (SDRO) by direct transfer of IWHS funds for personal expenses, knowing that she was not entitled to use IWHS funds for such a purpose (chapter 4) 
Between May 2014 and March 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to obtain $99,685 through submitting invoices to IWHS, falsely claiming she had worked as a facilitator and causing payment of those invoices to be made to her by IWHS (chapter 5) 
Between May 2014 and March 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to obtain $34,050 for her son, Richard Sharobeem, through submitting invoices to IWHS, falsely claiming he had worked as a facilitator and causing payment of those invoices to be made to him by IWHS (chapter 5) 
Between May 2014 and February 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to obtain $7,750 for her son, Charlie Sharobeem, through submitting invoices to IWHS, falsely claiming he had worked as a facilitator and causing payment of those invoices to be made to him by IWHS (chapter 5) 
Between 2011 and 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself by arranging for IWHS to pay $59,558.70 for work on her property at 92 Smart Street, Fairfield, knowing that, as owner of that property, those costs were her responsibility (chapter 6) 
In 2014, improperly exercising her official functions to benefit herself by falsely stating in an application to the NSW Community Building Partnership that IWHS was the owner of her property at 92 Smart Street, Fairfield, with the intention of obtaining public funds to pay for work on her property (chapter 6) 
In 2015, improperly exercising her official functions by knowingly falsifying statistics relating to the numbers of attendees for IWHS programs reported in the IWHS 2014–15 annual report, which she submitted to the South Western Sydney Local Health District (SWSLHD), knowing the false statistics would be relied on by NSW Health and the SWSLHD in determining IWHS’s funding (chapter 7) 
Between 2013 and 2015, improperly exercising her official functions by providing false statistics to the Smith Family in order to falsely represent to the Smith Family that IWHS had conducted the Multicultural Parenting Project and the Steps to Employment Project programs in accordance with its contractual obligations to the Smith Family (chapter 7) 
Between January and April 2014, improperly exercising her official functions to transfer a total of $13,500 from the IWHS bank account into her bank account and then arranging for NESH to reimburse IWHS for that amount (chapter 8) 
On 16 March 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to transfer $3,000 from the NESH bank account to her own bank account in order to reimburse herself for the $3,000 payment she made to Westmead Private Hospital for her son’s medical procedure (chapter 8)  
In late December 2014, improperly exercising her official functions to apply $18,000 in IWHS funds towards the purchase of a Mercedes car for her husband, Haiman Hammo, and then arranging for NESH to reimburse IWHS for that amount (chapter 8)I
In early 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to arrange for her son, Richard Sharobeem, to be hired as a paid employee of NESH (chapter 9) 
For a period of about six months from late December 2014 or early January 2015, improperly exercising her official functions to facilitate the exclusive use, including personal use, of a NESH motor vehicle by her son, Richard Sharobeem (chapter 9) 22. between at least 2006 and 2016, improperly exercising her official functions by falsely representing herself to be a qualified psychologist with a PhD in psychology and providing psychological treatment to IWHS clients and patients referred to her (chapter 10) 
In March 2011, knowingly submitting false academic qualifications to the CRC for the purpose of obtaining financial advantage by being appointed to the paid position of part-time commissioner of the CRC (chapter 11) 
In about December 2012, knowingly submitting false academic qualifications to the ADB for the purpose of obtaining financial advantage by being appointed to the paid position of a board member of the ADB (chapter 11). 
No findings of serious corrupt conduct were made against any other person. Section 74A(2) statement Statements are made in the report pursuant to s 74A(2) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (“the ICAC Act”) that the Commission is of the opinion that consideration should be given to obtaining the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions with respect to the prosecution of Ms Sharobeem for the following offences:
• the common law offence of misconduct in public office (chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) 
• fraud contrary to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (“the Crimes Act”) (chapters 2, 4, 5 and 11) 
• obtaining benefit by deception contrary to s 178BA of the Crimes Act (chapters 2 and 4) 
• publishing a false statement contrary to s 192H of the Crimes Act (chapter 3) 
• using a false document contrary to s 254 of the Crimes Act (chapter 3) 
• giving false or misleading evidence to the Commission contrary to s 87 of the ICAC Act (chapters 2 and 10). 
The report features  the following corruption prevention recommendations
R1 That the SWSLHD, in conjunction with relevant non-government organisations (NGOs), develops additional outcomes-based key performance indicators (KPIs) that reflect the critical objectives of the services that it funds. Where possible, measurement of these KPIs should not be based solely on information self-reported by NGOs. 
R2 That the SWSLHD adopts a coordinated and holistic framework for monitoring its funded NGOs that incorporates and links NGO governance capability, performance measures and financial reporting. This should entail less reliance on self-reported information. 
R3 That the SWSLHD considers allocating additional staff to manage the NGOs it funds. Considerations for setting adequate staffing levels could include the nature of the service, the vulnerability of the client groups, and the potential governance and financial risks that could arise. 
R4 That the SWSLHD requires funded NGOs to provide it with copies of audit management letters from external auditors. 
R5 That the SWSLHD conducts an initial, thorough review of its funded NGOs, focusing on financial competence and whether adequate governance arrangements are in place to ensure probity around funding arrangements. 
R6 That the SWSLHD develops risk metrics and conducts regular risk assessments of funded NGOs. The risk metrics should have regard to the risks that small NGOs can be prone to, including: • limited staff numbers • perverse incentives to falsify client data, either to enhance reputation or to lobby for increased funding • volunteer boards with limited time and skills to properly oversee the financial and administrative practices of the NGO and that members of these boards may not be aware of their responsibilities as managers of the CEO and/or other senior staff • poorly segregated financial practices and controls • CEO/coordinators with limited skills in managing staff, and in overseeing financial practices and systems. 
R7 That the SWSLHD checks and, wherever possible, verifies the qualifications, and continued registration (where relevant), of NGO employees. This should adopt a risk-based approach by focusing on qualifications that are: • mandatory to perform the service • required for the provision of medical, psychological and allied health services or • linked to the provision of any other services that could bring risks to the NGOs’ clients, and to the NGOs themselves. These checks could take the form of spot checks, risk-based checks or randomised checks on NGO staff members. 
R8 That SWSLHD considers requiring funded NGOs to maintain an internal reporting or whistleblowing program that aligns to better practice (such as AS 8004-2003), and/or guidance issued by the NSW Ombudsman. Among other things, this should facilitate reporting directly to the SWSLHD or a similar representative body. 
R9 That the NSW Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) considers requiring funded NGOs to provide it with copies of audit management letters from external auditors. 
R10 That FACS, in conjunction with relevant NGOs, develops additional outcomes-based KPIs that reflect the critical objectives of the services that it funds. Where possible, measurement of these KPIs should not be based solely on information self-reported by NGOs. 
R11 That FACS considers, as part of its ongoing review of its contract governance framework, implementing checks and (wherever possible) verifying qualifications, and continued registration (where necessary) of NGO employees.R 
R12 That FACS considers requiring funded NGOs to maintain an internal reporting or whistleblowing program that aligns to better practice (such as AS 8004-2003) and/or guidance issued by the NSW Ombudsman. Among other things, this should facilitate reporting directly to FACS or a similar representative body