28 December 2018

Personality Rights, Privacy and Copyright

'Recognition and Protection of Personality Rights: Classification and Typology' by Johann Neethling in (2018) 9(3) Journal of European Tort Law comments
In this article the premise is that personality interests exist in factual reality independently of any legal recognition. This emphasis on the pre-legal existence of individual personality interests is not merely of philosophical interest, but of cardinal jurisprudential and practical significance as it brings to the fore the fact that the qualities of personality interests are not determined by legal principles, but primarily by their nature in the sphere of factual reality. A jurisprudential definition and delineation of personality interests, which is essential to enable protective measures to be properly applied in practice, does not detract from this. This classification and typology therefore take account of factual reality, supplemented on a comparative law approach by the personality rights identified and delimited by jurists, the courts and legislatures, as well as typical examples of infringements of personality sanctioned by the different legal systems. Accordingly, the following classification and typology of personality rights are proposed: the right to life, the right to physical integrity, the right to physical liberty, the right to reputation, the right to dignity, the right to feelings, the right to privacy, and the right to identity.
'Monkey Selfie and Authorship in Copyright Law: The Nigerian and South African Perspectives' by Caroline Ncube and Desmond Oriakhogba in (2018) 21 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal comments
A photograph taken by a monkey was in the centre of a copyright claim in the famous monkey selfie case in the United States of America. Suing as next friend of the monkey named as Naruto, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals contended that copyright in the photograph belonged to the monkey as author of the photograph since the monkey created the photograph unaided by any person. On the motion of the defendants, the case was dismissed by the US district court on the ground that the concept of authorship under US Copyright Act cannot be defined to include non-human animals. The dismissal order was confirmed by a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeal of the Ninth Circuit. This paper reviews the case in the light of the concept of authorship and ownership, with specific focus on authorship of photographs, under the Nigerian Copyright Act and South African Copyright Act. In so doing, it examines and relies on Ginsburg’s six principles for testing authorship to the authorship of photograph under the Acts. It also relies on the concepts of subjective rights and legal personality to explain the implication of conferring copyright ownership on non-human animals. It argues that for authorship of, and ownership of the copyright in, a photograph to be established under the Nigerian Copyright Act and South African Copyright Act, a legal person must have created the photograph. Consequently, for purposes of argument, the paper proceeds on the assumption that the monkey selfie case originated from Nigeria or South Africa. After analysing of relevant statutory provisions and case law, the paper finds that the Nigerian Copyright Act and the South African Copyright Act do not envisage conferral of authorship in particular, and copyright protection in general, to a non-human animal. It then concludes that the courts in both countries would not reach a different conclusion from the one made by the US courts.
'Unmasking the Right of Publicity' by Dustin Marlan comments 
In the landmark case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Judge Jerome Frank articulated the modern right of publicity. The right is now most often seen to protect the strictly commercial value of one’s “persona” — the Latin-derived word originally meaning the mask of an actor. Among other criticisms, the right of publicity is frequently accused of lacking a coherent justification, permitting only economic redress against public harms to the persona, and stripping away individual identity by allowing for an alienable, proprietary right in one’s personality. Why might Judge Frank have been motivated to create a transferable intellectual property right in the monetary value of one’s persona distinct from the psychic harm to feelings, emotions, and dignity protected under the rubric of privacy? 
Judge Frank was a leading figure in the American legal realist movement known for his unique and controversial “psychoanalysis of certain legal positions” through seminal works including Law and the Modern Mind, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, and Courts on Trial. His work drew heavily on the ideas of psychoanalytic thinkers, like Freud, Piaget and Jung, to describe the distorting effects of infantile and unconscious wishes and fantasies on the decision-making process of legal actors and judges. For Judge Frank, the psychoanalytic interplay between dual parts of the personality supported the realist interpretation of lawmaking as a highly subjective and indeterminate activity. Indeed, though Judge Frank provided little rationale for articulating a personality right separate from privacy in Haelan, he had given a great deal of attention to the personality in his scholarly works. 
In the spirit of Judge Frank’s psychoanalytic jurisprudence, this Article suggests that the right of publicity’s aim, apart from the personal right to privacy, may be understood through the psychoanalytic conception of the personality — divided into public and private spheres. In the psychological sense, the term persona, or “false self,” refers to an individual’s social façade or front that reflects the role in life the individual is playing. That is, as a metaphor for the actor and their mask, the persona is used to indicate the public face of an individual, i.e., the image one presents to others for social or economic advantage, as contrasted with their feelings, emotions, and subjective interpretations of reality anchored in their private “true self.” However, the law’s continued reliance on a dualistic metaphor of the personality — i.e., divided sharply into inner (private) and outer (public) subparts — appears misguided amidst a growing technology, internet, and social media-driven need for interwoven privacy and publicity rights.