19 December 2018

Sovereign Citizens

One of the more entertaining parts of my doctoral dissertation involved discussion of the 'sovereign citizen' or 'Freemen' phenomenon, in essence people who claim that Australian law does not apply to them because there was some sort of fundamental drafting problem after Magna Carta that for example rendered Federation invalid.

Examples are Thammaruknon v Queensland Police Service [2016] QDC 31, R v Stoneman [2013] QCA 209, Robert Mcjannett v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union of Workers [2012] WAIRComm 1111, Van den Hoorn v Ellis [2010] QDC 451, Carnes v Essenberg and Ors [1999] QCA 339, Essenberg v The Queen [2000] HCATrans 385, Elliott v Commissioner of Police [2014] QDC 161, ACCC v Rana [2008] FCA 374, Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2012] NSWDC 95; Green v Green [2018] FCWA 42; and Ulysses and Child Support Registrar [2007] FamCA 1395

It is often tied to assertions that the national government has no authority because it is a 'Delaware corporation' (for example Hedley v Spivey [2011] WASC 325) or - more unpleasantly - that the Reserve Bank, ATO, APRA and other entities are instruments of the devil du jour such as the Illuminati, Zionists, Roman Catholics, Freemasons or shape-shifting green-skinned extraterrestrial lizards. An insight is offered in ‘The Sovereign Citizen Movement and Fitness to Stand Trial’ by Jennifer Pytyck and Gary Chaimowitz in (2013) 12(2) International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 149 and in 'Competence to Stand Trial Evaluations of Sovereign Citizens: A Case Series and Primer of Odd Political and Legal Beliefs' by George F Parker in (2014) 42(3) Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 338.

On occasion it is bleakly amusing, with the Victorian Supreme Court in Jones (a pseudonym) v DPP [2015] VSCA 272 noting
The orders sought by the applicant on this appeal included, but were not limited to, that the position of Queen of Australia is invalid, that no bill of the Victorian Parliament has been made law since 1919, that the current Victorian Parliament be dismissed, and that the Court appoint the applicant as ‘the autocratic Head of Government of the State of Victoria to establish the rule of law and a constitution with a majority decision of the Sovereignty of the People of Victoria
In Western Australia ex-policeman, inventor and serial litigant Wayne Kenneth Glew has experienced problems with reliance on a claim of sovereign citizenship, having had his property seized and sold for after failing to pay Geraldton council $300,000 in rates on the basis that local governments local governments are not written in Australia's constitution. He reportedly claimed "It is not getting sold because I have it held under clause 61 of Magna Carta". The court was unpersuaded and, as with the quixotic Beerepoot family in Tasmania (who chose not to pay rates on the basis that all land belongs to God), sale has duly taken place.

The Court in Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123 stated
On the hearing of the appeal, the appellant chose not to advance any substantive oral argument, being content merely to assert that the primary judge could not lawfully hear the respondent's application and the members of this court could not hear the appeal, because they were 'a judge in their own cause'. The appellant did not explain the utility of his appeal in the light of that submission. 
The appellant's written outline of submissions did not advance the matter. It consisted, without any explanation as to their relevance, of the reproduction of a number of provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Crimes Act 1958, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth), and miscellaneous other legislation, extracts from Black's Law Dictionary and, from The Bible, extracts from the books of Exodus and Zechariah , the second epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, the epistle of James and the gospel according to St Matthew. 
In any event, it is clear that the appeal is entirely without merit. The primary judge was, with respect, plainly correctly, for the reasons he gave, in finding that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous and vexatious. No other finding was open. 
I should also point out that the appellant's challenge to the validity of the AARCLP Act follows similar, unsuccessful, challenges to it in Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 and Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289. An application to the High Court for special leave to appeal against the former decision was dismissed: Glew v Shire of Grennough [2007] HCATrans 520 (6 September 2007). 
The appellant needs to understand that he cannot simply revisit in other guises issues that have been decided against him. The persistent reagitation of these issues is a waste of the time and resources of the court and puts the other party to significant expense and inconvenience. It cannot continue.
In discussing Glew's status as a vexatious litigant the WA Supreme Court in Glew v Attorney General (WA) [2014] WASCA 93 unsurprisingly commented that his arguments
In substance, ... simply repeat the same contentions, or variations of the same contentions, which the appellant has advanced over and over again, and which this court, among others, has rejected over and over again. They do not improve by repetition; they remain as devoid of legal merit as they were at the outset. None has the remotest prospect of success. 
The point has long since been passed where the appellant's persistence in advancing these contentions could be put down to a lack of understanding of their absence of legal merit. It can now be attributed only to an obduracy which is impervious to reason and which is unlikely to diminish. The fact that in an appeal against the finding that he was a vexatious litigant the appellant has advanced the same sort of fallacious contentions which caused that finding to be made in the first place bears that out
In Frank Jasper v Glew [No 3] [2012] WASC 24 the Court stated
Mr Glew filed written submissions which dealt only with the question of my authority to determine the proceedings, and which did not deal at all with any of the substantive issues in the case. When the matter came on for hearing, Mr Glew challenged my authority to determine the claims against him by reference to those written submissions. I advised Mr Glew that I found those submissions to be incomprehensible, referring, as they did, to a schedule to the Australian Constitution which does not exist, and failing to identify any coherent basis upon which it was asserted that my appointment as a judge of the court was invalid. I advised Mr Glew that at the time of my appointment I had taken the oaths applicable to the various judicial offices which I hold in accordance with the requirements of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). I invited Mr Glew to refer me to any provision of the Australian Constitution which could support the proposition that my appointment was invalid. He was unable to identify any such provision. I therefore indicated to Mr Glew that I considered my appointment to be valid, and that I had authority to determine the case against him, and would proceed to exercise that authority.
In Glew v White [2012] WASCA 138 the Court stated
This appeal is an abuse of process. The appellant is well aware that his idiosyncratic contentions have been repeatedly rejected in other cases. The appellant has invoked the court's process and procedures for an illegitimate or collateral purpose, namely, as a platform for advancing his nonsensical theories. He appeared at the hearing with the support of a large retinue who appeared to share or sympathise with his views. The appellant is not interested in securing justice according to law (either in relation to the convictions in question or otherwise) in accordance with the system to justice administered by the courts of this State. At the hearing on 5 July 2012 he advanced arguments in language which was often disparaging and derisory of this court and the functions it performs.
The grounds of appeal consist of a pronouncement of the appellant's eccentric theories about the judicial power of the Commonwealth, the Constitution, the right to trial by jury and the status of courts in this State. None of the grounds had any reasonable prospect of succeeding ... 
This appellant is wasting the time of the courts by repeatedly advancing his theories or variations of them, even though they have been dealt with and disposed of in other cases: see, for example, Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260; Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289; Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123; Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87; Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew [No 2] [2010] WASC 24; and Glew v City of Greater Geraldton [2012] WASCA 94.
In Attorney General (WA) v Glew [2014] WASC 100 the Court stated
The defendant is one of those individuals who believes the courts of this State do not have jurisdiction to administer the law because they are at odds with the Constitution of the State of Western Australia or the Commonwealth Constitution. It is not really possible to define the defendant's position any more clearly than that. It is simply nonsensical and incoherent. The argument has been rejected countless times not only in Australia but in other common law jurisdictions. But individuals such as the defendant are undaunted - they plough on regardless. The argument does not vary much and has never been successful in any way, shape or form. 
It is unnecessary to go through all of the actions commenced by the defendant in which this 'constitutional invalidity' argument has been raised. It is enough if I give one example. On 19 January 2005 Magistrate King heard an application by the Shire of Greenough to recover $934.27 being rates due by the defendant and his wife Mrs Kylie June Glew to the Shire of Greenough for the 2003 2004 rate period. During the course of the hearing the defendant submitted there was no case to answer because the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) was unconstitutional and therefore unlawful. The learned magistrate rejected the argument. On 16 February 2005 he entered judgment against Mr and Mrs Glew.
By notice of appeal dated 4 March 2005 Mr and Mrs Glew appealed Magistrate King's orders. In the notice of appeal the order sought was: Pursuant to the State and Federal Constitutions the Local Government Act is unlawful and therefore the case be dismissed and costs awarded [sic].
On 15 December 2005 Judge Wager of the District Court handed down her decision: Glew v Shire of Greenough [2005] WADC 245. Judge Wager actually gave careful consideration to the defendant's argument. She rejected it in the clearest possible terms. There is no doubt her reasoning was correct and any reasonable person would have accepted that to be the case. But the defendant pressed on. 
By notice of appeal dated 10 January 2006 the defendant sought leave to appeal the decision of Judge Wager. The defendant then widened his attack. He lodged a document with this court entitled 'Legal Notice Supreme Court of Western Australia'. That document alleges 'serious indictable offences' committed by the solicitors for the Shire of Greenough and Members of the Shire of Greenough. A further document gives notice that 'serious indictable offences' had been committed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA).
When the matter came on for hearing it was summarily dismissed by Justices Pullin and Buss: see Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260. 
The defendant then sought leave to appeal to the High Court. The application was dealt with by Justices Gummow and Heydon. A copy of the transcript of their Honours' decision appears as annexure MG 23 to Ms Georgiou's affidavit. It is worth quoting what Justice Gummow had to say:
The local court of Western Australia at Geraldton gave judgment for the respondent and against the applicants for a trivial sum, being arrears of rates. That court rejected the applicants' argument that the Local Government Act 1995 (WA) is unconstitutional, as is s 52 of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA). The District Court of Western Australia dismissed the applicants' appeal. In turn the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed a further appeal as 'entirely lacking in legal merit'. We agree, and the same expression applies to the prolix, offensive and vexatious documents filed in support of this special leave application. 
All avenues of appeal were then exhausted. The Shire of Greenough lodged a bill of costs for taxation. This bill had to do with the costs of the appeal to the Supreme Court. The matter came on before Registrar Powell. The defendant repeated the same arguments he had made before and which had been comprehensively rejected. The bill was taxed and the defendant sought a review. The matter came on before Justice Beech who dismissed the defendant's application. He rejected the defendant's regurgitated argument. 
Since that time there have been six other sets of proceedings involving the defendant. Without going into details they can be summarised as follows:
  • Department of Planning and Infrastructure proceedings. This involved a Magistrates Court prosecution against the defendant. It led to an appeal to a single judge of the Court of Appeal, an appeal to the Full Court of the Court of Appeal and a taxation of costs. 
  • Frank Jasper proceedings. These proceedings were brought by Frank Jasper Pty Ltd against Mr Glew and Glew Technologies Pty Ltd for alleged breach of intellectual property licence agreement and damages for misleading and deceptive conduct. The defendant applied for leave to represent Glew Technologies. That was refused. There was an appeal from an interlocutory decision. There were then two trials - one in relation to liability, the other in relation to quantum. There were then two appeals against the decisions in each of the trials. The defendant was unsuccessful at first instance and on appeal. 
  • The Governor of Western Australia proceedings. This application appeared to be directed at preventing the 2008 State election. White proceedings. This was an action against the defendant for assaulting and obstructing a public officer. A conviction was recorded in the Geraldton Magistrates Court. This was followed by an appeal to a single judge of this court and then to the Court of Appeal. Both appeals were dismissed. The same argument was used by the defendant in each case. 
  • City of Geraldton-Greenough/City of Greater Geraldton proceedings. This was an attempt by a local government to recover unpaid rates. The same arguments were once again run right up to the Court of Appeal.