Is your name “yours”? Are you free to choose a name for yourself? Does a name withstand border-crossing and even acquisition of new citizenships? In the common law world, the undoubted answer is yes. However, in civil law, this answer is not so clear. While the global tendency over the last few decades has been towards relaxing the norms governing names, old traditions die hard, and in some cases now re-emerge in other parts of the world. In an ever more globalized world, given widespread immigration, refugees, and people with dual- (or even multi-) citizenships, the different national attitudes towards names and the lack of proper cross-border regulation of names is becoming a relevant and pressing question. This paper maps out and conceptualizes the challenge of names by demonstrating the different approaches towards names and suggesting possible cross-border regulation (i.e., choice-of-law rules) that may address this issue for the benefit of the individuals and countries involved.
In Warren Ronald Wichman v Pepper Finance Corporation Limited [2019] NSWCA 195 Meagher JA states ...
On 5 August 2019 Mr Wichman filed a second notice of motion in response to a further notice from the sheriff’s office advising that it proposed to evict the occupants of the property after 2pm today, 8 August 2019. As is mentioned above, that motion challenged the decision of Registrar Bradford and sought a stay of the writ of possession. (As to the power of a Judge of the Court to set aside or vary a judgment or order of a registrar, see Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 121(3)). Mr Wichman made a further affidavit in support of that application on 5 August 2019.
The argument before Rothman J is sufficiently recorded in his Honour’s final reasons: Pepper Finance Corporation Limited v Wichman [2019] NSWSC 1009. At [12] he records:
It is unnecessary to go to the merits of the application that was originally dealt with by the Registrar. Essentially, as I understand it, from the submission of the applicant, the applicant argues that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction en banc, and there has to be a panel of judges that exercises jurisdiction.
His Honour rejected that argument which was the only argument put to his Honour as to why the Registrar erred in rejecting his earlier motion, and accordingly dismissed the motion of 5 August, 2019.
In support of his motion in this Court, Mr Wichman has read or relied on the three affidavits filed in the proceedings below, as well as his short affidavit filed in this Court on 7 August 2019 which states:
1. I am the deponent. Let it be known, that I was not given Due Process and the judge was Bias.
2. The matter could not be heard. He would not confirm a sworn Oath, or a Bond.
It is convenient at this point to record some matters concerning the content of Mr Wichman’s earlier affidavits. Those affidavits make a number of assertions as to the application of Australian common law and statutory law to the deponent in language which is strikingly similar to that described in the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, as “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument”: see also K Sheridan v Colin Biggers & Paisley [2019] NSWSC 528 at [10] (Black J).
The assertions made in those affidavits include:
That Mr Wichman is not bound by any law, statutory or otherwise, unless he has personally consented to it. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of his affidavit of 5 August 2019 say:
3. Be it known, as always, One [Mr Wichman] stands in Common Law as a flesh and blood man standing on the land, reserving both One’s Common Law of England rights and Unalienable rights. One reserves the rights of Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law, the right by any claim to heard by jury in a court of record according to the Common Law of England and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (U.K.) 1901.
4. Be it known, One is also free from standing under any statutes, codes, ordinances, or rules conflicting with the Common Law of England and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (U.K.) 1901. and those to which One does not consent to.
That Mr Wichman does not recognise the authority or jurisdiction or judgment of a registrar or single judge of the Supreme Court, and also, it would seem, of a judgment of any Court applying any law to which he has not consented. Paragraph 5 of his affidavit of 29 May 2019 and para 6 of his affidavit of 5 August 2019 say, respectively:
5. Be it known, One does not understand nor does One recognise the authority, jurisdiction or judgement made by a single judge. One man cannot stand in judgement over another. One does not understand nor does One recognise a ‘default judgement’. One understands that both violate natural Unalienable Rights, and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (UK) 1900, which is the foundational legal document for British colony Law in Australia. “The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury…” Ref: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (UK) 1900 Sect. 80. “No man can legally be bound by judgment given behind his back and without opportunity of being heard.” Ref: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (UK) 1901 Quick & Garran P.614 Sect. 206.
6. Be it known, to all governments, government and public officials, courts and other parties, that One is a natural, free born, free man, self-governing, without subjects. One is neither subject to any entity anywhere, nor is any entity subject to One.
