[35] Having reached a decision in respect of the application brought by the defendants, there is another matter which I need to address, namely whether I ought to bring this plaintiff to the attention of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. The personal litigant's dilemma is often that he or she cannot afford to pay a legal team to represent them in legal proceedings and therefore has the unenviable task of self-representation. This is not an easy task for the untrained. It often leads to many errors. In this case, for example, the plaintiff relies on what he describes as section 30 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Unfortunately for him, although certain parts of that Act do apply to Northern Ireland, the majority of the Act, including the section that the plaintiff wishes to rely on, does not. (This is by virtue of section 153 of the Act.) That the plaintiff was relying on an out of date textbook or unreliable internet resources is indicated by the fact that the Supreme Court Act 1981 has now, for over a decade, been renamed the Senior Courts Act 1981 following amendment by Schedule 11 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The legal forest is difficult terrain for the untrained.
[36] However I have concerns with the manner in which this particular plaintiff conducts his litigation which go beyond the difficulties experienced by all legally unqualified personal litigants. While listening to his submissions I was reminded of Chief Justice Rooke's judgment in the Canadian case of Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571. In his extensive and detailed written judgment the Chief Justice explains that the court has developed a new awareness and understanding of a particular category of vexatious litigant. They describe themselves in a variety of ways, sometimes, for example, as "Freemen" or "Freemen-on-the-Land". The Chief Justice, in the absence of what he considers to be a better description, terms them "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants" or "OPCA litigants". He explains that these persons employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by others to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations, and individuals. He notes that in Canada over a decade of reported cases have proven that the individual concepts advanced by such litigants are invalid. In his judgment he then goes on to categorise these schemes and concepts, identify defects to simplify future response to variations of identified and invalid OPCA themes, and develop court procedures and sanctions for persons who adopt and advance these vexatious litigation strategies.
[37] According to Meads v Meads this category of Canadian litigation traces back to the late 1990's, representing the spread of concepts that emerged much earlier in the United States. Although the judgment identifies reported caselaw that comments on OPCA litigants, OPCA gurus, and their misconduct, Chief Justice Rooke observes that the reported caselaw is the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The vast majority of encounters between the courts and OPCA litigants are not reported. Such litigants and their schemes have been encountered in almost all areas of law. They appear in chambers, in criminal proceedings, initiate civil litigation based on illusionary rights, and attempt to evade court and state authority with procedural and defence-based schemes.
[38] Meads v Meads states that the strategies of these litigants as brought before the Canadian courts have proven disruptive, inflict unnecessary expense on other parties, and are ultimately harmful to the persons who appear in court and attempt to invoke these vexatious strategies. Because of the nonsense they argue, such litigants are invariably unsuccessful and their positions dismissed, typically without written reasons. Nevertheless, their litigation abuse continues.
[39] The decision in Meads v Meads is worthy of mention because the litigation involving the plaintiff in this case possesses a number of features which caused concern to Chief Justice Rooke :
Names
[40] Chief Justice Rooke observes that the vast majority of such litigants use highly stereotypic formats to name and identify themselves. The most common form adds atypical punctuation, usually colons and dashes, into a name. Any litigant who uses this dash/colon motif almost certainly, in the view of Chief Justice Rooke, has some kind of OPCA background. Such litigants have argued that a person is immune from court action if that person identifies himself by an entirely different name; that structuring a name in a format which includes a colon between the first name and surname means that one is a separate person from the person whose name is similar but does not have the insertion of a colon; that structuring a name in the format for example [John] of the [family] of [Sargent] means that he is a separate person from "John Sargent". Further, a capital letter version of the name is some kind of non-human thing, while the lower case name is the "flesh and blood" aspect of the litigant. It appears that the use of duplicate names is usually an indication that the OPCA litigant has adopted a "double/split person" strategy.
[41] I have already referred to the fact that the plaintiff refers to himself in the writ before me as "The Man Known as Anthony : Parker". He also refers to himself as "a living man known as Anthony of the family parker". In addition his writ refers to himself in three places by a lower case "i". The same features are also present in the writ against Master Ellison and Mr Justice Deeny.
Oaths and qualifications
[42] Chief Justice Rooke notes that Freemen litigants will typically make certain demands including demands to see the oath of office of a judge, lawyer, or court official; that a judge prove his or her appointment; that the judge make certain oaths or statements, such as that the judge is a public servant; that an opposing party provide proof that it has authority to proceed against the OPCA litigant; or for a certified copy of a document or legislation.
[43] In the current application before me the plaintiff challenged Mr Cush's right to appear on behalf of the defendants. He wanted proof that he was entitled to do so. In a previous application before me, the plaintiff requested that I state whether or not I was acting under my judicial oath.
[44] I note that in his judgment in Santander (UK) PLC v Anthony Parker [2012] NICh 6 Deeny J stated : "He objected to the solicitors acting and to counsel acting because counsel had not produced his "power of authority" or his law licence to practice in Northern Ireland. I reject those submissions. Needless to say no power of authority is required and counsel is well known to the court as a member, indeed a leading member of the Chancery junior bar."
[45] I also note that in his judgment in Santander (UK) PLC v Anthony Parker (No 2) [2012] NICh 20 Deeny J stated : "When I sat in this matter initially today he showed an obstructive approach to the conduct of the hearing which was followed by a demand to see my oath of office as a judge which was unlikely to be appropriate in any event but utterly inappropriate when I was dealing with a matter remitted from the Court of Appeal and this was followed by direct defiance of the orders of the court constituting, subject to any submissions which I will hear after this judgment, a contempt in the face of the court."
Consent to Obligations
[46] In Meads v Meads Chief Justice Rooke stated that a common belief expressed by Freemen litigants is that all legally enforceable rights require that a person agree to be subject to those obligations. This strategy takes two closely related forms. Firstly, every binding legal obligation emerges from a contract and, secondly, consent is required before an obligation can be enforced. Litigants who advance this concept extend it to interactions between state actors, including Canada and the provinces, and individual persons. This is what Chief Justice Rooke describes as a kind of "magic hat". The OPCA litigant says he or she has not agreed to be governed or subject to court authority, and the OPCA litigant is therefore allegedly immune.
[47] A necessary first step in any "everything is a contract" or "consent is required" scheme is that the OPCA litigant develops a mechanism that denies a unilateral obligation can arise from legislation. Some OPCA litigants argue they have opted out of legislated obligations. Others simply claim consent is required, otherwise legislation is a set of optional guidelines.
[48] In his affirmation before me in these proceedings the affirmation sworn by the plaintiff contains the following : "18. Legislative Acts confer how duties and obligations are applied to Government Officers, legal fictions and persons. 19. I do not consent to legislative Acts."
Jurisdiction
[49] Chief Justice Rooke observes that OPCA litigants frequently deny that a court has jurisdiction or authority over them and this emerges in a number of ways including in a statement or declaration that the litigant is only subject to a specific category of law, most often expressed as "natural law" or "the common law". I observe that the plaintiff's affirmation before me included the statements : "I claim that I have not had a jury of my peers under common law. I claim that any instruments that the man known as Ian McKenna, here after referred to a Ian used on behave of and THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OFFICE, hereafter referred to as EJO, did not come from a common law court."
[50] I also observe that Deeny J in his judgment in Santander (UK) PLC v Anthony Parker [2012] NICh 6 stated : "He takes the point that this matter should be adjudicated on by Sir Christopher Geidt, Private Secretary to Her Majesty The Queen. He says that on foot of Clause 45 of the Magna Carta of 1215, which in the version advanced by him reads: "We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs or other officials only men that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well." Of course I have the privilege to serve as one of Her Majesty's justices and sit here to do justice as envisaged by Magna Carta rather than Sir Christopher whom, while I am sure a person of distinction, is not so far as I am aware a judge or lawyer."
[51] In the same judgment Deeny J makes reference to the following point which was raised by the plaintiff who now appears before me : "Since I am a living man, I operate under a foreign jurisdiction to the legal system. I already tried this case in my private foreign jurisdiction court, and find Santander in default judgment. Since Santander was found in default judgment in my private foreign jurisdiction court, Master Ellison, under the rules of the Hague Convention on foreign judgments and civil and commercial matters, should have respected that judgment." Deeny J unsurprisingly found that this was a wholly misplaced submission without foundation.
[52] I also note that in his affirmation before me the plaintiff states : "I do not consent to any court other than a common law court nor to any Judge that does not act upon his Oath of Office and will seek remedy if these terms are not met." and "I wish to exercise my right to challenge the validity of court documents by subpoenaing Master Ellison, Judge Deeny and the court transcripts in order to ascertain : A) If the instruments used by Ian, EJO and Katrina are fraudulent. B) If they come from a court that had jurisdiction."
Conclusion
[53] In Master McCorry's decision in the case of The Man known as Anthony Parker v The Man known as Master Ellison and the Man known as Donnell Justin Patrick Deeny (Unreported, 16 April 2014) Master McCorry concluded that the plaintiff's arguments largely consisted of : "a kaleidoscope of pseudo legalistic jargon, alien to law, practice and the administration of justice in any modern common law jurisdiction and in short is largely nonsense." I entirely agree with that assessment.
[54] In summary, the proceedings before me represent the third Writ issued by this plaintiff which the courts have struck out as, inter alia, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. Furthermore, there are specific features of the plaintiff's arguments and practice which give me cause for concern. Whether the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant is not a matter for me to decide. However, without doubt the plaintiff is a litigant who persistently attempts to use arguments which have been found by various members of the judiciary to be utterly untenable. I have therefore decided that I will draw this plaintiff to the attention of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland so that the Attorney can consider whether it is appropriate to make an application under section 32 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 for him to be declared a vexatious litigant by a judge of the High Court. I will therefore direct that a copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Attorney General.
In Foster v McPeake & Ors [2015] NIMaster 14 the Court states
[20] It is necessary to observe that the application before me possesses a number of features which I referred to in my judgment in The Man Known as Anthony : Parker v The Man Known as Ian McKenna And The Enforcement of Judgments Office [2015] NIMaster1. In that judgment I referred to a decision by Chief Justice Rooke judgment in the Canadian case of Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571. In his extensive and detailed written judgment the Chief Justice explains that that court has developed a new awareness and understanding of a particular category of vexatious litigant. They describe themselves in a variety of ways, sometimes, for example, as "Freemen" or "Freemen-on-the-Land". The Chief Justice, in the absence of what he considers to be a better description, terms them "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants" or "OPCA litigants". He explains that these persons employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by others to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations, and individuals. He notes that in Canada over a decade of reported cases have proven that the individual concepts advanced by such litigants are invalid. In his judgment he then goes on to categorise these schemes and concepts, identify defects to simplify future response to variations of identified and invalid OPCA themes, and develop court procedures and sanctions for persons who adopt and advance these vexatious litigation strategies.
[21] The application in the case before me has a number of these features. Firstly, the plaintiff uses an odd mode of identification. His Statement of Claim states "I, greg of the family foster (as commonly called), being the undersigned, do solemnly swear, declare and depose that I am not the all capitalised name 'GREG FOSTER' defined to take advantage of by diminishing my status to Roman civil officer subject to Roman civil codes." I put it to him that he presumably did not introduce himself socially as "Greg Foster, a man and one of the people" and that the reason he asked me to refer to him as "Greg" in court was that he believed he obtained some sort of legal benefit thereby. He agreed.
[22] Secondly, the plaintiff stated that he was not bound by statute law passed by Parliament unless either he consented to it or an act contrary to a statute caused hurt or injury to another person. His affidavit states, inter alia, "the law of statutes is the law of contract"; "a statute is a legislative rule of society given the force of law by the consent of the governed. (I am not legally qualified to interpret statute and do not give my consent either tacitly or otherwise)"; "enforcing statute on a man without his consent, when he has caused no harm or broken no contract is slavery"; and "presuming millions of statute liabilities are attached to a man from birth, without his knowledge or consent is morally wrong and classed as slavery."
[23] Thirdly, although he did not go as far in his submissions as to say that he believed that the court had no jurisdiction over him, his statement that he was sovereign amounts to a similar position. His Statement of Claim states : "as one of the people I do not yield my sovereignty to the agencies of government that serve the people."
[24] In Master McCorry's decision in the case of The Man known as Anthony Parker v The Man known as Master Ellison and the Man known as Donnell Justin Patrick Deeny (Unreported, 16 April 2014) Master McCorry concluded that the plaintiff's arguments largely consisted of : "a kaleidoscope of pseudo legalistic jargon, alien to law, practice and the administration of justice in any modern common law jurisdiction and in short is largely nonsense." That assessment is apposite to the arguments made by the plaintiff in this case. The Freeman approach has been considered in legal literature in recent years and been described as a "delusional approach to legal issues" ("Land of the Free, Home of the Deluded", Rooney, K., Irish Law Society Gazette, April 2012, p 12.) which arises from a "murky pseudo-legal world" ("Freeman on the Land and Other Organised Lay Litigant Groups – Part 2", Keys, T., [2014] Commercial Law Practitioner). It has proved difficult to discover any case in which any court in any jurisdiction has found the arguments to be meritorious.
