'Historicizing the Historical Turn in Human Rights Studies: Origins, Inequality, and Neoliberalism in the Modern Epoch' by Tomas Wedin and Carl Wilén in (2024) Nordic Journal of Human Rights comments
The historical turn in human rights studies is characterized by a deep cleavage between scholars who locate the origins of human rights in the Atlantic Revolutions of the late 18th century, and scholars who instead focus on the post-WWII period in general, and on the 1970s in particular as a breakthrough decade for international human rights. Against the background of what has been described as the threatened status of human rights today, we contend that the problem of origins remains as crucial as ever before, but that the way in which it is conceived is outdated and in need of reconceptualization in three ways. First, the historical turn should be seen as one body of literature with two distinct phases: one focused on origins and historical continuity and rupture, and a more recent, ongoing phase addressing the relationship between human rights and the concomitant neoliberalization of society and increasing economic inequality. We contend, secondly, that the debate itself needs to be historicized, and that the two thematic phases are rooted in two specific political, ideological, and economic contexts. The debate about origins relate to a pre-2007-2008 financial crisis era, marked by near-universal acceptance of human rights. Meanwhile, the issues of inequality and neoliberalism predominantly emerged in the post-crisis period as human rights faced more and more challenges. Thirdly, we present a theoretical argument for why the distinct issues constituting the two thematic phases should not be separated from each other. Indeed, in this setting, we demonstrate that the question regarding the relation between neoliberalism and human rights presupposes an account of the origins of human rights.
'Demystifying Legal Personhood for Non-Human Entities: A Kelsenian Approach' by Thomas Buocz and Iris Eisenberger in (2023) 43(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 32–53 comments
This article aims to show that minimalist theories of legal personhood are particularly well suited to evaluating legal personhood proposals for non-humans. It adopts the perspective of Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal personhood, which reduces legal persons to bundles of legal norms. Through the lens of Kelsen’s theory, the article discusses two case studies: legal personhood for natural features in New Zealand and legal personhood for robots in the EU. While the New Zealand case was an acclaimed success, the EU’s proposal was heavily criticised and eventually abandoned. The article explains these widely differing outcomes by highlighting the relevant legal norms and their addressees rather than legal personhood itself. It does so by specifying the rights and obligations that constitute the legal persons, by preventing the attribution of any other rights and obligations to these persons and, finally, by tracing who is ultimately addressed by the relevant rights and obligations.
