Interior Ministry officials will be authorized to collect the biometric data - fingerprints and facial contours - of all residents for the purpose of issuing identity cards, passports or other official documents.
As with similar identity regimes in Australia and elsewhere (eg the latest generation of Australian passports), those documents will feature a microprocessor (ie a chip similar to those used in some credit cards and perimeter access cards) that will contain data based on the individual's fingerprints (two fingers) and facial geometry, eg a unique hash generated from an image of the person's face rather than the image itself. Biometric and other information on the databases will be matched with registration information on national databases. That would permit an official to determine, for example, that the photo on an identity document corresponds to the bearer's face but that the individual is using another name and therefore is engaging in an identity offence.
As yet I haven't sighted the legislation. From media reports it appears that the government has mollified some critics through a statutory commitment to establish two discrete databases: one including the card-bearer's name and the other featuring data from the individual's fingerprints and the face. The databases will be established and maintained in two separate ministries and "will be linked by a code". There seem to be no official statements about sharing data with the private sector.
The 'splitting' of initial plans for a central database was an addition to the draft legislation in November, promoted as a safety measure -
so that anyone managing to penetrate one data bank would have only part of the information and it would be meaningless without the information from the other data bank.The Chair of the Knesset Science and Technology Committee claimed -
The protection provided for this data bank is among the best in the world. It is protected at a level of 11 on a scale of one to 10... which sounds impressive but is arguably meaningless. (What's an '11' when the scale ends at '10'? The Bill's sponsor subsequently explained that "if the databases of the Mossad, the Shin Bet and the Prime Minister's Office are currently protected at a level of 10, then this one will be protected at a level of 11".)
Debate about development of the new regime featured the usual claims. A government spokesperson claimed that "there are 350,000 people living in Israel with fraudulent documents including tens of thousands with forged passports" and that forgery of the 'smart' documents will be impossible.
One former police executive offered an exceptionalist argument, commenting that -
in a normal state that does not face the enemies we face, there is no need for such a system. But here we are in an intolerable situation, facing internal and external enemies. The ease with which current Israeli documents can be forged is an enormous problem.He noted that the danger of official misuse of information is present with existing databases.
[Identity documents] are so easily faked. For us, this is an existential issue. There are thousands of people walking around with fake IDs or with no IDs whatsoever. Some are criminals, and others are hostile elements. You would not believe how many suspects we have found who changed their identities to hide previous convictions. Many identities have also been stolen.
Critics expressed concern that information will be leaked or misused, eg "Criminals could steal fingerprint information and use it to incriminate innocent people". Likud Minister Michael Eitan indicated that -
not only will the system threaten the privacy of all Israelis, but even worse, it will create an atmosphere in which everyone will feel their privacy is being invaded.Eitan was not however planning to vote against the law.
Implementation of the law involves a two year trial period, during which participation in the biometric database/s will be voluntary. Three months prior to the end of trial, the government will formally re-assess the regime's effectiveness, with the Prime Minister and Interior minister reporting to a special ministerial committee and to a Knesset committee. If the trial is deemed successful, Interior Ministry officials will be mandated to collect the biometric information without consent. The legislation allows some wriggle room: the Interior Minister will be empowered to extend the trial by an additional two years after provision of the reports, with a requirement that a 'final decision' must be made within four years after initiation of the databases.
