A Melbourne clairvoyant who killed his lawyer after losing his house in a divorce settlement, has won a reduction in his prison sentence.Perhaps the murderer was receiving mixed signals from the celestial aether, his clairvoyance apparently failing to convey bad news in advance regarding the divorce and several judicial decisions, such as DPP v Glascott (Ruling No 4) [2008] VSC 243 and DPP v Glascott (Ruling No 5) [2008] VSC 244.
But his appeal against the conviction was rejected.
The court heard Glascott was so resentful over his failed divorce settlement, that he went to [lawyer David] Robinson's offices with the intention of burning them down.
When Mr Robinson unexpectedly arrived, he shot him dead.
The initial judgment is DPP v Glascott [2008] VSC 236, where the court commented that -
I conclude particularly on the specialist evidence and also having regard to the general evidence that you at the relevant time (July 2006) suffered depression and had some cognitive deficits but that you were fully aware of what you were doing and had full control over what you were doing. In particular you were fully aware of, and had full control of, your acquisition of the Russian pistol and its ammunition, your taking it to Station Street fully loaded, your two attempts to set fire to the solicitor’s premises, your shooting of and assault upon Mr Robinson in order to avoid identification and apprehension, and your flight from the scene. At all times you fully knew the wrongfulness of your conduct. It has not been established that you now are, or ever were, psychotic.The Court stated that -
In all the circumstances I have moderated the sentence to be imposed upon you by reason of your medical history and condition, but do not conclude under well-known principle that general deterrence does not apply or should be moderated in this instance.
Further, I consider that general deterrence has an especial application in this case. That is because resentful persons who seek to punish the caring professions should themselves be discouraged by the law from doing so. It is the proper task of caring professions – lawyers, doctors, welfare persons and many others – to care for unstable persons, which persons can be resentful, brooding and aggressive. As you were. It is the function of the law to protect those caring professions from that incident of their good work.
You are an intelligent, unstable, and aggressive person. Your dealings with your former wife and her family, and their legal counsel, amply demonstrate those characteristics. You have a number of previous convictions. The relevant convictions are three convictions in May 1983 of imposition, for which ultimately you were placed on a good behaviour bond for twelve months; a conviction in April 1985 of being in possession of property suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained, for which you were placed on probation for two years; a conviction in September 1991 of making a false report to police, for which you were fined $500; and a conviction in February 1993 of being employed as an unlicensed agent and for which you were fined $500.
You have an extensive medical history. On the plea comprehensively made on your behalf by your counsel, a substantial body of material was tendered. In considering sentence I have had central regard to it. ... No witnesses, expert or otherwise, were called on your behalf on the plea.
It is evident from those reports that you have a lengthy medical history. You attempted suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning in January 1985. Following the 1985 attempted suicide, you have suffered cognitive defects as the result of brain damage in the region of the globus pallidus bilaterally and the right corona radiata. The principal consequence of this injury is in the area of memory, and also in new learning. However, as noted by the clinical neuropsychologist who examined you on 17 April 2008, Mr J Drury, in his report (p.8) you have "satisfactory cognitive skills across several measures, including verbal reasoning and social judgment". Mr J Drury reported that you have deficits in short-term memory and new learning. You were noted to exhibit no evidence of psychosis, depression or suicidal ideation upon admission in 1985 to the Mont Park Psychiatric Hospital. In April 2006 you were admitted to Sunshine Adult Acute Psychiatric Unit as a possible suicide risk, where you remained for six days and were then discharged. It is clear that you have suffered depression over many years. A distinguished psychiatrist, Dr L Walton, in his report of 2 June 2008 following a review of the medical history and examination of you on 9 April 2008 concluded as follows (p.3):"What can be stated unequivocally is that Mr Glascott is a brain-injured individual. It seems highly likely that he was suffering from significant depressive problems prior to the assault upon his brain with carbon monoxide and there have been recurring depressive problems thereafter, more than likely aggravated by the brain injury.I have had careful regard to the opinion of Dr Walton. However, I regret to say that the generality of his opinion ("It does seem that Mr Glascott has become increasingly paranoid in more recent years" and "it can be safely concluded that he was mentally compromised at the material time") renders it of limited utility. I conclude particularly on the specialist evidence and also having regard to the general evidence that you at the relevant time (July 2006) suffered depression and had some cognitive deficits but that you were fully aware of what you were doing and had full control over what you were doing. In particular you were fully aware of, and had full control of, your acquisition of the Russian pistol and its ammunition, your taking it to Station Street fully loaded, your two attempts to set fire to the solicitor’s premises, your shooting of and assault upon Mr Robinson in order to avoid identification and apprehension, and your flight from the scene. At all times you fully knew the wrongfulness of your conduct. It has not been established that you now are, or ever were, psychotic.
It does seem that Mr Glascott has become increasingly paranoid in more recent years. I suspect that this is a belated consequence of his brain injury as well, as he does not seem to have been observed at any stage in a state of full-blown psychosis.
Simply given the duration of this man’s psychiatric symptoms, it can be safely concluded that he was mentally compromised at the material time.
There was an air of unreality about Mr Glascott’s sense of wellbeing at the time of my assessment. I strongly suspect that in the aftermath of his being convicted and sentenced, he will experience another bout of depression necessitating active treatment.
The combination of this man's chronic depression, brain injury and paranoia, in my opinion, would allow a sentencer to rely upon the principles enunciated in Verdins et al.