I was accordingly amused but unsurprised to see the Western Australia Supreme Court judgment in Deputy Commission of Taxation v Casley [2017] WASC 161 last week.
Le Miere J states
In CIV 3132 of 2016 the plaintiff, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, claims against the defendant, Leonard Casley for debts due and payable for income tax, interest and penalties in respect of the income years ended 30 June 2006 to 30 June 2013. Leonard Casley has entered a conditional appearance and applied for an order that the writ of summons be set aside 'for reasons of jurisdiction'. The Deputy Commissioner has applied for summary judgment.
In CIV 1603 of 2017 the Deputy Commissioner claims against Arthur Casley for debts due and payable for income tax, interest and penalties in respect of the income years ended 30 June 2006 to 30 June 2012. Arthur Casley has applied for an order that the writ of summons be set aside on the ground that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the claims. The Deputy Commissioner has applied for summary judgment. ...
Each of the defendants has filed an affidavit and written submissions and made oral submissions to the effect that the court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant or to hear the matter because they are the sovereign of, or citizen of, the Hutt River Province which is an independent sovereign state. That argument has no legal merit or substance. Anyone can declare themselves a sovereign in their own home but they cannot ignore the laws of Australia or not pay tax.
Each of the defendants advances the pseudo legal straw man argument. The straw man argument has no legal merit or substance. Leonard Casley advances an argument based on the Hutt River Province being the political and financial branch of the church of Nian. That argument has no legal merit or substance. The defendants have made other assertions in their affidavits and submissions which are irrelevant and raise no defence to the claims against them. In each action the defendant has no defence to the claims by the Deputy Commissioner. In each action judgment will be entered in favour of the Deputy Commissioner against each defendant.The judgment states
The jurisdiction argument - secession
[11] Each of the defendants asserts that the court has no jurisdiction over them or no jurisdiction to hear these claims. In essence, they say that the land on which they reside is part of the Principality of Hutt River which seceded from Australia and is no longer part of Australia, that they are the sovereign or a citizen of Hutt River, a sovereign independent state, they are not residents of Australia, the laws of Australia and in particular the taxation laws do not apply to them and this court has no jurisdiction over them.
[12] In 1970 Leonard Casley was a wheat farmer. He was aggrieved by the wheat quotas allocated to his business. He served a notice of secession on the Western Australian Premier, the Governor, the Prime Minister and the Governor General. He also notified the Queen. Since then he has taken other steps which he believes are the acts of an independent sovereign state including declaring war on Australia. He is convinced that, in taking these steps, he succeeded in separating Hutt River from Australia.
[13] Covering cl 5 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) (Constitution Act) relevantly provides: This Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State ... This court is bound by and to give effect to the Constitution Act and to any law made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution, including the TAA.
[14] In 2007 Leonard Casley applied to the High Court to remove two sets of proceedings from the Geraldton Magistrates Court to the High Court under s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Each of the proceedings related to offences of not filing taxation returns. The applicants contended that they reside in the so called Hutt River Province and that that is not part of Australia and not subject to Australian taxation laws. In dismissing their applications Heydon J said:
The arguments advanced by the applicants are fatuous, frivolous and vexatious: Casley v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] HCA Trans 590.
The observations of Heydon J are apt to describe the arguments advanced by the defendants in this case.
Jurisdiction - Straw man
[15] In an affidavit filed by Leonard Casley he swore:
I am the Real Man, Leonard George Casley born at Kalgoorlie Western Australia on 27 August 1925. Upon the registration of my birth certificate, it is claimed that I became a ward of the state. Owing allegiance to the Monarch, under contract and the Monarch undertakes the protection of myself and my property. ... I am Leonard George Casley, a real man not a straw man. The Straw Man is a fictitious body, which does not exist, but is that which is controlled by the State, and the State's judiciary.
An affidavit filed by Arthur Casley contains similar statements. This appears to be a variant of the strange pseudolegal straw man theory. The theory holds that an individual has two personas, one of himself as a real flesh and blood human being and the other, a separate legal personality who is the straw man. The idea is that an individual's debts, liabilities, taxes and legal responsibilities belong to the straw man rather than the physical individual who incurred those obligations, conveniently allowing one to escape their debts and responsibilities. It is all gobbledygook.
Jurisdiction - church of Nain
[16] Leonard Casley referred to the establishment of the church of Nain. In a document filed in the court Mr Casley said that the Hutt River Province Principality is the political and financial branch of the church of Nain. In answer to a question from the court Mr Casley referred to s 116 of the Constitution which precludes the Commonwealth from making laws for establishing any religion, imposing any religious observance or prohibiting the free exercise of any religion. It has nothing to do with the defendants' liability to pay tax.
Other matters advanced by defendants
[17] In affidavits and submissions filed by the defendants they made numerous other statements irrelevant to the issues before the court. They range from the merely irrelevant to the bizarre, such as the statement that the ATO has been utilising a form of torture known as 'Old Hags Nagging'. It is not sensible or a proper use of judicial resources to recite and analyse all of the defendants' utterances masquerading as legal submissions. It is sufficient to say that none of them raises a defence to the Deputy Commissioner's claims or any reason why there ought to be a trial of the claims.
Conclusion
[18] The defendants have not made out any of their assertions that the court does not have jurisdiction over them or jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. The application of each of the defendants to set aside the writ will be dismissed.
Similarly implausible arguments were unsuccessfully raised in ACCC v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Limited [2001] FCA 1062, where the ourt stated
[23] The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the application filed by the Commission. Their contentions focused on claims that the Act was invalid, and that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court as they had seceded from the Commonwealth of Australia and were now citizens of the Principality of Caledonia, having transferred their assets and investments to the Principality.
[24] It was not apparent what were the boundaries of that Principality, but the address of the company and Mr Lyster was 20 Davis Street Kew. The respondents filed a joint affidavit sworn on 19 April 2001 in which they asserted that:
* According to s 7 of the Act, it was the duty of the Governor-General to appoint members of the Commission;
* The post of Governor-General does not hold a legal position or authority to carry out this duty. The position of Governor-General has never existed or held jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the Commonwealth of Australia or the people of Australia as the appointment of each of the Governors-General was invalid because the relevant Letters Patent were not signed under the Royal Sign Manual or by Queen Victoria's heir;
* All employees, members and associate members of the Commission were illegally employed and had no jurisdiction over matters described in the Act;
* As the post of Governor-General was invalid, the Act was invalidly assented to and was unconstitutional, null and void;
* On and from 17 February 1986, the respondents formed the constructive intent to secede from the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Governor of the State of Sherwood had the power to deem the respondents to be Caledonian citizens and to have seceded from that date;
* As Caledonian citizens, the respondents had no allegiance to uphold contracts pertaining to the Commonwealth of Australia and were not beholden to answer to the Commission;
* All members of parliament, ministers of State and justices were invalidly appointed;
* As the respondents were no longer citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia, having chosen to exercise their right of secession, they were immune from the jurisdiction of the Court;
* The former officers of the former de facto government of the Crown and Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, including the Commission, by continuing to assume sovereignty over the people of Australia, represented the imposition over the people of Australia of a foreign power;
* There were no members or employees of the Commission validly appointed at law to cause the issue of demand for relief sought in the Commission's application, to cause the issue of the initial inquiry, to swear any affidavit in support of application for relief, or to appoint and instruct the Australian Government Solicitor (also invalidly or illegally appointed) to prosecute the proceeding.
The respondents also claimed $30 million in damages and sought injunctions directing the Commission to distribute and publish corrective material and directing all unconstitutional government bodies to exempt the respondents' activities.
[25] Similar arguments in respect of the invalidity of certain other legislation were considered and rejected by Hayne J in Joose v Australian Securities & Investment Commission [1998] HCA 78; (1998) 73 ALJR 232 and Helljay Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 56; (1999) 166 ALR 302. In those cases, it was submitted that there had been a break in sovereignty in Australia with the effect that some legislation purportedly passed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or one or more State Parliaments was invalid. Hayne J considered that these submissions confused questions of political sovereignty with the question of identifying the supreme legislative authority recognised in the legal system and the rules for recognising its valid laws. He found that these questions were resolved by cl 5 of the Commonwealth Constitution which provided that the Constitution and the laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution were binding on the Courts, judges and people of every State and every part of the Commonwealth.
[26] The respondents' arguments were also not unlike those considered by Hill J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick [1999] FCA 1580; (1999) 168 ALR 383 in which his Honour rejected an argument that the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) was invalid and made a costs order against the solicitor who had advanced that argument in opposition to a creditor's petition against his client. This decision was upheld by the Full Court in Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 120 FCR 155.
[27] I reject the respondents' submission that the Governors-General have not been properly appointed and that legislation assented to by the Governors-General has not been validly assented to. On 29 October 1900, Queen Victoria issued Letters Patent constituting the office of Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia. Those Letters Patent were passed under the seal of the United Kingdom and issued by Warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual: Commonwealth Gazette (No 1), 1 January 1901. The first Governor-General, Lord Hopetoun, was appointed to his office in accordance with those Letters Patent. The current Letters Patent were issued by Queen Elizabeth II on 21 August 1984 and gazetted in the Commonwealth Special Gazette (No S334), 24 August 1984. The Governor-General at the time the application was filed, Sir William Deane, was appointed to his office in accordance with the current Letters Patent by Commission dated 29 December 1995 passed under the Royal Sign Manual and the Great Seal of Australia and took the oath of allegiance and prescribed oath of office on 16 February 1996: Commonwealth Special Gazette (No S66), 19 February 1996. As each of the Governors-General have been validly appointed, there is no merit in the respondents' contentions that all members of parliament, ministers of State and justices were invalidly appointed or that the Act is invalid.
[28] I also reject the respondents' claims that they are no longer citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia, having chosen to secede. The Commonwealth Constitution recognises the Commonwealth and the States and Territories as the only entities in the federal polity known as the Commonwealth of Australia. An area of land cannot cease to be part of a State in the Commonwealth of Australia except pursuant to s 123 of the Constitution which provides that:
"The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the consent of the Parliament of a State, and the approval of the majority of the electors of the State voting upon the question, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the State, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, and may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect and operation of any increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any State affected."
There are no other constitutional means available for the establishment of any separate political community in Australia. The territory allegedly forming the Principality of Caledonia remains part of Australia and the respondents remain subject to Australian law, including the Act.
[29] The respondents asserted that they had seceded from the Commonwealth of Australia and that the crown land of Australia had been annexed by the Principality of Caledonia through the United Nations. Such an assertion is quite untenable and I reject it. The respondents were not able to produce a copy of the instrument by which the transfer was effected at the hearing. The Commission produced evidence of the incorporation of the company under the Corporations Law and evidence that Mr Lyster and Ms Glover were directors and secretaries of the company. Mr Lyster and Ms Glover acknowledged (as was disclosed by a search obtained from records of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission) that they were directors and secretaries of the company and that the company carried on business at 20 Davis Street Kew, which is geographically within the State of Victoria and, therefore, part of the Commonwealth of Australia. ...
In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Purple Harmony Plates Pty Limited (No 3) [2002] FCA 1487 the Court states
Mr Lyster filed an affidavit on 24 October 2002 in which he contended that my judgment, which I took to be a reference to the 6 August order, was of no effect. The affidavit is discursive and difficult to comprehend, but I take Mr Lyster to be asserting that I had no jurisdiction to make the orders on 6 August 2001 and 9 April 2002. Mr Lyster maintained that he was the Head of State of the Principality of Caledonia, and that his title was:
"H.R.H. Prince Neal Arthur Lyster
(i) Prince Palatine of the Kingdom of Heaven and Earth,
(ii) Bishop of St David's Diocese Southern Cross appointed by Hereditary Constable Foley in keeping with the Customs and traditions of the Church in Wales,
(iii) Governor of H.M. Government of the Commonwealth of Caledonia Australis".
The address of Mr Lyster shown on his affidavit was stated to be "20 Davis Street, Kew, the Principality of Caledonia, Australia 3101". He contended that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court and that he had been advised by a person who he described as "Ab Beth Din" that my previous judgments were unconstitutional and null and void. He asserted that effect is not given to the decision of a judge delivered in excess of his or her jurisdiction.
28 Mr Lyster contended in his affidavit that there were decisions of two courts which supported his submission that I did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claims made by the Commission against him. Mr Lyster tendered as an exhibit a "Conditional notice of intention to defend" in the Magistrates' Court at Ipswich, Queensland in which the Ipswich City Council was the plaintiff. Mr Lyster appeared to be saying that the document was an order or judgment of the court, but it is not.
[29] Mr Lyster also relied upon the decision of Cooper J in Gunter v Hollingworth [2002] FCA 943. In that case the applicant filed a petition in the High Court of Australia sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns. The petition related to the general election for the House of Representatives and half of the Senate held on 10 November 2001. The petition was referred by the High Court for trial to the Federal Court in the Queensland District Registry. The Australian Electoral Commission, which was a respondent to the petition, filed a summons seeking that the petition be dismissed on the grounds that:
* the Court of Disputed Returns had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition as it sought relief on the ground that the entirety of the general election was void;
* by virtue of s 358(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) no proceeding could be had on the petition as it did not comply with s 355(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) because it failed to set out facts which would invalidate any election or return.
Cooper J was satisfied that both grounds of objection had been made out and that the petition should be dismissed.
[30] Two of the respondents to the petition claimed to appear as citizens of the Independent Sovereign State of Australia. They apparently contended that they were not citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia and they supported the petition. They also sought orders to the effect that, as citizens of the Principality of Acworth, they were not citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia and were exempt from observing a number of statutory provisions applicable to citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia. Mr Lyster appeared to submit that Cooper J accepted this contention or submission. Cooper J did not do so. In relation to those particular respondents, as well as other respondents in the proceeding, Cooper J was concerned with, inter alia, the situation whether a person who was not entitled to vote at a particular election had the right to appear on a petition challenging such election and to be made a party to it. The reasons for judgment of Cooper J do not support the proposition for which Mr Lyster contended.
[31] I reject Mr Lyster's submission that my previous judgments were unconstitutional and null and void and I reject the proposition that I have acted in excess of jurisdiction and that effect is not to be given to my earlier judgments and orders. I reject Mr Lyster's contention that he is a Head of State, holds the positions or titles for which he contends and that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. I am satisfied that I had the power and the jurisdiction to make the earlier orders on 6 August 2001 and 9 April 2002 ...
[58] Unlike Ms Glover, Mr Lyster has made no apology to the Court and has been quite unrepentant. He does not recognise the authority or jurisdiction of the Court and does not regard himself as required to perform any obligations imposed upon him by order of the Court. Notwithstanding the findings I made in my reasons for judgment on 6 August 2001, Mr Lyster continues to maintain that he is not subject to the authority or jurisdiction of the Court and is entitled to disregard the Court's authority and jurisdiction because in some manner he has seceded from the Commonwealth and has established the Principality of Caledonia. He Is under a misapprehension in this respect. ...
[60] Ordinarily, in such circumstances I would be disposed to order a term of imprisonment for Mr Lyster and direct that a warrant for his committal to prison be issued and executed forthwith. However, having listened to Mr Lyster on a number of occasions I am satisfied that he lacks a full appreciation of the seriousness of the position in which he now finds himself. I am satisfied that he does not appreciate fully that he is subject to two Court orders which require him to carry out certain acts and that if he does not comply with them it is open to the Court to order that he be committed to prison for a period of time. However I take into account the fact that he has not been legally represented and does not appear to have had access to competent legal advice. Mr Lyster is labouring under a delusion that he is the head of state of a non-existent state and that his conduct is beyond the reach of the laws of Australia. Mr Lyster should realise he is quite wrong in this respect. He is obliged to comply with the laws of Australia and orders of the Federal Court of Australia.
[61] In the interests of justice I consider that the appropriate course for me to take is to bring home to Mr Lyster, as I have, the seriousness of his conduct in refusing to recognise the authority and jurisdiction of the Court, and to give him an opportunity to alter his position and recognise the authority and jurisdiction of the Court by complying with the orders I have made and propose to make. If he is prepared to do so he will be able to avoid a term of imprisonment as I propose to order that a warrant for his committal to prison for one month issue and lie in the Registry and not be executed provided Mr Lyster complies with a number of conditions. If he is not prepared to do so it will follow that the warrant issued for his committal to prison for a period of one month be executed.
