Accountability

'Participatory Accountability at the Dawn of Artificial Intelligence' (King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2019-31) by Perry Keller comments

 In making a myriad things more efficient and convenient, advanced data analytics are also opening our lives to unjustifiable biases and unseen manipulations. It is, however, less often considered that algorithmic decision making is also progressively changing the nature of liberal democratic forms of governance. In particular, they are rendering direct public participation in transparency and accountability mechanisms unsustainable. In this paper, I address that question in three steps. 

First, using the idea of participatory accountability, the paper explains the importance of information access rights to public engagement in governance. Outwardly, these rights are dispersed across distinctively different fields of law, including freedom of information, data protection and litigation laws and procedures. Yet, in practice, they not only share similarities in design and application, but also benefit from a contemporary political ethos that celebrates public knowledge and scrutiny of authority and power. Their impact on liberal democratic governance, moreover, often lies in their mass and random power to force the disclosure of information. Participatory accountability in the United Kingdom, however, is largely focused on these transparency tools, leaving citizens to pursue accountability as they see fit through diverse processes of litigation, judicial review, regulatory complaint or media publicity.

Second, the paper turns to the complexity and opacity of data analytics and the challenge this poses for direct public participation in algorithmic governance. This challenge goes well beyond a lack of technical expertise in the general public. Deliberately restricted by design and doctrine to limit compliance burdens and disclosure risks, public information access rights cannot be used to compel controllers of algorithmic decision making to provide systemic explanations of their data sources, purposes and outputs. In short, participatory accountability is under-equipped for the future and is, consequently, losing its force and direction. Solutions will, furthermore, need to be as transformational as the societal consequences of data analytics. The answer does not, however, lie in enhanced access rights enabling the public to demand systemic explanations at will. The compliance and disclosure harms of that mass empowerment would undoubtedly outweigh its public transparency benefits.

Third, the paper proposes workable solutions that avoid both the harms of mass empowerment and the alternative of remote and paternalist forms of algorithmic governance. Taking inspiration from the European Court of Human Rights judgement in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary recognising an ECHR Article 10 derivative information access right, I argue that enhanced public access rights, including a power to compel systemic explanations of algorithmic decision making, should be recognised for qualifying media and societal watchdog organisations and individuals.

In addition, where full public transparency is not possible, regulatory and self-regulatory mechanisms should be opened up to greater public participation, in particular for such watchdog organisations. As trusted intermediaries representing the public interest, statutory regulators should, in particular, resist the current rationales of paternalism in algorithmic governance. Relaxation of legal barriers to direct public agency in accountability processes, as exemplified by the Court of Appeal’s recent judgement in Lloyd v Google regarding representative actions, should also be pursued. While a cautious approach to enhanced litigation rights is understandable, more flexibility in representative actions will be necessary as data analytics move beyond the knowledge and resources of the average citizen or consumer and the assistance of better equipped watchdog organisations becomes essential.

'What causes employees to whistle while they work? Factors affecting internal whistle‐blowing in the Australian Public Service' by Jeannette Taylor in (2019) Australian Journal of Public Administration comments

What causes employees in the Australian Public Service (APS) to internally blow the whistle on corruption in the workplace? This research examines the impact of the nature of corruption, organisational culture, and employees’ work attitudes and actions on internal whistle‐blowing in the APS. The respondents were found to internally blow the whistle for most types of corruption: fraud, conflict of interest, unlawful disclosure of government information, and perverting the course of justice. Their whistle‐blowing behaviour was, however, unaffected by observations of theft of official assets. They were also unlikely to report observations of cronyism and nepotism. Active observers of workplace bullying (those who have blown the whistle after witnessing someone else being bullied) were three times more likely to also internally report corruption than inactive observers of bullying.

 Taylor states

 What causes employees in the Australian Public Service (APS) to internally blow the whistle on corruption in the workplace? What types of corruption are they more or less likely to internally report in the APS? What types of organisational culture encourage or discourage internal whistle‐blowing? And what work attitudes and behaviours are significantly associated with internal whistle‐blowing? For example, are whistle‐blowers in the APS disgruntled employees or are they satisfied, committed, and productive employees? It is the aim of this research to address these questions. 

In the process, this research addresses several gaps in the whistle‐blowing literature and corruption issues in the Australian public sector. First, although corruption is multifaceted, most whistle‐blowing research has adopted a unidimensional approach to examine it (Andersson, 2017). There have been few studies conducted on whistle‐blowing by type of corruption, particularly in the public sector and in a non‐U.S. setting (Caillier, 2017; Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004). In addition, although whistle‐blowing studies by type of corruption have included fraud and other forms of corruption, most have failed to include cronyism and nepotism, two examples of corruption related to favouritism (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013). Yet, cronyism and nepotism are the most prevalent forms of corruption in the Australian federal and state public sectors (APSC, 2018; CCC, 2017; IBAC, 2017; ICAC and OPI, 2018). This research examines the impact of different types of corruption, from fraud to cronyism on internal whistle‐blowing in the APS, particularly comparing nepotism and cronyism with other forms of corruption. 

Second, several investigations of corruption cases in the Australian public sector have pointed to the organisation's culture (e.g. CCC, 2017; IBAC, 2017). Public sector studies examining the relationship between organisational culture and whistle‐blowing are, however, rare (Lavena, 2016; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006). The few studies of culture on whistle‐blowing have also produced inconclusive findings. It is timely to examine the effects of different types of organisational culture on internal whistle‐blowing in the APS. 

Third, despite earlier research indicating that whistle‐blowers are not disloyal or dissatisfied employees (Miceli & Near, 1988), negative stereotypes of whistle‐blowers continue to persist in the workplace (Wortley, Cassematis, & Donkin, 2008). This issue highlights the value of more research across various contexts, such as in the APS. As we gain more understanding about the characteristics of whistle‐blowers through more empirical evidence across different contexts, we can finally put to rest any misperceptions about whistle‐blowers. Further, although research on whistle‐blowing has identified various personal and situational antecedents (Miceli & Near, 2005; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990; van der Wal, Graycar, & Kelly, 2016), they have not examined the effects of work behaviours on whistle‐blowing behaviour. This research examines whether employees who report about the occurrence of one type of wrongdoing in the workplace (witnessing someone else being bullied) are more likely to report about the occurrence of another type of wrongdoing in the workplace (witnessing someone else engaging in corruption). This article starts by defining workplace corruption and whistle‐blowing. It also discusses the significance of internal whistle‐blowing as a control mechanism against workplace corruption.