The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) begins with the striking claim that the ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. Rather than use words that individualise and universalise in abstract terms, the Declaration describes humanity as an extended family, knit together by ties that are personal, natural and communal. Despite this, the rights enshrined within the Declaration and other international human rights instruments have generally been understood in a way that prioritises the rights of individuals, and the concept of human dignity is often cited in a way that connects it with individual autonomy. However, a close examination of these instruments shows them to presuppose a social ontology in which human beings are not merely isolated individuals, but constituted as members of communities at familial, local, regional, national and global scales. An exploration of this communal embedding of the dignity of all members of the human family has implications for how international human rights are understood, particularly in controversial cases where the rights of human beings conceived as individuals have to be harmonised with the rights of human beings living in community with others. A better understanding of the social ontology presupposed by international human rights law is therefore a prerequisite for addressing problems of harmonisation of this kind.
Noting that the individualistic aspects of human rights law is often said to reflect Western influence, this paper traces the historical development of the idea of human dignity in classical, medieval, reformed and modern Western thought. It is argued that while the older classical conception of dignity understood it to be an attribute that set some classes or groups of human beings apart from others, the idea was transformed under the influence Stoic philosophy and especially Christian theology into an attribute possessed by all human beings by virtue of their created nature. In the early and later medieval and reformed perspectives, human dignity was understood to be an attribute of all human persons, conceived not as autonomous and atomised individuals, but as embedded in a great variety of associations and communities. Moreover, in the classical, medieval and reformed conceptions alike, dignity was considered to be something that can never be separated from one’s moral responsibilities as a human being called upon to perform the duties associated with one’s particular callings and stations in life. It is only in certain modern conceptions that human dignity has become disassociated from the qualities of one’s character and from the associations and communities in which human beings are naturally embedded.
It follows that international human rights law, insofar as it recognises a social ontology which is simultaneously individualistic, associational and communal, is not entirely oriented to modern Western atomising conceptions of human dignity, but embraces older Western and possibly wider non-Western conceptions as well.'Dignity Transacted' by Lu-In Wang and Zachary W Brewster in (2019) 53 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform comments
In interactive customer service encounters, the dignity of the parties becomes the currency of a commercial transaction. Service firms that profit from customer satisfaction place great emphasis on emotional labor, the work that service providers do to make customers feel cared for and esteemed. But performing emotional labor can deny dignity to workers, by highlighting their subservience and requiring them to suppress their own emotions in an effort to elevate the status and experiences of their customers. Paradoxically, the burden of performing emotional labor may also impose transactional costs on some customers by facilitating discrimination in service delivery. Drawing on the extant scholarship on emotional labor and ongoing research on full-service restaurants, we argue that the strain and indignities of performing emotional labor, often for precarious compensation, lead servers to adopt various coping strategies, including some that open the door to their delivery of inferior and inhospitable service. When these strains and indignities are coupled with culturally entrenched racial stereotypes and racialized discourse in the workplace, the result is that people of color—a legally protected category of customers—are systematically denied dignity and equality by being excluded from the benefits of welcoming and caring customer service. Discriminatory customer service often is so subtle and ambiguous that it escapes legal accountability. It nevertheless warrants our attention, because it contributes to the social and economic marginalization of people of color. Far from being a mundane or trivial concern, the dynamics described in this article underscore the various ways in which particular groups come to be designated as suitable targets for a wide range of disregard and mistreatment. These dynamics also illuminate how structural conditions facilitate and promote economic discrimination, as well as the connections between workers’ rights and civil rights.
South Australia has followed Victoria in issuing prohibition orders regarding Kambô, of interest for scholars regarding the regulation of new age medicine. The orders are based on Health and Community Services Complaints Act 2004 (SA) s 56C.
The South Australian Health & Community Services Complaints Commissioner (HCSCC) media release refers to prohibition orders against Ms Carlie J Angel and Mr Brad T Williams (trading as Two Wolves – One Body - noted elsewhere on this blog).
The orders prohibit Ms Carlie Angel, Mr Brad Williams and the entity Two Wolves – One Body, either personally or through or in connection with another person or entity, from:
- providing health services that involves, or is any way related to, Kambô or Sananga services of any description on an indefinite basis; and
- offering, advertising or otherwise promoting health services that involves, or is any way related to, Kambô or Sananga services of any description on an indefinite basis.
The prohibition orders follow an investigation by the HCSCC, during which expert evidence was obtained concluding that there are no clinical data which indicates any medical benefits arising from the application of Kambô treatments.
Significantly, the expert opinion is that the application of Kambô and Sananga treatments have a range of adverse physiological effects. In the case of Kambô, these may include vomiting, diarrhoea, dehydration, electrolyte loss, and hypotension and tachycardia in individuals with underlying cardiovascular issues.
Deaths, whilst rare, have been reported.
In the case of Sananga, reports of pain, ranging from mild to severe, have been documented.
Associate Professor Davies explained that this evidence was reason behind issuing the prohibition orders.
“After receiving the expert advice, it was clear to me that Kambô and Sananga could be very dangerous for some individuals,” Associate Professor Davies said.
“From the expert evidence, I have formed the view they are unsafe, and that the effectiveness of such treatments cannot be guaranteed. “I have decided to issue the indefinite prohibition orders to protect South Australians from potential harm from these practices. ;
