In Stamp & Ors v Capital Home Loans Ltd (t/a CHL Mortgages) & Ors [2024] EWHC 1092 (KB) the Court states
The outcome of the applications now before the Court is that all three claims are to be struck out. This outcome is not just a justification of the Defendants, it is also a mercy to Claimants who appear to have invested much in claims that are founded upon false learning and false hope. No one wants to be taken in by such things any longer than is really necessary. There are often understandable reasons why people are taken in, particularly where their circumstances are difficult and the temptation exists to seek a prize or windfall which others in better circumstances may not be distracted by. But once a deceit is exposed, however disagreeable this may be, it is better to shake dust from feet and move on. In these claims, and the far greater number they represent, the prize has appeared to be to recover compensation equal to the value of a mortgage, and better still the value of the property against which it is secured, as a consequence of a mortgage lender transferring the mortgage debt owed, to them, to a third party. It is to all intents and purposes a 'get-rich-quick' scheme. Only it is nothing of the sort because the arguments that it relies upon, and which have clearly been made available to people to widely adopt, are so misconceived as to be fundamentally wrong. This deceit is all the uglier because the material that forms the building blocks of the claims (and the large group of claims) is a nonsensical and harmful mix of legal words, terms, maxims, extracts and statutes which are designed to look and sound good, at least to some. But they stand only as an approximation of a claim in law, a parody of the real thing. This is not only harmful to those finding themselves relying upon this material but, given the scale of that reliance and the volume of cases generated, it unjustifiably draws heavily upon the resources of the Court. Because these resources are publicly funded they are finite and need to be properly managed so that they are available to all users of the Court, and in fair measure. ...
The claim form is accompanied by separate particulars of claim as well as a witness statement from the Claimant the lucidity of which is rarely matched amongst the other documents that are relied upon. Mr Stamp complains that the mortgage he agreed with the Defendant, CHL, was 'miss- sold' to him because CHL went on to assign or transfer its interest in the mortgage to a third party, a so- called (in banking parlance) Special Purchase Vehicle (the 'SPV'). By this Mr Stamp alleges CHL sought unjust enrichment although no particulars of such, in law or fact, are given. Mr Stamp refers to this activity by CHL as "legal manoeuvres" which is a description we see repeated in other claims. He maintains that the result is that he now has no contract with CHL but only a contract with the SPV. He contends the assignment of the mortgage to have been a 'true sale' of the mortgage and to have been unlawfully concealed by CHL, for tax-avoidance purposes, from both himself as borrower and HM Land Registry. By this concealment "the world remains ignorant of these events" is how Mr Stamp describes this (a description relied upon by all three claimants) and CHL are said to be in breach of section 33 of the Land Registration Act 1925.
It is further alleged that CHL's conduct has been a "violation of fundamental constitutional rights". This assertion relies upon the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right 1628, the Treaty of Ripon 1640, Habeus Corpus Act 1679, the Coronation Oath Act 1688, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Treason Act 1795, the Judicature Act 1873, and on to the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2010, The European Union Act 2018 and concludes with the flourish Nemo me impune lacessit in a witting, or unwitting, nod to the fearsome history of service proudly borne by the Scots Guards. It is not explained how this long list establishes a violation of Mr Stamp's rights under the mortgage he agreed with CHL. It is difficult to see how mention of so many elderly statutes was intended to persuade the Court to find in Mr Stamp's favour. It is more likely that it was intended to sound credible and to encourage others to rely upon material like it in making a similar claim. If this is so, then the intention is a deceitful one. Mr Whitworth's claim was issued on 13 September 2023. His wish is to receive damages of around £712,000.
The claim was accompanied by Particulars of Claim and supported by a statement that included a statement of truth signed by Mr Whitworth (albeit not in compliance with CPR 22PD.2). Much of the claim form is identical to that presented by Mr Stamp. The Particulars complain of a "true sale of my mortgage" by the Defendant, Lloyds Bank ('Lloyds') by which is meant an assignment of the mortgage by Lloyds, to a Special Purpose Vehicle, a 'securitisation' which Mr Whitworth says was concealed from him; and so "the world remains ignorant of these events". It is alleged that following these "legal manoeuvres" Mr Whitworth, "never had and no longer has", a contract with Lloyds. It is contended therefore that Mr Whitworth's mortgage was thereby "mis-sold" to him and Lloyds proceeded to unjust enrichment, and that he is a victim of an unlawful act with Lloyds having violated his "fundamental constitutional rights". Like Mr Stamp, Mr Whitworth pins his hopes on the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right 1628, the Treaty of Ripon 1640, Coronation Oath Act 1688, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Treason Act 1795, the Judicature Act 1873, and so on to the Human Rights Act 1998. The Defendant points out that there is no obvious connection between this long list of legislation and any dispute between Mr Whitworth and Lloyds.
The third claim is that of Mr Le Clere. It was issued on 7 December 2023 and accompanied by Particulars of Claim running to 10 pages with a statement of truth. He too complains of the, now familiar, "legal manoeuvres" by the Defendant, the Bank of Scotland ('BoS'), whereby assignments of the mortgage took place to a third party, as part of a securitisation of the debt owed to the bank. It is contended that these assignments were deliberately concealed from Mr Le Clere and HM Land Registry. It is alleged that the assignments that took place were illegal, fraudulent and criminal, or at least that they might have been. But Mr Le Clere, who is clearly a man not short of curiosity or ability, does have to accept that he does not actually know these things to be true. He also accepts that in this regard his claim is a speculative one. He says that he has asked to see the contract, and deed of assignment and indemnity insurance that relate to his mortgage and that he has not received the full provision of documents from the Defendant that he was expecting and that would put his mind to rest. All of this he characterises as a violation of his fundamental constitutional rights and as a failure by BoS to exercise its public duty, or function, thereby "bringing the administration of justice into disrepute". He complains of a decision that was incorrect by reason of procedural irregularity and decision-making that took into account improper considerations and entirely missed relevant ones. The impugned decision itself though is not identified. Among others he relies upon the Magna Carta 1297, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Scottish Claim of Right Act 1689, the Union with Scotland Act 1706, Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the European Communities Act 1972 and Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006. ...
In all the circumstances Mr Stamp's claim ought properly to be described as incoherent and making no sense and/or failing to disclose a legally recognisable claim. For these very reasons CPR 3.4(2)(a) caters for such claims in providing for them to be struck out. Further CPR 3.4(2)(b) provides for a claim to be struck out where the Court considers it an abuse of process or otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. This ground for striking out includes statements of case which are unreasonably vague or incoherent and indeed so badly drafted that they do not make clear the case the defendant has to meet. A claim like Mr Stamp's, that asserts "I exercise my constitutional rights, Magna Carta 1215,Petition of Right 1628, Treaty of Ripon 1640,, Habeaus Corpus Act 1679, Coronation Oath 1688, Bill of Rights 1689, Act of Settlement 1701, Treason Act 1795…", and more, amongst others, is unlikely to pass scrutiny when challenged. Likewise, particulars of claim that contend "the problem is that wartime legislation has not required any change which deals with the Courts and constitution. They still have all the methods of judicial control; what has changed have been the powers of Government", with no reference to the facts or matters supposedly in dispute between the parties. No defendant to a claim like this can reasonably be expected to understand what the relevance of these passages might be and what it is they have to answer. Even less may the Court see a way in which it might begin to justify a claimant who relies upon this. For these reasons the application to strike out the claim must succeed. ...
The totality of claims that are the subject of this judgment have not revealed the full extent of the source, and nature, of encouragement and co-ordination that lies behind them but there is every appearance of deceit, of abuse and contempt of Court, and it is a matter of time before a full picture of these comes to light. Anyone drawn into bringing claims like this should be cautious. Those that promote them are duly warned. Claims that are presented with these characteristics can expect the Court's mercy and forbearance to be particularly limited. Claimants that are unable to explain the meaning of words that they appear to rely upon can expect to be frustrated and to lose money in the payment of fees that cannot be recovered and in costs ordered against them. Claimants that rely upon stock templates that are purchased by or given to them and that are nonsensical can expect to incur the Court's displeasure. Those indifferent towards wasting the Court's resources can anticipate having claims stayed or struck out and costs ordered against them. Claims listing elderly statutes and home-made legal labels and maxims can expect to be identified as being totally without merit. Those failing to comply with orders directing them in ways clearly aimed at providing assistance to the Court cannot expect to cast themselves in the light of being genuine and credible parties to justice. Those that pursue abusive claims can expect to be made the subject of orders that curtail their ability to adversely impact upon the proper and efficient administration of justice.
In NNRM v The Commissioner of Police & Anor [2024] QDC 64 Cash DCJ states
The appellant’s submissions
[7] With these principles in mind, I turn to the appellant’s notice of appeal. The notice begins with, but soon abandons, the usual form for notices of appeal under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). At the very beginning, the appellant recites: Take notice without ill will and with just cause that, for [NAME NAME NAME NAME] appeals against the whole of the decision/order* of trading name CS Benson...
[8] The document is signed in the following manner: by:[Name]-[Name]-[Name]:[Name], all rights reserved UCC308.
[9] I take the latter to be a reference to section 308 of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States of America. This section is intended to permit contracting parties to reserve legal rights. It has no application in Queensland or Australia which – it is trite to observe – are not governed by the statute law of the United States. The appellant’s references, during oral submissions, to the District of Colombia – where he asserts Queensland is registered as a trading corporation – do nothing to persuade me that the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States is of any relevance whatsoever.
[10] To those who have had even a glancing exposure to the discredited alternative legal theories known as pseudolaw, what I have already mentioned is enough to raise the alarm. ...
[22] The notice of appeal did not suggest the appellant had much prospect of success. His position was not improved by the contents of the 46-page document filed by him as an ‘outline of appeal’. It was a document complete with a postage stamp in the top left corner on the first page. The drafting of the document implies that the appellant subscribes to the so-called strawman argument, and other discredited pseudolegal theories.
[23] So far as I am able to discern any actual argument in the document, I will deal with it.
[24] First, the appellant asserts the court had no jurisdiction because section 4 of the Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld) was not engaged. The appellant is right about the latter and wrong about the former. That is because the court was exercising the jurisdiction granted to it pursuant to the DFVPA. Section 4 of the Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld) was irrelevant. There is no merit in this complaint.
[25] Next, the appellant writes: Statement of counsel in brief or in argument are not sufficient for a summary judgment, see Trinsey v Pagliaro.
[26] I do not know what this means in the context of the hearing or the appeal. Trinsey v Pagliaro was a decision of a United States Federal District Court Judge in Philadelphia in 1964. It stands for the proposition that a court in the United States asked to give summary judgment will not act upon assertions of fact from the bar table. In what appears to be an ex-tempore decision, Judge Wood said: The defendant’s motion to dismiss ... is incomplete because it requests this Court to consider facts outside the record which have not been presented in the form required by [the] Rules. Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.
[27] This is an unexceptional proposition, and one which would largely apply in this jurisdiction as well. But it is irrelevant to this appeal where the record contains all that is necessary to decide the matter.
[28] I am guessing the appellant discovered this case during an internet search, as it appears that the case has some traction among pseudolawyers, who rely upon it to argue that attorneys cannot present facts to a court. The principle in Trinsey v Pagliaro has morphed into the mistaken belief that whenever an attorney refers to a fact – whether proved in evidence or not – it is objectionable. Not only is the pseudolawyers’ understanding of the principle wrong, they often misunderstand the citation and claim it is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is not, though there may have been an unsuccessful attempt to engage the Supreme Court of the United States who declined to take the case. As an aside, the apparent popularity of this decision in some circles is attested to by the ability to buy a T-shirt with the case and the last sentence above printed upon it.
[29] Third, the appellant asserts bias again, and again without evidence.
[30] Next, the appellant deals at length with his asserted errors of fact. These include such weighty and significant matters as the Magistrate stating that the application was ‘brought by police’ when it was actually commenced by a single police officer, or that the appellant ‘represented himself’ when in truth he claims to have appeared as some kind of agent for a separate legal entity. The former is of no legal consequence and the latter is wrong, for reasons that I have already expressed in R v Sweet. A repetition of this claim by the appellant when discussing service of a notice by police is similarly of no assistance to him.
[31] Apart from one matter, it is unnecessary to give further consideration to the appellant’s claims as to errors of fact. They are either not made out or are of no consequence. But there is one matter to be mentioned which does not favour the appellant in this appeal. In January 2017, the appellant violently assaulted the second respondent. The results of his violence upon her were shown in photographs and evidence at the hearing. The appellant was convicted by a Magistrate and sentenced to imprisonment for 15 months but was released immediately on parole.
[32] The appellant asserts the Magistrate was wrong to say he had assaulted the second respondent because the ‘[Name]’ sitting in the courtroom was not the trust, or estate, or trading vessel constituted by the name printed on the criminal history, which was written in capital letters. This curious and wrong assertion – another instance of what has been described as the ‘strawman duality’ or ‘strawman argument’ – appears to derive ultimately from a style guide that stipulates that corporations should be named using capital letters. It is wrong in law and does not help the appellant.
[33] The manner in which his name was printed on the criminal history did not change the fact that he has been found to have committed that offence. His denial during the hearing that he committed the offence was a matter which diminished his credit, to which the Magistrate properly had regard.
[34] Next, the appellant complains that while the rules of evidence did not apply to the hearing (see section 145 of the DFVPA), he was prevented from cross-examining the second respondent by the same ‘rules of evidence’. This misunderstands the effect of the complementary legislation found in the DFVPA dealing with protected witnesses. The statutory prohibition on the appellant cross-examining the second respondent in section 151 of the DFVPA is not a ‘rule of evidence ...applying to courts of record’ for the purposes of section 145 of that Act.
[35] In this court, the appellant objected to the Magistrate’s reference to his ideas as being similar to those proffered by so-called ‘sovereign citizens’. He complains this was a defamatory slur and he denied identifying as a ‘sovereign citizen’. The only curiosity of the appellant’s position is that it demonstrates a shift in the landscape of pseudolaw. Adherents have come to recognise that the term ‘sovereign citizen’ carries negative connotations, and now go to some length to attempt to disassociate themselves from the term, despite repeating the same tired and discredited ideas long associated with so-called ‘sovereign citizens’. ...
[37] There follows a brief diversion via the Fair Trading Act, which is of no relevance.
[38] Then on page 23 of the writing, the appellant comes to something which might matter, if he were right. He submits that the messages providing evidence of his acts of domestic violence were not admissible. Unfortunately for the appellant, the asserted basis for this proposition misunderstands the common law as it relates to ‘without prejudice’ offers in civil proceedings. The appellant apparently believed that by writing that the messages were private, or sent with rights reserved, they could not be used or admitted in either criminal proceedings or proceedings under the DFVPA. This belief is wrong and the messages were properly available for the Magistrate to consider.
[39] Of course, no pseudolaw submissions would be complete without a reference to either Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights. The appellant chooses the latter, but it avails him not. The provision he cites was intended to address a supposed abuse by James II in levying fines and forfeitures in a summary matter. When William and Mary were invited to take the throne, they agreed to prohibit such conduct, among many other things listed in the Bill. A prohibition on the levying of such fines without due process – assuming that is the effect of the Bill of Rights in Queensland, which is a very questionable proposition – is irrelevant to this appeal. In any event, if there is any inconsistency between the Bill and Queensland legislation, it is within the legislative competency of the Parliament to repeal the effect of the Bill.
[40] Much of what I have set out above is wrong or misguided, but with a little effort, can be understood. There remains, however, parts of the appellant’s writings that defy comprehension.
[41] First, there is the assertion that: Cameron Dick issued a 10 billion global note, note, 13th January 2023 to trade on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange via the Deutsche Bank and with in cahoots with of big banks listed in the note.
[42] I do not know what this means, or how it is relevant, and I was unable to understand the submissions directed by the appellant toward that topic.
[43] Next, there are a series of disconnected assertions which, taken together, produce a claim that the appellant is to be paid some $28 million, being $5.7 million for each year that the protection order will be in place. This is based on the combination of a “fee schedule”, the United States Commercial Code, and what is said to be a ‘Calderbank’ offer (though Calderbank is spelt ‘Caulderbank'). Presumably, the appellant means Calderbank v Calderbank. While reference to this case might indicate an intriguing combination of real law and pseudolaw, the decision of the English Court of Appeal in a case about costs is not relevant here. Otherwise, the idea that the appellant might be entitled to $28 million as a result of this proceeding, much less that I have the power to order it, is so disconnected from reality as to be concerning.
[44] I cannot leave the appellant’s writings without noticing his apparent response to my dismissal of the strawman argument in R v Sweet. Having quoted my conclusion that a ‘human being is also a legal person’, the appellant goes on to write:
Human is not man Human means as defined: see Monster Monster means: Person is like a Human being defined as “Monster” would be type of animal/beast thing, res, that cannot own property Hu-man is sort of Shade or colour of man, a hue, and Human is a law merchant type term imposition presumption as a legal person, legal fiction, in a legal setting of legal proceedings, are not lay terms.
[45] The appellant proceeds to assert, I think, that the DFVPA is part of the ‘merchant law’ as distinct from admiralty law but does not explain why that is so or why that matters.
[46] None of this is in any way a rebuttal of my reasoning in R v Sweet which, in my view, remains an entire answer to the spurious suggestions of people like the appellant that they are possessed of distinct natural and legal personalities.
[47] Finally, I would note that the Magistrate’s careful, detailed and correct analysis of the messages sent by the appellant show why he committed acts of domestic violence. Having reached that conclusion in this case, it was practically inevitable that the Magistrate would find a protection order was necessary and desirable.
[48] The appellant has failed to show any error. The appeal he has brought is vexatious and a waste of the time of the respondents and the court.
