A pseudolaw exponent relying on an AI hallucination (time travelling Denning MR)?
In Pitter & Baier (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 197 Riethmuller J states
The appellant challenged the Court's jurisdiction relying upon pseudolegal arguments. This challenge was rejected by the primary judge: at [90]-[101]. The primary judge found that the appellant posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children based upon a number of reasons set out in the judgment, including: (a) The appellant’s view that the children were his property, referring to the five-year-old children as his "young women" and "property" (at [62],[63], [133] and [156]); ...
The appellant sets out six grounds of appeal. Grounds 3 and 6 are dealt with first, as they go to questions of jurisdiction, followed by Ground 1 as it goes to questions of procedural fairness.
6. Jurisdictional and Legal Misinterpretation:
The trial judge misinterpreted the father’s legal arguments regarding jurisdiction and the application of sovereign citizen terminology, which led to a dismissal of his legitimate concerns about the court’s authority and procedural conduct.
The judge did not properly address the legal principles under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), specifically the requirements for determining the best interests of the children in the context of the evidence presented by both parties.
The appellant’s Summary of Argument filed 24 July 2024 argues these grounds on the basis of: (a) “the dismissal of jurisdictional challenges”; and (b) “the exclusion of critical evidence, such as mental health assessments and drug testing results”.
The appellant’s arguments as to jurisdiction were cryptic, being framed in the style of pseudolegal arguments (see generally Planck & Planck [2024] FedCFamC1F 341).
The appellant purports to rely upon a passage that he said was by Lord Denning in Cruden v Neale, 2 N.C. 338 (1796). Lord Denning was not born until 1899 and was never a member of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The case appears to have been decided by Williams and Hayward JJ (the unusual arrangements for appeals in those turbulent times are described in Kemp P. Battle, “An Address on the History of the Supreme Court”, 103 N.C. 339 (1889)). The passage the appellant relies upon is not part of the judgment but is reported as part of the argument by one of the lawyers arguing the case. The passage argues that a person is only bound by the laws of nature and not the laws of any institutions formed by his fellow men or women without his consent. This appears to be a summary of a passage from John Locke’s ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (1689) explaining his theory of civil government. Even if the argument of the lawyer were considered an authority (which it is not), the appellant has overlooked that the lawyer in Cruden v Neale, when arguing the case, also said: When a change of government takes place, from a monarchical to a republican government, the old form is dissolved. Those who lived under it, and did not chuse [sic] to become members of the new, had a right to refuse their allegiance to it, and to retire elsewhere.
The appellant has not chosen to “retire elsewhere” and thus, even on his argument, the appellant is bound by the laws of Australia like all other citizens.
The parties and children are bound by the laws of Australia, and the Family Law Act is the relevant law with respect to parenting issues.
Secondly, the appellant sought to rely upon the Cestui Que Vie Act 1666 (UK). I was unable to identify any rational argument about how that Act (or its modern equivalents) could apply in this case as the appellant was never thought to be dead.
Thirdly, the appellant argues that the case falls within the ambit of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) on the basis that he is a “living man, and captain of [his] vessel navigating God’s holy water”. He is obviously not a “ship” as defined in s 3 of the Admiralty Act and the Act does not deal with parenting issues.
Fourthly, the appellant argued that as the children were created with his DNA, he is able to claim them as his property. No person has property rights over another person in Australia.
Finally, the appellant’s references to the Sedition Act 1918 (US), the Trading with the Enemy Act 1917 (US) or one of the various Trading with the Enemy Acts from the UK (it is unclear which), and what he described as the “Roman cult known as the Vatican establish[ing] the Bank for International Settlements”, make no sense in the context of this case.
The primary judge, as a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), had jurisdiction as a result of s 132 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) which confers jurisdiction on that Court with respect to proceedings instituted under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Section 65D of the Family Law Act provides for a court with jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to make “such parenting order as it thinks proper”. The appellant’s arguments concerning jurisdiction are entirely without foundation and must be rejected.
In Foundas v Arambatzis (No 6) [2024] NSWCA 231 the judgment states
In her affidavit in support of the application for a stay of execution of the writ of possession Ms Foundas deposed:
“3 ... (i) I am a Freeman and have the inalienable, constitutional and inherited Right to Trial by Jury, as guaranteed by the Constitutional Enactments of Magna Carta 1297, The Petition of Right 1627, The Habeas Corpus Act 1640, and The Bill of Rights 1688, which are listed in the Second Schedule Part 1 of the NSW Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 No. 30 as having come into force in New South Wales on the 25th day of July, 1928 by virtue of the Imperial Act 9 George IV Chapter 83.”
She also deposed, by way of submission, that:
“5 Once the Jurisdiction of the Court is Challenged there is an immediate and peremptory Stay of Proceedings until the Jurisdiction of the Court is determined by a Special Jury.”
There is no substance to this submission. Even if the Imperial Acts to which Ms Foundas refers enshrined a right to trial by jury (which they do not) they are subject to amendment or repeal by later legislation. Section 85 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) deals with parties’ rights to a jury in civil cases. Section 85 relevantly provides:
“85 Trial without jury unless jury required in interests of justice (1) Proceedings in any Division are to be tried without a jury, unless the Court orders otherwise. (2) The Court may make an order under subsection (1) that proceedings are to be tried with a jury if— (a) any party to the proceedings— (i) files a requisition for trial with a jury, and (ii) pays the fee prescribed by the regulations made under section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, and (b) the Court is satisfied that the interests of justice require a trial by jury in the proceedings. ...”
Ms Foundas did not file a requisition for the proceedings to be tried with a jury.
