Celebrities and cameras

WA Today reports that a WA police officer has been charged over disclosing information about Ben Cousins to the officer's friend, who is a journalist.

It's a somewhat muddled report -

Seven News reporter Monique Dirksz, who was in a relationship with a police officer charged with disclosing secret information to her about Ben Cousins.

A policeman has been charged over leaking confidential information about the arrest of Ben Cousins to a Channel 7 Perth news reporter he was in a relationship with.

The 29-year-old first class constable was stood down immediately after the incident, amid an investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit.

On Tuesday, Constable Jamieson was charged with four counts of disclosing official secrets. He will appear in Perth Magistrates Court on May 5.

Acting Police Commissioner Steve Brown said police would allege the information divulged by the officer was "not within the remit" of his work "and that it gave an advantage to that particular journalist".

... Mr Brown said the tip-off allegedly provided to Ms Dirksz had led her to be outside Fremantle Police Station at 2am - the exact time Cousins was released on bail from the station. His exit was captured on camera, with Channel 7 running "exclusive" vision and Ms Dirksz participating in multiple radio interviews the next day.

Mr Brown told 6PR Radio that 112 police officers, including some in regional WA, had accessed Cousins' police record 300 times in two days through the computer aided dispatch system. Information was also accessed about former West Coast Eagle Daniel Kerr.

"About half are going to clearly be what has been described as professional curiosity and we agree with that. Those officers have absolutely nothing to fear," Mr Brown told 6PR Mornings host Gary Adshead.

Secret, confidential, professional curiosity ...

The report states -

"The remaining half we are still working through to try and identify why they would have accessed that record. From where the investigation is currently at, those officers weren't working at the time or weren't working in close proximity. They had no need – 10 of them or thereabouts were working in regional Western Australia."

Nine of the 112 have been previously disciplined over similar breaches, he said.

"We want to know why they have accessed these records. It's a breach of trust."

Some curiosity kills some cats, it seems, although recurrent breaches might raise questions about the effectiveness of the previous discipline.

Brown is reported as indicating -

 advice had suggested that Ms Dirksz had done nothing wrong and no criminal charges had been laid against her.

"We expect that journalists right across the sector have people that they speak to. They'll source information about what's happening... But for the police, from an agency perspective, we're talking about officers here, or an officer, who disclosed information they didn't have the right to do," he said.

"It is an absolute breach of trust not only for this agency but for the community at large. The community needs to know that police officers are looking after the integrity of the information."

In Victoria the Herald-Sun reports on plans to equip the state's 220 highway patrol cars with ANPR cameras (at a cost of $86 million) "to spy on errant drivers, bikies, and suspected terrorists". The characteristically breathless report, based on an 88 page report by Deloitte accessed under FOI, indicates that the cameras would

 feed vision, live, to a central intelligence base. ... the ANPR cameras would save lives by reducing numbers of dangerous drivers.

Linking the cameras to a central unit sharing, sorting and storing footage could also help police track vehicles associated with known terrorists, outlaw bikies, burglars, sex offenders and arsonists, it says.

The cameras, which can scan and record thousands of numberplates a minute and check them against vehicle, criminal and sheriff’s office records, could gather intelligence on “persons of interest” and identify patterns of behaviour and relationships.

Consistent with the usual rhetoric - and ignoring cautions such as those noted here and here -  the report

warns that Victoria’s failure to formally adopt ANPR technology — all other states have done so — is hampering law enforcement and efforts to cut the road toll.

Deloitte says the force lacks an advanced intelligence capacity to find vehicles of interest, and correlate their movements, from among hundreds of thousands of numberplates, times and places that would be captured daily.

It recommends a staged rollout, so the required infrastructure can be built and any necessary changes to privacy laws can be debated.

VicRoads estimates 38,000 unlicensed drivers take to the state’s roads every day, and on average one is involved in a fatal crash every fortnight. If the cameras were fitted to all 220 highway patrol cars, Deloitte estimates an additional 120,000 unregistered cars a year and nearly 66,000 dodgy drivers would be caught.

Deloitte found each of five pilot ANPR units fitted to police cars was detecting an average of 53 unregistered vehicles and 33 unlicensed, disqualified or suspended drivers a month, compared with just seven vehicles and 14 drivers for regular highway patrols. They scanned more than four million numberplates in the nine months to last October, detecting 84,000 unlicensed drivers and 53,000 unregistered vehicles.

UK CCTV

In the UK the Surveillance Camera Commissioner (SCC) is reported by the UK Independent as warning that the public face "a very real risk" to their privacy from ANPR and CCTV.

The Commissioner has urged that

clear guidance be provided to ensure “innocent” people do not fall victim to roadside automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras which have been the centre of concerns over the rise of surveillance in Britain. 

Through the Commissioner's interview with the newspaper UK  police have supposedly been "put on notice over their use of personal data". Regrettably there is no statement on the SCC site.

The Independent states that

Local authorities control more than 50,000 cameras while thousands of roadside cameras collect owner information on more than 18 million car journeys every day, in a swift and unregulated expansion over the past 30 years.

Police have declined to say how many cameras are used for the ANPR system, but it has the capacity to check information on up to 50 million cars every day, and cross-check it with other police databases to trace wanted offenders.

The information, which according to police has led to important intelligence gathering and tens of thousands of arrests every year, is retained for up to two years, even when there is no evidence of any wrongdoing.

But reports into three cases that highlighted failings in the system prompted the police watchdog to warn that the scale of the system meant it was “impossible” to achieve its full potential. In April 2012, the database held almost 11.2 billion vehicle sightings.

“I think there has to be very clear guidance to officers about the way in which ANPR is used and once it has been used, ensuring that data is removed or at least is updated to that effect. I think that’s crucial,” said Mr Porter, a former senior police anti-terror officer.

“There is a very real risk that if systems aren’t adhered to innocent members of the public could be put at risk of having their privacy impacted upon. I can see the value of understanding how many ANPR cameras there are. There are other concerns that have been expressed … the large data-grab of information and the period of retention of that information.”to encourage compliance with the surveillance camera code of practice.

The office of the Commissioner was created under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (UK) to regulate CCTV. It is independent of the Information Commissioner (counterpart of the OAIC in Australia).

The 2012 statute required a Code of Practice regarding surveillance camera systems. That Code of Practice sets out guidelines for CCTV and ANPR. It is not applicable to domestic use in private households.

The Code states -

Surveillance camera systems are deployed extensively within England and Wales, and these systems form part of a complex landscape of ownership and operation. Where used appropriately, these systems are valuable tools which contribute to public safety and security and in protecting both people and property.

The government is fully supportive of the use of overt surveillance cameras in a public place whenever that use is: in pursuit of a legitimate aim; necessary to meet a pressing need2; proportionate; effective, and; compliant with any relevant legal obligations.

The purpose of the code will be to ensure that individuals and wider communities have confidence that surveillance cameras are deployed to protect and support them, rather than spy on them. The government considers that wherever overt surveillance in public places is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and meets a pressing need, any such surveillance should be characterised as surveillance by consent, and such consent on the part of the community must be informed consent and not assumed by a system operator.

Surveillance by consent should be regarded as analogous to policing by consent. In the British model of policing, police officers are citizens in uniform. They exercise their powers to police their fellow citizens with the implicit consent of their fellow citizens. Policing by consent is the phrase used to describe this. It denotes that the legitimacy of policing in the eyes of the public is based upon a general consensus of support that follows from transparency about their powers, demonstrating integrity in exercising those powers and their accountability for doing so.

In order to achieve this, the code sets out guiding principles that should apply to all surveillance camera systems in public places. These guiding principles are designed to provide a framework for operators and users of surveillance camera systems so that there is proportionality and transparency in their use of surveillance, and systems are capable of providing good quality images and other information which are fit for purpose.

The 12 principles are -

1. Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need.

2. The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified.

3. There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints.

4. There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system activities including images and information collected, held and used.

5. Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them.

6. No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged.

7. Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes.

8. Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards.

9. Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use.

10. There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published.

11. When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value.

12. Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date.

The SCC role is to -

• encourage compliance with the surveillance camera code of practice
•  review how the code is working 
• provide advice to ministers on whether or not the code needs amending.

Importantly (and fostering suspicions that the SCC is a potemkin regulator) the commissioner has no enforcement or inspection powers but "works with relevant authorities to make them aware of their duty to have regard to the code". The Commissioner must consider how best to encourage voluntary adoption of the code by other operators of surveillance camera systems.

The Commissioner is responsible for -

• providing advice on the effective, appropriate, proportionate and transparent use of surveillance camera systems 
• reviewing how the code is working and if necessary add others to the list of authorities who must have due regard to the code 
• providing advice on operational and technical standards 
• encouraging voluntary compliance with the code.

The National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT) has meanwhile reported that nearly one in 10 members now have CCTV cameras in their classrooms, expressing concern that although CCTV was supposedly introduced to enhance pupil and teacher safety (and act as a deterrent to bad behaviour) it is now being used by executives to assess teaching standards.

89% of NASUWT members reporting on CCTV in the classroom indicated that they could not switch off the cameras, with 88% indicating that there was constant recording of lessons, 55% said headteachers were viewing the video and 41% believing it was used to form negative views of staff.

The union's General Secretary, with a grab for the soundbite, stated that “Lab rats have more professional privacy" -

This is yet another example of how teachers are being undermined and stripped of their professionalism.  Teachers are already wrestling with excessive monitoring, masquerading as classroom observation, carried out by senior management and a host of other people regularly visiting their classrooms.  Now, in some schools, they are being subjected to permanent surveillance through CCTV cameras. In some cases, teachers have reported having their private conversations filmed when the school was not in session.

Risk metrics and airport security

'Cost-Benefit Analysis of Australian Federal Police Counter-Terrorism Operations at Australian Airports' (ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing & Security Working Paper 2013) by Mark G. Stewart and John Mueller [PDF] is a paper that crunches some numbers about security theatre,  recommends the standard nostrums of identity imaging (ANPR, cards, CCTV and so forth) and can be read subversively in debunking fashionable hyperbole from particular politicians and agencies.

The authors comment that

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 highlighted the vulnerabilities of airports and aircraft. Further attacks in 2002, 2007 and 2009, have led to major government reforms in passenger processing and airport access. The security of Australian airports has also followed this trend, with an increased police presence. However, limited consideration has been given to the costs of these measures, compared to benefit. This Working Paper identifies the factors to be considered in such cost-benefit analyses and the authors outline their preliminary findings. The scope for further research is highlighted, particularly in relation to risk analysis and cost.

The authors state that

Much research on aviation security focuses on airplanes due no doubt to the events of September 11 2001 and to the more recent attempts to bomb U.S. bound flights in 2002, 2006 and 2009. However, Elias (2010) notes that an airport has ‘unique vulnerabilities because it is unsecured’. There is little information about whether airport security satisfies a cost-benefit assessment, or how airport policing can be made more effective. The Australian Office of Best Practice Regulation, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and other regulatory agencies strongly recommend risk and cost-benefit assessments of major programmes. A risk and cost-benefit assessment quantifies risk reduction of security measures, losses from a successful attack, threat likelihood, probability that attack is successful, and cost of security measures. This allows costs and benefits of security measures to be compared and optimal security measures to be selected. This Working Paper seeks to assess the risks and cost-effectiveness of Australian Federal Police (AFP) airport counter-terrorism (CT) policing designed to protect airport terminals and aircraft from terrorist attack. 

They conclude

If the annual threat probability at all airports in Australia is less than 1% (or one in a hundred) the BCR [benefit to cost] for airport CT policing is significantly less than one, and the security measure consequently fails to be cost-effective by a considerable margin. However, a threat probability of 50% (or one attack every two years) would yield a BCR of 15.8 and airport CT policing would be cost-effective under that condition, and $1 of cost would buy $15.80 in benefits. Table 3 shows that airport CT policing would also be cost-effective when the annual threat probability exceeds 5% or one attack every 20 years - that is, it would have to be solely responsible for deterring, foiling, or protecting against one threat every twenty years for the security measures to be cost-effective. It also needs to be kept in mind that many threats against the aviation industry would be deterred, foiled or prevented by other (non airport) police and security measures (as well as by public awareness and response, etc.). ... The co-benefit of CT airport policing may well exceed $25 million per year, particularly if CT airport policing is able to utilise number plate recognition capability, passenger photograph identification and other measures to apprehend people with outstanding criminal issues. If a security measure also enhances the passenger experience, there would be an additional co-benefit, dramatically improving the measure’s cost-effectiveness. ....

This Working Paper sets out the basic principles of risk and cost-benefit analysis. These principles are applied to airport CT policing provided by the AFP. The results are preliminary, and based on our ‘best estimates’ using publicly sourced material, and are a starting point for this type of risk analysis. The preliminary results show the combinations of risk reduction and threat probability that allow airport CT policing to be cost-effective. For example, airport CT policing is costeffective if it reduces risk by approximately 25% and that the probability of an attack at any airport in Australia exceeds 5% per year. The co-benefits of airport CT policing - such as reduction in crime and reassurance to the travelling public - can be considerable, and will dramatically improve the costeffectiveness of airport CT policing. Further work should focus on more comprehensive threat scenarios; the layers of airport security, interactions and interdependencies; analysis of operational data on effectiveness of airport CT policing; and improved cost data, including co-benefits. The scope could be broadened to encompass all airport police, their rates of crime deterrence and prevention, and propose how airport policing may be made more effective/efficient by the use of other security measures, for example, number plate recognition capability and passenger photograph identification ID.

Send policemen, guns and money, in other words ... and stop along the way to follow up the authors' citation of their  ‘The Price is Not Right: The U.S. spends too much money to fight terrorism’ in (2011) 58(10) Playboy 149-150. Personally I preferred Mueller's Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (Oxford University Press, 2010)

ANPR and theatrics

The federal Coalition's Crime policy statement calls for rollout of Austomated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) at major air and shipping hubs, presumably followed by extension to other locations.

It is important that police and criminal intelligence agencies are told when vehicles associated with suspected or known criminals and gangs approach our ports or airports. 

This knowledge can help them monitor suspicious activity or deploy additional resources if necessary. 

Automatic numberplate recognition systems (ANPR) are one such way to effectively monitor vehicle approaches to airports and ports. If elected, the Coalition will commission an urgent scoping study for the roll out of ANPR to be operated by CrimTrac, for the approaches to airsides and waterfronts. This will enable law enforcement and criminal intelligence agencies to identify people and organisations whose attendance at these locations may be unauthorised or suspicious.

Given that there's nothing like function creep we will no doubt see the cameras used for other purposes.

CrimTrac is probably dusting off its expensive ANPR consultancy report already. A perspective is provided by 'ANPR: Code and Rhetorics of Compliance' by Christopher Parsons, Joseph Savirimuthu, Rob Wipond and Kevin McArthur in (2012) 3(3) European Journal of Law and Technology.

The authors comment that

 ANPR systems are gradually entering service in Canada's western province of British Columbia and are prolifically deployed in the UK. In this paper, we compare and analyze some of the politics and practices underscoring the technology in these jurisdictions. Drawing from existing and emerging research we identify key actors and examine how authorities marginalize access to information about the systems' operation. Such marginalization is accompanied by the rhetoric of privacy and security that are used to justify novel mass surveillance practices. Authorities justify the public's lack of access to information about ANPR practices and technical characteristics as a key to securing environments and making citizens 'safe'. After analyzing incongruences between authorities' conceptions of privacy and security, we articulate a means of resisting intrusive surveillance practices by reshaping agendas surrounding ANPR.

In 'war on organised crime' mode the Coalition indicates that

2. Fighting Organised Crime 

Organised crime and outlaw bikie gangs are a massive cost to our community in many different ways. 

Tackling organised crime requires significant commitment due to the sophisticated and extensive nature of these criminals’ operations. 

a. Local anti-gang squads 

The Coalition will establish Local Anti-Gang Squads to fight organised crime at the local level with the support and backing of national tools, resources and intelligence. 

Labor’s recent announcement of an anti-gangs taskforce is an inefficient way to deal with the national problem of organised crime. While organised crime does not recognise State and Territory borders, it manifests itself in different ways across Australia and involves a multiplicity of groups with diverse criminal interests. 

We will redirect $64 million to the Coalition’s Local Anti-Gang Squads initiative that will build a series of smaller, better targeted and regionally based anti-gang taskforces. They will work in partnership and consultation with State and Territory law enforcement agencies, while reporting to the Commonwealth’s central criminal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 

Australia already has national law enforcement and criminal intelligence bodies deeply invested in fighting organised crime. However, dealing with organised crime is not necessarily amenable to a ‘one size fits all’ model. 

The simple facts are that a local approach to dealing with organised crime will be more effective if it can tap into national support, resources and intelligence. 

Commonwealth resources and money should be committed in a way that best supports the entirety of Australian law enforcement and respects the priorities and work of State and Territory agencies. 

The Coalition will fund these taskforces so they have access to the full suite of federal intelligence and operational resources available from the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission, Customs, CrimTrac, the ATO and Centrelink. They will also collect and act upon intelligence from local law enforcement. 

The taskforces will share the benefit of new unexplained wealth legislation in order to disrupt criminal organisations and seize their assets. They will set ambitious targets to seize assets and disrupt criminal organisations.

In CCTV territory the statement indicates that

The Coalition’s Plan for Safer Streets will boost the efforts of local communities to address crime and anti-social behaviour by helping them to install CCTV and better lighting, funded from a pool of $50 million to help deliver effective solutions to local crime problems. 

The money will come from proceeds of crime so that the crimes of yesterday will help to prevent tomorrow’s crimes. 

Recent studies indicate that CCTV footage can be extremely helpful in solving crime: in the United Kingdom, a study found that almost 70 per cent of murders are solved using images captured by CCTV. Another study found that in London six crimes a day are solved using CCTV and that detectives consider the technology as valuable as DNA in solving crimes. 

The Coalition will establish a voluntary national register of CCTV locations accessible through law enforcement agencies’ computer mapping services to enable them quickly to identify likely sources of evidence. Those businesses who wish to register their locations will be able to display notices that their CCTV is registered with police, which may have additional deterrent effects. 

The Coalition’s Plan for Safer Streets will help protect communities from crime.

The statement also indicates that

The Coalition will make sure that people with a relevant criminal history can never receive a security clearance to work at port and airport entry points.

Under Labor, people with a relevant criminal history are able to get a security clearance to work on ports and in airports where cargo comes into the country. On some occasions, these people have been found acting corruptly to help criminals and make smuggling operations easier. The Coalition will ensure that the criteria for issuing people with security clearance to work on Australia’s wharves are upgraded and tightened. Tough laws will apply that will make sure applicants with a relevant criminal history are never given a Maritime Security Identification Card or an Australian Security Identification Card.

The Coalition strongly believes that stopping criminals from smuggling guns and drugs at our ports and airports is a vital step toward suppressing organised and violent crime.

ANPR

The ACLU has released You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used To Record Americans’ Movements  [PDF], a 37 page report on what in Australia is characterised as automated number plate recognition (ANPR).

It comments that

implementation of automatic license plate readers poses serious privacy and other civil liberties threats. More and more cameras, longer retention periods, and widespread sharing allow law enforcement agents to assemble the individual puzzle pieces of where we have been over time into a single, high-resolution image of our lives. The knowledge that one is subject to constant monitoring can chill the exercise of our cherished rights to free speech and association. Databases of license plate reader information create opportunities for institutional abuse, such as using them to identify protest attendees merely because these individuals have exercised their First Amendment-protected right to free speech. If not properly secured, license plate reader databases open the door to abusive tracking, enabling anyone with access to pry into the lives of his boss, his exwife, or his romantic, political, or workplace rivals.

In July 2012, American Civil Liberties Union affiliates in 38 states and Washington, D.C., sent 587 public records act requests to local police departments and state agencies to obtain information on how these agencies use license plate readers. We also filed requests with the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Transportation to learn how the federal government has used grants to encourage the widespread adoption of license plate readers, as well as how it is using the technology itself.

We received over 26,000 pages of documents from the law enforcement agencies that responded to our requests, about their policies, procedures, and practices for using license plate readers.

This report provides an overview of what we have learned about license plate readers: what their capabilities are, how they are being used, and why they raise privacy issues of critical importance. We close by offering specific recommendations designed to allow law enforcement agencies to use license plate readers for legitimate purposes without subjecting Americans to the permanent recording of their every movement.

The potential privacy harms discussed in this report are not merely theoretical. In August 2012, the Minneapolis Star Tribune published a map displaying the location, obtained via a public records request, of the 41 times that Mayor R.T. Rybak’s car had been recorded by a license plate reader in the preceding year. The Star Tribune also reported that of the 805,000 plate scans made in June, less than one percent were hits. Yet for as long as the information was retained, the other 99 percent of scans were also vulnerable to the risk that they might be released, used by the police to track innocent people, or otherwise abused. The alarming fact that a law-abiding citizen’s sensitive location history could be revealed so easily was not lost on this exposed mayor.

The report notes that

License plate readers are used not only by law enforcement agencies but also by private companies. This has led to the emergence of numerous privately owned databases containing the location information of vast numbers of Americans.

License plate readers are used in a variety of non-law enforcement roles. Private companies use license plate readers to monitor airports, control access to gated communities, enforce payment in parking garages, and even help customers find their cars in shopping mall parking lots. While these uses in and of themselves are not objectionable, private companies can scan thousands of plates each day and store information indefinitely, creating huge databases of Americans’ movements.

Perhaps the largest private users of license plate readers are repossession agents who have recognized the value of license plate location information and built enormous private databases with data from all over the country. MVTrac, one of the biggest companies in this industry, claims to have photographs and location data on “a large majority” of registered vehicles in the United States, while the Digital Recognition Network (DRN) boasts of “a national network of more than 550 affiliates.” These affiliates, most of whom are repossession agents, are located in every major metropolitan area of the United States. DRN fuels rapid growth of its database by offering to fully finance up to five automatic license plate readers for affiliates located in major metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, Orlando, Boston, and Washington, D.C., which guarantee they will provide DRN with a minimum of 50,000 aggregate plate scans per month. DRN affiliates feed location data on up to 50 million vehicles each month (nearly all of which are not wanted for repossession) into DRN’s national database. This database now contains over 700 million data points on where American drivers have been.

Private companies have partnerships with law enforcement. Police departments can purchase license plate reader data from private corporations. For example, law enforcement agencies can access MVTrac’s database and search through data collected by private repossession agencies. DRN contributes its affiliate-generated data to the National Vehicle Location Service (NVLS), which is run by Vigilant Solutions, a partner of DRN. NVLS aggregates DRN’s data with data received from other private sources, such as access control and parking systems, and from law enforcement agencies.  According to Vigilant, NVLS “is the largest [license plate] data sharing initiative in the United States.” The database holds over 800 million license plate reader records, and is used by over 2,200 law enforcement agencies and 25,000 United States law enforcement investigators. Each month, the system adds roughly 1,000 new users   and grows by 35 to 50 million license plate reader records. Law enforcement agencies that use or have used NVLS include the Milpitas Police Department in California, police in Port Arthur, Texas, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

These private databases raise serious privacy concerns. Their massive size suggests that they contain a great deal of information about our movements. These huge databases of plate information are not subject to any data security or privacy regulations governing license plate reader data. These companies decide who can access license plate data and for what purposes.

Last year, California considered a bill that would have required private companies to delete license plate records after 60 days and regulated the sale and sharing of privately held plate data. Due in part to the companies’ vigorous opposition, as well as that of law enforcement agencies, the bill died on the Senate floor. Today, these companies continue to operate with no regulation of how they use the data they are rapidly collecting. 

The report concludes with several recommendations

To ensure that license plate readers can be used by law enforcement agents for legitimate purposes without infringing on Americans’ privacy and other civil liberties, the ACLU calls for the adoption of legislation and law enforcement agency policies adhering to the following principles:

• License plate readers may be used by law enforcement agencies only to investigate hits and in other circumstances in which law enforcement agents reasonably believe that the plate data are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The police must have reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred before examining collected license plate reader data; they must not examine license plate reader data in order to generate reasonable suspicion. 

• Law enforcement agencies must not store data about innocent people for any lengthy period. Unless plate data has been flagged, retention periods should be measured in days or weeks, not months, and certainly not years. 

• It is legitimate to flag plate data (1) whenever a plate generates a hit that is confirmed by an agent and is being investigated, (2) in other circumstances in which law enforcement agents reasonably believe that the plate data are relevant to a specific criminal investigation or adjudication, (3) when preservation is requested by the registered vehicle owner, or (4) when preservation is requested for criminal defense purposes. 

• Once plate data has been flagged, a longer retention period commensurate with the reason for flagging is appropriate. 

• Law enforcement agencies must place access controls on license plate reader databases. Only agents who have been trained in the departments’ policies governing such databases should be permitted access, and departments should log access records pertaining to the databases. 

• People should be able to find out if plate data of vehicles registered to them are contained in a law enforcement agency’s database. They should also be able to access the data. This policy should also apply to disclosure to a third party if the registered vehicle owner consents, or for criminal defendants seeking relevant evidence. 

• Law enforcement agencies should not share license plate reader data with third parties that do not conform to the above retention and access principles, and should be transparent regarding with whom license plate reader data are shared. 

• Hot lists should be updated as often as practicable and, at a minimum, at the beginning of each shift. Whenever a license plate reader alerts on a plate, law enforcement, before taking any action, should be required to confirm visually that a plate matches the number and state identified in the alert, confirm that the alert is still active by calling dispatch and, if the alert pertains to the registrant of the car and not the car itself, for example in a warrant situation, develop a reasonable belief that the vehicle’s occupant(s) match any individual(s) identified in the alert. 

• Any entity that uses license plate readers should be required to report its usage publicly on at least an annual basis.

Protection of Freedoms Act

Britain's Protection of Freedoms Act became law on 1 May 2012, picking up amendments announced by the Cameron-Clegg Government in its first hundred days (and dissected in my seminar paper for ANZSOG two years ago).

The Act

• provides greater independence for the Information Commissioner;
• creates a new Disclosure and Barring Service and restricts the scope of the 'vetting and barring' scheme for protecting vulnerable groups and makes changes to the system of criminal records checks
• introduces a code of practice for CCTV and ANPR, overseen by a new Surveillance Camera Commissioner;
• extends the scope of the Freedom of Information Act and requires datasets to be available in a re-usable format;
• brings in a new framework for police retention of fingerprints and DNA data;
• requires schools to get parents' consent before processing children's biometric information.

In summary the statute comprises seven parts  -

Chapter 1 of Part 1 makes provision in respect of the retention and destruction of fingerprints, footwear impressions and DNA samples and profiles taken in the course of a criminal investigation. In particular, it replaces the existing framework, set out in Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, whereby fingerprints and DNA profiles  from a person arrested for, charged with or convicted of a recordable offence may be retained indefinitely. Under the new scheme provided for in this Chapter, the fingerprints and DNA profiles taken from persons arrested for or charged with a minor offence will be destroyed following either a decision not to charge or following acquittal. In the case of persons charged with, but not convicted of, a serious offence, fingerprints and DNA profiles may be retained for three years, with a single two-year extension available on application by a chief officer of police to a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts). The police will also be able to seek permission from the new independent Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material to retain material for the same period (three plus two years) in cases where a person has been arrested for a qualifying offence but not charged. In addition, provision is made for the retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles in the case of persons convicted of an offence or given a fixed penalty notice and for extended retention on national security grounds.

Chapter 2 of Part 1 imposes a requirement on schools and further education colleges to obtain the consent of parents of children under 18 years of age attending the school or college, before the school or college can process a child’s biometric information.

Chapter 1 of Part 2 makes provision for the further regulation of Closed Circuit Television, Automatic Number Plate Recognition and other surveillance camera technology operated by the police and local authorities. The provisions will require the Secretary of State to publish a code of practice in respect of the development and use of surveillance camera systems and provide for the appointment of a Surveillance Camera Commissioner to monitor the operation of the code.

Chapter 2 of Part 2 amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 so as to require local authorities to obtain judicial approval for the use of any one of the three covert investigatory techniques available to them under the Act, ie the acquisition and disclosure of communications data, and the use of directed surveillance and covert human intelligence sources.

Chapter 1 of Part 3 makes provision in respect of powers to enter land or other premises. The provisions enable a Minister of the Crown (or the Welsh Ministers), by order, to repeal unnecessary powers of entry, to add safeguards in respect of the exercise of such powers, or to replace such powers with new powers subject to additional safeguards. Each Cabinet Minister is placed under a duty to review existing powers of entry with a view to considering whether to exercise any of the aforementioned order-making powers. Provision is also made for the exercise of powers of entry to be subject to the provisions of a code of practice.

Chapter 2 of Part 3 makes provision in respect of parking enforcement. It makes it a criminal offence to immobilise a vehicle, move a vehicle or restrict the movement of a vehicle without lawful authority. Further provision is made to extend the power to make regulations for the police and others to remove vehicles that are illegally, dangerously or obstructively parked. Provision is also made so that the keeper (or in some circumstances the hirer) of a vehicle can be held liable for unpaid parking charges where the identity of the driver is not known.

Part 4 makes provision in respect of counter-terrorism powers. Sections 57 and 58 reduce the maximum period of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects from 28 to 14 days whilst introducing a power for the Secretary of State to increase the limit to 28 days for a period of three months in circumstances where Parliament is dissolved or in the period before the first Queen’s Speech of the new Parliament. Sections 59 to 63 relate to stop and search powers. They confer a power on a constable to search a vehicle if he or she reasonably suspects that a vehicle is being used for the purposes of terrorism; replace the powers to stop and search persons and vehicles without reasonable suspicion in sections 44 to 47 of the Terrorism Act 2000  with a power that is exercisable in more restricted circumstances; and similarly restrict the operation of the power to search persons and vehicles for munitions and transmitters without reasonable suspicion in Schedule 3 to the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007.

Chapter 1 of Part 5 amends the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006  which provides the framework for the vetting and barring scheme operated by the Independent Safeguarding Authority in England and Wales. The amendments, in particular, repeal the provisions of the 2006 Act that provide for the monitoring by the Secretary of State of persons engaging in regulated activity. The Chapter also provides for broadly similar changes to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007, ie the framework for the Northern Ireland vetting and barring scheme.

Chapter 2 of Part 5 amends Part 5 of the Police Act 1997 which sets out the framework for the operation of the Criminal Records Bureau (and the disclosure of criminal convictions and other relevant information in certificates issued by that Bureau - the counterpart of Australia''s CrimTrac - to support the assessment of a person’s suitability for employment and other roles.

Chapter 3 of Part 5 establishes a new organisation, to be known as the Disclosure & Barring Service, which will replace and combine the functions of the Bureau and ISA.

Chapter 4 of Part 5 provides for a person to apply to the Secretary of State for a conviction or caution for an offence under section 12 or 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, and certain associated offences, involving consensual gay sex with another person aged 16 or over, to become a disregarded conviction or caution. It provides for such disregarded convictions and cautions to be deleted from the Police National Computer and other police records so that they no longer show up on criminal record checks.

Part 6 amends the Freedom of Information Act 2000  and the Data Protection Act 1998. It amends the FOIA to make provision for re-use of datasets by public authorities subject to that Act. It amends the definition of a publicly owned company for the purposes of the FOIA to include companies owned by two or more public authorities. Thirdly, Part 6 extends to Northern Ireland amendments made to the FOIA by the Constitutional Reform & Governance Act 2010. Finally, it amends the FOIA and DPA regarding the appointment and tenure of the office of the Information Commissioner and to change the role of the Secretary of State in relation to the exercise of certain functions by the Information Commissioner.

Part 7 makes two principal changes to existing criminal offences on human trafficking. First, it expands the existing trafficking offences, currently set out in sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and in section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004, which make it an offence to traffick a person into, within, or out of the United Kingdom for the purposes of exploitation. Part 7 will, in addition, make it an offence for a UK national to traffick a person for sexual exploitation or for the purpose of labour or other exploitation regardless of where in the world the trafficking occurs or is intended to occur; and regardless of where the facilitation or arrangement of the trafficking takes place. Secondly, Part 7 amends the 2004 Act so that it is an offence where the trafficking of a person for the purpose of labour or other exploitation takes place wholly within the United Kingdom.

Part 7 introduces into the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 two new offences of stalking (a summary only offence) and stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress (an either way offence). It also introduces a power of entry in relation to the summary only offence of stalking that would confer on the police a power, subject to the authorisation of a magistrate, to enter and search premises if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is material on the premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence.

Part 7 also contains two repeals of enactments. It repeals section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which makes provision for certain fraud trials to be conducted without a jury, and removes the restrictions on the times when a marriage or civil partnership can take place. This Part also contains consequential amendments and repeals, makes provision for transitional arrangements, determines the extent of the provisions in the Act and provides for commencement.