Knutson, Mayan Calendar and Postal Court

In Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 858 Thomas J states 

 [1] James Kenneth Knutson [Knutson] has since 2016 employed a broad spectrum of abusive pseudolegal strategies in his attempts to evade enforcement of his credit card and mortgage debts. His litigation arguments are “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” or “OPCA”, a class of spurious “pseudolaw” concepts which are sold to abusive litigants by conman “gurus” who promise extraordinary but false benefits: Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215. Gurus’ illusionary promises include free money, debt elimination, “get out of jail free cards”, immunity from income tax, and “travelling” - unlimited motor vehicle use. OPCA ideas sound like law and use legal terminology and references, but are universally rejected by Canadian courts. 

[2] All OPCA constitute an abuse of court processes. The employing of OPCA strategies is a basis on which a court may impose court access restrictions through what is sometimes called a “vexatious litigant order”: Meads v Meads; R v Fearn, 2014 ABQB 233 at para 49, 586 AR 182; Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92, 590 AR 288, aff’d 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303. Some OPCA ideas are so notoriously false that simply employing these concepts creates a presumption that a litigant appears in court for an abusive, ulterior motive: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31, 368 Nfld & PEIR 80; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288. 

[3] Knutson’s litigation history in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench amply demonstrates that he persistently employs these false concepts. He has continued with his abusive, futile schemes, despite failing on every occasion where he has attempted to impose pseudolaw on the Courts and opposing parties. ... 

[10]. ... 2. A document dated September 16, 2016 where Knutson demands Brian J. Porter, president of the Bank, do various things including validate the debt, provide a signed contract, and if these demands are not satisfied in seven days that means the debt never existed or has been paid, and that damages and fee schedule charges are due. This document is an exact duplicate of a “Conditional Acceptance” document sold by the UK “Get Out Of Debt Free” OPCA website (see Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771, 603 AR 261, paras 55-73, Appendix “A”), which is the first document in a Three/Five Letters pseudolaw process which is intended to eliminate debts by foisting obligations on lenders. This document is marked by ink fingerprints in the lower right corner of each page, with the annotation “Seal” and “Copy-claim”. Also attached is a second document from the Get Out Of Debt Free website, titled “Common Law Copyright Notice” (reproduced in Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, Appendix “E”), which purports to claim intellectual property interests over Knutson’s name, biometric data, DNA, urine, feces, and other bodily fluids. Any breach of this claimed interest results in a $1 million penalty. This document also sports the ink fingerprint markings, and on its front page a Canadian postage stamp, signed across “by: James-Kenneth: Knutson”. 

3. A further document to Brian J. Porter, dated September 29, 2016, reproduced in Appendix “A”, which in brief says that two attached documents titled “Promissory Note” pay any outstanding debts. The September 29, 2016 letter states that if the “Promissory Notes” are not returned, or if they are returned “... without a legitimate written explanation ...” [emphasis in original], then that means “... my account balance is now zero for both accounts.” [emphasis of original]. The same fingerprint and postage stamp ornaments are present as the previous documents. ... 

5. Last is a letter dated January 1, 2017, reproduced as Appendix “C”, where “Sovereign ©James of the family: Knutson, Authorized Agent and Representative for JAMES KNUTSON™” declares that he is “an endless creditor” thanks to “the birth certificate bond”, “money no longer exists”, and that he has been denied a “Common Law court de jure”. This trial can only proceed if he receives $10 million in gold or silver “paid up front”, he is recognized as an “Ambassador of God”, and “You must verity the [BAR CULT] fiction-code: NO LAW OR FACT SHALL BE TRIED IN COURT.” This document attaches a 20 page “Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right” [NOUICR], which is a document commonly used by persons in the Freeman-on-the-Land movement which purportedly eliminates state authority and fetters the operation of the Court. The document states: ... Free-men-on-the-land do not have earthly masters. I am a Free-man-on-the-land and I do not have a master on planet Earth other than GOD and only from GOD ... This document also includes a “FEE SCHEDULE”, which allegedly sets fines to government actors, for example: FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5000.00) PER HOUR or portion thereof if I am held, handcuffed, transported, incarcerated or subjected to any adjudication process without my express written and notarized consent ... This particular NOUICR is largely identical to a NOUICR filed by Alfred Potvin in Royal Bank of Canada v Potvin, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #1701 01667 and Potvin v Royal Bank of Canada, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #1701 13997: Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652. 

[17] ... In the Affidavit filed by Knutson on March 7, 2017, Knutson indicates “I am a Common Law man , of inherent jurisdiction.”, and attaches as proof his NOUICR and Registration of Live Birth. Knutson continues to say he has sent this lender another set of Get Out Of Debt Free letters, which are attached as exhibits. Knutson claims that proves no debt exists. He also says Charter, s 32 means the law of Canada does not apply to him: “I have never, nor am I now acting as agent of the government.” 

[18] Both the Knutson and MCAP Affidavits include a bizarre, practically indecipherable document, the first page of which is reproduced as Appendix “D”. The content and text of the first page of this document is representative of its entire nine pages. As best I can evaluate this item, I conclude this is a “judgment” of a purported US court, the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”, issued on November 26, 2016 by “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-JUDGE: David-Wynn: Miller. The “judgment” is followed by a “:STUDY-GUIDE” which seems to indicate a strange kind of grammar. For example: ~4 = PRONOUNS = FOR THE SINGLE-ONE-WORD; FOR AN ADJUCTIVE-PRONOUN-OPINION OF THE FACT CHANGES WITH THE FACT INTO THE PRONOUN; FOR AN ADVERB-CONNECTS TO THE PRONOUN BEFORE AND ADVERB. 

[19] The remaining ten pages are the Knutson MCAP mortgage, but that document has been annotated. Each page is marked in thick felt marker “:EVIDENCE:” and stamped with a legend: :Syntax-word-key-meaning: 1=Adverb 8=Past-time 2=Verb 9=Future-time 3=Adjective 0=Conjunction 4=Pronoun NC=No-Contract and is sometimes annotated with other text, such as “:STYLES-Boxing=:OMIT-VOID-CONTENT-FRAUD-SYNTAX-GRAMMER”. All words are then individually annotated with a hand-written number, which appears to correspond to the stamped legend. 

[20] Though my analysis of the meaning of this peculiar item is hampered by its perplexing nature, I conclude the function of the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision and attached annotated mortgage document is that the mortgage contract is being proofread using an abnormal grammar code. The failure of MCAP to format its documents according to this outlandish linguistic system allegedly means the contract is void and fraudulent. 

[21] In support of that interpretation, I note the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench is not the first (legitimate) court to receive a document from the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”. In Gilly v Ocwen, 2016 WL 868167 (Conn Dist Ct), US District Court Judge Meyer reports the local court had received dozens of purported “Certified Copy of Final Judgment, Translation of Final Default Judgements” from the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”. 

[22] Judge Meyer’s subsequent encounter with the “judge” behind this so-called Court is worth reproducing in full: Because of doubts about the validity of the “Federal Postal Court,” I entered an order to show cause for a hearing to learn more about the judgment and the “Federal Postal Court.” Notice of the hearing was transmitted to plaintiff, but she did not communicate with the Court. Two individuals ended up participating in the hearing by telephone from an Arizona telephone number. They identified themselves as David Wynn Miller, who described himself as a judge of the “Federal Postal Court,” and Leighton Ward, who described himself as clerk of the “Federal Postal Court.” These two names appear on the registration documents filed with the Court. Miller told me that Benjamin Franklin opened the “Federal Postal Court” on July 4, 1775. But the court was soon closed in 1776 with the onset of the Revolutionary War. It remained closed for more than two centuries. Then, according to Miller, he and a colleague reopened the court for operation on December 21, 2012 (a day that is otherwise well known as the predicted end of the world according to the Mayan Calendar). Miller explained to me that the “Federal Postal Court” operates on the basis of a sophisticated mathematical understanding of language that proves that certain mortgage documents are fraudulent. According to Miller, the “Federal Postal Court” has been recognized by the United Nations. The “Federal Postal Court” does not have a courthouse or other fixed location; instead, it has transitory jurisdiction with a presence wherever the federal postal eagle symbol may be. A YouTube search discloses numerous videos of Miller and others explaining the operation of the “Federal Postal Court.” A Westlaw search does not disclose any valid judgments or other proceedings involving the “Federal Postal Court.” A Westlaw search for the name of “David Wynn Miller” otherwise reflects a lengthy history of frivolous filings that use the same impenetrable language that appears in the filings in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Pflum, 2013 WL 4482706 (D. Kan. 2013) (collecting dozens of cases and noting that several district courts have imposed pre-filing screening orders to prevent Miller from filing suits in these courts without prior leave of the court). 

[23] Judge Meyer refused to file the purported “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” default judgment, and instead concluded: ... there is no basis to conclude that the purported judgment of the “Federal Postal Court” arises from any valid legal authority at all. So far as I can tell, the “Federal Postal Court” is a sham and no more than a product of fertile imagination. ... I totally agree with this statement. 

[24] Commonwealth authorities have also previously rejected David Wynn Miller and his concepts as an authentic legal authority, for example: National Leasing v Top West Venture, 2001 BCSC 111; CIBC v Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625; Borkovic v Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337; R v McMordie, 2001 BCCA 412, 155 BCAC 21; Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2010] NSWLEC 66; Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2009] FMCA 1204; APD Property Developments Ltd v Papakura District Council, [2009] NZHC 1677. 

[25] The “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision I have reviewed and “Judge” Miller’s statements to Judge Meyer only hint at scope of Miller’s bizarre claims. For example, Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2010] NSWLEC 66 reports representation by “plenipotentiary judge David-Wynn Miller”, who shared “a little secret” with the Court: “Every word that starts in the English language with a vowel, a, e, i, o and u and followed by two consonants is a word that means no contract.” That insight is “astonishing”, or, in “Millerese”, “no contract”. 

[26] Not surprisingly, the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision purchased by Knutson from Miller was of no legal effect. On March 6, 2017 Gill J dismissed Knutson’s appeal and ordered that Knutson must vacate the mortgaged property by March 20, 2017. ... 

[46] Knutson’s litigation to date exhibits a broad range of OPCA concepts, as well as other indicia of abusive litigation. 

A. OPCA Concepts and Strategies 

[47] I have reproduced and described Knutson’s OPCA materials in some detail to provide illustrations of the false concepts he has employed to this point. What follows is an incomplete review of his OPCA strategies, highlighting some of the most egregious misconduct. 

1. “Strawman” Theory 

[48] First, Knutson’s materials indicates he advocates “Strawman” Theory, which was recently summarized by Rooke ACJ in Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-85: “Strawman” Theory claims an individual has two parts, a physical human being component, and an immaterial but legal double. Pseudolaw gurus use many names to identify the latter, but I will refer to this part by one of its more common names: the “Strawman”. The way one tells these two aspects apart is by the letter case of their name. “Alfred Gerald Potvin” is the human half, while “ALFRED GERALD POTVIN” is the “Strawman”. “Strawman” Theory claims that human beings are born without a “Strawman”, but that nefarious government actors trick parents into obtaining a birth certificate, and that attaches the “Strawman” to the infant by a contract. In this scheme governments have no authority over humans, but instead must chain their authority through to the human via the “Strawman” and its secret contract. “Strawman” Theory also often claims that “Strawman” and birth documentation is associated with a bank account or some other form of wealth, and with special techniques that money can be obtained by “A4V” ... See also Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 110-120; Meads v Meads, at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88, [2017] DTC 5024; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 57-70; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134 at paras 10-17, confirmed 2018 ABQB 399 at paras 25-33. 

[49] The “Strawman” scheme is so notoriously bad (“fanciful”, “no rational support”, and “no basis in the law”) that, in Fiander v Mills, at paras 20-21, 40, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal concluded that anyone who even uses the “Strawman” in court is presumed to act in bad faith, and for a “vexatious and abusive” ulterior purpose. A court that encounters the “Strawman” may act pre-emptively to terminate or restrict litigation abuse based on this notoriously false idea. This rule from Fiander v Mills has been subsequently adopted in many Alberta cases, including Re Boisjoli; Gauthier v Starr; Alberta v Greter, 2016 ABQB 293; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency); Re Gauthier, Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 288, decision confirmed 2018 ABQB 399; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 438; Toronto-Dominion Bank v Leadbetter, 2018 ABQB 472, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 611; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 475, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 618; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 834. 

[50] Knutson obviously subscribes to “Strawman” Theories. He self identifies the two halves of himself by the usual language. For example, in the document reproduced in Appendix “C”, he is “James-Kenneth: Knutson”, rather than “JAMES KNUTSON™”, which “James” says is the real party to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench debt collection action. 

[51] In Court he refused to identify himself as James Knutson, instead, he is “James of the Family Knutson”. His NOUICR also makes these distinctions. 

[52] The Affidavit reproduced in Appendix “E” further illustrates Knutson’s spurious belief in the “Strawman”: I James, a minister of GOD, am making a special limited appearance on behalf of the defendant [JAMES KNUTSON]. 

[53] He then indicates he believes the letter case of a name has legal significance: I know the US Printing Style Manual, which explains how to identify a CORPORATION, dictates the use of capital letters. Knutson continues to indicate he identifies JAMES KNUTSON as some kind of trust. He, the physical man, is its beneficiary. 

[54] As was reviewed in Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, OPCA theories put special significance on birth documentation, often associating it with great value. Knutson makes that claim in the August 1, 2017 Affidavit: I know that man's laws are to make money for the Corporation of Canada and to pay back the Interest on the money you the 'de facto government' have borrowed in fraud on my behalf from the I.M.F. in the form of my birth bond #, on my Birth Certificate. 

[55] This related claim that birth documentation has some extraordinary legal significance was also identified in Fiander v Mills, at paras 21, 37-40, as a separate basis for a court to presume that a litigant conducts themselves in bad faith and with abusive and ulterior objectives, see also d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 68-70; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 91-92. 

2. The Three/Five Letters 

[56] Knutson has employed template documents from the UK OPCA website Get Out Of Debt Free in the Bank of Nova Scotia and MCAP actions. These are a Three/Five Letters process: Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, at paras 55-73; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 6-21. Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 68 provides a useful overview of this concept: ... Briefly, a Three/Five Letter process uses a series of documents that are sent to a target one after another. Each says that if the target does not respond, or does not respond in an adequate manner, then certain results automatically occur. These “foisted unilateral agreements” ... are all based on a commonplace pseudolaw fallacy, that in contract silence means agreement or consent. [Citation omitted.] In Knutson’s case, he purports to have eliminated his debts in this manner. 

[57] What is particularly problematic is that the exact documents that Knutson used were reproduced in full and rejected in the Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky decision issued by this Court on December 16, 2014, long before Knutson began sending his creditors these documents in 2016. I draw a strong negative inference from Knutson’s using Get Out Of Debt Free materials after this Court issued an explicit finding that these materials were not merely worthless, but abusive. 

[58] Further, Associate Chief Justice Rooke in Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 6-21 concluded that the Three/Five Letters scheme has been rejected in Canadian courts on so many occasions that, like “Strawman” Theory, as a principle of law, whenever a person uses a Three/Five Letters process that action creates the presumption that OPCA litigant is engaged in a vexatious and abusive argument, and does so for an improper and ulterior purpose. 

[59] I conclude this rule applies to Knutson as well. 

3. Fee Schedules, Copyright in a Personal Name, and Other Threats 

[60] As previously indicated, Knutson’s NOUICR includes a “fee schedule”, which purports to unilaterally set penalties or fines for certain activities which are lawful acts, or duties, of government actors. This is yet another category of foisted unilateral agreement. 

[61] OPCA fee schedules are a form of intimidation: Meads v Meads, at para 527; Fearn v Canada Customs, at para 199; Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, at para 78; Gidda v Hirsch, 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84; R v Sands, 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18, 416 Sask R 279; R v Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46, 450 Sask R 147; Re Boisjoli, at paras 58-69; Allen Boisjoli Holdings v Papadoptu, 2016 FC 1260; Pomerleau v Canada Revenue Agency, at para 135; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, 2017 ABQB 124 at para 28, 276 ACWS (3d) 847; Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 at para 39, 86 CPC (7th) 348; Re Gauthier, at paras 65-66; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 79-80. In Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 80, Rooke ACJ explains: In law (and simple common sense) a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts ... Intimidation is the natural consequence of Mr. Potvin’s illegal and unreasonable fee schedule demands. I therefore presume Mr. Potvin intended exactly that by using these strategies and issuing bills and a counterclaim on that basis. [Citation omitted.] 

[62] I adopt this reasoning, which applies equally to Knutson. 

[63] The Get Out Of Debt Free claim by Knutson that anyone who infringes on his purported intellectual property rights is another attempt at illegal intimidation. There is no legal basis for his claim to have “common law copyright” in his name (Meads v Meads, at para 504), and, generally, this concept “... has an overwhelmingly juvenile character.” (Meads v Meads, at para 502). I conclude that threats of this kind are another example of illegitimate OPCA-based intimidation. 

[64] Knutson also threatens in his August 1, 2017 Affidavit that unless MCAP accedes to his false OPCA-based demands for a free house and nearly a million dollars he will initiate criminal proceedings through the Criminal Code, ss 504, 507.1 private information process. 

[65] All these OPCA intimidation activities are a potential basis for court access restrictions. 

4. Fractional Reserve Banking Theories and Promissory Notes are as Good as Cash 

[66] Knutson also advances two often intertwined but legally false claims that purport to eliminate debts and provide free money. First, he claims there is no such thing as real money (January 1, 2017 Affidavit, Appendix “C”): l know that I am an endless creditor and NEVER a debtor from the birth certificate bond, which I claim fiduciary gent of. I know the corporation known as CANADA is in a 70 year bankruptcy cycle; money no longer exists, since the seizure of gold and there is only charge and discharge of credit. I know banknotes are debt instruments; having people pay debt with debt is enslavement! And I will not participate. 

[67] This and other related claims concerning the operation of banks relate to a conspiracy theory that fractional reserve banking means that mortgages and other debts are a fraud. This concept has been thoroughly examined and rejected in many Canadian decisions, including Dempsey v Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at paras 27, 39, 151 ACWS (3d) 204; Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703 at paras 68-85, 28 Alta LR (6th) 104; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, at paras 51-53. 

[68] Knutson in the Bank of Nova Scotia and Capital One Bank actions argues that his providing of a promissory note which promises that he will at some point pay the outstanding debt fully discharges his obligations. This “a promise to pay is payment” promissory note is cash argument is, in any case, ridiculous, since the end result would be nothing more than “a conga line of promissory notes, each purporting to satisfy the debt of the note one step up the cue”: Re Boisjoli, at para 35. 

[69] Beyond advancing the fundamentally illogical argument that a promise is a payment, Knutson relies on a quotation of Lord Denning from Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar: We have repeatedly said in this court that a bill of exchange or a Promissory Note is to be treated as cash. It is to be honoured unless there is some good reason to the contrary. 

[70] Commonwealth Courts have consistently rejected Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar creates a principle that a debtor may discharge his or her obligations by a paper note that is not backed by actual funds: Re Boisjoli, at paras 32-34; Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, 2015 ABQB 700 at paras 65-68, 7 Admin LR (6th) 700; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, at paras 35-37; Dove v Legal Aid Ontario, 2018 ONSC 17 at paras 4, 8; Bank of New Zealand v Donaldson, [2016] NZHC 1225 at paras 47-52. The modern approach to payment of debt by a promissory note is set in Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Wilson, 2014 SLR 46, [2013] CSIH 95. The Denning rule only applies, and a bill of exchange or promissory note only extinguishes a debt, where the lender has agreed in advance to payment in that manner. 

[71] Knutson’s attempts to ‘miracle away’ his debts by worthless promissory notes or claims he never received anything of value from his lenders is a further indication that Knutson is potentially an appropriate subject for court access restrictions. 

5. The :FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT Judgment 

[72] Knutson’s submitting to this Court and his reliance on the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision of “Judge :David-Wynn: Miller” warrants special comment. This step is serious litigation misconduct. An attempt to impose a fictional court decision into an Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench process is prima facie contempt of court: Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 201-210. 

[73] That is not the only implication of asserting alleged authority of this kind. Pseudolaw is a kind of self-destructive extremist political ideology that is reinforced in highly introspective, introverted community ‘echo chambers’: Re Gauthier, at para 92. As I observed in 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 72-73, people who use pseudolaw are motivated by extremist political beliefs and ideologies:

Judicial and legal academic authorities uniformly identify OPCA narratives and their associated pseudolegal concepts as resting on and building from a foundation of paranoid and conspiratorial anti-government and anti-institutional political and social belief. These individuals are sometimes called ‘litigation terrorists’ for this reason. They may act for personal benefit, but they also do so with the belief they are justified and act lawfully when they injure others and disrupt court processes. Persons who advance OPCA litigation to harm others have no place in Canada’s courts. ... Their next target can be anyone who crosses their path - government officials or organizations, peace officers, lawyers, judges, business employees - and who then offends the OPCA litigant’s skewed perspectives. These individuals believe they have a right to attack others via the courts, they like the idea of doing that, and they view their litigation targets as bad actors who deserve punishment. ... 

[74] That makes “summons”, “orders”, and “judgments” of vigilante fake courts purportedly operating under pseudolegal authority a highly problematic phenomenon. Worse, orders and decisions of vigilante courts are a precursor to illegal actions, including extrajurisdictional vigilante actions against government actors. As Tilleman J observed in Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 201-204:

Another extremely disquieting aspect of certain OPCA movements is a belief that individuals are authorized to take extrajudicial vigilante actions against court actors, including judges. Naturally, these illegal actions are cloaked with some kind of purported thought fictitious authority, most commonly as an expression of the “mutant” common law in a jury or court process. Typical language is formation of “common law”, “people’s” or “de jure” posses, juries, and trials. Other times OPCA litigants announce they are forming their own court, on the spot, using their “personal inherent jurisdiction”. A third related scenario is where an OPCA litigant claims that it is notaries who are the true judges or possess some supervisory, judicial authority ... Othertimes OPCA litigants will threaten judges with sanctions from international courts and tribunals, real or imaginary. ... Freeman-on-the-Land guru Robert Arthur Menard operates a group of self-declared and appointed vigilante “peace officers”, the “Canadian Common Corps Of Peace Officers” (“C3PO”).

[75] The “C3PO” example is not an isolated one. In Alberta a vigilante court which called itself “The Tacit Supreme In Law Court” operated a police force of uniformed “Territorial Marshals”: Donald J Netolitzky, “The History of the Organized Pseudolegal Argument Phenomenon in Canada” (2016) 53(3) Alta L Rev 609 at 628-629. This fictional court claimed to terminate criminal prosecutions of its members. 

[76] In Fearn v Canada Customs, at para 205, Justice Tilleman observed escalation to violence by OPCA litigants is a more common phenomenon in the US than in Canada. That is no longer the case. 

[77] Recently, a Freeman-on-the-Land, Amos Edwin McKechnie went so far as to in court declare he has the right under his law to kill judges, lawyers, police, corrections and government personnel, and he will kill them, except if they act according to his OPCA-based pseudolegal demands: McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 493; McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677. McKechnie has been evaluated as a high threat of violence to any non-compliant justice system participant, and is currently detained facing multiple trials. 

[78] OPCA Detaxer Ian Bush issued a “summons” from the “High Court of Humanitarian Justice” that demanded former Chief Judge Alban Garon appear at a vigilante court process: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 2202 at para 110. Chief Judge Garon did not comply. Ian Bush subsequently conducted a home invasion of Chief Judge Garon’s residence, during which Bush hogtied, tortured, and killed by suffocation Chief Judge Garon, his wife, and an unfortunate neighbor who happened to be in the residence when Bush accessed the residence via subterfuge: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7426 at para 2; R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7050 at para 3. This was only one attack in Bush’s broader plan to rob and murder a list of judges, government officials, lawyers, and human rights activists: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7627 at paras 9, 29-31. 

[79] These are only examples of more violent and dangerous activities by Canadians with OPCA beliefs who exercise what they say is their own authority, or that of vigilante court and police organs: Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments [OPCA] in Canada, an Attack on the Legal System” (2016) 10 JPPL 137; Barbara Perry, David C Hofmann & Ryan Scrivens, “Working Paper 17-02: Broadening our Understanding of Anti-Authority Movements in Canada” (Waterloo: TSAS, August 2017). Vigilante court proceedings, orders, and decisions are a dangerous precursor of elevated illegal activity by persons who have adopted pseudolaw: Netolitzky, “Attack on the Legal System” at 186; Stephen A Kent & Robin D Willey, “Sects, Cults, and the Attack on Jurisprudence” (2013) 14 Rutgers’ JL & Religion 306 at 319-329. 

[80] In light of these facts I conclude that Knutson deploying a fictional decision of a fraudulent vigilante court is a very serious form of litigation misconduct. That, too, warrants investigation of whether Knutson should be made subject to court access restrictions. 

B. Other Indicia of Abusive Litigation 

[81] In addition to the many variations on abusive OPCA concepts that Knutson has employed in his litigation, he has also exhibited other litigation misconduct indicia identified in Chutskoff v Bonora and its successor decisions. 

[82] I conclude that Knutson’s attempt to re-open the Bank of Nova Scotia Default Judgment is a form of collateral attack. His litigation attempts to frustrate the collection of his debts and foreclosure were hopeless. His appeal in the MCAP action had no prospect of success. 

[83] Knutson has also sought impossible or disproportionate remedies, including: 1. $1 million “common law” intellectual property claims on his name, biometric data, and bodily excreta, 2. “four fold” damages “per Luke 19:8”, 3. Charter remedies vs a non-government entity, a bank, and 4. criminal investigation and prosecution in a civil proceeding. 

[84] The multiple orders that Knutson vacate the mortgaged residence in the MCAP action indicate he does not follow court instructions. He refused to comply with instructions to cooperate with the realtor hired to conduct the court-ordered sale. 

[85] As the passages and documents reproduced from Knutson’s materials indicate he has advanced unmeritorious claims of conspiracy, fraud and improper conduct by institutions and lawyers.

Curiosa

In Taylor, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2023] HCATrans 63 Gageler ACJ states: 

Pursuant to rules 6.07.3 and 13.03.1, I refuse the application for leave to issue or file the proposed application for a constitutional or other writ. I publish my reasons and I direct that those reasons be incorporated into the transcript. ... 

On 4 April 2023, Ms Cindy Taylor filed an application for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ under r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”), supported by an affidavit affirmed by her on 28 March 2023. Leave is required because on 27 March 2023 pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the Rules Steward J directed the Registrar to refuse to issue or file the document without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained. 

Ms Taylor’s proposed application for a constitutional or other writ names the Commonwealth Attorney-General as the defendant and seeks “an order of Mandamus on the Attorney General of the Commonwealth to: Immediately instruct the Crown to: Succeed the Plaintiff to the title and role of Sovereign Empress of Australia; And other orders as the Court sees it, in support of the above”. It appears that Ms Taylor also seeks damages for “the Crown’s ongoing use of Lawfare” against her and for having been “thrown from [her] natural path of evolvement”. 

The legal claims sought to be agitated by the application are unintelligible and the primary relief sought is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The proposed application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

In Taylor, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file a document [2017] HCATrans 248 Keane J notes that the applicant sought to file an application for an order to show cause against the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth. 

The application is difficult to understand but appears to be directed to vindicate aspects of the applicant’s claim as “Mother of ALL” to achieve “compliance with the Family Undertaking . . . for all Families by 21/7/18”. 

On 21 September 2017, Nettle J, pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), directed the Registrar to refuse to issue or file the application without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained by the applicant. 

On 26 September 2017, the applicant filed an ex parte application seeking leave to have the application issued and filed. An affidavit by the applicant was filed in support of the application. 

To the extent that this material is intelligible, it only serves to confirm that the application to show cause is frivolous and vexatious. A letter from the applicant dated 4 December 2017, received by the Registry this morning, does not alter this conclusion.

In James v District Court at Whanganui [2023] NZCA 181 the Court states  

[1] The appellant, who goes only by the name James, brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court in February 2022 in which he sought an injunction against the Whanganui District Court. The terms of the injunction were directed towards halting or challenging proceedings brought against James in District Court. It is not possible to discern the subject matter of the District Court proceedings with any certainty from the documents James has filed. 

[2] Churchman J struck out the judicial review proceeding as an abuse of process.[1] James filed an appeal against Churchman J’s decision. ...   

[4] In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd, this Court explained that:  ... a “frivolous” pleading is one which trifles with the court’s processes, while a vexatious one contains an element of impropriety. ... [One that is] “otherwise an abuse of the process of the court” ... extends beyond the other grounds and captures all other instances of misuse of the court’s processes, such as a [proceeding] that has been brought with an improper motive or are an attempt to obtain a collateral benefit. ... 

 [6] In his pleading, James sought to distinguish between “the Man James” and “the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES” and asserted that District Court required the former’s written consent to “conduct any business” with the latter and that consent had been withdrawn. 

[7] It appeared to Churchman J that the form and wording of James’ statement of claim was consistent with that typically advanced by the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Litigants” who adhere to the “ Sovereign Citizen movement”.  Essentially, these arguments proceed on the premise that an individual has both a natural persona and a separate legal or “corporate” persona and that the natural person cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the state without their consent. The Court has previously held that this position is untenable. Almost always, it will be viewed as an abuse of process by a litigant.  Churchman J concluded that there was no legal basis for James’ claim against the Whanganui District Court and that the proceeding was an abuse of process. ...   

[10] The grounds of appeal, although expressed in a convoluted manner and although denying the concepts of “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and “sovereign citizen ”, nevertheless rest on the argument regarding the “separation” between natural and legal persons and the rejection of Acts of Parliament unless consent has been given. They can be summarised as being that the District Court has no jurisdiction over James without him giving his consent, which he has not done, and that Churchman J erred in rejecting this argument. 

[11] The arguments that James relies on are properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments. They cannot succeed. Apart from the sovereign citizen arguments, there is no genuinely identifiable legal or factual error asserted. We are satisfied that the appeal cannot succeed. We consider that it is properly viewed as both vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.

Scofflaws and Litigation Terrorists

In Royal Bank of Canada v Anderson, 2022 ABQB 525 Rooke ACJ states 

 [1] This Decision responds to an unusual, but not unique, litigation scenario. Sandra Ann Anderson [Ms. Anderson] owns a condominium in Calgary [the Condo] that she financed with a 2019 mortgage, with a principle of $160,000, loaned from the Royal Bank of Canada [RBC]. Ms. Anderson calls herself many things and by many names, as indicated in the style of cause, above. Ms. Anderson has ceased making payments on the mortgage. RBC, on June 16, 2021, filed a Statement of Claim to foreclose on the Condo, and recover its debt, which had by then had increased to $160,954.94. Ms. Anderson also had secured a personal Visa credit card against this property, and accumulated $3,930.58 in further debts. 

[2] None of this is particularly unusual. Foreclosures such as this occur all the time at this Court. However, Ms. Anderson is an unusual litigant because she believes she is not subject to Canadian law - but rather only to a different and special law, that she seems to claim means that she can get a condo for free, and that she does not need to pay her credit card debt. Ms. Anderson says she is not subject to Canadian “law, statutes, ordinances, codes”. Ms. Anderson says there are no debts, at least any that she owes. Instead, she says it is RBC who owes her money. Ms. Anderson has many explanations for these claims. She points to secret (and imaginary) bank accounts operated by the US government that are linked to her birth certificate. She says that a bank in the UK, the “WeRe Bank” and its proprietor, “Peter of England”, have provided a “Voucher” signed by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, that discharges all her obligations. These are clearly irrational and unaccepted OPCA claims: see Meads v Meads, cited at para 12 infra. 

[3] Other times Ms. Anderson says that “i woman sandra-ann” does not owe anything. Rather, it is SANDRA ANN ANDERSON who is in a contract with RBC. That all capital names entity is someone, or something, else, but certainly not her, she claims. Ms. Anderson, at various points, says she is the “Executrix” of SANDRA ANN ANDERSON. And many, many more unusual claims, some of which I will later survey. 

[4] The net effect is that Ms. Anderson is doing all she can to frustrate RBC’s foreclosure. She has bombarded the Court and RBC with obviously legally worthless, abusive documents. When Ms. Anderson appears in court physically, or via teleconference, Ms. Anderson is disruptive, contemptuous, ignores court directions and orders, and acts, literally, as a law unto herself. That has led to Ms. Anderson being kicked out of courtrooms, and muted and expelled from teleconference appearances. 

[5] None of Ms. Anderson’s claims, arguments, or magical documents have any merit, whatsoever. Ms. Anderson has been wasting, and continues to waste, the Plaintiff’s and the Court’s time. 

[6] Ms. Anderson is a self-represented litigant, and, so, has the benefit of special privileges and status, as set by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pintea v Johns, 2017 SCC 23. However, Ms. Anderson has been involved in a range of litigation before this and in other courts that makes very clear that her activities are not those of some misinformed and confused person, stumbling through a complex, inscrutable, apparatus. Instead, Ms. Anderson is an intentional bad, vexatious, actor. She has been informed of the what, why, and how she is getting things wrong. Ms. Anderson has been cautioned that very negative consequences will follow from her misconduct - and that is, indeed, what has transpired. All that has made no difference to her continuing vexatious conduct. Instead, as I will subsequently discuss, Ms. Anderson’s bad conduct in the foreclosure action has now escalated to a new level: she is directly threatening the Court staff and judiciary, who will pay Ms. Anderson the fines that she purports to levy, in silver coin, a.k.a. “lawful money”. 

[7] This Decision has several functions. One is to address Ms. Anderson’s abuse of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, its employees and decision makers, and wastage of the Court’s resources. A second objective of this Decision is to end the RBC foreclosure proceeding in a manner that is fair and efficient to those involved parties who have engaged this Court in good faith. That means that Ms. Anderson may not find the result of this Decision is what she prefers, but Ms. Anderson has forfeited her interests being front and center in this matter. Ms. Anderson is a litigation terrorist (Lee v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ABQB 464 at para 155; Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2019 ABQB 283 at paras 227, 238 [Unrau #2]), a person who uses courts and law to harm others, because she likes it, and for her personal advantage. The time for that to end is now – and this Decision will do that. 

[8] I also note, as an initial point in this matter, that Ms. Anderson recently was involved in a testamentary manner where I was one of the Case Management Justices. Suffice to say that Ms. Anderson received a multimillion-dollar inheritance from her father. That fact is relevant in several ways. First, Ms. Anderson is well able to pay her mortgage payments, and the outstanding Condo debt as a whole. Second, Ms. Anderson can easily afford to hire a lawyer. She formerly did so, but that cramped her litigation style. Ms. Anderson is thus not a destitute, desperate person, but, instead, a greedy scofflaw, who seeks a condo for free, with no legitimate legal basis. [9] Third, those significant resources mean that Ms. Anderson is well positioned to misuse legal processes, and harass and abuse others, and she has done exactly that. That capacity, intent, and activity also warrants certain steps. 

[10] As will become apparent, Ms. Anderson’s bad conduct in the Condo foreclosure is simply one facet of Ms. Anderson’s overall, and consistent, approach to her social and legal obligations. Simply put, Ms. Anderson seeks to do only what Ms. Anderson wants to do. 

II. Sandra Ann Anderson 

[11] Prior to reviewing the status of the Condo foreclosure, and taking steps to achieve the two goals identified above, some further background on Ms. Anderson and her activities is helpful to put this Court’s admittedly unusual and stringent responses into context. What follows is an overview with illustrative examples, rather than a comprehensive record of how Ms. Anderson has flouted Canadian law, and abused Canadian courts. Compiling a complete record would be excessive, repetitive, and a waste of judicial resources. 

[12] Ms. Anderson is a pseudolaw adherent and guru, an individual who claims that the laws created by Parliament and the legislatures, and inherited via the common law, are all a fraud, that are unjustly imposed without valid authority. In Canada, pseudolaw is usually grouped as “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” [OPCA], a term coined in the first court decision to comprehensively review that subject: Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571. OPCA schemes are pseudolaw, rules that sound like law, and use legal language, but are false, “not- law”. 

[13] Functionally, OPCA strategies are a kind of cheat code, a sort of “get out of jail free card”, that pseudolaw adherents engage to purportedly get free money (and condos), not pay taxes, drive without insurance or a driver’s licences, engage in criminal offences without state sanction, and so on. In Meads v Meads, I observed, at para 4, that beyond using a highly stereotypic and conserved set of not-law concepts: Page: 4 ... This category of litigant shares one other critical characteristic: they will only honour state, regulatory, contract, family, fiduciary, equitable, and criminal obligations if they feel like it. And typically, they don’t. That exactly describes Ms. Anderson, and, in many ways, is all one needs to know about her. 

[14] No court in any jurisdiction has accepted the stereotypic conspiratorial not-law concepts that make up pseudolaw. Employing pseudolaw is always an abuse of court processes, and warrants immediate court response: Unrau #2 at paras 180, 670-671. 

[15] Ms. Anderson has a dismal legal record. What follows are a sampling of illustrative examples. 

A. Sandra Anderson, Horse Smuggler, and Vigilante Judge of Her Own Do-It- Yourself Court 

[16] Ms. Anderson is an international horse smuggler: Anderson v Ossowski, 2021 ABQB 382, action struck out 2021 ABQB 428, costs ordered 2021 ABQB 456. Ms. Anderson has repeatedly purchased horses in the US, and then, when transporting those horses into Canada, she has claimed the horses were her property that she had taken first into and then back out of the US, thus evading customs duties. Ms. Anderson was caught, and that led to horse seizures and fines. I note that one of Anderson’s smuggled horses, “Gaesbekers Gabbertje”, was purchased by Ms. Anderson for about $120,000 Canadian - in the range of her outstanding condo debt. 

[17] Ms. Anderson then took the unconventional step of filing pseudolaw paperwork in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench that purported to seize control of the Court’s physical infrastructure. Ms. Anderson’ pseudolaw documents stated she would then conduct a vigilante legal proceeding against Canadian Border Service officers and administrators, federal government officials, and a Public Prosecution Service of Canada Crown Prosecutor. Ms. Anderson, “i.woman.Sandra of the Anderson family”, would be the prosecutor and judge, who would determine the guilt and penalties of these “trespassers”. All this follows a well-established and never successful US Sovereign Citizen pseudolaw scheme promoted by Carl (Karl) Lentz: Anderson v Ossowski, 2021 ABQB 382 at paras 19-32. [ 

18] Needless to say, this attempt to conduct at a vigilante “do it yourself court” was rejected by this Court, Ms. Anderson’s materials were struck out, and Ms. Anderson was ordered to pay costs. Ms. Anderson sent the Court printed copies of the Decisions that rejected her horse smuggling vigilante judge process, with each page marked, in red sharpie, at 45 degrees to the lower right: this seventh day of June two thousand and twenty one. No Trespass Contract declined All rights reserved Sandra-ann [ink fingerprint] [See Anderson v Ossowski, 2021 ABQB 456, Appendix “A”.]  

[19] Naturally, that was meaningless and had no legal effect. 

B. Sandra Anderson, Criminal Proceedings 

[20] Ms. Anderson is the accused in numerous Provincial Court of Alberta criminal proceedings:  Docket 190768739P1 - charges include driving while impaired, failure to produce a driver’s licence, and operating a motor vehicle while having a prohibited blood alcohol concentration.  Docket 210776647P1 - uttering a forged document (forged COVID-19 test results), and transporting fireworks on an aircraft.  Dockets 210335584P1, 201295763P1, 210335584P1 - customs and fraud offenses resulting from Ms. Anderson’s international horse smuggling.  Docket 211079462P101 - failure to attend court.  Docket 211071105P1 - failure to comply with release conditions. 

[21] Ms. Anderson has illegally attempted to disrupt and sabotage those criminal proceedings by submitting forged subpoenas (Anderson (Re), 2022 ABQB 35 at paras 8-11), repeatedly submitting pseudolaw documents that purport to unilaterally terminate the prosecutions against her, in some instances by “payments” from an imaginary bank account (Canada (Attorney General) v Anderson, 2022 ABQB 310 at paras 8-11, 14). When Ms. Anderson appeared in Court, she was disruptive and was ejected by the Sheriffs. 

[22] Ms. Anderson also took the unconventional step of retaining a Calgary-based pseudolaw lawyer, Daniel Terry Lozinik, “private sovran attorney general”. Lozinik operates the “Angelic Law” OPCA website: http://www.angeliclaw.com. Lozinik’s in-court misconduct has led to him being ejected from Alberta courtrooms: Anderson (Re) at para 17. Lozinik has been prohibited from engaging in unlicenced legal services: Law Society of British Columbia v Daniel Lozinik (26 January 2021), Vancouver S-211132 (BCSC). Lozinik is also facing multiple criminal charges, including firearms offenses: Canada (Attorney General) v Anderson at para 17. 

[23] Ms. Anderson currently has outstanding arrest warrants in five criminal matters, dating from June 2019, onward. Ms. Anderson has informed my office that she is no longer in Canada, and, instead, has relocated to California. I find on a balance of probabilities that Ms. Anderson has absconded from Canada to evade arrest and detention in her criminal proceedings. 

C. Straw(wo)man Theory Strategies 

[24] Ms. Anderson’s wealth of pseudolaw activity includes her persistent use of “Strawman Theory”, the idea that individuals have two aspects, a “flesh and blood” human being, and an immaterial legal doppelganger, the “Strawman”: see Meads v Meads at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-92; Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments and Magic and Ceremony” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 1045 at 1069-1078. The two halves use names with different letter case and, often, punctuation, e.g. “Sandra-Ann: Anderson” vs “SANDRA ANN ANDERSON”. The core reason for Ms. Anderson’s use of Strawman Theory is it that SANDRA ANN ANDERSON is purportedly responsible for everything bad, and thus is the only half that is subject to debts, legislation, criminal liability, and court authority. 

So Sandra-Ann: Anderson says she owns the Condo, and if someone has to pay, that’s SANDRA ANN ANDERSON. [25] Ms. Anderson has over and over used Strawman Theory, and, Ms. Anderson has been told, over and over, that Strawman Theory is false and does not work. Her Straw(wo)man is a fanciful imaginary thing: Anderson (Re) at para 12. Strawman Theory is so notoriously false that anyone who employs Strawman Theory is presumed to do so in bad faith, and for abusive, ulterior purposes: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31 at paras 37-40; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 6-21; Unrau #2 at para 180. That presumption applies to Ms. Anderson, who consistently and persistently uses Strawman Theory schemes, periodically switching to new variations, but always maintaining her SANDRA ANN ANDERSON sock-puppet to take all the debts and blame. 

D. OPCA Guru 

[26] Ms. Anderson has now gone past simply acting as user of pseudolaw, to actively propagating misinformation of that kind, she is an “OPCA guru”: Meads v Meads at paras 85- 158. Ms. Anderson is now teaching others via the Internet that they (incorrectly) do not have to pay income tax. Ms. Anderson claims to have the secrets for that. As I noted in Meads v Meads at paras 669-674, pseudolaw promoters are predatory conmen/women who profit from exploiting the naïve and vulnerable. In Canada (Attorney General) v Anderson at para 18, I observed: ... The fact Ms. Anderson has escalated and deepened her pseudolaw activities from “student” to “teacher” is not a prerequisite for her to be subject to prospective court access restrictions. What this development demonstrates is the degree to which Ms. Anderson is dedicated to, and has oriented her life around, these toxic non-law concepts. She is a committed pseudolaw adherent and proselytizer. 

[27] Tilleman J in Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 at paras 215-256 concluded that OPCA guru activities are prima facie criminal contempt, given their rejection and public denial of Canadian legislation and court authority. That is Ms. Anderson’s legal character, rather than a “good faith, fair dealing” litigant. 

E. Vexatious Litigant Status and Court Access Restrictions 

[28] These factors, and other litigation misconduct by Ms. Anderson, led this Court to on April 26, 2022 to impose Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, ss 23-23.1 court access restrictions to mitigate Ms. Anderson’s abusive litigation conduct: Canada (Attorney General) v Anderson. The chief effect of these court access restrictions is that Ms. Anderson cannot initiate litigation or litigation steps at the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, except with the permission – “leave” – of the Court. 

[29] Court access restrictions are a useful tool to minimize the harm cause by abusive litigants, but they are far from a universal panacea. One problem is that court access restrictions do not meaningfully affect “defensive” steps taken by abusive litigants to frustrate litigation where the abusive litigant is a responding party. This limitation on court access restrictions will become very apparent when I subsequently review the progression of Ms. Anderson’s foreclosure proceeding. 

[30] Court processes are based on the underlying assumption that litigants at least will try to cooperate with the Court and its procedures. Pseudolaw litigants rarely engage in anything that could be described as “cooperation”. Ms. Anderson is an illustrative, even dramatic, example. F. 

Conclusion 

[31] Ms. Anderson is an unrepentant, disruptive, greedy, uncooperative, abusive scofflaw. That has now been her uniform approach to legal rights and obligations, and the Courts, for years. Her misconduct is expanding into multiple subjects and disputes. Ms. Anderson cannot be trusted. When she is pointed to the actual law, she reliably rejects that, and claims to unilaterally impose something else. 

[32] Unlike many pseudolaw litigants, Ms. Anderson has significant and substantial resources. She has already demonstrated that she will use unorthodox vigilante processes against those who simply are engaged in their legal duties. All these factors, and Ms. Anderson’s dismal record of pseudolaw misconduct, mean that Ms. Anderson is an appropriate target for unusual and intrusive litigation and litigant management steps by this Court. Doing otherwise simply guarantees more trouble ahead.

Vexatious Sovereign Citizens

In Bradley v The Queen [2021] QCA 101 - following up a sovereign citizen claim noted here - the Court states 

Mr Bradley has filed yet another appeal. He has previously filed notices of appeal that have been struck out as an abuse of process: [2018] QCA 163; [2017] QCA 66; [2016] QCA 53. I struck out a similar notice of appeal in November last year. Proceedings have also been struck out for the same reason in the trial division: 11427 of 2017; 13 November 2017; [2017] QSC 275. 

[2] The notice of appeal in this case continues these precedents. It is a confused hodgepodge of confusion. One paragraph is enough to illustrate the content that fills the document: 

That the supreme Ecclesiastical Law is ONE, under the CROWN. (The ‘Ecclesia’.) And this means that all ecclesiastical entities including Queensland as a state can (equally) sue and or be sued in the one Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Men and women within court-house Registries (as ‘public officials’ under the state) have a disregard for and are continually disregarding the fact that Australia and it’s [sic] state were “created” at and remain under this supreme Christian Law. Clear contempt of the Law. 

[3] The notice of appeal should be struck out as an abuse of process. 

[4] Mr Bradley has been incorrigible in his attempts to vex the parties he chooses to name as respondents to his applications. This case is an example. It arose from a document filed by Mr Bradley in the Magistrates Court which purported to sue “The Queen” and was entitled “Common Law to Govern the Court”. Mr Bradley then pressed for a committal hearing at which he wanted to air his complaints. Like the notice of appeal before me, the document in the Magistrates Court was a confused heap of nonsense. An example is the following:

The common law (as per the First Charter of Justice, 1787 and as proclaimed under the Crown and that still remains valid today) says that this is so. (Also, See attachment One) This document (as filed) involves a matter that went before the District Court of Appeal on 11/10/2018. (See DCA 31/18) The honourable court is asked to determine if this my allegation that a public official/s or, person/s of Queensland (see Exhibit # THREE – DCA 31/18) has or have knowingly or unknowingly committed a common law offence to pervert the course of justice. (Attach. Two) That as a man, and born with unalienable inherent Rights and Duties and through my person (BRADLEY), my matter as Filed by me and as was incorrectly listed by registry staff of the Beenleigh court-house, had subsequently resulted in an ‘obstruction’ of the course of justice that then became (resulted in) an unfair hearing, when conducted before a Coram.

[5] The learned magistrate rightly struck out the proceeding. Mr Bradley then appealed to the District Court, under the aegis of yet another senseless piece of paper, which was struck out, and he now seeks leave to agitate his concerns in the Court of Appeal. 

[6] The time has come to stop this kind of behaviour from being repeated. 

[7] At the hearing of this matter, I invited Mr Bradley to submit why his proceeding should not be struck out. Mr Bradley could not formulate a ground but, instead, persisted in making oral statements that were consistent with the incomprehensibility of his written statements. 

[8] I also invited Mr Bradley to make submissions as to why he should not be declared a vexatious litigant. He made submissions of the same disordered kind, which merely demonstrated further the need for an order to be made to prevent any further abuse of the judicial process by him. 

[9] I am satisfied that Mr Bradley has frequently instituted vexatious proceedings in Queensland. I am also satisfied that unless an order is made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 Mr Bradley will continue to waste the time and money of the people he chooses to sue and waste the time and resources of the Courts. I am satisfied that an order should be made to stop Mr Bradley from continuing to do this.

Vexation

'Goldsmith Collins: Footballer, Fencer, Maverick Litigator' by Simon Smith in (2008) 34(1) Monash University Law Review 191 comments 

The surge in 'litigants in person' is a challenge for contemporary courts. At the extreme end are a small group of vexatious litigants or querulents who persistently and unsuccessfully pursue litigation until banned by the court. But who are they and what motivates them? This article traces the story of one of this small band of persistent litigants, Goldsmith 'Goldie' Collins (1901-1982). As a young man Collins was a champion Australian Rules Footballer with the Fitzroy Football Club. He found later notoriety through his provocative legal proceedings as a self-represented litigant against the Northcote City Council that rapidly escalated into a legal assault against all persons and institutions drawn into that web. In 1952 Collins was the fourth Australian to be declared a vexatious litigant. As the first person declared by the High Court, his declaration the next year by the Victorian Supreme Court (its third) made him the first person to be declared in two jurisdictions. Despite his declarations and being gaoled a number of times for contempt of court, Collins continued as a legal 'maverick' into the 1970s. In providing context for Collins' litigation this article will demonstrate the difficulties faced by other litigants, the profession and the judiciary when dealing with an unpredictable, even aggressive, litigant who determinedly challenges authority. Drawing on recent psychiatric literature it will also demonstrate that the vexatious litigant sanction is an inadequate response to the challenge a litigant, such as Collins, presents to the courts.

Smith argues 

Unquestionably, Rupert Frederick Millane (1887-1969) was the pioneer of the Australian 'vexatious bar'. It was his extraordinary flood of unsuccessful litigation in the 1920s, mainly against the Melbourne and Heidelberg Councils, that led to the enactment in 1928 of the vexatious litigant sanction in Victoria. That provision empowered the Supreme Court to prohibit the issue of proceedings by such litigants without the Court's prior leave. It provided the model for similar provisions in all superior court jurisdictions in Australia. In 1930, Millane became the first person in Australia to be declared a vexatious litigant. If Millane was the leader of Melbourne's 'vexatious litigants' bar' then his associate (for a time), Goldsmith 'Goldie' Collins (1901-1982) was his natural successor.' Indeed, as one commentator has noted:

The 'fifties, the era of Dixon and Fullagar, is often regarded by Victorians as the golden age of the High Court. It was, even more certainly, the golden age of the great vexatious litigants - Millane and Collins. 

As a young man Collins was a champion Australian Rules Footballer with the Fitzroy Football Club. However, he found later notoriety through his provocative legal proceedings as a litigant in person and then as legal 'advisor' to others. His litigation started in the 1940s over a grievance with the Northcote City Council and rapidly escalated into a legal assault against all persons and institutions drawn into that web. In 1952 Collins was the fourth Australians to be declared a vexatious litigant. As the first person declared by the High Court, his declaration the next year by the Victorian Supreme Court (its third) made him the first person to be declared in two jurisdictions. Despite his declarations and being gaoled a number of times for contempt of court, Collins continued as a legal 'maverick' into the 1970s inserting himself 'pro bono' into the cases of other self-represented litigants in Victoria and interstate. 

But who are vexatious litigants and what motivates them? How do courts deal with them and is the vexatious litigant sanction effective? There has been little scholarly attention given to these and related questions. Accordingly, at a time when contemporary courts are experiencing a surge in 'litigants in person' and a perceived rise in persistent vexatious litigants, this article explores these issues through the story of one vexatious litigant, Goldsmith Collins. It will trace his life using material not previously accessed and gathered together and will provide a context for his persistent litigation. In seeking to explain his extraordinary litigation it will suggest that the underlying explanation for the behaviour that led to his being declared a vexatious litigant was an abnormality of his mental functioning. In doing so it will draw on the recent work of Australian psychiatrists Paul Mullen and Grant Lester who have been at the forefront of renewed attention being given to the challenge of managing vexatious litigants - or in medical parlance - 'querulents'. These are broadly defined as individuals who exhibit:

[A] pattern of behaviour involving the persistent pursuit of a personal grievance in a manner seriously damaging to the individual's economic, social, and personal interests, and disruptive to the functioning of the courts and/or other agencies attempting to resolve the claim.

They suggest querulousness is foremost a disorder of behaviour and only secondarily an abnormality of mental function and that personality traits, social situation, contemporary sources of distress and disturbance, even the dispute resolution systems themselves only contribute to querulous behaviour. They are positive on the potential of modern anti-psychotic medication alongside psychotherapy, to normalise the behaviour and thinking of the patient/litigant over a period of month. This of course assumes a level of patient/litigant insight and co-operation that may be difficult, if not impossible, to engender. 

Of particular interest is the profile of the querulent that Lester and Mullen derive from the psychiatric literature and their own research. Querulousness is said to most commonly develop in the middle-aged adult between 30 and 50. There is a preponderance of men (4:l) and prior to onset the individual is said to have functioned competently, had a sound secondary education and fair work history. Relationships are more problematic with only 30 per cent having ever married, 18 per cent having divorced and 50 per cent having never married 

Of further interest are the identifying characteristics that Lester and Mullen draw from the written communications of querulents that they examined as part of their 2003 research. They are:

Form 

• Curious formatting. 
• Many, many pages. 
• Odd or irrelevant attachments - eg copies of letters from others and legal decisions, United Nations human rights instruments etc, all usually, extensively annotated. 
• Multiple methods of emphasis including

•  Highlighting (various colours) 

• Underlining 

• Capitalisation. 

• Repeated use of "",???, !!!. 

• Numerous foot and marginal notes.

Content

• Rambling discourse characterised by repetition and a pedantic failure to clarify. 

• Rhetorical questions. 

• Repeated misuse of legal, medical and other technical terms. 

• Referring to self in third person. Inappropriately ingratiating statements. 

• Ultimatums. 

• Threats of violence to self or others. 

• Threats of violence directed at individuals or organization

This article will draw on this research to demonstrate that the litigious behaviour of Collins departs from the general proposition of Mullen and Lester that posits querulousness is foremost a disorder of behaviour and only secondarily an abnormality of mental function. In the case of Collins it will be suggested that it was a mental disorder that was the major contributor and that unlike with other vexatious litigants where personality traits, social situation, contemporary sources of distress and disturbance, even the dispute resolution systems themselves only contribute to querulous behaviour, with Collins, they aggravated his condition. 

Further, the article will canvass the dispute resolution approach of a local government authority to by-law enforcement and argue that the availability of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms (had they existed) may have forestalled the litigation that resulted from its persistent enforcement. Instead, the subsequent reliance by the Council and judiciary on the legal system with its emphasis on forms, rules, procedures, professional advocacy and sanctions such as costs and even gaol contributed to the escalation, indeed became, the dispute. This will bring into focus the difficulty that the small and intimate 1950s Melbourne judiciary faced in dealing with an unpredictable, mentally disordered and aggressive litigant, who determinedly challenged their authority. Here, it will be argued that the vexatious litigant sanction was an inadequate response to the challenge which a litigant such as Collins presents to the courts and that a multidisciplinary approach involving the medical profession may have been more effective

Conspiracies

'Where the Earth is flat and 9/11 is an inside job: A comparative algorithm audit of conspiratorial information in web search results' by Aleksandra Urmana, Mykola Makhortykh, Roberto Ulloa and Juhi Kulshrestha comments 

Web search engines are important online information intermediaries that are frequently used and highly trusted by the public despite multiple evidence of their outputs being subjected to inaccuracies and biases. One form of such inaccuracy, which so far received little scholarly attention, is the presence of conspiratorial information, namely pages promoting conspiracy theories. We address this gap by conducting a comparative algorithm audit to examine the distribution of conspiratorial information in search results across five search engines: Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo, Yahoo and Yandex. Using a virtual agent-based infrastructure, we systematically collect search outputs for six conspiracy theory-related queries (“flat earth”, “new world order”, “qanon”, “9/11”, “illuminati”, “george soros”) across three locations (two in the US and one in the UK) and two observation periods (March and May 2021). We find that all search engines except Google consistently displayed conspiracy-promoting results and returned links to conspiracy-dedicated websites in their top results, although the share of such content varied across queries. Most conspiracy-promoting results came from social media and conspiracy-dedicated websites while conspiracy-debunking information was shared by scientific websites and, to a lesser extent, legacy media. The fact that these observations are consistent across different locations and time periods highlight the possibility of some search engines systematically prioritizing conspiracy-promoting content and, thus, amplifying their distribution in the online environments. 

Web search engines (SEs) are crucial information gatekeepers in contemporary high-choice information environments (Van Aelst et al., 2017) with internet users turning to them on a daily basis (Urman and Makhortykh, 2021). At the same time, as demonstrated by a mounting body of evidence, search results can be inaccurate or biased (Kay et al., 2015; Kulshrestha et al., 2017; Makhortykh et al., 2020; Noble, 2018; Otterbacher et al., 2017). Still, search outputs are highly trusted by people and can influence their opinions on matters ranging from commercial brands to elections (e.g., Fisher et al., 2015; Nichols, 2017). Thus, malperformance of SEs can cause societal problems by leading, for example, to the spread of misinformation or of racial stereotypes (Noble, 2018). 

While the explorations of bias in search results are increasingly common (see below), other forms of SE malperformance, in particular the one related to inaccurate search results, remain under-studied with a few notable exceptions (Bernstam et al., 2008; Bradshaw, 2019; Cooper and Feder, 2004). Unlike biased outputs, which tend to disproportionately amplify a particular point of view - e.g., by associating modern technology with Whiteness (Makhortykh et al., 2021a), - inaccurate outputs contain factually incorrect information (e.g., that the Earth is flat). Consequently, inaccurate outputs have higher potential for misinforming the users of SEs, which in some cases can pose a threat for their individual well-being as well as the society. It is particularly valid for outputs promoting conspiracy theories, which unlike other forms of incorrect or biased search outputs has so far received meager attention from the scholarly community. As shown by the ongoing COVID-19 crisis (European Commission, 2021), conspiracy theories diminish trust towards authorities and scientific community which can undermine societal cohesion and lead to radicalization, in particular at the time of crises. 

In this paper, we address the above-mentioned gap by investigating the presence of content promoting conspiracy theories in web search results through a systematic comparative algorithm impact audit. We rely on virtual agent-based infrastructure to systematically collect search outputs for six conspiracy theory-related queries on five most popular SEs across three locations and two waves (in March and in May 2021). Out of six utilized queries, three correspond to specific conspiracy theories (“flat earth”, “new world order”, “qanon”) - and are likely to be utilized by users interested in respective theories. Another three broadly refer to subjects about which many conspiracy theories circulate (“9/11”, “illuminati”, “george soros”) - and can be utilized by users broadly interested in related topics, without specific interest in conspiracy theories. We then conduct a qualitative analysis of all retrieved results to establish their stance on conspiracy theories (e.g., promoting/debunking) and their sources (e.g., social media or scientific websites), and compare our observations across locations and time periods. With this paper, we contribute, first, to the body of research on the spread of conspiracy theories through online platforms by analyzing their presence in web search results which were not studied in this context before; and second, to the literature on algorithm auditing and quality of information provided by web search engines. 

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first review the state of research on inaccurate and biased information in web search and on conspiracy theories online. Then, we build on this review to formulate concrete research questions and describe the methodology of our study in detail. Finally, we summarize our results and discuss their implications as well as the limitations of the current research.

One example of conspiracy claims is Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Shaw [2012] VSC 334 dealing with a vexatious litigant. 

The Court states 

 [11] After setting out in considerable detail the various proceedings issued by Mr Shaw prior to 2007, Hansen J summarised the position as follows:

I make the following observations concerning the legal proceedings brought by the defendant. The defendant has brought a large number of criminal prosecutions in which he has made a range of the most serious allegations, including treason and perverting the course of justice, against numerous public officials. In all cases the charges have been struck out on the basis that the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions took over and withdrew the charges. I accept that by the nature of the charges, the circumstances in which they were laid, and the material provided by the defendant in support of them, it can be inferred that each charge was untenable and doomed to fail. In this sense, the proceedings were vexatious legal proceedings instituted without any reasonable ground. As to whether they were instituted habitually and persistently, I note that while not an invariable rule, there does emerge from the material a pattern whereby the defendant has brought criminal proceedings against those persons who have made decisions adverse to him. For example, upon taking over and discontinuing criminal prosecutions, both the Victorian and Commonwealth Directors of Public Prosecutions were themselves charged. After refusing the defendant’s grand jury application, the five members of the Court of Appeal were charged with criminal offences. And, after refusing to accept for filing an application for a grand jury, Master Cain was charged with criminal offences. These are just a few examples. And although there was some variation in the wording of the defendant’s allegations against those he charged, the substance of his allegations remained the same, namely their complicity in indictable offences relating to a Freemason conspiracy and/or constitutional improprieties. 

I turn now to the proceedings in which the defendant sought to challenge determinations of the Magistrates’ Court in relation to traffic offences. In essence the defendant alleged that the law under which he was charged was invalid because the Victorian constitution was invalid. He also raised allegations of a Freemason conspiracy. In each case the defendant’s proceeding was dismissed or struck out. The material demonstrates that these proceedings, instituted over at least six years, were vexatious and had no prospect of success. 

I now turn to the applications to summon a grand jury. This category is particularly significant, as it is apparent, both from an overview of the legal proceedings instituted by the defendant generally, and from what his counsel said during argument, that the defendant ultimately seeks to place before a grand jury his allegations that: (a) a Freemason conspiracy has corrupted the judiciary and the court process in Victoria; (b) there is currently an illegal conspiracy, already commenced in Western Australia, to fracture the Commonwealth of Australia and create a republic in its place; and (c) the Victorian Constitution is invalid and enacted without legal authority. ... 

Viewing the matter overall, I am of the opinion that the defendant has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings, without any reasonable ground. The allegations made by the defendant are of the most serious nature, yet completely lacking in substance. ...

[18] I do not propose to set out every matter addressed in oral submissions by Mr Shaw, but will identify some of those that made their mark with me.

• The removal of the oath of allegiance and the oath sworn by Australian lawyers is an act of treason on the part of at least the Attorney-General and possibly the Victorian Parliament. This was also said to be relevant to the affidavit sworn by Ms English on behalf of the Attorney-General. 

• In a similar way, the Courts and Tribunals Legislation (Further Amendment) Act 2000 of this State has shattered the whole structure of “our jurisprudence” by removing the oath of allegiance. The Attorney-General at the time the Act was introduced, Mr Rob Hulls, had acted in a treasonous way for his involvement in removing the oath of allegiance and subsequently declaring Mr Shaw a vexatious litigant “for exposing it”. 

• The Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA) had, by omitting references to the Crown, fractured the constitution. 

• Every politician, State or Commonwealth, from Western Australia is not qualified to sit since the passing of the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA). 

• The Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic), by s 51(3) which separated the office of the DPP from that of the Crown, was unconstitutional. 

• The lack of qualifications of Mr Andrew McGinty, the Western Australian Attorney-General in the year 2000, who subsequently allowed legislation to be introduced that “turned the whole jurisprudence of Australia upside down”. 

• That charges against 54 defendants (including the former Prime Minister Mr John Howard) are still pending before a grand jury. 

• That two UK judges should sit in Victoria to determine the constitutional points he has raised. 

• There are possibly two Victorian constitutions. 

• The Australia Act 1986 (Cth), at the instigation of the then Prime Minister, Mr Bob Hawke, and six premiers, is totally invalid and fraudulent, as is the sale of the Commonwealth Bank. 

• Mr Hawke, the Prime Minister responsible for introducing the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) continues to act illegally, as demonstrated by the front page of the Weekly Times of June this year, which showed a photograph of Mr Hawke. 

• The removal of the grand jury provisions by the Criminal Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) was, in effect, a scheme devised by the Victorian Attorney-General to avoid being prosecuted by Mr Shaw before a grand jury and amounted to perverting the course of justice.

[19] Mr Shaw also relied upon a number of matters contained in the notice given under s 78(b) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to the Victorian Attorney-General. It included the following allegations.

• The existence of a criminal conspiracy to move the people of the Commonwealth into and under the United Nations, with or without the people’s knowledge and/or consent. 

• That the grand jury proceedings against the former Attorney-General, Mr Hulls, remained pending. 

• That in 2008, the then Attorney-General (Mr Hulls) perverted the course of justice when he introduced the Criminal Procedure Bill 2008 (Vic). 

• The decision of the Full Court in Re Shaw is “nugatory because the five judges entered into evidence and in doing so moved into the exclusive jurisdiction of a Grand Jury (23 electors) thereby voiding any ruling, order or judgment”. 

• That all State Governors are “Principal Offenders” and asserted that the Supreme Court, the County Court, the Magistrates’ Court and VCAT had their independent jurisdictions removed under Business Unit 19 of the Justice Department. 

• That the passing of the Western Australian Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 had “broken unlawfully” the Act of Settlement 1700 (UK) and was an act of treason against both the Queen and the people. 

• That Judges of the High Court and the Governor-General were principal offenders and that the Premier, Deputy Premier or Attorney-General, Governor, Chief Justice and President of the Court of Appeal were each involved in a criminal conspiracy against the people. 

• That the principal issue in the Supreme Court in issuing a vexatious judgment related to and involved Freemasonry and the oaths and obligations of Freemasonry and the Masonic allegiance, and that the Supreme Court is a Masonic lodge. 

• That many lawyers, judges and magistrates are Catholic with no working knowledge either of scripture or the constitution.

[20] I do not think it is necessary to itemise any more of the allegations contained in this document, nor is it necessary to repeat the allegations contained in the written submissions which are in a similar vein.

The dastardly freemasons appear in other claims such as Haughton, Commonwealth Bank of Australia & Ors v Ridout & Ors [2004] WASC 136 and National Australia Bank v Walter [2004] VSC 36. In the latter the Court states 

The Walters raised a number of unorthodox arguments and challenges to jurisdiction at the commencement of the trial, on which I ruled at the outset. The matters in question included the alleged impact of Freemasonry, an alleged banking practice described as "fractional reserve banking", the invalidity of the Constitution of the State of Victoria, the Walters' entitlement to trial by jury under Magna Carta, and apprehended bias on my part, due to my disclosure of beneficial ownership of a parcel of NAB shares. 

I determined that none of the Walters' challenges to the Court's jurisdiction was of any substance. I also ruled that the issues of Freemasonry and fractional reserve banking were of no substance and irrelevant to any legitimate claim. Despite those rulings, the issues, which were not clearly defined, were persistently raised by the Walters in various altered guises throughout the course of the trial. 

The claims and challenges based on Freemasonry, fractional reserve banking, constitutional invalidity and Magna Carta which were raised by the Walters in these proceedings have previously been raised by litigants in person in the course of enforcement proceedings by banks. All have been the subject of some degree of previous judicial consideration and have been dismissed as wanting substance or as nonsense. Although those arguments occupied a considerable time at trial, the Walters also advanced a more conventional claim that the loans and securities were unenforceable on various related equitable grounds, including unconscionable conduct, duress, undue influence and estoppel. ... 

The Walters contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceedings and was unlawfully constituted because certain judges and other Court officials are, or are suspected to be, Freemasons. They alleged that Freemasons administer and swear unlawful oaths, including oaths of allegiance to a foreign power, contrary to s.316 of the Crimes Act and s.321 of the Crimes Act. Further, the Walters contended that Freemasons are party to conspiracies to commit criminal acts and are otherwise implicated in criminal conduct. 

Ms Walter read to the Court some oaths allegedly administered to, and taken by, Freemasons. The Walters served a subpoena on an associate of a judge of the Court, requiring him to produce documentation which would reveal the identity of any judges, masters or other Court officials or employees who were Freemasons. 

The Walters contended that Freemasonry is a brotherhood of persons who habitually take unlawful oaths and who owe obedience to foreign powers. They alleged that in the course of their dealing with the NAB, Mr Fritz Walter (who is not a Freemason) failed to respond to a secret Masonic handshake made by an unidentified bank officer. The Walters claimed that in consequence, the NAB thereafter acted to the Walters' detriment and ultimately sold their property. No evidence of the alleged handshake incident was adduced at any stage. However, the Walters asserted that alleged Freemasonry within the Court precluded a fair trial of their claims. Ms Walter stated: "If the judge hearing the case were a Freemason, and the other party was a Masonic member as well and they had discussed the court case previously and made their decision while they were in the lodge" then "a litigant could not win." 

Master Evans, whom the Walters believed to be a Freemason (as he would neither confirm nor deny membership) had made an order in the principal proceeding for trial by judge alone. Master Evans' order was said to be of no effect, due to his alleged status as a Freemason. 

Although I stated that I was not, and had never been, a Freemason, the Walters contended that the status of the individual judge hearing the proceeding was irrelevant. They claimed that the Bench of the Supreme Court of Victoria was infested with Freemasons who were guilty of criminal acts, indictable offences and other unlawful conduct which contaminated the entire Court. Although Ms Walter preferred to characterise it as a "question", she essentially submitted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the proceedings on the ground of Freemasonry. 

In reliance upon Re Shaw & Another, in which the Court of Appeal considered almost identical arguments about Freemasonry to those raised in the present matter, I ruled from the outset that Freemasonry had no bearing on any legitimate issue to be determined in the case. The reiteration of such allegations and the associated baseless attack on the Court's personnel and processes were, in my view, irresponsible and regrettable. SLAs where the High Court was unimpressed include Knight v Bell and Anor M43/2000 [2002] HCATrans 446 and Fyffe v The State of Victoria M123/1999 [2002] HCATrans 442.