Showing posts with label ID Cards and Tags. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ID Cards and Tags. Show all posts

28 September 2023

Digital Identity

The Explanatory Memo for the Identity Verification Services Bill 2023 (Cth), ahead of the foreshadowed privacy reforms noted in the preceding post, states 

1. Secure and efficient identity verification is critical to minimising the risk of identity fraud and theft, and protecting the privacy of Australians when seeking to access government and industry services and engage with the digital economy. The identity verification services are the only national capability that can be used by industry and government agencies to securely verify the identity of their customers. 

2. Identity verification services are a series of automated national services offered by the Commonwealth to allow government agencies and industry to efficiently compare or verify personal information on identity documents against existing government records, such as passports, driver licences and birth certificates. 

3. 1:1 matching services (the Document Verification Service and the Face Verification Service) are now used every day by Commonwealth, State and Territory government agencies and industry to securely verify the identity. In 2022, the DVS was used over 140 million times by approximately 2700 government and industry sector organisations, and there were approximately 2.6 million FVS transactions in the 2022-23 financial year. 

4. Examples of the current uses of the DVS and FVS include:

• verifying the identity of an individual when establishing a myGovID to access online services, including services provided by the Australian Taxation Office 

• financial service providers, such as banks, when seeking to verify the identity of their customers and to meet the 'know your customer' obligation under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 

• Government agencies when providing services, disaster relief and welfare payments, and 

• Commonwealth, state and territory government agencies verifying identity in order to provide or change credentials. 

5. The Identity Verification Services Bill 2023 establishes new primary legislation that provides a legislative framework to support the operation of the identity verification services. The Bill will support the efficient and secure operation of the services without compromising the privacy of the Australian community. 

6. The IVS Bill will:

• authorise 1:1 matching of identity through the identity verification services, with consent of the relevant individual, by public and private sector entities. This will be enabled by: o the Document Verification Service which provides 1:1 matching to verify biographic information (such as a name or date of birth), with consent, against government issued identification documents; o the Face Verification Service which provides 1:1 matching to verifiy biometric information (in this case a photograph or facial image of an individual), with consent, against a Commonwealth, state or territory issued identification document (for example, passports and driver licences); and o the National Driver Licence Facial Recognition Solution which enables the FVS to conduct 1:1 matching against State and Territory identification documents such as driver licences. 

• authorise 1:many matching services through the Face Identification Service only for the purpose of protecting the identity of persons with a legally assumed identity, such as undercover officers and protected witnesses. The protection of legally assumed identities will also be supported by the use of the FVS. All other uses of 1:many matching through the identity verification services will not be authorised, and will therefore be prohibited. 

• authorise the responsible Commonwealth department - in this case the Attorney-General's Department - to develop, operate and maintain the identity verification facilities (the DVS hub, the Face Matching Service Hub and the NDLFRS). These approved identity verification facilities will be used to provide the identity verification services. These facilities will relay electronic communications between persons and bodies for the purposes of requesting and providing identity verification services. 

7. Subject to robust privacy safeguards, the Department will be authorised to collect, use and disclose identification information through the approved identity verification facilities for the purpose of providing identity verification services and developing, operating and maintaining the NDLFRS. Offences will apply to certain entrusted persons for the unauthorised recording, disclosing or accessing protected information. 

8. The Bill ensures that the operation the identity verification services and requests for the use of those services are subject to privacy protections and safeguards. These include consent and notice requirements, privacy impact assessments, requirements to report security breaches and data breaches, complaints handling, annual compliance reporting and transparency about how information will be collected, used and disclosed. Furthermore, privacy law and/or the Australian Privacy Principles will apply to almost all entities that seek to make a request for identity verification services. These privacy protections and safeguards will be set out in participation agreements. 

9. Government authorities that supply identification information that is used for the purpose of identity verification services will also be subject to the privacy protections and safeguards captured in the participation agreement. Breaches of participation agreements can lead to suspension or termination of the agreement, meaning that the entity would no longer be able to request identity verification services. 

10. States or territories seeking to contribute to the NDLFRS will be subject to privacy obligations and safeguards, which are required by the Bill and will be set out in the NDLFRS hosting agreement. 

11. The Bill requires parties to the agreement to agree to be bound by the Privacy Act or a state or territory equivalent, or agree to be subject to the Australian Privacy Principles. The Bill requires state or territory authorities to inform individuals if their information is stored on the NDLFRS (and provide for a mechanism by which those persons can correct any errors), inform the Department and individuals whose information is stored on the NDLFRS of any data breaches, establish a complaints mechanism, and report annually to the Department on the party's compliance with the agreement. The Bill enables states and territories to limit the use of identity information stored on the NDLFRS, and requires the Department to maintain the security of the NDLFRS. The Department may suspend or terminate access to the NDLFRS in the event of a party's non-compliance with legislative obligations. 

12. To protect the privacy of Australians, the Department will be required to maintain the security of electronic communications to and from the approved identity verification facilities, and the information held in the NDLFRS. This information and communications must be encrypted and data breaches reported. 

13. There will be transparency about the operation of the approved identity verification facilities, including through extensive annual reporting requirements and annual assessments by the Information Commissioner on the operation and management of the facilities. 

14. The Bill reflects and seeks to implement aspects of the Commonwealth's commitments under the Intergovernmental Agreement on Identity Matching Services (Intergovernmental Agreement). The Intergovernmental Agreement provides that jurisdictions would share and match biographic and biometric information, with robust privacy safeguards, through the identity verification services. 

15. The Bill will be supported by the Identity Verification Services (Consequential Amendments) Bill which amends the Australian Passports Act 2005 to provide a clear legal basis for the Minister to disclose personal information for the purpose of participating in one of the following services to share or match information relating to the identity of a person: • the DVS or the FVS, or • any other service, specified or of a kind specified in the Minister's determination. 

16. The Consequential Amendments Bill will also allow for automated disclosures of personal information to a specified person via the DVS or the FVS. In combination, this comprehensively authorises the operation of the DVS and FVS in relation to Australian travel documents regulated by the Australian Passports Act.

13 September 2023

Profiling and Matching

The Explanatory Memo for the Identity Verification Services Bill 2023 (Cth) states 

 Identity verification services are a series of automated national services offered by the Commonwealth to allow government agencies and industry to efficiently compare or verify personal information on identity documents against existing government records, such as passports, driver licences and birth certificates. 

1:1 matching services (the Document Verification Service and the Face Verification Service) are now used every day by Commonwealth, State and Territory government agencies and industry to securely verify the identity. In 2022, the DVS was used over 140 million times by approximately 2700 government and industry sector organisations, and there were approximately 2.6 million FVS transactions in the 2022-23 financial year. 

Examples of the current uses of the DVS and FVS include:

• verifying the identity of an individual when establishing a myGovID to access online services, including services provided by the Australian Taxation Office 

• financial service providers, such as banks, when seeking to verify the identity of their customers and to meet the ‘know your customer’ obligation under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 

• Government agencies when providing services, disaster relief and welfare payments, and 

• Commonwealth, state and territory government agencies verifying identity in order to provide or change credentials. 

The Identity Verification Services Bill 2023 establishes new primary legislation that provides a legislative framework to support the operation of the identity verification services. The Bill will support the efficient and secure operation of the services without compromising the privacy of the Australian community. 

The IVS Bill will:

• authorise 1:1 matching of identity through the identity verification services, with consent of the relevant individual, by public and private sector entities. This will be enabled by:

 the Document Verification Service which provides 1:1 matching to verify biographic information (such as a name or date of birth), with consent, against government issued identification documents; 

the Face Verification Service which provides 1:1 matching to verifiy biometric information (in this case a photograph or facial image of an individual), with consent, against a Commonwealth, state or territory issued identification document (for example, passports and driver licences); and 

the National Driver Licence Facial Recognition Solution which enables the FVS to conduct 1:1 matching against State and Territory identification documents such as driver licences. 

• authorise 1:many matching services through the Face Identification Service only for the purpose of protecting the identity of persons with a legally assumed identity, such as undercover officers and protected witnesses. The protection of legally assumed identities will also be supported by the use of the FVS. All other uses of 1:many matching through the identity verification services will not be authorised, and will therefore be prohibited. 

• authorise the responsible Commonwealth department – in this case the Attorney General’s Department – to develop, operate and maintain the identity verification facilities (the DVS hub, the Face Matching Service Hub and the NDLFRS). These approved identity verification facilities will be used to provide the identity verification services. These facilities will relay electronic communications between persons and bodies for the purposes of requesting and providing identity verification services. 

Subject to robust privacy safeguards, the Department will be authorised to collect, use and disclose identification information through the approved identity verification facilities for the purpose of providing identity verification services and developing, operating and maintaining the NDLFRS. Offences will apply to certain entrusted persons for the unauthorised recording, disclosing or accessing protected information. 

The Bill ensures that the operation the identity verification services and requests for the use of those services are subject to privacy protections and safeguards. These include consent and notice requirements, privacy impact assessments, requirements to report security breaches and data breaches, complaints handling, annual compliance reporting and transparency about how information will be collected, used and disclosed. Furthermore, privacy law and/or the Australian Privacy Principles will apply to almost all entities that seek to make a request for identity verification services. These privacy protections and safeguards will be set out in participation agreements. 

Government authorities that supply identification information that is used for the purpose of identity verification services will also be subject to the privacy protections and safeguards captured in the participation agreement. Breaches of participation agreements can lead to suspension or termination of the agreement, meaning that the entity would no longer be able to request identity verification services. 

States or territories seeking to contribute to the NDLFRS will be subject to privacy obligations and safeguards, which are required by the Bill and will be set out in the NDLFRS hosting agreement. 

The Bill requires parties to the agreement to agree to be bound by the Privacy Act or a state or territory equivalent, or agree to be subject to the Australian Privacy Principles. The Bill requires state or territory authorities to inform individuals if their information is stored on the NDLFRS (and provide for a mechanism by which those persons can correct any errors), inform the Department and individuals whose information is stored on the NDLFRS of any data breaches, establish a complaints mechanism, and report annually to the Department on the party’s compliance with the agreement. The Bill enables states and territories to limit the use of identity information stored on the NDLFRS, and requires the Department to maintain the security of the NDLFRS. The Department may suspend or terminate access to the NDLFRS in the event of a party’s non-compliance with legislative obligations. 

To protect the privacy of Australians, the Department will be required to maintain the security of electronic communications to and from the approved identity verification facilities, and the information held in the NDLFRS. This information and communications must be encrypted and data breaches reported. 

There will be transparency about the operation of the approved identity verification facilities, including through extensive annual reporting requirements and annual assessments by the Information Commissioner on the operation and management of the facilities. 

The Bill reflects and seeks to implement aspects of the Commonwealth’s commitments under the Intergovernmental Agreement on Identity Matching Services (Intergovernmental Agreement). The Intergovernmental Agreement provides that jurisdictions would share and match biographic and biometric information, with robust privacy safeguards, through the identity verification services. 

The Bill will be supported by the Identity Verification Services (Consequential Amendments) Bill which amends the Australian Passports Act 2005 to provide a clear legal basis for the Minister to disclose personal information for the purpose of participating in one of the following services to share or match information relating to the identity of a person:

- the DVS or the FVS, or 

- any other service, specified or of a kind specified in the Minister’s determination. 

The Consequential Amendments Bill will also allow for automated disclosures of personal information to a specified person via the DVS or the FVS. In combination, this comprehensively authorises the operation of the DVS and FVS in relation to Australian travel documents regulated by the Australian Passports Act.

The Memo also states

... subclause 6(4) of the Bill ensures certain types of information are excluded and cannot be sought or requested through the identity verification services. This information is: 

  •  information or an opinion about an individual’s racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, membership of a political association, religious beliefs or affiliations, philosophical beliefs, membership of a trade union, sexual orientation or practices, or criminal record (paragraph (a)) 

  • health information about an individual (as defined in section 6FA of the Privacy Act) (paragraph (b)), and 

  • genetic information about an individual (paragraph (c))

05 July 2022

Impersonation

Another impersonation incident, with the BBC reporting than an Indian court has convicted a man for posing as the son of a wealthy Bihar landlord for 41 years. 

Kanhaiya Singh, the actual son, disappeared in February 1977 on the way home from school. A village shaman told his father that the boy was alive and would "appear" soon. In September 1981 a younng man arrived in a nearby village, claiming that he was the "son of a prominent person" of Murgawan, the missing boy's home. The father travelled to the village to see for himself, accompanied by neighbours (who may have been part of a consopiracy) who said that the man was indeed his son. The father reportedly said "My eyes are failing and I can't see him properly. If you say he is my son, I will keep him". The mother subsequently sighted the claimant and realised that the man was not her son; he was missing a telltale scar and failed to recognise a teacher from the boy's school. The mother filed a case of impersonation, with the man being arrested and spending a month in prison before securing bail. 

The BBC reports 

Even as he was on bail, he assumed a new identity, went to college, got married, raised a family and secured multiple fake identities. Using these IDs, he voted, paid taxes, gave biometrics for a national identity card, got a gun licence and sold 37 acres of Singh's property. He steadfastly refused to provide a DNA sample to match with the landlord's daughter to prove that they were siblings. And in a move that stunned the court, he even tried to "kill" his original identity with a fake death certificate. 

The imposter's tale is a grim commentary on official incompetence and India's snail-paced judiciary: nearly 50 million cases are pending in the country's courts and more than 180,000 of them have been pending for more than 30 years. ... 

[A]ccording to the judges who found the man guilty of impersonation, cheating and conspiracy and sent him to prison for seven years, his real name was Dayanand Gosain, who hailed from a village in Jamui district, some 100km (62 miles) away from his "adopted" home. ... His official documents have different dates of birth - it's January 1966 in his high school records, February 1960 in his national identity card and 1965 in his voter identity card. A 2009 local government card for accessing food rations listed his age as 45 years, which would mean he was born in 1964. Gosain's family said he was "about 62", which would tally with his birth date in the national card.

Once accepted by the father (but apparently not by his supposed mother) the imposter was married off to a member of the own landowning caste, had children and on the father's death inherited part of the family property. In court he stated that he had never claimed to be the landlord's lost son as the father "accepted me as his son and took me home". However, at trial he claimed he was indeed the missing person and thus "I did not deceive anyone by impersonation". 

The case was heard over four decades by at least a dozen judges. Finally, a trial court held the hearings without a break for 44 days beginning in February this year and gave its verdict in early April. ... In June, a higher court upheld the order and imposed seven years of "rigorous imprisonment".

Shades of Partha Chatterjee's A Princely Impostor? The Strange and Universal History of the Kumar of Bhawal (Princeton University Press, 2002).

18 February 2022

COVID and Fraud

The Joint Committee on Law Enforcement report on Vaccine related fraud and security states 

 COVID-19 vaccines have emerged as the primary tool being used to combat the health impacts to individuals by variants of coronavirus. The integrity of the COVID-19 vaccination program is therefore vital to ensure the success of public health initiatives to reduce the mortality and morbidity caused by coronavirus. ... 

There are a number of different elements to ‘vaccine related fraud and security’. For the purposes of this report:

  • Vaccine related fraud refers to organised crime groups undertaking fraud using peoples’ uncertainty or desire for vaccines as the ‘bait’. 

  • Vaccine security refers to the integrity of the individual vaccine dose being injected in a person. 

  • Vaccination related fraud (as distinct from ‘vaccine related fraud’) refers to groups or individuals seeking to subvert the Australian Government’s COVID-19 vaccination program or state and territory governments’ vaccination related public health restrictions. 

Vaccine related fraud 

Vaccine related fraud was examined in detail in the committee’s interim report of this inquiry. As explained in the interim report, concerns held early on in the pandemic were that: …a significant proportion of COVID-19 related crime will be where criminals use vaccine-themed telephone and online phishing scams to obtain personal identification information to exploit for future fraud, with cyber criminals ‘preying on citizens’ anxieties and uncertainties, along with less secure [working from home] conditions to take advantage of the COVID‑19 vaccine rollout through online scams’. 

As outlined in the interim report: …the actual levels of pandemic-related fraud experienced by Australians has to date been less than expected. This has been particularly true in relation to vaccines, largely due to the no-cost public health nature of Australia’s COVID-19 vaccination program. 

Since the release of the interim report, no evidence has been provided to the committee to cause it to revise that finding. This final report will therefore not re-canvass issues of vaccine related fraud, and the committee instead refers interested readers to the interim report which covered this topic extensively. 

Vaccine security 

As outlined above, vaccine security refers to the physical security of the supply chain and the integrity of the vaccine dose to be injected in an individual—is it legitimate or is it counterfeit, black market or otherwise tampered with? 

Early in the pandemic there were concerns that ‘Australia may prove to be particularly vulnerable to illegal COVID-19 black markets, with one of the world’s highest concentrations of darknet drug vendors per capita’. 

The interim report for this inquiry provided extensive detail on the steps being taken by various government law enforcement and health agencies to ensure the integrity of vaccines to be administered to individuals, underpinned by the measures put in place by pharmaceutical companies and health professionals themselves, such as pharmacists, nurses and medical practitioners. 

As with vaccine related fraud discussed above, the interim report found there was little manifestation of vaccine security concerns and reported that ‘the widespread distribution of no cost COVID-19 vaccines mitigates the organised crime threat in Australia, with the most likely remaining threats limited to scam attempts and small-scale black-market activity’. 

Since the publication of that interim report in August 2021, the committee has continued to keep a watching brief on the security of vaccines and is confident that the situation remains the same, with no physical security or vaccine integrity concerns being actualised. This final report will therefore not re-canvass vaccine security issues and, as with vaccine related fraud, the committee refers interested readers to its interim report. 

However, it is important to note the continued work of the Australian Government to protect Australian essential services by strengthening the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. Amendments to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (the SOCI Act), enacted on 22 November 2021, introduced mandatory cyber incident reporting (Part 2B of the SOCI Act) and provided government assistance in response to significant cyber attacks that impact Australia’s critical infrastructure assets. Further changes have been proposed under the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Bill 2022, introduced into the House of Representatives on 10 February 2022, which would enact: [C]ritical infrastructure risk management programs for critical infrastructure assets (proposed Part 2A of the SOCI Act); and enhanced cyber security obligations for those assets most important to the nation, described as systems of national significance (proposed Parts 2C and 6A of the SOCI Act). 

These amendments are intended to help address threats to Australia’s critical infrastructure during events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, but also broader threats ‘ranging from natural hazards (including weather events) to human induced threats (including interference, cyber attacks, espionage, chemical or oil spills, and trusted insiders). 

Vaccination related fraud 

Increased population-wide uptake of COVID-19 vaccinations can allow governments to reduce reliance on other disease suppression methods, such as lockdowns, travel and site attendance restrictions and face masks. As such, the Australian and state or territory governments implemented a range of measures designed to encourage greater uptake of COVID-19 vaccinations which, apart from the reduced health risks to the vaccinated individual, largely centred on vaccinated people having fewer public health related movement or activity restrictions. It is important to note that these public health restrictions, with the exception of entry to Australia, are the responsibility of state and territory governments and are enacted and enforced via the laws and policies of those jurisdictions. 

To ensure compliance with various proof-of-vaccination requirements, governments have required a reliable system for individuals to prove their vaccination status. To support this, the Australian Government expanded the existing Australian Immunisation Register (AIR) system—the national database that tracks the immunisation records of Australians—to include COVID-19 vaccinations. As with other vaccinations, individuals book a COVID-19 vaccination with a registered health professional who then logs the vaccination onto the AIR system. Individuals can download a certificate showing their vaccination status onto personal digital devices or in printed form, which can then be shown when COVID-19 vaccination proof is required. The digital certificate was designed to be integrated with state and territory check-in apps, so that those jurisdictions are able to control how they work in conjunction with QR codes and locally set health restrictions. 

There are some Australians who are opposed to COVID-19 vaccinations and/or vaccination mandates. It is important to note that there are people who do not wish to be vaccinated but are nonetheless compliant with other COVID‑19 related public health restrictions, such as mask wearing, contact tracing, and movement or workplace restrictions. 

However, within the cohort of people who do not want to be vaccinated against COVID-19 evidence and reports suggest that many also wish to avoid other public health restrictions. Some of these people are engaging in various forms of fraud, not to avoid vaccination—which is not itself mandatory—but to avoid other public health restrictions. These fraud activities can be broken down into three broad categories:

  • Vaccination status (certificate) fraud, where a person uses a forged certificate to fraudulently claim to be vaccinated. 

  • Vaccination exemption fraud, where a person or medical practitioner fraudulently claims an exemption from vaccination. 

  • Vaccination administering fraud, where a medical professional fraudulently registers administering a vaccination to an individual, or where an individual takes a vaccination under another person’s name. 

These three key types of vaccination fraud are discussed in detail below. 

It is important to note that, at time of writing, many of the public health restrictions that some unvaccinated people have sought to avoid have recently been relaxed or lifted—with further easing expected in the near future. There are exceptions to this general trend, including, for example, in Western Australia, where additional movement and work restrictions have recently been introduced for unvaccinated people. However, to the extent that restrictions on unvaccinated people are reduced or removed, this will likely correspond to a decrease in the incidence of fraudulent activity such as that described below. 

Vaccination certificate fraud 

The Australian Government has responsibility for vaccination programs under its public health role, including maintaining a register of vaccinations. As outlined above, proof of COVID-19 vaccination status uses the existing AIR system, which was expanded by the Australian Government to include COVID-19 vaccinations. 

With the exception of vaccination mandates for workers within aged care facilities, the Australian Government does not impose any restrictions on people in Australia based on their COVID-19 vaccination status. Any such restrictions are instead the responsibility of state and territory governments, which rely on Australian Government vaccination registers to monitor and ensure compliance with local laws. 

The Department of Health has responsibility for establishing what constitutes proof of vaccinations status, and Services Australia has responsibility for maintaining the AIR system. Services Australia informed the committee that: Since the inception of the AIR Act [Australian Immunisation Register Act 2015], vaccination provider compliance has always been high. 

Services Australia submitted that the approach taken to designing the system for registering COVID-19 vaccinations was to manage a ‘balance of providing consistent security features, appearance and format for vaccination certificates across all channels, while also considering customer experience and accessibility’. 

Services Australia outlined the existing measures taken to protect the integrity and accuracy of immunisation records: Contemporary cybersecurity measures are in place across the Agency’s AIR system to protect data and people’s personal information. The Agency continues to invest in a cyber-skilled workforce, modern cyber technologies, advanced threat intelligence systems, next generation firewalls and industry best practice. As technology changes and new challenges emerge, the Agency routinely subjects its online systems to independent security testing, to ensure systems are kept secure and up to date to mitigate threats. 

Proof of COVID-19 vaccination status is available via a digital certificate accessible via myGov through Medicare and the Medicare Express Plus app or via a person’s My Health Record. The certificate can be stored on a mobile device or printed. Services Australia outlined to the committee prior to the rollout that it was ‘working closely with the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Cyber Security Centre on managing vulnerabilities with the mobile applications used to generate and display digital certificates’.  Services Australia further informed the committee that digital certificates contain security measures such as a ‘shimmering Coat of Arms that shifts position when tilting or moving the mobile device (a parallax effect) … an animated tick, as well as a live clock showing the current date and times’. 

Services Australia also informed the committee that AIR data is protected by restricting access to the system to officers of the agency and approved vaccination providers and their delegates with formal registration. Further, users can only download their own information via the ‘Provider Digital Access system to ensure secure access to government online services, including the AIR, via a username, password and verification code log on’. 

Paper-based certificates 

Users can also print their certificate, have one mailed to them or collect one from a Services Australia service location. Printed certificates contain ‘a Commonwealth Coat of Arms watermark, and every digital certificate displays a unique “document number” which can be used to verify the authenticity of certificates in the future’. Services Australia noted these security measures are consistent with other government documents, such as birth and citizenship certificates.   

Concerns have been raised regarding the risks posed by paper-based vaccination certificates, given the ability to more easily forge them combined with the fact that, generally, those certificates are being used in informal settings such as shops, hairdressers, restaurants and cinemas. Services Australia informed the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 that help lines were established to assist businesses and individuals with any concerns regarding potentially fraudulent behaviour.   

According to the U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre (U4), as paper‑based certificates are susceptible to alterations and falsification, digital‑based vaccination certificates can counter these limitations, allowing countries to reopen more safely. However, the centre also noted that while ‘QR codes with digital signatures make it far more difficult to falsify vaccine certificates, they are not entirely foolproof’. 

Certificate fraud: perceived risks 

The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) perceived the risk posed by fake vaccine certificates in Australia as relatively small and submitted there is ‘unlikely to be significant financial benefit in producing fake certificates, unless done on a large scale by criminals selling these to people who do not wish to be vaccinated.’ 

Aged & Community Services Australia (ACSA) raised concerns that ‘there may be adverse implications for the aged care sector from the use of fake vaccine certificates’ because the ‘employment of potentially unvaccinated aged care workers … would create increased vulnerability for older persons who are consumers of aged care as well as creating risk for providers not meeting Public Health Orders requiring workers to be vaccinated’. 

To reduce this risk, ACSA recommended threefold that the Australian Government ‘introduce penalties for use of fraudulent certificates as a deterrence’, ‘ensure that robust technology is in place … enabling aged care workers to readily access clear evidence of their vaccinations’ and finally to publish information to ‘assist providers in recognising fake certificates and processes implemented to allow providers to report concerns’.  However, it is notable that ACSA did not point to any actual cases of certificate fraud, only that should such fraud occur, it could have adverse impacts. 

Likewise, the Pharmacy Guild also recommended ‘there should be standardised reporting procedures as well as legislated penalties for individuals engaging in this type of behaviour, both for the citizen and the healthcare professional.’  Penalties, akin to those that apply to quarantine breachers and those who ignore mandatory vaccination orders, should also apply to those seeking to bribe a vaccinator to falsify records or to manipulate records, either digitally or by having someone else get vaccinated in their place. 

The committee notes the Australian Government has already introduced penalties in relation to such offences. Services Australia submitted that ‘with the emerging adult vaccine requirements there may be potential risk around forging of vaccination records’ and to address this risk there are ‘harsh penalties in place’. Penalties for a vaccination provider not complying with or contravening obligations under the AIR Act is ‘a civil penalty of 30 penalty units’, currently $222 for offences committed on or after 1 July 2020. Additional penalties exist for both vaccination providers and the general public for ‘an offence committed relating to protected information, which can be a penalty of imprisonment for 2 years or 120 penalty points, or both’.  Additionally, Services Australia publishes information to assist businesses and individuals in recognising legitimate or fraudulent vaccination certificates. 

States and territories are also able to impose their own penalties for fraud in relation to vaccination status. For example, in October 2021 the NSW Government introduced laws that a person must not ‘provide, display or produce to another person information or evidence, including vaccination evidence, purporting to show the person is a fully vaccinated person, unless the information or evidence is true and accurate’. The maximum penalty for such an offence is 100 penalty units—$11 000 and/or six months imprisonment—with a further possible penalty of $5500 for each day the offence continues. 

The Pharmacy Guild also recommended that ‘any national digital solution for proving a person’s vaccination status, for travelling or entering venues for example, should primarily rely on AIR data as the single source of truth to mitigate fraud relating to vaccination status. 

As outlined earlier in this section, AIR data is being used as the system for proving COVID-19 vaccination status. As such, all recommendations provided to this inquiry as to ensuring the robustness of COVID-19 vaccination status proof, have been enacted. 

Certificate fraud: experienced 

While there have been some media reports of the use of fraudulent vaccination certificates, such fraud does not appear to be widespread and, in cases to date, appears to have been conducted in an inexpert manner that is quickly identified. These instances include individuals engaging in forgery as well as websites that allow users to input data to generate a fake certificate or check-in proof. A cyber security expert noted that these fake certificates have limited application as they cannot be used to enter locations using integrated check-in apps, and further relied on busy situations ‘where the differences between real and fraudulent certificates wouldn’t be noticed’. 

As noted above, there is a reduced risk of vaccination certificate fraud moving forward, at least to the extent that many of the movement and site attendance restrictions have been lifted, or are expected to be in the near future.  Remaining restrictions are largely around travelling between states and work-place vaccination mandates, both of which entail assessing proof of vaccination status in formal settings where the likelihood of successfully using a forged certificate is significantly lower. 

International certificate fraud 

There have been globally coordinated efforts in developing an International COVID-19 Vaccination Certificate that works in conjunction with existing ePassport technology already working across the globe. This certificate allows easy outbound and inbound international travel to and from countries that recognise the existing International Civil Aviation Organisation standards, using Visible Digital Seal technology. 

There is also some vulnerability to Australia from vaccination certificate fraud undertaken overseas, and then used to enter Australia. U4 listed a number of instances of COVID-19 certification fraud related to international travel, however it is important to note that these instances occurred in areas with significantly high rates of other types of fraud, including Russia, Central America, Zimbabwe, South Africa 

U4 noted that: Fraud cases are on the rise as security concerns around the Certificate mount. The main perpetrators include organised crime networks, corrupt healthcare workers, and anti-vaxxers. 

In Italy, several online fraud schemes peddling fake vaccine certificates, with fake QR codes and vaccine batch numbers, were closed down. In France, real certificates, with real QR codes were being sold, allegedly obtained from health workers with official access to the health databases. In Greece, a doctor who was himself an anti-vaxxer and ‘Covid denier’ was caught red-handed, giving fake inoculations to obtain certificates for his Covid-sceptic friends. We are seeing how security flaws in the European Certificate make it easy for those with the know-how and the right connections to forge and obtain fake certificates. 

Despite these instances of fraud overseas, no evidence was provided to the committee to suggest the current occurrence of forgery of international vaccination certificates had been used for entry into Australia. 

Vaccine exemption fraud 

Vaccine exemption fraud is where a person fraudulently claims to have a medical condition that warrants exemption, or where a medical practitioner (doctor) grants an exemption in breach of the guidelines established by the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI). 

There are existing systems to ensure the integrity of exemptions to vaccinations, which have been expanded to include reviewing COVID-19 vaccination exemptions. The primary integrity mechanism is that vaccination exemptions can only be granted by registered medical practitioners. 

Medical practitioner fraud 

Medical practitioners are regulated by the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA), which has published information on laws and policies that medical practitioners must follow in relation to COVID-19 vaccinations, as have many other medical practitioner organisations. This includes guidance for those who may have a conscientious objection to COVID-19 vaccinations that they must not ‘discourage their patient or client from seeking vaccination’ and must ‘ensure appropriate referral options are provided for vaccination’. Thus medical practitioners are able to personally object to COVID-19 vaccinations while remaining compliant with relevant public health laws and policies. 

Any vaccination exemptions must be reported by the practitioner to the Department of Health, which monitors the numbers and types of exemptions granted. Suspected breaches of law or policy regarding COVID‑19 vaccination exemptions are referred for investigation to AHPRA, with sanctions for breaches including a caution, education, limits to perform certain procedures or in extreme circumstances, a temporary or permanent ban from practice. 

The RACGP submitted that there have been a few reported cases of medical practitioners who fraudulently granted an ineligible person an exemption to taking a COVID-19 vaccine. The RACGP noted it would be ‘exceptionally rare for someone to not be able to receive any COVID-19 vaccine’ because ‘those who have a contraindication to one vaccine have other vaccine options available to them’. 

here are limited grounds for an exemption, such as a major medical condition or past anaphylaxis to an ingredient of the vaccine.  Anti-vaccination groups published details of certain medical practitioners who were willing to provide such exemptions. Some of these medical practitioners ultimately were the victims of their own success, when the large numbers of people attending their practices tipped off authorities, with investigations resulting in their suspension from practising medicine. 

Patient fraud 

There have been media reports of medical practitioners being pressured by patients to provide exemptions for COVID-19 vaccinations. Early on in the vaccination rollout, anti-vaccination groups published information that anxiety about vaccination could be considered a ‘major medical condition’ and advised people to seek exemption on these grounds. The President of the RACGP, Dr Karen Price, reported that some patients become ‘aggressive and abusive, demanding an exemption when not fitting the clear criteria’. 

As outlined above, health organisations provide a wealth of supporting information for medical practitioners and nurses on COVID-19 vaccinations, including tips on holding difficult conversations with vaccine-hesitant people.  It must be noted that medical practitioners receive a great deal of training and support as the role often includes navigating difficult consultations, such as when patients exhibit drug-seeking behaviours. COVID‑19 vaccination hesitancy, or outright refusal, is just one of the many difficult medical situations that medical professionals navigate in their profession. Dr Price also reported that in many instances, doctors were able to talk to patients about their concerns, resulting in that person agreeing to be vaccinated. 

Vaccine administering fraud 

Vaccine administering fraud refers to a health professional lying about having administered a vaccination so the patient can fraudulently claim to have been vaccinated. As such, it requires a level of conspiracy between two or more people—one of whom is a registered doctor, nurse or pharmacist—and is therefore rare. 

Vaccine administering fraud can also be where an individual takes a vaccination under another person’s name. The Pharmacy Guild of Australia (Pharmacy Guild) outlined vaccination processes that reduced risk of this type of fraud: Community pharmacy actively contributes to reducing the risk of vaccination certificate fraud with the implementation of strict processes and procedures for COVID-19 vaccine administration. These include processes and procedures for confirming the identity of individuals presenting for vaccination, as well as assessing an individuals’ eligibility for vaccination by checking the Australian Immunisation Register before administration of a vaccine.43  

The Pharmacy Guild submitted that following these processes had ‘enabled pharmacists to identify instances of potential vaccination fraud and address the situation by denying administration of a COVID-19 vaccine to the individual involved.’ 

The Pharmacy Guild noted further protective factors against fraud being that ‘pharmacists are adept at reporting prescription fraud and having difficult conversations with individuals potentially partaking in fraudulent behaviour’. 

Administering fraud experienced 

There have been a few media reports of medical staff who have been involved in a conspiracy to commit fraud by declaring a person as having been vaccinated for COVID-19 when in fact that no vaccine was administered. 

A nurse in Western Australia was accused of pretending to vaccinate a 15-year old boy, with further accusations she had elected to administer vaccines for the purpose of committing such fraud for a number of family and friends. The nurse was charged with fraud, with those charges later dropped due to lack of evidence. However, after investigation by AHPRA, the nurse agreed to surrender her registration and is now unable to work as a nurse in Australia.  As with the case cited earlier in this chapter of doctors granting false exemptions, suspicions were raised by the number of people attending the clinic and asking for the nurse by name, triggering notifications and ultimately the arrest of the nurse. 

The Pharmacy Guild submitted that there have been a small number of reports by pharmacists of being offered ‘significant’ bribes to ‘falsify Australian Immunisation Register records such that an individual may obtain a genuine COVID-19 vaccination certificate issued by the Australian Government’.  The Pharmacy Guild further submitted: Another concern is reports of individuals other than the person who has made the vaccination booking presenting for vaccination at a pharmacy for the purpose of enabling a vaccine hesitant person to obtain a genuine COVID-19 vaccination certificate without receiving the vaccine. 

The Pharmacy Guild recommended ‘establishing a dedicated system for COVID-19 vaccination providers to report potential COVID-19 vaccination fraud’. Such a system has already been established. COVID-19 vaccination fraud can be reported via existing fraud reporting systems of Services Australia, a system already well-known to health professionals, and information on how to report is also provided on the Services Australia website. 

22 December 2021

Fake COVID Certs

Another instance of fake vax certificates in Mr David Brownbill v O&M Pty Ltd [2021] FWC 6635, with the Fair Work Commission noting that on 8 December Brownbill made an application to the Commission under section 526 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) alleging he had been unlawfully stood down from employment with O&M Pty Ltd. 

The hearing was via Microsoft teams. O&M raised the question of Brownbill’s COVID-19 vaccination status, arguing that Brownbill was a casual employee, Brownbill had not been stood down and that as result of a Direction of the state's Acting Chief Health Officerit could not place its employees on a certain client site unless they had proof of vaccination or a first vaccination dose or had a booking to receive a first vaccination dose. O&M asserted that Brownbill had not supplied the requisite proof; accordingly it was unable to use his services from 14 October 2021. 

[3] During the conference, it was asserted by Mr Brownbill that he had supplied proof of having been vaccinated to the Company on 22 November 2021. The Company held some concerns about the vaccination certificate produced by Mr Brownbill. I requested a copy of the email Mr Brownbill had sent to the Company on 22 November 2021. It was provided. 

[4] The email dated 22 November 2021 contained within it the following hyperlink: [omitted here] 

[5] Having clicked on the hyperlink, it appeared to me that the means by which the vaccination certificate had been procured by Mr Brownbill may have been fraudulent and that the certificate he produced may be a fraud. 

[6] I expressed this view to the parties. 

[7] If the vaccination certificate is a fraud and has been fraudulently obtained via an illegitimate hyperlink on the internet, this would be a matter of extremely serious public policy concern. I invite the relevant public authorities to investigate further. 

[8] During a further exchange with Mr Brownbill about a separation certificate he says he was sent to him by the Company, he terminated his involvement in the conference by stating: “[expletive], I’m not wasting any more time with you corrupt idiots.” 

Brownbill left the conference.  

[9] From this, I have taken Mr Brownbill to have discontinued his application pursuant to Rule 10(2)(c) of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013. The Commission’s file will now be closed.

The 'gimme a fake vax cert' site states "Welcome to the Medicare vaccine pass generator. Please input the data needed to make the pass here", with users needing to input their name and date of birth and fake vaccination details, alongside guidance (“Make sure your dose dates add up. Remember, 12 weeks between AZ and 5 (give or take 1) between Pfizer") about how to make the fake certificate appear more authentic.

'COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates in the Darkweb: A Preprint' by Dimitrios Georgoulias, Jens Myrup Pedersen, Morten Falch and Emmanouil Vasilomanolakis comments 

COVID-19 vaccines have been rolled out in many countries and with them a number of vaccination certificates. For instance, the EU is utilizing a digital certificate in the form of a QR-code that is digitally signed and can be easily validated throughout all EU countries. In this paper, we investigate the current state of the COVID-19 vaccination certificate market in the darkweb with a focus on the EU Digital Green Certificate (DGC). We investigate 17 marketplaces and 10 vendor shops, that include vaccination certificates in their listings. Our results suggest that a multitude of sellers in both types of platforms are advertising selling capabilities. According to their claims, it is possible to buy fake vaccination certificates issued in most countries worldwide. We demonstrate some examples of such sellers, including how they advertise their capabilities, and the methods they claim to be using to provide their services. We highlight two particular cases of vendor shops, with one of them showing an elevated degree of professionalism, showcasing forged valid certificates, the validity of which we verify using two different national mobile COVID-19 applications. 

The darkweb has been actively serving as a platform where cybercriminals can carry out their operations, since the founding of the Farmer’s Market (2010) (18) and Silk Road (2011) (4). Both of these marketplaces, operated via Tor hidden services, which is still the most popular anonymization network to this day. While these marketplaces started off with a heavy focus on drugs, though the years such platforms have evolved, providing a large variety of products and services (e.g. firearms, botnet services, malware, stolen bank credentials). The COVID-19 pandemic has had a great impact on millions of people around the globe, affecting many different aspects of their lives. In order to reverse the worldwide disruption that the virus has caused, vaccines were developed, aiming towards protecting the population and halting the spread of the virus. 

Trading platforms on the darkweb were very quick to take advantage of the pandemic situation. Vendors started offering vaccines on several marketplaces, or on their own independent vendor shops (2). After the vaccine development, the next step was monitoring the vaccination status of the population, which was achieved through the issuance of vaccination certificates, in physical or digital form. In several countries, not being vaccinated is bound to cause implications in people’s social and work life, often excluding them from some activities, and making daily tasks harder to carry out. For example, the non-vaccinated population needs COVID tests frequently, might be denied indoor access to restaurants, or have challenges while traveling. Since vaccinations can play such an important role in certain countries, a new market has emerged on the darkweb. Marketplaces and vendor shops are currently offering both physical and digital certificates, from a variety of countries, or fake PCR test results as an alternative, with non-vaccinated people as the target client group. Individuals that do not wish to be vaccinated, but want the convenience of owning a vaccination certificate, can visit the darkweb and purchase one on a number of different platforms. 

In this paper, we focus on the COVID-19 vaccination certificate darkweb market, with an emphasis on the EU Digital Green Certificate (DGC). We investigate 17 marketplaces and 10 vendor shops that list physical or digital proofs of vaccination as available products, with the purpose of documenting the different aspects that compose this specific type of illegal trading. This includes elements such as countries of origin, countries that the certificate is valid in, shipping, means of communication with the vendors, as well as how these items find their way to the sellers. We then demonstrate examples of such sellers and emphasize on two interesting cases in which the vendors provide valid EU digital certificates as proof of their service’s legitimacy. Notably, one of the shops presents a very high degree of professionalism. We confirm the validity of these certificates, and examine their details. 

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the methods used to carry out our research for the purposes of this paper. Section 3 provides background information on the issuance and the verification of vaccination certificates, and discusses the related work. In Section 4, we dive into the mapping of the certificate market of the darkweb. Section 5 is dedicated to investigating the legitimacy of the listings we found. Lastly, Section 6 concludes this paper.

03 December 2021

Colanders

A bad but unsurprising day for adherents of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster in a case that alas has been much misreported.

In de Wilde v. the Netherlands (9476/19, Decision 9.11.2021) the ECHR has held that Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention is not applicable and in non-recognition of Pastafarianism as a religion or belief has endorsed rejection by the Netherlands of identity photos of Pastafarians wearing a colander. 

The Court's statement indicates 

Facts – The applicant is a so-called “Pastafarian”, a follower of the “Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster”. When she tried to renew her identity card and her driving licence, she submitted identity photographs of herself on which, allegedly in line with the prescriptions of her belief, she was wearing a colander. These were rejected, in accordance with the delegated legislation in force, which required the identity photograph on official identity documents to show the bearer bareheaded unless a head covering was prescribed by the bearer’s religion. Her challenges were unsuccessful; the administrative and judicial authorities found that Pastafarianism did not qualify as a “religion”. The applicant complained, inter alia, that the domestic authorities, in particular the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, had misapplied the standards developed by the Court and that no account had been taken of her forum internum. 
 
Law – Article 9: Given the applicant’s complaints, the core question was whether Pastafarianism could be regarded as a “religion” or “belief” to be protected by Article 9. The Court replied in the negative. In particular, it found no reason to deviate from the findings of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, whose decision appeared carefully measured and did not seem in any way arbitrary or illogical. That court had duly applied the standards set out in the Court’s case-law and noted a lack of the required conditions of seriousness and cohesion. While accepting that the applicant had been consistent in wearing her colander out of doors, it found that she had not shown that she belonged to a Pastafarian denomination that met the above preconditions. In this context, the Court noted that the original aim for which the Pastafarian movement had been founded had been to protest against the introduction into the school curriculum of the state of Kansas of the doctrine of “intelligent design” alongside the theory of evolution; this had inspired a movement critical of the influence and privileged position afforded to established religions in some contemporary societies. That movement had sought to express this criticism by parodying aspects of those religions and by claiming the same privileges for itself with a view to propagating its message. This understanding was supported not only by the form and content of Pastafarian teaching but also by the appearance in one of its “canonical” texts of the outright statement to that effect. 
 
In these circumstances, and in particular given the very aims for which the Pastafarian movement had been founded, the Court did not consider Pastafarianism to be a “religion” or “belief” within the meaning of Article 9. Consequently, the wearing of a colander by followers of Pastafarianism could not be considered a manifestation of a “religion” or “belief”, even if the person concerned submitted that he or she chose to do so out of a conviction that was genuine and sincerely held. 
 
It followed that Article 9 could not apply either to the “Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster” or to those who claimed to profess its doctrines.

12 November 2021

Fake Identity Certs

With the apt title ‘They tell you what you want to hear’ the Guardian has a short piece today on scamming people who buy fake vaccine cards or other certificates. It is an example of criminals victimising other criminals. 

The Guardian notes instances of scammers offering to sell a US fake vaccine card, including having the vaccinationed status registered in a non-existant Center for Disease Control (CDC) database. The CDC does not have a vaccination register or provide a CDC-labeled vaccination record card. As with fake testamurs, driver licence documents and passports the market is global. 

The article states 

 Home Boy, who is based in Cameroon, sells cards for $170 and claims he delivers within 48 hours. He said he had worked with more than 250 people in the past three months. When asked about rumors about rampant scams on the platform, he shares “proof” of vaccine cards he has made. “If we have to work together we have to start by building trust,” he said. 

For $149, a user called “Admin 24/24”, based in Australia, said they could provide a digital vaccine pass “for every country”. 

Another scammer going by the name of “Stella Bright” promised to send QR codes provided by doctors who “work with the government but are ready to save the world”. When asked if this was a scam, she said: “We are part of those fighting fraudsters on Telegram and doing the right job. In a period of hardship like this one, we need heroes out there who can protect humans again since our government has failed us all.” 

Getting the vaccine is free, straightforward and safe but some people have instead chosen to spend weeks trying to illegally obtain fake vaccine cards only to get scammed, by other criminals, for hundreds of dollars. ... 

It took Maggie two tries and $450 before she realized she wasn’t going to get the fake vaccine cards she was looking to buy.  ... Thinking that she might be getting scammed again, she pulled the plug. “I don’t trust any of them anymore. I haven’t come across even one other person [trying to buy a fake vaccine card] who has found someone legit,” Maggie told the Guardian.

Ah yes, disappointment that the person who you want to aid your scam is indeed a scammer

Sara, who is based in Australia, has been scammed by five people and lost more than $1,000. She had coronavirus in March and told the Guardian she believes she has enough immunity from the experience and so doesn’t need the vaccine. 

04 November 2021

Affiliation

Another instance of contested, if not appropriated, affiliation. 

The Guardian and CBC report controversy over claims by University of Saskatchewan academic Carrie Bourassa of Indigenous ancestry.  Bourassa has described herself as having Métis, Anishinaabe and Tlingit heritage and on occasion very publicly identified herself as “Morning Star Bear” (“I’m Bear Clan. I’m Anishinaabe Métis from Treaty Four Territory”).

 CBC television alleged that Bourassa was entirely of European descent, with a study of genealogical and other records indicating that her ancestors were of Russian, Polish and Czechoslovakian descent. As with much disagreement about affiliation, colleagues had expressed disquiet about her account of her ancestry and some appear to have undertaken genealogical searches (confirmed and deepened by CBC).

Bourassa states that she had been adopted as Métis by a friend of her grandfather and had subsequently been adopted into Tlingit and other communities. CBC was accused of running a “smear campaign", with  Bourassa stating she was “shocked and dismayed at the recent attack on my identity”. She indicated that she identified as Métis and that elders who supported her did not rely on “blood quantums” to assess Indigenous identity. 

CBC quotes a University of Toronto academic of Métis heritage as saying “It makes you feel a bit sick [t]o have an impostor who is speaking on behalf of Métis and Indigenous people to the country about literally what it means to be Métis … that’s very disturbing and upsetting and harmful.” 

Another colleague states 

 early on in Bourassa’s career, she only identified as Métis. But more recently, Tait said, Bourassa began claiming to also be Anishinaabe and Tlingit. Tait said she also began dressing in more stereotypically Indigenous ways, saying the TEDx Talk was a perfect example. 

“Everybody cheers and claps, and it’s beautiful,” said Tait. “It is the performance that we all want from Indigenous people — this performance of being the stoic, spiritual, culturally attached person [with] which we can identify because we’ve seen them in Disney movies.”

Authority aside, Bourassa may have benefited from scholarships as a Métis student.

In my forthcoming monographs on identity I note that 'identity states' rely on registers and tags. CBC states

On her Facebook page, Bourassa says she’s a member of First Indigenous Riel Métis Local #33 (FIRM 33). 

Wendy Gervais, the elected representative for the Métis Nation–Saskatchewan (MN-S) in the Regina region where FIRM 33 is located, says that organization is not connected to the Métis Nation. “They are not a recognized, legal local,” said Gervais. “They’re not part of our governing body.” 

Gervais said in Saskatchewan, proving you are a Métis person is relatively simple — you just show you are on the provincial citizenship registry. 

“If someone were questioning who I am, here’s my citizenship card, here’s my genealogy. This is who I am,” said Gervais. “Any person carrying a Métis citizenship card has produced their documentation to prove who they are.” 

In fact, during a 2012 address to a House of Commons committee examining Métis identity, Bourassa acknowledged she didn’t qualify for the registry. 

“I can have my local membership, but I know I am not eligible for that provincial registry,” Bourassa said.

A critic comments that

sidelining genealogical proof is alarming at a time when Indigenous people are fighting for their rights and their land. 
 
“That’s opening the doors to every Tom, Dick and Harry to claim Indigeneity,” she said. “Then suddenly out of the woodwork, everybody’s Indigenous because they feel like it.”

07 January 2021

Identification and Identity Offences

'Identification in EU Data Protection Law' by David Erdos comments 

Although the new EU data protection framework includes new pan-European limits based on notions of non-identification, these provisions cannot be construed in a sweeping or linear fashion. Non-identified data can only include information which is not being used to target a specific individual on- or offline and which does not readily and manifestly enable such pinpointing. Although GDPR controllers cannot generally be obliged to render such data identified, they must stand ready to do so to facilitate reactive subject rights. However, they have no design obligation to ensure this is easy. Identifying or authenticating whether a particular individual is a specific data subject and considering whether other data subjects are also linked to the information are separately regulated. With the exception of the GDPR rights to data portability and a copy of personal data, the latter is in principle left to national derogation. Regarding the former, both the GDPR and LED allow controllers to require further information where reasonably required to identify a claimant of reactive rights. However, controllers retain a fundamental duty to organise their processing to secure data obligations and rights. Controllers can generally only resist reactive rights claims where they can positively demonstrate that the request is manifestly excessive.

Late last year in Victorian Legal Services Board v Razos (Legal Practice) (Corrected) [2020] VCAT 1304 the Tribunal considered a disqualification order - for an indefinite period - regarding paralegal Athena Razos. It states

 the respondent has at various times been known by the aliases listed at Schedule 1 below. ... 

Schedule 1: Aliases 

Athena Ligris Zizzi 

Athena Athina Bouzas; 

Athena Katherine Bouzas-Legris; 

Athena Legris; Athina Ligris; 

Teena Ligris; Tina Ligris; 

Athina Zissi 

Athina Zissiadis; 

Teena Zissiadis; 

Zissiadis; 

Teena Zissiadis Ligris; and 

Tina Zissiadis-Ligris.

In providing Reasons VCAT states 

 Disqualification of individuals (other than practitioners) 

(1) The designated tribunal may, on the application of the designated local regulatory authority, make an order disqualifying a person who is an individual (other than an Australian legal practitioner) for the purposes of this Law, for a specified period or indefinitely, if satisfied that— (a) a ground for making the order under this section has been established (see subsection (2)); and (b) the disqualification is justified. 

(2) Any of the following are grounds for disqualifying a person— (a) that the person has been convicted of a serious offence; (b) that the person is not a fit and proper person to be employed or paid in connection with the practice of law or to be involved in the management of a law practice; (c) that the person was formerly an Australian legal practitioner and has, when an Australian legal practitioner, been guilty of conduct that constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct; (d) that the person has been guilty of conduct that, if the person were an Australian legal practitioner, would have constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct; (e) that the person could be disqualified under sections 206C–206F of the Corporations Act from managing a law practice if the law practice were a corporation. 

The grounds here are that Ms Razos has been convicted of a serious offence, in fact multiple serious offences, and is guilty of conduct which, if she were an Australian legal practitioner would have constituted professional misconduct. She has engaged in fraud and theft, including while employed in law practices. Ms Razos consents to the order, although she has sought suppression of publication of the order and any information about the reasons for it. ... 

My orders attach an agreed schedule of 14 other names by which Ms Razos has been known, which was itself attached to the minutes of consent order filed last year. I note that the convictions referred to below were in three different names: Tina Zissiadis-Ligris (2000 conviction) Athina Zissi (2007 conviction); and Athina Ligris (2009 conviction) 

... Ms Razos has advised that Zissiadis is her maiden name which she still uses and Ligris and Razos are married names. Whatever the reason for the use of so many different names, I am satisfied that the purposes of an order under s 119 are served by including the schedule in my orders and these reasons. 

In the following section, I have re-ordered the agreed facts so that the most recent conduct – misappropriation of over $1,000,000 from trust monies while working as a paralegal at a law practice between 2016-2017 – is set out first. The criminal convictions are dated 2000, 2007 and 2009 respectively. 

It underlines what I consider to be a continuing risk posed by Ms Razos if she were ever to be employed in a law practice again. My view is that this conduct, of itself, would justify the disqualification order, as would the criminal offending set out below. If she had been an Australian legal practitioner, it would constitute the most serious professional misconduct, misconduct at common law, warranting strike off from the roll of practitioners. 

Ms Athena Razos is not and has not at any time been an Australian legal practitioner. However, between 1984 and 2017, Ms Razos was employed in the following roles within the legal profession:

Secretary at Mallesons Stephen Jacques (1984) to 1988); Legal secretary at Minter Ellison. (1990 to 1988); Law clerk at Legal Finance and Business Matters (2002 to 2004); Senior secretary at Freehills (2004 to 2008); Senior conveyancer at Professional Legal Group (2007 to 2008); and Paralegal at Moray & Agnew (2008 to 2017). 

Misappropriation of trust funds 

While Ms Razos was employed as a paralegal with Moray & Agnew, her role involved the management of conveyancing matters and she was responsible for directing Moray & Agnew’s accounts department to bank deposit monies that were to be held on trust by the law practice pending settlement and allocate the receipted funds to clients’ trust ledgers. 

Between April 2016 and July 2017, Ms Razos used trust monies totalling $1,051,063 for her own benefit. These funds were obtained by providing false and/or misleading documents in support of unauthorised payments out of the Moray & Agnew trust account: into a trust ledger in her own name, with those funds subsequently paid out at her direction; into bank accounts controlled by her; to third parties as payment for goods and services procured by her; and to third parties as payment of costs and/or expenses associated with her own residential property. 

During this period, Ms Razos also: made unauthorised transfers of funds between trust ledgers in respect of different client files, making up the shortfall caused by the funds paid out as above; and overpaid clients from funds in trust, stating that the additional money had been earned in interest on the funds invested on the clients’ behalf, when in fact the funds had not been invested and no interest had been earned. Ms Razos has since repaid the law practice amounts totalling $1,103,157 including amounts for lost interest and costs resulting from the above conduct. 

Criminal Offending 

On 7 September 2000, under the name of ‘Tina Zissiadis-Ligris’, Ms Razos was convicted of the following offences:

  • one count of theft; 

  • 17 counts of obtaining property by deception 

  • one count of making a false document to the prejudice of another person; and 

  • one count of using a copy of a false document. 

By way of sentence, Ms Razos was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment (wholly suspended for 12 months), placed on a 12-month Community Corrections Order and ordered to pay $81,192.46 in compensation. Subsequently, while working at the law practice Freehills, Ms Razos stole amounts from petty cash totalling $16,346.60. 

As a result, on 6 August 2007, Ms Razos was convicted of the following offences under the name of ‘Athina Zissi’ and ordered to pay compensation: 

  • 61 counts of obtaining property by deception; and 

  • 141 counts of theft. 

On 8 May 2009, Ms Razos was convicted of further offences relating to conduct occurring between 1992 and 2003. Convictions were recorded under the name of ‘Athina Ligris’ in relation to the following offences:

  • seven counts of making a false document to the prejudice of another person; 

  • seven counts of using a false document to the prejudice of another person; 

  • two counts of attempting to obtain property by deception; 

  • two counts of obtaining property by deception; and 

  • nine counts of obtaining financial advantage by deception. 

For these offences, Ms Razos was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment (with 1 year being suspended for a period of 18 months) and ordered to pay $5,081.08 in compensation. 

Ms Razos ’ conduct leading to the 2009 conviction occurred both before and after the first Magistrates’ Court conviction and involved:

  • forging her husband’s signature on a Transfer of Land in respect of jointly-owned property; 

  • forging the signatures of her husband and a solicitor as witness (who did not exist) on documents relating to a mortgage over jointly-owned property; 

  • applying for a credit card in her husband’s name, in respect of which a debt of $38,957.25 was written off by the bank; 

  • forging her husband’s signature in respect of a ‘direct debit authority’ for payment of insurance premiums; 

  • forging her husband’s signature and that of a witnessing solicitor (who did not exist) on an affidavit filed in the County Court of Victoria; obtaining an amount of $12,000 from the ANZ bank by a fraudulent credit card application in the name of ‘Athina’ K Bouzas Legris’; 

  • incurring debts of $3,231.83 on a credit card in the name of a third party, without that person’s knowledge or consent; 

  • writing fraudulent cheques to herself, drawn on accounts in the names of third parties, which were subsequently dishonoured; 

  • forging her husband’s signature on government documents in order to access his superannuation benefit of $2,545.87; and 

  • using cheques to pay for goods, services and cash advances to the value of $3,258.41, which were dishonoured.