Deaths

'The Law of Digital Resurrection' by Victoria Haneman in (2025) 66(5) Boston College Law Review 1569-1626 comments 

The digital right to be dead has yet to be recognized as an important legal right. Artificial intelligence, augmented reality, and nanotechnology have progressed to the point that personal data can be used to resurrect the deceased in digital form with appearance, voice, emotion, and memory recreated to allow interaction with a digital app, chat bot, or avatar that may be indistinguishable from that with a living person. Users may now have a completely immersive experience simply by loading the personal data of the deceased into a neural network to create a chatbot that inherits features and idiosyncrasies of the deceased and dynamically learns with increased communication. There is no legal or regulatory landscape against which to estate plan to protect those who would avoid digital resurrection, and few privacy rights for the deceased. This intersection of death, technology, and privacy law has remained relatively ignored until recently. This Article is the first to respect death as an important and distinguishing part of the conversation about regulating digital resurrection. Death has long had a strained relationship with the law, giving rise to dramatically different needs and idiosyncratic legal rules. The law of the dead reflects the careful balance between the power of the state and an individual’s wishes, and it may be the only doctrinal space in which we legally protect remembrance. This Article frames the importance of almost half of a millennium of policy undergirding the law of the deceased, and proposes a paradigm focused upon a right of deletion for the deceased over source material (data), rather than testamentary control over the outcome (digital resurrection), with the suggestion that existing protections are likely sufficient to protect against unauthorized commercial resurrections.

Repatriation

The ambitious UK Laying Ancestors to Rest policy brief from the UK Parliament's All-Party Parliamentary Group for Afrikan Reparations (APPG-AR) is characterised as addressing

the ethical and legal challenges surrounding the retention and public display of African ancestral remains in British museums, universities and other cultural institutions. It examines existing legislation, notably the Human Tissue Act 2004, and draws upon best practices from other countries as well as insights from legal experts, academics, community activists and museum professionals to provide actionable recommendations. 

The goal is to facilitate the respectful repatriation of these remains to their countries and communities of origin, end their sale, public display and other non-consensual uses, which are increasingly viewed as a legacy of colonialism and cultural insensitivity.

Its  recommendations aim to

 to ensure the end of the public display and non-consensual uses of African ancestral remains and achieve their repatriation from UK institutions to their communities or countries of origin. 

African is used in a broad sense, including remains from Pharaonic and Ptolemaic Egypt.  

Government 

1. All sales of human remains should be made illegal on the basis that they are not commercial objects but human beings. 

2. The UK government should make these amendments to the Human Tissue Act 2004:

- The act should be amended to govern activities relating to all human remains, without exceptions for the remains of persons who died before the act came into force and more than 100 years have elapsed since their death, imported human remains as well as ‘existing holdings’. 

- The act should be amended to expressly make an offence of the public display of human remains, except if appropriate consent is obtained or for religious or funerary purposes. 

- The license requirement in Section 16 should apply to all human remains, without exceptions for activities relating to the body of a person, or material which has come from the body of a person, who died more than 100 years ago and before the section came into force. Museums and other institutions that hold ancestral remains older than 100 years will thus be required to obtain a license from the Human Tissue Authority for the storage of such remains. 

3. The UK Culture, Media & Sport Committee should undertake an inquiry on restitution, including as a prominent subject the presence and uses of ancestral remains in British museums and cultural institutions. The inquiry’s call for evidence should request recommendations on the implementation of a programme to map the collections of ancestral remains in the UK’s national museums. - The inquiry should include a public consultation on the proposal to collectively bury and memorialise orphaned ancestors in the UK, or those ancestral remains whose identities were destroyed by colonial violence. 

4. The UK government should ensure that the board of trustees of national museums include representatives from diasporic civil society organisations. 

5. The UK Department for Culture, Media & Sport should establish a national, independent Human Remains Advisory Panel, following the model of the UK Spoliation Advisory Panel charged with resolving claims from people or their heirs who lost possession of cultural material during the Nazi era. 

Museums and cultural and educational institutions 

6. Museums and cultural and educational institutions should stop the public display of ancestral remains in their collections. 

7. Museums should train individuals from UK civil society and community groups in museum cataloguing practices with the aim that representatives from the community can actively contribute to the management of museum collections of African ancestral remains. 

8. Museums and cultural and educational institutions should revise their internal policies for the return of human remains, placing particular emphasis on:

- The removal of any distinctions between the return of human remains, modified human remains and cultural material. It should be up to source communities to determine what falls within the definition of ancestral remains. 

- The removal of any requirements or recommendations that claims for return should be accompanied by evidence that the remains were originally subjected to a mortuary practice or were intended for such. 

- The removal of any requirements or recommendations that claims for return should be made through a national government or government agency. 

Funders 

9. Funders should dedicate resources to research projects that intend to map the ancestral remains inventory of UK museums and other cultural institutions. 

10. Funders should finance legal test cases for the return of ancestral remains to their communities or countries of origin. 

Civil society and community groups 

11. Civil society organisations should organise workshops that train individuals from the African diasporic community in museum and cultural institutional governance, to promote community participation in museum and other institutional boards. 

12. The Black Studies Association with other stakeholders should advocate for a more comprehensive teaching of Britain’s colonial past in schools and the history of the acquisition of cultural material and ancestral remains in developing the collections of British cultural institutions. 

13. Seminars should be organised that gather community, academic, legal and museum stakeholders to take forward conversations around the key issues that were raised throughout the first phase of AFFORD’s African Ancestral Remains Project. 

14. African and African diasporic restitution organisations and movements should establish a common forum or informational hub in which best practices can be shared.

Mortality

'Representations of Immortality and Institutions in 21st-Century Popular Culture' by Devaleena Kundu and Bethan Michael-Fox in Kate Woodthorpe, Helen Frisby, and Bethan Michael-Fox (eds), Death and Institutions: Processes, Places and the Past (Bristol University Press, 2025) 161-175 comments 

This chapter examines how death and institutions intersect in four 21st-century popular cultural representations of immortality. While the routes to immortality in the four texts examined are varied, the chapter shows how powerful and elite institutions are positioned as central in all of these cultural representations of immortality on screen and in literature. Considering one film documentary – Freeze Me (2006), two television series – Torchwood: Miracle Day (2011) and Upload (2020–) – and one narrative fiction novel – Death at Intervals (2008), the chapter shows how a range of popular cultural narratives produced between 2005 and 2020 effectively function as spaces through which to negotiate shifting ‘real life’ anxieties about the medical and political institutionalization of death in the early 21st century. Questions about whether institutions can be trusted and about the roles they play in deciding what life and death are, as well as who gets to live and die, come to the fore across this range of popular cultural examples, demonstrating how popular cultural texts can function as spaces through which to negotiate sociocultural concerns about mortality. The chapter shows how the institutions that feature in these four texts take on a shadowy form with often nefarious motivations and ties to economic and social privilege.

Dissection

'A common law power to dissect: a medico-legal history' by Joshua Shaw in (2025) 33(1) Medical Law Review states 

Comments on the legal history of anatomy and dissection in common law jurisdictions often cite three statutes. First, the Concerning Barbers and Chirurgians Act 1540, which entitled the Company of Barbers and Surgeons of London to the bodies of four executed convicts each year for the purpose of dissection. Secondly, the Murder Act 1751, which granted courts the power to sentence murderers to be dissected by members of the Company of Surgeons of London after their execution. And, finally, the Anatomy Act 1832, which repealed the Murder Act 1751 to the extent that it allowed dissection as punishment, empowered those in lawful possession of bodies to direct their use for anatomical examination, and introduced a regulatory scheme for schools where anatomical examinations took place. These statutes supplied bodies for dissection under certain conditions as exceptions to fundamental obligations at common law to effect and preserve a parishioner’s right to ‘Christian’ or ‘decent’ burial and, thus, to facilitate requirements of ecclesiastical or church law. 

The common law, in such comments, is associated with the traditional religious feeling of what ought to be done with the dead (namely, Christian or decent burial), a feeling popularly held in England at the time of the Anatomy Act 1832 and required by ecclesiastical law. Christian eschatology placed importance on burial so as to preserve the dignity of the body until resurrection at the Last Judgment, and whilst religious elites could tolerate other uses, such as dissection, burial of the body remained integral to ecclesiastical law as that was practised in England. Common law courts generally deferred to ecclesiastical administration and courts to handle disputes relating to the disposal of the dead, following the comment of Edward Coke that the dead body was of ‘ecclesiastical cognizance’. Indeed, Coke suggested that this was why no property could exist in a dead body at common law, which William Blackstone appeared to concur with whilst relying on Haynes’s Case (1614) as authority. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, common law courts increasingly clarified obligations they could enforce to facilitate ecclesiastical law. This included requiring the performance of burial from certain persons upon whom the duty to bury was placed, as well as establishing criminal offences for preventing the decent burial of the dead or disinterring the buried dead without lawful excuse. 

Legislation, in contrast, was responsible for deviations from the tradition held by the common law, deviations tolerated owing to the putative utility of modern medicine and surgery. Anatomy and dissection were thereby authorized only according to the provisions of these statutes; such acts were not otherwise lawful. That image of the law appears to have led some historians to refer to dissection outside the permissions of the Anatomy Act 1832 as illegal, for want of authority. Likewise, some jurists, relying on such histories, construct decent burial (and, more recently, cremation) as all the common law ordinarily permits; most other uses, like anatomy and dissection (outside coronial examinations), depend entirely upon legislation for their authority.  However, the historical record is more complicated than this image of the law. There were jurists who insisted that what could be done at common law was more than decent interment. Rather, the common law, by their argument, appeared to admit the existence of a power to dissect, claimed by physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries prior to and outside of legislation. 

As this article shows, to these jurists, such a power authorized and regulated dissection outside the contexts contemplated by anatomy legislation. This is important to show for at least two reasons. First, a common law power to dissect challenges the narratives ordinarily told about the history of anatomy law specifically, and the law of the dead generally, which is instructive for understanding medico-legal history in England and Wales and throughout the British Empire (where legislation could be scant, such as in the Province of Canada and Nova Scotia).  Secondly, a common law power to dissect may be extant where legislation has not displaced it, and thereby authorize certain uses of the human dead, such as dissection specifically, as well as wider uses if the power is understood to also support a more general principle that the common law did not require burial. The presumptive legality of the body’s use begins analysis at a different point, potentially allowing for a wider array of uses if not dependent on statute. That will be relevant to courts that must adjudicate ‘exceptional’ uses of the human dead or tissue and look to the historical record for guidance, such as when Justice Jackson of the High Court of Justice in England and Wales considered ‘the old authorities on the unlawful treatment of dead bodies’ with respect of the novel practice of cryonics.  Likewise, legislators and others interested in law reform affecting the disposal of the dead and the use of human bodily materials will benefit from a corrected historical record. 

As Margaret Brazier has said alone and with Jonathan Montgomery, medico-legal history assists the lawyer in examining the relationships of law and morality to medical practice, by tracing the conditions for their emergence.  Without history, ‘we waste time and effort and repeat the same mistakes’ and ‘[i]f we have only a vague notion of history, a notion unsupported by evidence, we may make bad laws today’.  I specifically engage in medico-legal history as that services doctrinal understandings of medical law, ‘us[ing] formal legal materials such as reports of decisions […] and evidence of lawyers’ argumentation and reflections, in order to reconstruct the mind of the professional legal collective as it understands its own activity in guiding conduct and resolving disputes’.  Re-examining old doctrines can disrupt the orthodoxy of current legal doctrine, suggesting alternative possibilities for law through its retelling.  Especially with the young discipline of medical law, in search of its history and the history of its subject matter,  histories of legal doctrine remain worthwhile. 

The article focuses on identifying the historical sources and elements of a common law power to dissect, as expressed by some jurists. Analysis of its broader significance, historically and to contemporary legal doctrine, merits more space than allowed here. But I do occasionally place the power to dissect in the context of bodysnatching, and the inadequate supply of bodies for dissection and anatomical examination, which precipitated the Anatomy Act 1832. Bodysnatching involved disinterring the buried dead or, more dangerously, murder, so to procure bodies for dissection and anatomical examinations. The practice emerged in response to the inadequate supply of bodies for anatomical examination, especially as private and university anatomy schools were increasingly opened in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, creating greater demand.  It is necessary for me to place the power in this context, as it will assist the reader of legal history in gaining a fuller understanding of the policies underlying the doctrine and its use. Furthermore, the context preceding the Anatomy Act 1832 also supplied at least two cases that led some from this period to conclude that anatomy and dissection were unlawful at common law.  These cases are important to analyse since they may be raised to negate the existence of a power to dissect. 

The article has three parts: first, I show where and how jurists in the common law described the power to dissect; secondly, I set out the power’s elements, particularly as it interacted with the ‘no property’ rule, criminal law, the law of tort, and any other municipal law; and thirdly, I observe how the power to dissect was threatened by concern for bodysnatching but ultimately persisted despite how certain cases were narrated.

Cryo and Biopolitics

'Anticipating and suspending: the chronopolitics of cryopreservation' by Thomas Lemke in (2024) BioSocieties comments 

The article brings together two disparate and so far largely disconnected bodies of research: the critical analysis of cryopreservation technologies and the debate on modes of anticipation. It starts with a short review of the state of the research on the concept of cryopolitics. In the next part I will suggest two revisions. I will problematize the idea of latent life and the focus on potentialities that have been central to the research on cryopolitics so far, proposing to shift the analytic frame to suspended life on the one hand and to modes of anticipation on the other. I argue that cryopreservation practices are part of contemporary technologies of anticipation. They are linked to a politics of suspension by mobilizing a liminal biological state in which frozen organisms or biological material are neither fully alive nor ultimately dead. This seeks to avert and/or enable distinctive futures by extending temporal horizons and keeping vital processes in limbo. ... 

In the past ten years, a number of STS scholars have proposed the term “cryopolitics” or “cryopower” to capture the profound socio-material changes introduced by technologies producing low temperatures (Friedrich and Höhne 2014; Kowal and Radin 2015; Radin 2017; Friedrich 2017).Footnote 1 The notion seeks to address the radical and ongoing transformation of temporal trajectories and spatial configurations in contemporary societies engendered by cryopreservation practices. In this understanding, cryobiological processes fundamentally affect the politics of life in the twenty-first century. They undermine conventional understandings of life and give rise to novel modes of controlling, enhancing and processing organic matter. 

This article seeks to explore and further advance the “cryopolitical account” (Peres 2019, p. 77) by connecting it to the debate on modes of anticipation. This growing literature has emerged in the past two decades in STS and beyond, arguing for the need to explore how different futures are enacted through socio-material assemblages (Adams et al. 2009; Anderson 2010; Alvial-Palavicino 2015; Poli 2017; Davis and Groves 2019). Bringing together these so far largely disconnected bodies of research, I propose the concept of a politics of suspension. It builds on the idea of cryopolitics but shifts the analytic focus to the chronopolitical strategies enacted by cryopreservation and cryobanking practices that modify and mould the order of time to accommodate future events. 

I start with a short review of the state of the debate on cryopolitics. The next part suggests two revisions. It problematizes the idea of “latent life” as well as the focus on potentialities that have been central to the literature so far, proposing to shift the analytic frame to “suspended life” on the one hand and to modes of anticipation on the other. I argue that cryopreservation practices are linked to a politics of suspension by mobilizing a liminal biological state in which frozen organisms or biological material are neither fully alive nor ultimately dead. They are an integral part of contemporary technologies of anticipation as they seek to avert and/or enable distinctive futures by extending temporal horizons and keeping vital processes in limbo. 

Reassessing cryopolitics: a brief review of the debate 

The term cryopolitics was first introduced almost twenty years ago by Michael Bravo and Gareth Rees to draw attention to the increasing geostrategic importance of the Arctic region as melting polar sea ice opens up new political conflicts over material resources (Bravo and Rees 2006; Haverluk 2007; Bravo 2017). In the past decade, however, scholars have proposed a more comprehensive understanding of the term that directly follows Foucault’s analytics of biopolitics. Friedrich and Höhne (2014) and Kowal and Radin (2015; Radin and Kowal 2017) have argued that cryopolitics is an extension of the Foucauldian concept. Foucault famously contrasts biopower with sovereign power. While the latter is characterized by taking life or letting live, the former operates by technologies that foster life or let die (Foucault 2003, p. 241). Cryopolitics marks an important intensification of the biopolitical problem space as it is organized around the imperative to “make live and not let die” (Friedrich and Höhne 2014, p. 2, emphasis in orig.; Kowal and Radin 2015; Friedrich 2017; Radin and Kowal 2017).Footnote 2 Thus, cryopolitics is defined by interrupting processes of development and decay, opening up a “unique biological state between life and death” (Neuman 2006, p. 260). 

In this understanding, cryopolitics serves as a “theoretical frame brought into existence by the practice of freezing” (Kowal and Radin 2015, p. 68). It does not work as a conceptual alternative to the classical understanding of biopolitics but rather represents “a mode of Foucault’s biopolitics” (8ibid.; Friedrich and Höhne 2016; Radin and Kowal 2017). While this reading stresses continuity and consistency, the concept of cryopolitics also significantly enlarges the original understanding of biopolitics. In line with empirical insights and theoretical propositions by STS scholars and many other researchers investigating the impact of contemporary biosciences, the analytics of cryopolitics is marked by three important extensions. First, it shifts the focus of investigation beyond the disciplining of the individual body and the regulation of the population—the “two poles of development” (Foucault 1978, p. 139; 2003) in Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics. Cryopolitics opens up the analytic frame to include the control and enhancement of biological matter. Beyond the individual body of a human subject and the collective body of the population, it includes “bits and pieces from human bodies” (Hoeyer 2017, p. 207) such as gametes, tissue or DNA. Secondly, the concept of cryopolitics undermines any attempt to restrict biopolitics to “the vital characteristics of human existence” (Rabinow and Rose 2006, pp. 197–98; Rose 2007). Rather, it attends to the “totality of life” (Friedrich and Höhne 2014, p. 38; Friedrich 2020a, p. 247) and the multiple ways in which biopolitical mechanisms also affect nonhuman species, seeking to govern animal and plant life (Haraway 2008; Friese 2013; Wolfe 2013; see also Lemke 2021). Third, while the colonial legacy of biopolitics only plays a minor role in Foucault’s work, the analytics of cryopolitics often engages with colonial and racialized rationalities underpinning cryopreservation practices. One important area of research has been the International Biological Program (IBP) that ran from the 1960s through to the mid-1970s. Using mechanical laboratory freezers and techniques of cold storage, the anthropologists, biologists and physicians involved in the program collected hundreds of thousands of blood samples from indigenous communities in many countries, whose peoples were considered to be both unchanged by civilization processes and threatened by extinction. These collections were assembled in order to determine biological traits of individuals and populations often conceived of as ‘primitive’ to promote knowledge for the future of mankind. However, as TallBear notes, this research initiative (as well as many others with similar objectives) that claims to preserve indigenous DNA for the study of human diversity “is predicated on indigenous death” (TallBear 2017, p. 182; Radin 2013; Kowal et al. 2013; Kowal and Radin 2015; Radin 2017). 

In the past decade, the concept of cryopolitics has attracted a lot of academic interest, especially after the publication of an edited volume on the subject by Radin and Kowal (2017). Cryopolitics: Frozen Life in a Melting World contained a number of important contributions covering topics such as biosecurity (Keck 2017), global food chains (Friedrich 2017) and species conservation (van Dooren 2017; Chrulew 2017; Kirksey 2017). In the wake of this seminal publication, the “cryopolitical analytic” (Radin and Kowal 2017, p. 4) was fruitfully extended to other relevant research fields. It has been used to analyse the control of temperature in urban spaces (Höhne 2018), to investigate the governance of frozen seeds repositories (Peres 2019), to assess the impact of cryogenic technologies in reproductive policies in Scandinavian countries (Kroløkke et al. 2019), to study the practices of egg cell freezing and the potential use of cryopreserved oocytes for biomedical research (Friedrich 2020b), to follow resurrection projects in Russia that seek to bring the mammoth back to life (Wrigley 2021), and to trace the technoscientific networks of human milk donation and banking in Spain (Romero-Bachiller and Santoro 2023). 

The “cryopolitical framework” (Kroløkke 2019, p. 541; Peres 2019, p. 84) often puts forward two fundamental and interconnected claims. Firstly, cryopolitics is characterized by “the perpetual deferral of death” (Kowal and Radin 2015, p. 68; see also Radin and Kowal 2017, p. 7) and draws on a state of “latent life” (Friedrich and Höhne 2014; Kowal and Radin 2015; Radin 2017; Kroløkke 2019; Romero-Bachiller and Santoro 2023). According to this reading cryopreservation practices make it possible to store organic material by cooling it to sub-zero temperatures for an indefinite period of time, resulting in a “life without death” (Kowal and Radin 2015, p. 69, emphasis in orig.). Secondly, the concept of cryopolitics designates the “potential of life or life forms that had been redirected in time through the use of low temperature” (Radin 2017, p. 4; 2013; see also Friedrich 2020b, p. 340). In this understanding, cryopreservation practices store potentialities available for future use, opening up scientific or medical perspectives as well as commercial options. 

In the following, I propose a two-fold analytical shift to clarify and complement the original reading of cryopolitics. First of all, I will argue that in order to conceive the mode of operation of cryopreservation practices, “suspension” is more appropriate than “latency”. In contrast to “latent life”, “suspended life” accounts for the deferral of both death and life and better captures the liminal biological state of frozen organic material. Building on and extending the existing debate on cryopolitics, I seek to offer a conceptual clarification that suggests shifting the analytic focus from latency to “suspended life” (Lemke 2022). The idea of suspension in cryopreservation practices has been fruitfully explored before in conceptual reflections (Hoeyer 2017) as well as in empirical studies (Romero-Bachiller and Santoro 2023), but so far it has not been consistently distinguished from the notion of latency and its chronopolitical dimensions still lack a systematic consideration. Secondly, I suggest situating cryopreservation practices within the current “regime of anticipation” (Adams et al. 2009; Mackenzie 2013; see also Dolez et al. 2019). Analysing how cryotechnologies are mobilized within anticipatory rationalities displaces the promissory focus on potential with a practical interest in addressing future concerns and catastrophic risks.

Burial Law

The Law Commission consultation paper noted in the preceding post includes a concise history of burial law in England and Wales

1.44 The history of burial in England and Wales can be described as a series of moves away from it being the sole preserve of the Church of England: toward first the nonconformist churches, and then toward private cemetery companies, municipal provision, and now, arguably, a second wave of private and religious burial grounds. 

Pre-nineteenth century burial custom and law 

1.45 As noted by historians, “for much of the mediaeval and post-mediaeval period the Church had dominion over the dead”. Until the nineteenth century, the Church of England was responsible for burials. Burials took place in churchyards, typically attached to the parish church, and were governed by ecclesiastical law.  All parishioners and inhabitants of a parish, and anyone dying within the parish, had (and continue to have) a right at common law to be buried in the local churchyard. 

1.46 Following the Act of Toleration in 1689 some Protestant Christian dissenters from the established Church of England obtained the right to worship freely, and began to establish their own places of worship, some of which included burial grounds. 

1.47 Burial grounds for other faiths begin to date from around this time. The earliest extant Jewish burial ground is “the Velho”, opened by the Sephardic community in 1657.  Dissenter and Quaker burial grounds were established in London following the great plague of 1665-66. 

1.48 One of the earliest laws on the depth at which bodies must be buried is a 1665 Order of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London, stating that bodies must be buried at least six feet deep, in an attempt to stop the spread of the bubonic plague.  Later, Parliament ordered that only woollen shrouds or coffin linings could be used, to support the English wool industry. 

Early Victorian burial law 

1.49 The nineteenth century began to see a change in burial practices, sparked by significant increases in urban populations as England and Wales industrialised, which swiftly overtook the capacity of Anglican churchyards.  The situation was indeed dire – in many churchyards it was reported that coffins were “stacked [above ground] rather than interred, since there was no longer sufficient fresh earth for burial”. 

1.50 Academics have argued that the development of new cemeteries in the nineteenth century was spurred by these alarming circumstances, but not solely by them. Increasing calls for space for nonconformist burials were another cause, which would eventually result in the Burial Laws Amendment Act 1880, permitting burial in Church of England churchyards without the Anglican rites.20 So were concerns about the security of buried bodies against the activities of the “body-snatchers” – those who stole corpses to supply anatomists. 

1.51 First came a number of individual dissenter cemeteries. Some appear to have been established as companies through trust deeds, such as the first non-denominational cemetery in England in 1819, The Rosary in Norwich,  and later the Cottenham Dissenters Cemetery in 1846.  In cemeteries such as these, any burial rites could be used, and putting in place features to ensure the security of the bodies buried was seen as paramount. 

1.52 From the 1830s onward, legislation was often used to establish private cemetery companies. In the nineteenth century, companies law required a private Act to establish a limited liability joint stock company so that a commercial cemetery could operate without the exposure of individual investors to losses.An 1832 Act of Parliament, which incorporated the General Cemetery Company for the Interment of the Dead, encouraged the establishment of seven commercial cemeteries in a ring around London to serve its inhabitants; the first such cemetery was Kensal Green 

1.53 The Cemeteries Clauses Act 1847 was later enacted to provide a statutory code for the establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, which could apply to any specific legislation which incorporated it, as an attempt towards some standardisation. Many of these cemetery companies initially focussed on providing a “luxury burial service” to the burgeoning middle classes. But by the 1840s, the sanitary problems perceived in relation to churchyards led to the creation of a new type of cemetery, operated by public authorities under a statutory framework, rather than private companies. 

The Burial Acts 

1.54 In 1839, George Walker published Gatherings from Grave Yards, an exposé of the condition of graveyards of the time and, as its subtitle stated, containing “detail of dangerous and fatal results produced by the unwise and revolting custom of inhuming the dead in the midst of the living.” His book advanced the miasma theory, which held that emissions from graves were responsible for a host of deaths and diseases. The public health reformer Edwin Chadwick subsequently sought to reform burial law to address such concerns. 

1.55 The Public Health Act 1848, the first major piece of public health legislation in England and Wales passed at the urging of Chadwick, included only limited regulation of burial. It provided for the closure of burial grounds which were a danger to public health, but only if alternatives were available, and required the permission of the new national General Board of Health before new burial grounds were opened. 

1.56 In 1850, following a cholera epidemic which was blamed on the state of churchyards, the General Board of Health presented the Metropolitan Interment Act 1850. That Act provided for a single burial authority for London, with powers to open its own burial grounds, close existing churchyards and restrict other burials, and provide mortuaries – what has been described as an “integrated funerary and cemetery system”.However, the Act was viewed as imposing excessive regulation, and was swiftly repealed. 

1.57 In its place came the Burial Acts, beginning with the Burial Act 1852 concerning London, and the Burial Act 1853 which contained similar provisions relating to the rest of the country. These two Acts permitted the creation of local burial boards, if the ratepayers voted for them, with powers to borrow from the Public Works Loan Board to fund new burial grounds. Unlike the previous attempt at reform in London, they did not provide for centralised regulation or provision of burial space. 

1.58 Importantly, the Acts enabled the closure of burial grounds by an Order in Council, powers which were used to prohibit most burials in churchyards within the City of London and surrounding boroughs.   A Parliamentary Return in April 1854 shows how popular (and perhaps necessary) this ability to close churchyards and cemeteries was: Over sixty separate London parishes had sought an inspection, and burials had been discontinued in the vaults of over 50 churches and chapels, interments had been immediately ceased or were planned to come to an end in the near future in over 70 churchyards and chapel burial grounds, and over 30 burial grounds – including some sites attached to schools, workhouse and hospitals – were also closed. The process of churchyard closure was by no means restricted to London. 

1.59 The first two Burial Acts also provided for the Secretary of State to make regulations governing such burial grounds, which in some ways resemble modern local authority cemetery laws. 

1.60 These Acts were followed by a number of further Burial Acts. These amended the powers of the burial boards, as well as providing limited powers to the Secretary of State to regulate cemeteries and exhumations.The Public Health (Interments) Act 1879 also created a parallel system which enabled local sanitary authorities to bypass the need to create burial boards, and simply set up their own cemeteries using the template of the Cemeteries Clauses Act 1847. Unlike burial board burial grounds, these did not need to be consecrated. 

1.61 Further Acts in the latter half of the nineteenth century regulated other aspects of burial. The Registration of Burials Act 1864 created a requirement for all burials to be registered, and the campaigns by non-conformists to access burial in Church of  England churchyards without Church of England rites culminated in the Burial Laws Amendment Act 1880. 

1.62 Finally, the Disused Burial Grounds Act 1884 protected disused burial grounds from development, alongside the Open Spaces Acts 1887 and 1906 which enabled their conversion into parks and green spaces. It has been argued that the two developments were linked, with the bar on other development “eliminating the competition” for the use of burial grounds as public spaces.

Twentieth century reforms 

1.63 Following the high volume of legislation on burial in the nineteenth century, little reform was undertaken in the first half of the twentieth century, aside from the Welsh Church (Burial Grounds) Act 1945. That Act resolved the status of burial grounds of the Church in Wales, following disestablishment over two decades prior. 

1.64 The second half of the century saw a major change. The Local Government Act 1972 simplified public provision of burial space significantly by ending the system of burial boards and repealing most of the Burial Acts. Instead, parish councils and first-tier councils were empowered to provide cemeteries.  Secondary legislation was passed to regulate these cemeteries.  Another more minor change was the introduction of exceptions to the ban on developing over burial grounds. 

The Church in Wales 

1.65 The history of the law of burial in Wales is the same as in England until the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales in the early twentieth century, at which point the position diverges. The Church in Wales was formally created in 1920, under the provisions of the Welsh Church Act 1914. This Act caused the ecclesiastical law of England to cease to operate in Wales. The Church in Wales is governed by pre-disestablishment canon law as amended by its own procedures.  However, burial is one of the two areas where the Church in Wales continues to be  affected by the consequences of having been formerly part of the established Church of England (the other being marriage). 

1.66 Church property in Wales thus ceased to have “owners”. This problem was resolved by granting members of the disestablished Church in Wales the power to appoint representatives to hold property for the newly established Representative Body of the Church in Wales, a charitable trustee corporation incorporated by Royal Charter. 

1.67 Before disestablishment, parishioners or people who died within a parish were entitled to be buried in the relevant parish churchyard, irrespective of their adherence to the Church of England (which before disestablishment extended to Wales). This remains the position in England. With the disestablishment of the Church in Wales, there had to be some assurance that public rights of burial would continue to be respected.  The 1914 Act achieved this continuity by requiring the ownership of a churchyard to be transferred to the local authority when an incumbent of the parish died or retired,  although in many cases local authorities did not accept them. 

1.68 What resulted from the 1914 Act was a confusing division of ownership – some burial grounds were owned by parish incumbents, some by local authorities, some closed burial grounds may have been transferred to the Representative Body of the Church in Wales, and some remained vested in the Welsh Church Commissioners, a body created to effect the disestablishment.  Eventually, the Welsh Church (Burial Grounds) Act 1945 was passed, and these automatic transfers to local authorities stopped.  Now, most Church in Wales burial grounds are vested (by virtue of the 1945 Act) in the Representative Body of the Church in Wales, which is responsible for their maintenance,  with no contribution made by the state to their costs. 

1.69 The 1945 Act also empowered the Church in Wales to make rules regarding public rights of burial.  These rules must now be approved by Welsh Ministers, to avoid discrimination against people who are not members of the Church, but may be different to provisions made by local authorities for their cemeteries.  The 1945 Act also now requires the Welsh Ministers to set fees for burial. 

1.70 The area affected by the disestablishment of the Church in Wales is not exactly the same as the nation of Wales. At disestablishment, a number of Church of England parishes straddled the border. Section 9 of the Welsh Church Act 1914 provided for the views of parishioners to be taken into account in deciding whether to disestablish the church in those parishes. Only one voted to join the Church in Wales, meaning that there are 18 parishes which are part of the Church of England, but located in Wales; and Llansilin parish of the Church in Wales is partly in Shropshire, which is in England (but its church, St Silin’s, is located in Wales). 

Recent developments 

1.71 The result of the development of burial law over the centuries is that burial is now a diverse sector, with broadly a tripartite division between Anglican, local authority, and private burial grounds – and with further divisions within that, such as between the Church in Wales and Church of England, between private cemeteries established by an Act of Parliament and those which were not, and so on. 

1.72 Nothing has fundamentally altered that structure since the 1970s, but the late twentieth century has seen some further changes. One is the creation of natural burial grounds. Natural burial describes a range of burial practices which seek to minimise environmental impact, and often to create or preserve a habitat for wildlife.  Most commentators on natural burial grounds cite a dual purpose: avoiding the perceived ecological negative impact of traditional burial, alongside conserving land by creating new wild spaces. 

1.73 The first modern natural burial ground in England and Wales was opened by Carlisle City Council in 1993. The Association of Natural Burial Grounds states that there are now over 270 natural burial grounds in the UK.69 Natural burial grounds may be operated by local authorities, private operators including charitable trusts, or the Church of England. 

History of cremation 

1.74 Cremation was not typically practised in the UK before the nineteenth century. Christians did not favour it, given their belief in the resurrection of the body. In addition, it may have had associations with Pagan treatment of the body (being practised by the Greeks and Romans).  However, the end of the nineteenth century saw the increasing emergence of cremation when it was encouraged as a more sanitary funerary method (including by the surgeon to Queen Victoria, who had been impressed with a model cremating apparatus he saw at the Vienna Exposition in 1873). 

1.75 When cremation first emerged in the nineteenth century, it was not clear that it was permitted under the law. An 1884 criminal case found that cremation (meaning simply burning a body) was legal so long as it did not amount to a public nuisance or prevent a coroner’s inquest.  An initial attempt was made, at the instigation of the Cremation Society, to introduce a Bill enabling the regulation of cremation, but this was opposed by the Government and the Opposition. 

1.76 A number of local Acts of Parliament were then passed enabling councils or corporations to establish crematoria. This continued until the Cremation Act 1902 was enacted, creating a regulatory system which allowed all burial authorities to establish crematoria, as well as governing how private crematoria should operate. 

1.77 However, cremation did not become commonplace until the second half of the twentieth century. The subsequent growth of cremation to become the most common funerary method has been attributed to the increasing secularisation of society, certain religious faiths (including Catholicism) ending earlier prohibitions against it, urbanisation, limitations on space, and lower costs than burial. 

1.78 The twenty-first century has seen the introduction to England and Wales of “direct cremation”, which is when a cremation takes place without a concurrent funeral service. This had been seen as a legitimate funerary choice for many years prior in the USA and Australia. The proportion of cremations which are direct cremations has risen quickly since their introduction. Academics have noted that the “purest” form of a direct cremation might involve the body being cremated with no-one in attendance, but that the direct cremation packages now sold by providers may include elements of attendance.  In any case, family and friends may choose to have a memorial service separate to the cremation. 

1.79 Research suggests that those who choose direct cremation do so for a mix of reasons, including: to effect a compromise between family members or where other plans could not be carried out; being able to control the arrangements and attendees, as opposed to the lack of control involved in an open public cremation service; and to be consistent with a person’s beliefs or attitudes toward the body after death. 

New funerary methods 

1.80 The most recent development has been the invention of new funerary methods, with two, alkaline hydrolysis and human composting, currently in use in other jurisdictions, such as a number of US states. Alkaline hydrolysis is a process which uses water, alkaline chemicals, heat and pressure to break down the body.  Human composting involves keeping a body in a controlled environment which is optimised so that the body’s own microbiome can break down the remains into soil much more quickly than in a burial. 

1.81 As these methods will be explored in detail in a forthcoming Law Commission consultation paper, we do not discuss them further here.

DATA ON BURIAL AND CREMATION 

1.82 In 2023, the latest year for which data is available, there were 581,363 deaths registered in England and Wales. In response to a freedom of information request in 2023, the Office for National Statistics confirmed that there are no centralised statistics on the proportion of people who are buried or cremated.  Data is collected on cremation by the Cremation Society, but for burial, sources such as ad-hoc surveys are all that is available. 

Cremation 

1.83 The Cremation Society is a charity which was founded in 1874 to promote and establish the practice of cremation. It collects statistical information from every crematorium in the UK. The first cremation it records was on 26 March 1885 at Woking, of Mrs Jeanette Pickersgill. In that year three cremations occurred. By 1947 over 10% of deaths resulted in a cremation, and there were 58 crematoria in operation across the UK. The proportion of deceased people cremated rose to 50% in 1967, and 70% by 1987. 

1.84 By 2022, there were 322 crematoria operational in the UK. 477,629 people were cremated in 2022, amounting to 82% of all deaths in that year.   The cremation rate has continued gradually to increase over time in the twenty-first century, as shown in figure 1 below. 

1.85 Other data provided by the Cremation Society provides tells us about trends in what occurs in crematoria. There has been a shift towards crematoria providing longer slots for the service as part of a cremation, for example, with four in ten providing hour-long slots in 2023, compared with 7% in 2007. 58% provide specific facilities for religious groups, compared with just 17% in 2008. Fees for the cremation itself vary by crematorium, from the highest of £1,400 at the Harwood Park Crematorium in Stevenage to the lowest of £497 at the City of London’s crematorium in east London. 

1.86 According to a SunLife report, in 2023, 20% of people chose to use direct cremation, with 39% saying that this was following a request from the deceased person, and 30% saying it was quicker to organise. However, 18% said they chose it as the funeral took place during COVID-19 restrictions, while 12% said they could not afford an alternative option. 33% of those who organised a direct cremation said they had a wake afterwards, while 27% held a memorial service, and 18% held both. 

Burial 

1.87 Based on the Cremation Society’s data, 18% of deaths in England and Wales in 2022, or 101,989 deaths, did not result in a cremation. All but a very small minority of those will have resulted in burials. Aside from data on the number of burials, an important area for data collection is in relation to where burials happen and the amount of space which is available for future burials. Such data is based on occasional surveys, but each such exercise has suggested that burial space is likely to run short in some places in the near future, a concern which is relevant to the aims of law reform as explored in this Consultation Paper. 

1.88 This data is set out in more detail in Chapter 14. In brief, a Government survey from 2007 estimated that there are between 16,000 and 18,000 Church of England burial grounds and 2,000 Church in Wales burial grounds. Around 2,000 local authority and 900 other burial grounds also responded to the survey. However, far more burials were made in the local authority burial grounds surveyed: 761,500 compared with 222,100 in the Church of England and Church in Wales burial grounds. The median time before burial grounds were full was 30 years in local authority and 25 years in Church of England and Church in Wales burial grounds. 

Cost of funerals 

1.89 Data on the cost of funerals indicates a significant increase over the last few decades, with rises continuing. The annual SunLife Cost of Dying report has found that the cost of a basic funeral rose from £3,953 to £4,141 from 2022 to 2023. These costs have risen 126% since their first report in 2004, outpacing inflation.British Seniors’ funeral costs report finds that a burial plot costs on average £1,107, burial fees £1,229, and cremation fees £1,383, although no comparison is made year-on-year. 

1.90 The link between the lack of available burial space and the cost of burial may not be straightforward and has not been rigorously assessed. Only certain elements of the cost of a funeral will also be within the scope of law reform in this project. However, it is conceivable that the former may have an impact on the latter. In addition, understanding the current costs to consumers of funerary methods is important for any law reforms which could impact on those costs. 

WIDER LEGAL CONTEXT 

1.91 This part of the chapter sets out in brief some areas of law which are not necessarily within scope of this project of law reform, but which are relevant context for consideration of the areas which are in scope. 

Ecclesiastical law 

1.92 The Church of England (or the Anglican Church of England) is the established church of England. “Establishment” is an elastic concept, so what it means in any given jurisdiction varies. Generally, it “refers to a formal relationship between a church and  the state in which it operates”.The relationship between the Church of England and the state has several formal elements within the United Kingdom: in relation to the monarchy (the role of the Sovereign in the Church); the executive (the role of the Prime Minister in ecclesiastical appointments); the judiciary (the operation of the ecclesiastical courts); and the legislature (the representation of the Church in the House of Lords, the Church Estate Commissioners, and the passing of ecclesiastical law).  It is the relationship with the judiciary, the ecclesiastical courts, and the legislature, in the role of ecclesiastical laws, which are most relevant to this project. 

Ecclesiastical courts 

1.93 The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts is governed mainly by the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure 2018. The ecclesiastical courts which are relevant to burial law are the consistory courts of each diocese, and the appeal courts: the Arches Court for the Province of Canterbury (the south of England, broadly), and Chancery Court in the Province of York (the north). These courts together hear applications for a type of decision called a “faculty” in order to permit changes to churches and churchyards, and appeals on such cases. 

1.94 In the consistory court, a case will be heard by a chancellor, a judge who is appointed by the bishop of the diocese.They must meet the requirements for secular judicial office. 

1.95 Faculties are required in order to alter the fabric of a church or churchyard, unless such changes are in a list of permitted minor works.  A faculty is required to issue an exclusive burial right in a churchyard, to permit an exhumation, and for gravestones which are outside of diocesan regulations.  Carrying out changes requiring a faculty without securing one could result in a civil action for trespass, or a criminal prosecution under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.   The consistory court can also  issue injunctions to prevent breaches of ecclesiastical law, and restoration orders to remedy such breaches, and failure to comply with them is a contempt of court. 

Ecclesiastical laws 

1.96 Although the Church of England has autonomy over matters of worship and doctrine, it is otherwise subject to Parliament. It has been described as a “Parliamentary Church”.The laws that apply to the Church are both ecclesiastical law and laws of general application. As stated by Mark Hill KC: The Church of England, through its constituent parts, is subject to a variety of laws, rules, and norms, some imposed by the state, some made by the church with the concurrence of the state, and others created internally by the church itself at national, provincial, or diocesan level.

1.97 The Church of England can submit legislation to Parliament in order to govern its affairs – these are called “Measures”, and must be passed by both Houses of Parliament in order to become law.  Measures can deal with any Church of England matter, and can amend or repeal other Acts of Parliament.   It has been suggested that there is a convention that the government will not legislate on areas entirely internal to the Church of England without the Church’s consent, although Parliament continues to legislate in areas of general application which affect the Church. 

 Local government structures in England and Wales 

1.98 As set out in detail in Chapter 14 on the impact of our proposals, local government in England and Wales provides a significant proportion of burial space, and councils are the main operators of crematoria. The structures of local government differ in the two countries. 

1.99 In England, structures of local government have been described by the Local Government Association as “complex and often baffling”.  Parish and town councils are the lowest tier of governance in England.   They cover 91% of the geography of England, but just 36% of the population. This is because urban areas often do not  have them, as a result of the complexities of past reorganisations.  Where a parish does not have an elected parish council, it still has a parish meeting where parish affairs can be discussed and which can exercise some functions.  Both parish councils and parish meetings can open and operate cemeteries, and parish councils can operate crematoria. 

1.100 The next tier of local government in England varies. Councils at this level are called “principal” authorities. Some parts of the country have a two-tier system, with a county council providing some services and smaller district councils below them providing others. In these cases, it is the district councils who have the power to open and operate cemeteries and crematoria. In others there is just a unitary council, which will have those powers. 

1.101 Wales has a simpler system. There are 22 principal local authorities, styled as either counties or county boroughs. Each is then divided into smaller “communities” which may have a community council – there are currently over 730 of them.Both community councils and principal local authorities can open cemeteries and crematoria. 

The law that applies between death and a funeral 

1.102 This section sets out a timeline of the law and practice which applies from the point of someone’s death up until a funerary method is used. As we note, at a number of points there are choices to be made by those who are responsible for the body of the deceased person, or by public bodies they come into contact with. That means there is no one fixed “route” for things to take after a death happens. 

Registering the death 

1.103 Every death must be registered within five days in the register of the sub-district in which the death occurred by the registrar of births and deaths, unless it is referred to the coroner. A doctor who treated the deceased person during their lifetime will propose a cause of death, which will be independently scrutinised by a medical examiner (see below). An agreed cause of death will be recorded on a medical certificate of cause of death and delivered to the registrar, or the death will be  referred to the coroner if appropriate. Details of the death and the deceased person must be entered onto the register by the registrar. The entry must then be signed by the informant, that is, a person qualified to provide information to the registrar by virtue of, for example, their relationship with the deceased person or proximity to the death. 

1.104 The registrar will then issue a death certificate, also known as a certificate of registration, and a certificate for burial or cremation, also known as the “green form”. The certificate for burial or cremation must be passed onto the person conducting the burial or cremation to enable it to take place. If the death has been referred to the coroner, a coroner’s order, rather than a certificate for burial or cremation, is required for the burial or cremation to take place. 

1.105 There is an exception to the above process if burial is sought, which is set out in Chapter 5. 

1.106 There has been an increase in the time taken to register deaths in recent years. The median time between a death occurring and being registered in England and Wales was seven days for deaths registered in 2022, two days more than in 2021. While the issue of death registration is outside the scope of this project, we have heard from stakeholders, particularly those from religious communities whose faith requires a quick burial or cremation, that such delays have a negative impact. 

The medical examiner system 

1.107 Government has introduced a statutory medical examiner system to provide independent scrutiny of the cause of death for deaths which are not referred to the coroner. The system came into force on 9 September 2024. 

1.108 Medical examiners are senior doctors who are responsible for agreeing the proposed cause of death with the doctor completing the medical certificate of cause of death. The medical examiner system applies to deaths which are not being investigated by a coroner, regardless of whether the body is to be buried or cremated. This means that all deaths are subject to the scrutiny either of a medical examiner or a coroner. 

1.109 A detailed explanation of the law surrounding medical examiners is set out in Chapter 10. 

The involvement of the coroner 

1.110 Coroners have a duty to investigate deaths reported to them where the body lies in their area if they suspect that the death was violent or unnatural; the cause of death is unknown; or the deceased person died while in custody or other state detention.Coroners can undertake preliminary enquiries to determine whether this duty arises. 

1.111 The registrar of the sub-district in which the death occurred must report deaths to the coroner in certain circumstances.The duty to report a death to the coroner can also fall on someone other than the registrar. In that case, the registrar must satisfy themself that the death has been reported to the coroner, or they must report it themself. 

1.112 Once the coroner has determined that the duty to investigate arises, the purpose of the investigation is to ascertain who the deceased person was; how, when and where the deceased person died; and the particulars needed to register the death.  As part of the investigation, an inquest can take place.  An inquest is an inquisitorial hearing to determine the answer to the above questions. 

1.113 The coroner can order a post-mortem to determine if their duty to investigate arises, or as part of the investigation itself. 

1.114 The registrar must not register a death that has been reported to the coroner before they receive either a coroner’s certificate after an inquest or notification that there will not be an inquest. 

1.115 The coroner must release the body of a deceased person for burial or cremation as soon as reasonably practicable.  A coroner’s order is required before burial or cremation can take place. This can only be issued once the coroner no longer needs to retain the body for the purpose of an investigation.

Using a funeral director 

1.116 A person organising a funeral will need to decide whether to use a funeral director – doing so is not a legal requirement. According to a survey by the insurer British Seniors, nine out of ten people choose to do so. 

1.117 The responsibilities of the funeral director are governed by contract law.  There is no specific regulator for funeral directors; however, the National Association of Funeral Directors and the National Society of Allied and Independent Funeral Directors provide and enforce voluntary codes of conduct.  In addition, the Competition and Markets Authority have by order required that funeral directors disclose certain price and commercial information, and refrain from entering certain anti-competitive arrangements. 

1.118 Delays in the death care sector have caused significant issues for funeral directors and their clients. In 2023, the National Association of Funeral Directors published research into delays between deaths and funerals. They found that there are delays with registering a death by the registrar, bodies being released by coroners, and the production of medical certificates of cause of death. 

Choosing a funerary method 

1.119 The deceased person’s personal representative is responsible for making funeral arrangements. Reasonable funeral costs can be recovered from the deceased person’s estate. 

1.120 Social fund payments, called Funeral Expenses Payment, are available for people if they meet certain eligibility criteria, to provide financial assistance towards the cost of a funeral.   These payments are also recoverable from the deceased person’s estate.  Non-means tested support is available for the funerals of children aged under 18 or stillborn babies from the Children’s Funeral Fund for England, and the similar scheme in Wales. Local authorities are also under a duty to bury or cremate the body of any person who has died or been found dead in their area if it appears that no suitable arrangements are being made.  These “public health funerals” will be considered as part of our third sub-project on this issue, Rights and Obligations Relating to Funerals, Funerary Methods, and Remains. 

1.121 There are also charities which provide financial assistance for funerals. For example, the Muslim Burial Fund provides financial support for the burial of Muslim people. 

PERPECTIVES ON FUNERARY PRACTICES 

1.122 The funeral practices of people who follow each of the different faith traditions in England and Wales, or none, are rich and diverse – too diverse fully to capture in this Consultation Paper. Instead, we set out in brief some of the beliefs and practices which particularly relate to the funerary methods used by some of the major faiths in England and Wales as these are the considerations most relevant to this law reform project. 

Christianity 

1.123 Neither of the two major Christian denominations, the Church of England and Church in Wales (the Anglican churches) and the Roman Catholic Church require either burial or cremation. However, the doctrine in both churches requires that ashes from cremation are buried or strewn in ground consecrated (in a religious, but not legal sense) by the relevant church. We have been told that in some other traditions, such as those of the Orthodox Churches, cremation is not permitted. In other Christian denominations, including nonconformist traditions such as Methodism, cremation is acceptable and there are no rules on what should happen to ashes. 

1.124 Other aspects of the interaction of burial law and Anglicanism are explored in sections on ecclesiastical law and the Church in Wales above. 

Islam 

1.125 Muslims believe that death comes at God’s decree – this shapes the way that they mourn their dead, and the funerary methods that they use. It is rare for funeral directors to be involved in Muslim funerals and funeral procedures; typically, the entire process is supported by the community of the deceased person. Muslims follow a strict procedure after a person’s death. The body is prepared for burial as quickly as possible, starting with the washing of the body, which is done by family members of the same sex as the deceased person. Once prepared, the body will be taken to the mosque for the funeral ceremony and the body will be buried, with the head of the body facing Mecca.  Ideally, the deceased person will be buried within 24 hours of their death. 

1.126 Whereas many Christian denominations accept cremation, Islamic beliefs prohibit it. The preservation of the dignity of the body, spiritually and physically, is seen as crucial; if the body is to be resurrected, it must be fully intact.  The Qur’an gives specific directions that the dead should be buried.  There are a number of Muslim burial grounds in England and Wales, the largest of which is the Gardens of Peace in North East London, as well as Muslim sections in many local authority cemeteries. 

1.127 There was concern during the COVID-19 pandemic that this strict prohibition on cremation continue to be observed, despite the increasing death rate worldwide. In England and Wales, an early draft of the Coronavirus Act 2020 contained provisions that may have allowed local and national authorities to decide if a person was cremated or buried – for some faith groups, including Muslims, the idea that cremation may be forced upon them was a direct affront to a core religious belief. The  Coronavirus Act 2020 was amended before it was enacted to reflect these concerns. 

Judaism

1.128 In Orthodox Judaism, burial is a strict requirement, but the Liberal and Reform movements also permit cremation. Orthodox Jewish funerals are also generally stricter in their requirement that burials must take place as quickly as possible, and usually within 24 hours (although not on Shabbat or most Jewish holidays).  Bodies are ritually washed by people of the same sex as the deceased person (called tahara), and then buried in a simple, biodegradable coffin. After the funeral a week-long mourning period, or shiva, is observed. 

1.129 Many Jewish people will pay dues to belong to a burial society. Burial societies are operated both for particular synagogues and for groups of synagogues (including the United Synagogue, the largest organisation of synagogues in Orthodox Judaism). Members pay dues throughout their lives, and when they die their funeral costs are covered. Many burial societies own their own burial grounds, but not all do. 

Hinduism 

1.130 Hindus view the body and soul as pure, and believe that when a person dies, the soul leaves the body and re-enters a new one.  The driving belief behind Hinduism is that the body will reincarnate as many times as it takes for an individual to achieve moksha – a state of unity between body and soul that will end the cycle of reincarnation.  Cremation is believed to help the soul leave the body to enter the new body, thus encouraging the reincarnation process. As a result, cremation in Hindu funerals is seen as an important part of severing the tie between one body and the next, and thus is the traditional funerary method used by Hindus. The only bodies that would not be cremated, traditionally, are infants and young children (below the age of eight, when adulthood is believed to begin).  Children this young are considered “without sin”, and thus do not need to be purified by cremation.  Issues relating to traditional Hindu cremations on open-air pyres are explored in Chapter 1  

Sikhism 

1.131 For Sikhs, cremation is the preferred method as it helps release the soul from the body.  The “Sikh Reht Maryada”, a code of conduct for Sikhism, states that bodies should be cremated, but if this cannot be done, other methods are acceptable. After death the body should be bathed, while remaining dressed in the Sikh symbols. The ashes from cremation should be placed into flowing water or buried with no monument. The Guru Granth Sahib, the Sikh holy scripture, is read in its entirety after the funeral. 

Buddhism 

1.132 Buddhists will often choose cremation over other funerary methods, to follow in the footsteps of the Buddha, who was himself cremated. However, this is not a religious requirement, as Buddhism has no strict rules about the funerary method that should be used. 175 We have been told by a Buddhist stakeholder that the belief that the consciousness and physical body separate upon death means that Buddhists do not require a specific funerary method in order to facilitate reincarnation or passage to an afterlife. 

Other faiths and perspectives 

1.133 Other religious faiths in England and Wales have beliefs which affect the funerary methods used. Baháʼís require burial rather than cremation, and for this to happen within a short distance of the place of death. Followers of Paganism do not have a single shared set of beliefs about death, but are likely to seek methods that reflect their veneration of nature. 

DEVOLUTION TO WALES AND FUNERARY LAW 

Legislative competence and reforms to burial and cremation law 

1.134 The law on burial and cremation was explicitly included within the areas over which the Welsh Assembly had legislative competence in the Government of Wales Act 2006, as originally passed.  Following the move to a reserved powers model,  neither burial nor cremation, nor matters which could be taken to refer to new funerary methods, are listed as matters which are reserved to the UK Parliament. That means that the Senedd has competence to legislate in relation to them.   Enacting reforms to primary legislation in these areas would require either an Act of the Senedd, or a legislative consent motion from the Senedd should the Westminster Parliament legislate. 

1.135 Some issues which are relevant to the context of this review are reserved, such as death registration and certain aspects of water and sewerage regulation. 

Secondary legislation and executive functions 

1.136 The functions of Welsh Ministers refer to a combination of the powers they are given to act by legislation and common law, and their ability to make secondary legislation (for example, regulations and orders) as given by primary legislation. 

1.137 A number of Acts relevant to burial and cremation law have had their functions transferred to Welsh ministers. They are listed below, along with the relevant provisions that have been transferred: (1) Burial Act 1853 (section 1, making representations for a closure Order; section 4, granting licences to bury in vaults; section 5, permitting new burial grounds); (2) Burial Act 1855 (section 8, inspection of burial grounds); (3) Burial Act 1857 (sections 10 and 23, Orders for regulating common graves and to prevent burial grounds becoming hazardous, but not section 25, governing exhumation); (4) Burial Act 1859 (section 1, directing the local authority to complete acts ordered under an Order in Council); (5) Open Spaces Act 1906; (6) Welsh Church (Burial Grounds) Act 1945 (section 4, approving rules for burial); (7) Cremation Act 1952 (section 1, certifying new crematoria, section 3 governing fees for medical certificates); (8) Local Government Act 1972 (section 214, orders for the management, regulation and control of burial authorities); (9) Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (section 46(7), inquiries necessary for the purposes of public health funerals);184 and (10) Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (the powers which relate to the Town and Country Planning (Churches, Places of Religious Worship and Burial Grounds) Regulations 1950). 

1.138 The effect of the transfer of these powers is that the functions of a Minister of the Crown under those Acts are transferred to the Welsh Ministers, as far as they relate to Wales. 

1.139 This includes the power to make statutory instruments. That means, for example, that the Welsh Ministers could make an order for Wales under section 214 of the Local Government Act 1972, replacing the Local Authorities’ Cemeteries Order 1977 (“LACO 1977”).  If this review were to recommend reforms to LACO 1977, amendments to the order for Wales would need to be made by the Welsh Ministers. 

1.140 Other functions which relate to burial and cremation have not been transferred to the Welsh Government in this way. Notably, the Cremation Act 1902 does not appear to be an Act in relation to which functions have been transferred, hence instruments such as The Cremation (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 have been made solely by the UK Secretary of State. 

1.141 The function of issuing exhumation licences under section 25 of the Burial Act 1857, was also excluded from the transfer of functions. However, broadly speaking, reforms to the Cremation Act 1902 and Burial Acts themselves remain within the Senedd’s legislative competence, meaning that the Senedd could legislate for Welsh Ministers to take over those functions. 

TERMINOLOGY 

1.142 When we agreed with the Lord Chancellor to take on this project as part of our 13th Programme of Law Reform, it was under the title “A Modern Framework for Disposing of the Dead”. The fact that we have changed it to its current title, Burial, Cremation and New Funerary Methods indicates the extent to which language matters when it comes to death and dying. A number of different stakeholders told us that they disliked the term “disposal” in this context, and so we have chosen not to use it, unless we are quoting a source that does. 

1.143 In order to achieve this, we have used the term “funerary method” to describe the act of burial, or cremation, or indeed the new funerary methods such as alkaline hydrolysis and human composting which will be explored in a forthcoming Consultation Paper as part of this project. That term is in use, but it is not commonplace. However, we think that it is a useful addition to the lexicon. 

1.144 We have sought to avoid some other forms of language where we are aware they can cause offence or be viewed as problematic. For example, we avoid referring to “the deceased”, instead of which we prefer “deceased people”, “deceased person” or other formulations. Similarly, we do not use the phrase “loved one”, which presupposes how people feel about the person who has died. We are indebted to the “#DeadGoodWords” campaign started by Poppy’s Funeral Directors for their steer on careful consideration of our language in this project. 

1.145 This project often engages with issues relating to ecclesiastical law, which carries its own terminology with which some readers will not be familiar. We have chosen to use that terminology rather than use longer explanations of its meaning, as in some cases, such as the term “incumbent”, a shorter description may not be accurate. The Glossary at the end of this Consultation Paper defines many of these terms. 

1.146 We use burial grounds as a neutral term for all such sites, regardless of who operates them. We describe those operated by the Church of England as churchyards for brevity, although the law which applies to them also applies to Church of England burial grounds which are not located alongside a church. Local authority burial grounds are described as cemeteries in statute, so we use that term, as we do for private cemeteries which are established by private Acts of Parliament.