Conspiracism

'Conspiracy theory, anti-globalism, and the Freedom Convoy: The Great Reset and conspiracist delegitimation' byr Corey Robinson and Scott D. Watson in (2025) Review of International Studies comments

In this article, we analyse how anti-globalist conspiracy theories were mobilised online to delegitimise national authorities and policies designed to curb the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada. These conspiracy theories attacked the political authority underpinning public health measures and targeted purportedly ‘liberal’ policies and ‘globalist’ actors. Our case study examines the Freedom Convoy, a series of protests against Covid-19 vaccine mandates that began in Canada but inspired global demonstrations. The Freedom Convoy fostered and relied upon anti-globalist conspiracy theories, including the ‘Great Reset’ and ‘Great Replacement’, both of which posit a global conspiracy to erode national sovereignty and impose a ‘liberal’ international order. We investigate far-right social media commentary from 4chan’s Politically Incorrect imageboard /pol/, Infowars, and Rebel News, showing how conspiratorial claims were marshalled in alt-tech spaces. These narratives were used to delegitimise public health measures to combat Covid-19 and the Liberal Trudeau government by linking them to various ‘globalist’ forces. In exploring three mechanisms of delegitimation – externalisation, personification, and Othering – we argue that far-right movements like the Freedom Convoy, motivated by anti-globalist conspiracism, mobilise the international realm by leveraging the legitimacy gap of international organisations and agendas to undermine the political authority of actors at the national level. 

 

The Freedom Convoy (FC) began in January 2022 as a series of protests, blockades, and online campaigns opposing Covid-19 vaccine mandates for commercial truckers crossing the Canada–US border. The protests quickly evolved into a broader movement, both within Canada and internationally, against ‘globalism’ and various issues associated with liberal global governance. These issues ranged from vaccine mandates to intentional depopulation and world government. The FC, which united a loose coalition of far-right groups alongside vaccine sceptics, organised via social media and travelled across Canada to gather in Ottawa and at key border points. The movement mobilised far-right anti-globalist conspiracy theories to articulate its opposition to a range of measures associated with the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the ‘Great Reset’. 

 

Using semi-trailer trucks, protestors established an encampment and demanded the repeal of public health measures and the dissolution of the Trudeau government. Sustained by the deafening chorus of honking from 400 to 500 semi-trailer trucks and supported by approximately $24 million CAD in online donations – 56 per cent of which came from the United States – the protests grew to an estimated 10,000 people in Ottawa’s downtown core, paralysing city services for over three weeks. The Ottawa protest sparked demonstrations at provincial capitals and blockades at numerous Canada–US border crossings. It obstructed at least 19 ports of entry, resulting in $3.9 billion CAD in lost trade activity. At the Coutts Port of Entry, along the Alberta border, police uncovered a cache of guns, ammunition, a pipe bomb, and body armour. Four protestors, some with alleged ties to Diagolon – a far-right accelerationist group – were charged with conspiracy to murder RCMP officers. 

 

Driven by anti-globalist conspiracies and extremist rhetoric, the FC and the Canadian government’s invocation of the Emergencies Act to end the protest garnered significant international attention, leading to smaller but notable copycat demonstrations worldwide. Countries such as Austria, Bolivia, Israel, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand saw groups rally against what they perceived as the authoritarianism of public health orders, framing the situation as a populist battle for ‘freedom’ against alleged government overreach and a ‘globalist’ agenda. In Wellington and Helsinki, vehicles blocked roads around Parliament, while Paris and Brussels took steps to prohibit anti-vaccine protests inspired by the FC. French police arrested dozens of individuals and intercepted vehicles heading to Brussels. In the United States, former president Donald Trump criticised Prime Minister Trudeau as a ‘far-left lunatic’ who ‘destroyed Canada with insane COVID mandates’. Senator Ted Cruz visited the ‘People’s Convoy’ in Washington, DC, to show his support, while Florida Governor Ron DeSantis vowed to investigate GoFundMe after the crowdfunding platform suspended fundraising for the protestors. Pierre Poilievre, leader of the Conservative Party and the official opposition in Canada, enthusiastically supported the FC as a popular campaign against Trudeau and the ‘gatekeeping elite’.  In his campaign to become the next prime minister, Poilievre continues to engage with many of the groups that participated in the Convoy and to weaponise conspiracy theories that found a discursive vehicle in the protests, such as the Great Reset. 

 

Focusing on the conspiracy theories surrounding the FC that circulated online, this article explores the question: how does anti-globalist conspiracism function in the delegitimation of political authority? Contextualising these transnational protests within broader scholarly debates about the global far right and populist internationalism, this article examines how far-right populists and movements have increasingly mobilised conspiracy theories to undermine national governments and ‘elites’ associated with ‘globalist’ institutions and agendas. 

 

Our analysis illustrates that the anti-globalist conspiracism surrounding the FC functioned discursively to delegitimise the political authority of the Canadian government (and public health measures like vaccine mandates) by associating them with international institutions and ‘globalist’ agendas held responsible for the pandemic response. As we show in the following sections, conspiracist delegitimation employs three primary mechanisms: externalisation, personification, and Othering. 

 

First, externalisation involves projecting problems of national politics onto the international level and attributing their causes to foreign actors, institutions, and agendas, to the exclusion of internal/domestic processes, policies, and complex, multilevel governance structures. This process redirects concerns about domestic issues onto representative figures of the global elite, delegitimising national actors (such as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau), international institutions (like the WEF), and agendas (such as the Great Reset). Of course, this is not unique to anti-globalism; identifying foreign, international actors as the driving force in history is a fundamental feature of conspiracy theories. External figures such as Klaus Schwab, George Soros, and Bill Gates were prominent in the Convoy discourse, as was the general term ‘globalists’. Externalisation functioned discursively by linking public health measures and post-Covid recovery policies to international organisations such as the WEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations (UN). At the same time, externalisation obscured key factors that shaped the response, such as the division of federal and provincial powers, and the rejection of legitimate democratic processes and actors, which were discredited through their association with the legitimacy deficit of international institutions. Externalisation thus served to delegitimise democratic norms and procedures by mobilising the international and the legitimacy deficit of international institutions and agendas. 

 

Second, personification entails reducing various processes and structures to the actions of single individuals or groups – what Popper referred to as ‘psychologism’ in his early critique of conspiracism – a phenomenon also captured by terms such as ‘hyperagency’. Personification assumes that individuals hold near-total control over outcomes and that outcomes are always intended. Consequently, it attributes both unintentional effects and negative outcomes of impersonal and abstract structures to the intentional conspiratorial design of powerful individuals or groups, such as Schwab, Soros, or Gates. Domestically, Trudeau personified the Covid public health measures associated with ‘globalism’, while externally, Klaus Schwab of the WEF was considered responsible for the ‘Great Reset’. The focus on Trudeau, along with his association with Schwab, obscured the mistakes and unintended outcomes that contributed to the pandemic and simplified complex global processes into a narrative of intentional design by individuals. These processes, and the complex governance of public health, border controls, international trade, and supply chains in Canada, were reduced to the intentions of specific elites. By focusing on Trudeau and associating him with Schwab and the WEF’s Great Reset, anti-globalist conspiracism offered a simplistic diagnosis of the pandemic that challenged the legitimacy of the Canadian government and public health measures by discursively linking the prime minister to elitist, illegitimate, and undemocratic forces of ‘globalism’. 

 

Finally, Othering draws on racist, civilisational, and gendered discourses to identify those allegedly engaging in or facilitating conspiratorial behaviour intended to alter social norms and practices against the values and interests of the national community. Certain groups are consistently Othered in anti-globalist conspiracism, including Jews, homosexuals, and communists, either explicitly or through the use of coded language like ‘globalists’. As we explore in subsequent sections, the FC online narratives focused their discursive energy on these ‘Others’, with communists (Trudeau and Castro), women and homosexuals (globohomo), and Jews (George Soros) all featured in the discourse about the FC. 

 

Through an analysis of the anti-globalist conspiracy theories that discursively fuelled the FC, this article makes a twofold contribution to International Relations (IR). First, it adds to the emerging body of research situated at the intersection of IR, the global far right, and conspiracy theories by extending the study of anti-globalist conspiracism beyond the realms of populist foreign policy and far-right ideology to focus on alt-tech spaces, which are becoming increasingly influential in these movements. Second, this article advances the study of populist internationalism by highlighting the role of anti-globalist conspiracism in the FC’s resistance to the perceived forces of globalism, and by analysing the mechanisms of delegitimation directed towards national authorities, who were cast as front organisations for global elites. 

 

Before analysing the process of conspiracist delegitimation in the alt-tech space, the following section reviews the multidisciplinary literature on conspiracy theory. While existing scholarship identifies individual and cultural responses to globalisation, it has not sufficiently addressed the national and international political dynamics at the root of anti-globalist conspiracism. Subsequently, we examine the emerging scholarship on conspiracy theory in IR. We then turn quickly to the literature on the global far right, which has drawn attention to the internationalisation of the far right but has largely neglected anti-globalist conspiracism. Finally, before the empirical analysis, we outline our methodological approach.

Extremism

Chapter Seven of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee report Right Wing Extremist Movements In Australia states 

7.1 Australia is a healthy and vibrant democracy. Freedom of speech is fundamental to Australia’s values. Political views become unacceptable when individuals or groups use fear, terror, or violence to further or achieve ideological aims. Ashift from peaceful political engagement to the promotion, or use, of violence is incompatible with liberal democracy. The threat or use of violence against specific groups of people is an attack against our shared values. Violent extremism must not be tolerated in Australia. 

Defining extremism 

7.2 It is challenging to precisely define right wing extremism. A wide range of defining characteristics were provided to the committee. This included hostility towards minority groups, liberal democracy, a pluralistic society, and equality. 

7.3 Some right wing extremists condone the threat or use of violence to further their goals or defend their position in what they see as a decaying social order. They justify violence to advance their extreme ideology. 

7.4Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies explained that it is not helpful to categorise extremism according to a binary left-right conceptualisation of political ideologies. Those agencies reported that extremists increasingly adopt hybrid ideologies that do not fit neatly on the political spectrum. 

7.5 Australian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have developed two broad categories of politically motivated violence that are further divided into more specific sub-‍categories. Those broad categories are: religiously motivated violent extremism; and ideologically motivated violent extremism. 

7.6 Ideologically motivated violent extremism is further divided into a range of sub-‍categories including: nationalist and racist violent extremism; anarchist and revolutionary violent extremism; and specific issue violent extremism. 

7.7 For the purposes of this inquiry, much of the evidence received by the committee related to individuals and groups who fall within the category of nationalist and racist violent extremism, including neo-Nazis and white supremacist groups. 

Nature and extent of extremism in Australia 

7.8 There is a long history of extremism in Australia. The views of Australian extremist movements reflect the sociopolitical context of the time and evolve according to that context. 

7.9 Ideologically motivated violent extremism is rising globally, and Australia is not immune to that trend. Disturbing evidence was received by the committee of communication between extremists based elsewhere in the world and those based in Australia, often in the online environment. 

7.10 Australian extremists have built links with international movements that reflect their ideological position. They have developed these links to create a shared community that can provide ideological, discursive, financial, and organisational support. 

7.11 Extremists opportunistically co-opt elements of mainstream culture to give their movements and ideological views greater credibility, to appeal to a wider audience, and to lure people into their extreme world view. Radicalised individuals can be encouraged to consider, or even commit, violent acts. 

7.12 The internet facilitates the rapid sharing of this culture and the creation of a globalised extremist movement. For some individuals, joining a large and active community can satisfy an unmet need for social connection. 

7.13 For example, the committee learned of the transnational so called active club network, which is used by extremists to build a community on shared principles. Those communities are designed to appear innocuous to outside observers as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

7.14 Active clubs are usually decentralised and are only loosely connected to each other. To outside observers they appear to focus on brotherhood and physical fitness. However, they may provide participants with an introduction to extremist ideologies and promote an extreme ideology. 

7.15It is noted that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reported that it is aware of the active club model and, at the time of giving evidence to the committee, it had assessed that it presents a low risk of politically motivated violence. 

7.16Concerningly, in August 2024, during this inquiry, ASIO raised the terrorism threat level to PROBABLE. There is a greater threat of people radicalising and using violence to further their ideological cause. 

7.17 As at November 2024, there have been nine attacks, disruptions or suspected terrorist incidents in Australia. In ASIO's assessment, most of those incidents were motivated by nationalist and racist ideologies or a hybrid of ideologies. All those incidents involved lone actors or small groups and low-capability weapons. 

7.18 It is deeply concerning that law enforcement and intelligence agencies reported that many radicalised individuals the subject of their investigations are young people. TheAustralian Federal Police informed the committee that it has commenced investigations and conducted operational activity against a number of people under the age of 16, with the youngest person being 11 years old. 

Mainstreaming of extremist ideas 

7.19 The committee received evidence to suggest that extremists aim to make their ideas and ideologies more politically and culturally accessible and acceptable. They do that through the spread of propaganda both in physical spaces and on widely used online platforms. 

7.20 Mainstream online platforms can act as gateways to more radical or extremist content hosted elsewhere online. 

7.21 Some extremists overtly pursue radical social change using violence or through the distribution of vile propaganda material intended to vilify and instil fear in minority groups. Others adopt more nuanced tactical approaches, distorting and manipulating mainstream political issues to lure people, including young Australians, into their extreme ideological domain. 

The threat posed by extremism 

7.22 Extremist movements pose a threat to Australian society and Australian values. Certain communities and groups of Australians are at particular risk. Thecommittee received evidence that highlighted how these Australians are subjected to dehumanising propaganda and targeted by extremists. 

7.23 A range of communities were identified as being at particular risk from extremist actors. Those communities include: First Nations peoples; culturally diverse communities; religious communities; women; migrants; LGBTQIA+ people; and young people. 

7.24 Australians who belong to minority groups reported the feeling of alienation and exclusion associated with being targeted by extremists. Their evidence demonstrated that even non-violent actions can have severe consequences for their sense of belonging and participation in society. 

7.25 Nationalist and racist violent extremism is incompatible with Australian democracy. It is anathema to Australian values. 

Radicalisation 

7.26 The radicalisation process can be complex and idiosyncratic. There are a range of factors that could contribute to someone becoming susceptible to radicalisation. 

7.27 Those factors include: social isolation; a real or perceived loss of status or privilege; economic insecurity; a sense of marginalisation; 

7.28 Several inquiry participants cautioned against a simplistic approach to addressing radicalisation and violence. They warned that there is no straightforward 'conveyor belt' that carries individuals from exposure to extremist ideas, to radicalisation, to committing violent acts. 

7.29 The Australian Institute of Criminology identified three broad risk factors that contribute to radicalisation: sociodemographic characteristics, such as being male, young, unemployed or underemployed; psychological characteristics, such as low self-control, personal grievance, certain mental health conditions; and contextual characteristics, such as criminal history or associations with other radicalised persons. 

Measures to address extremism 

7.30 Throughout the inquiry, the committee heard that the criminalisation of extremist behaviour is unlikely to fully address the threat of violence and reduce the risk posed to the wider community. 

7.31 Some inquiry participants recommended that the response to extremism should primarily focus on addressing the potential for extremists to resort to violence and not on the ideology itself. People should be free to hold extreme ideas. However, they should be strongly deterred from using violence in furtherance of those ideas. 

7.32 Other inquiry participants suggested that a holistic approach is more appropriate. That approach would include providing resources that support civic engagement, strengthen civic institutions, and provide tools that weaken the appeal of extremist ideologies. 

7.33 Inquiry participants recommended that governments focus on: community outreach and engagement programs; deradicalisation initiatives; education programs that foster critical thinking skills, improve knowledge of civics, and instil a greater sense of empathy; and antiracism programs.  

Community outreach and engagement programs 

7.34 Civil society was recognised as an integral part of any response to extremism. Community organisations are often best placed to respond to extremism, asindividuals who belong to those communities often view those organisations as having greater credibility. The family also plays an important role. The committee received evidence regarding the effectiveness of involving parents in deradicalisation programmes. 

7.35 While government can provide assistance to community organisations, this does not necessarily provide a solution to the issue. Some individuals may mistrust government and government-led initiatives. 

7.36 Notwithstanding this, it was suggested that civil society organisations should be broadly supported so that they are able to continue to meet the social needs of individuals who may be drawn to radical ideologies. Civil society organisations provide individuals with meaning, connectedness, respect, and recognition. If they are not able to provide those outcomes, some individuals may turn to other sources and thereby become more susceptible to radicalisation. 

Deradicalisation initiatives 

7.37 The committee received evidence highlighting the importance of deradicalisation programs in countering violent extremism. 

7.38 A distinction was drawn between disengagement and deradicalisation. Disengagement refers to the disavowal of violence in the pursuit of an extreme ideology, while deradicalisation is a complete abandonment of a radical ideology. Individuals who have disengaged may still hold extreme beliefs but do not condone violence in the pursuit of that ideology. 

7.39 Violent extremists are often driven by emotion. Effective deradicalisation programmes may seek to engage people who have been radicalised on an emotional level to properly understand the factors in their lives that have motivated them to view violence as an appropriate means to further their ideological position. 

7.40 As individuals adopt extremist ideologies for idiosyncratic reasons, deradicalisation programs should be tailored to the specific needs of the individual. 

7.41 That support may require access to a multidisciplinary team of professionals depending on the unique needs of the individual. In some cases, it might also be appropriate to provide radicalised individuals with a mentor to help guide them on the path to rehabilitation. 

7.42 Some organisations with experience in providing deradicalisation programs suggested that former extremists who have been deradicalized may assist through the process. Their personal insights into extremism and radicalisation may be of particular benefit in some cases. 

7.43 The committee understands that deradicalisation and countering violent extremism initiatives require continuous evaluation and refinement to ensure that they are fit-for-purpose and responsive to the evolving threat environment. 

Recommendation 1 

7.44 The committee recommends that the Australian government undertakes periodic evaluation of Australian deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs. That evaluation should involve experts engaged in those programs, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and organisations that research countering violent extremism and deradicalisation. Any such periodic review should draw upon the experience both in Australia and overseas in other liberal democracies. Education and youth engagement programs 7.45Education was repeatedly highlighted as an effective tool in reducing the appeal of extremist ideology and weakening the propaganda disseminated by extremists. 

7.46 Instilling empathy for others was identified as an important facet of education. Empathy helps individuals better understand the perspectives of others and avoid the adoption of hateful ideologies. 

7.47 Several inquiry participants commented that the increased use of online platforms required a new approach to, and focus on media literacy, and critical thinking skills. 

7.48 Young people are at particular risk of developing links with extremist movements, as extremists often tailor their messages to appeal to young people. 

7.49 Young people are often at a stage of their life where they are testing their sense of self and developing their unique identity. They may be in positions of vulnerability and susceptible to insidious targeting from those purporting to provide social connection. Sometimes extremists position themselves to meet those psychological needs and to draw young people into the thrall of their extreme and hateful ideology. 

Recommendation 2 

7.50 The committee recommends that the Australian government develops a national framework for engaging with young people to deter them from radical extremism. That framework should provide best practice guidance to the states and territories and the broader civic community on how to engage with young people to: assist them in identifying harmful ideologies promoting violent extremism; deter them from adopting harmful ideologies promoting violent extremism; and provide them with the means to engage with the wider community in a socially positive way. 

The online environment 

7.51 The committee heard evidence in relation to the difference between ‘in real life’ and online extremism. The anonymity of the online environment is conducive to the sharing of violent rhetoric and harassment of individuals belonging to minority groups. Some people feel comfortable to say things online that they would never consider communicating in public. 

7.52 Some individuals find social fulfilment in online communities. They can meet a strong psychological need to feel part of a bigger movement. In the vast majority of cases, many of those communities contribute positively to wider society and perform a valuable social role. However, violent extremists may prey upon the psychological need of vulnerable people to perpetuate hate and promote their destructive cause. 

7.53 The online environment is where people are most likely to be exposed to fringe ideas and extreme ideologies. Individuals are likely to be exposed to that material even if they are not actively seeking it. 

7.54 Extremists are drawn to the internet not only for the anonymity, but also for the low barriers to access and its global reach. The internet provides them with a vehicle to recruit, radicalise, and inspire new adherents or reinforce the beliefs of other extremists. 

7.55 Efforts to remove offensive or objectionable content from the internet can be difficult. The committee received evidence that video footage of the despicable Christchurch terrorist attack and the perpetrator’s twisted manifesto continue to circulate online despite the New Zealand Chief Censor classifying it as objectionable content that is illegal to possess or distribute. 

7.56 It is clear that offensive, objectionable, and harmful material is likely to continue to circulate online despite efforts to regulate the online environment and remove that material. 

7.57 The Office of the eSafety Commissioner stated that it had not conducted research into the presence of ideologically motivated violent extremism online. It has conducted research into online hate, including in relation to children and young people’s experiences of hate on online gaming platforms. 

Recommendation 3 

7.58 The committee recommends that the Australian government conducts research into violent extremism in the online environment, including on: social media platforms; gaming platforms; and gaming-adjacent platforms. That research should examine how those platforms may be used by extremist actors to spread propaganda and recruit members, particularly in relation to young people. 

Social media platforms 

7.59 Social media platforms use algorithms to deliver content to their users. Those algorithms often prioritise similar material to the same user. Hence, there can be a compounding effect produced by the continual receipt by a user of emotive, shocking, and salient content, which can include extreme material. 

7.60 Depending on how individual users of those platforms engage with that content, over time they can find themselves presented with a larger volume of similar content. 

7.61 Extremists often use mainstream social media platforms as an initial point of contact with potential recruits, including vulnerable young people. If individuals engage with extremist content in a favourable way on mainstream platforms, they can be invited to closed sites where plans for violence can be discussed or promoted. 

7.62 In relation to the use of algorithms for content filtering on social media platforms, the committee heard that social media companies have in many instances reduced the level of transparency around how their platforms operate. 

7.63 The Christchurch Call, to which many social media companies are signatories, called for greater transparency around how those companies operate and the measures they have in place to regulate their platforms. The Office of the eSafety Commissioner told the committee that no social media company operating in Australia is adequately meeting its expectations under the Christchurch Call. 

7.64 The committee was told that independent researchers are not able to access the social media monitoring tools that were once available to them. Social media companies have discontinued the use of those tools, which make it difficult, if not impossible, for their efforts to enforce terms of service to be assessed by outside observers. The eSafety Commissioner indicated that the discontinuation of those tools has decreased public transparency and limited her office’s ability to monitor the presence of hate speech, abuse, disinformation, and extremist content on social media platforms. 

Recommendation 4 

7.65 The committee recommends that the Office of the eSafety Commissioner engages with stakeholders in relation to the development of best practice guidelines in relation to transparent and independent assurance measures to verify that social media platforms are enforcing terms of service to exclude harmful extremist content. Encrypted communication applications 

7.66 Online anonymity was raised as a major concern during the inquiry, particularly by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The widespread use of encrypted communication applications allows violent extremists to conceal their identities and hide their communication from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

7.67 ASIO reported that virtually all of its priority counter-terrorism and counter-espionage investigations are frustrated by the use of encryption technology. 

7.68 While encrypted communication platforms may be used for nefarious ends, it is acknowledged that they can also have a socially beneficial role. Those platforms have been used to uncover information that has been suppressed by authoritarian governments and in investigations into corrupt or criminal practices by individuals and companies. 

7.69 Encrypted communications are integral to the proper functioning of the internet and play an important role in public transparency. Encryption protects privacy and assists in the investigation of wrongdoing. At the same time, encrypted communication technologies are used by violent extremist actors to conceal their activities from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

7.70 Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should be permitted access to encrypted communications in very specific cases that involve well-founded concerns for national security and where such access is regulated by the judicial system through the issue of warrants. That access is integral to those agencies being able to conduct their very important work that keeps Australians safe. As the extremist threat is globalised, Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies are increasingly expected to be able to provide operational intelligence to their foreign counterparts. To ensure that violent extremism can be combatted wherever and whenever it emerges, it is vital that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are equipped with the tools they need to effectively monitor and respond to national security threats, including those posed by extremists. 

Recommendation 5 

7.71 The committee recommends the Australian government considers introducing legislation that would enable Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access encrypted communications if there is a well-‍founded threat to national security and a warrant has been issued by a judicial officer to access those communications. 

National hate crimes database 

7.72 Some participants in the inquiry advocated for the establishment of a national database to better track hate crimes. There are currently private organisations which are performing this invaluable civic function. It was also highlighted that there is no nationally consistent definition of what constitutes a hate crime in Australia, which can frustrate responses from law enforcement and human rights commissions. 

7.73 The lack of a nationally consistent understanding of what constitutes a hate crime has resulted in a reluctance to report those crimes and incomplete data about the extent of the problem. 

7.74 A nationally consistent approach to what constitutes a hate crime would facilitate a nationally consistent reporting and data collecting system. That system would: provide quantitative evidence of the efficacy of legislative measures that address hate and violence against targeted communities; assist law enforcement agencies in evaluating the effectiveness of their policing and education and training programs; and assist human rights commissions in developing advocacy programs and providing victim support programs. 

Recommendation 6 

7.75 The committee recommends the Australian government adopts a nationally consistent definition of what constitutes a hate crime and consider establishing a national hate crimes database.  

7.76 The committee recommends its finding and conclusions to the Senate.

Laundries

The 93 page 'Impacts of money laundering and terrorism financing: Final report' (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024) by Alicia Schmidt comments 

This report outlines a conceptual model of the social and economic impacts of money laundering and terrorism financing. Drawing on a comprehensive literature review and stakeholder interviews, it identifies possible economic, societal and sectoral impacts. Economic impacts are those that affect the economy at a macro level and include reductions in economic growth and foreign direct investment and the distortion of exchange and interest rates. Societal impacts include changes in crime levels—predicate offences which generate illicit proceeds that are then laundered, crimes financed using laundered funds and crimes attracted to areas where money laundering occurs—and the associated costs to the community. They also include the consequences of terrorism enabled by terrorism financing, including the costs of terrorist attacks and the impact on national reputation. Sectoral impacts include damage to the reputation of the financial sector and other regulated entities, the crowding out of legitimate competitors, artificial increases in prices (eg real estate prices), and lost tax revenue. Importantly, not all impacts are harmful; potential benefits of money laundering include the recovery of proceeds of crime from the enforcement of the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime, the profitability of certain sectors that facilitate or enable money laundering, and the growth of the AML/CTF industry. Having identified these impacts, this report assesses their significance in the Australian context and sets out a path towards quantifying the impacts identified as both relevant and measurable.

Netherlands Pseudolaw

'Sovereign Citizen Groups in the Netherlands are Arming Themselves: Cause for Concern?' by Menso Hartgers (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2024) comments 

On 9 July 2024, the first court hearing of a Dutch citizen who attempted to illegally acquire firearms and his arms dealer began. The suspect is part of the so-called Common Law Netherlands Earth (in Dutch Common Law Nederland Earth), a sovereign citizen group that rejects the democratic rule of law in the Netherlands, believing that they are not subject to government authority. Instead, they argue to be bound only by their interpretation of natural law and selective historical legal principles. The Public Prosecutor asserts that the group attempted to illegally acquire firearms to instigate a revolution. This case is indicative of a possible trend of sovereign citizens and anti-government extremists who not only espouse anti-democratic ideas but are also attempting to seize the means to realise their ideations. In a March 2024 report, ICCT already encountered online incitements for violence by Common Law Netherlands Earth, which advocated for “civil arrest” to “fight back” against government and law enforcement. This rhetoric is clearly a call to arms against the democratic rule of law. The ongoing trial evidences that the group’s adherents are heeding these calls, quite literally arming themselves. This short analysis aims to further shed light on the group, reflecting on developments of sovereign citizen movements abroad, and outlining possible challenges ahead. 

Anti-government extremism (AGE) encompasses movements, networks, and individuals that reject government legitimacy and undermine the democratic legal order, often rooted in conspiracy narratives, particularly surrounding the existence of an ‘evil elite’ that supposedly runs the world from behind the scenes. Sovereign citizens are a subset of anti-government extremists. Their beliefs in an evil elite are often centred around the notion that man-made, government mandated laws and statutes are ways to oppress ‘the people’ and strip them of their individual rights and sovereignty. They position themselves outside of this ‘oppressive’ legal regime by advocating for the establishment of their own courts and parallel societies instead. 

Common Law Netherlands Earth is part of an international genre of sovereign citizen collectives that is notably found in the UK and ‘British Heritage countries’ (i.e., former British colonies that have adopted and continue to use particular legislative or judiciary structures like courts inspired by British colonialism) such as the US, Canada, and Australia. The existence of these various ‘Common Law’ groups is predicated on a shared narrative of an aspired supersession of natural laws over existing legal structures and democratic norms. In the case of Common Law Netherlands Earth, it must further be noted that, based on limited open-source intelligence, the group may have changed its name or split off under a different nomenclature. 

ICCT’s early investigations into the Dutch anti-government and sovereign citizen extremist scene revealed that the group is (or was) comparatively well organised. Its official website, which is currently defunct, neatly listed several Telegram channels through which it could share sovereign citizen content and messages, while also linking to international affiliate organisations like the Australian People of the Commonwealth, the Republic of Kanata in Canada, and the People of Krystal City in Spain. Visitors of the website could also be directed to toolkits and documents, including procedural guidelines detailing the establishment of Common Law people’s tribunals. In the eyes of groups that adopt Common Law views, these people’s tribunals serve as Common Law alternatives to Dutch courts. 

Perhaps more worryingly are the ‘sheriffs’ training materials that the group distributes through its website and various Telegram channels. In Common Law speak, sheriffs, are those individuals empowered to execute the verdicts of people’s tribunals. According to the group’s doctrine, Common Law sheriffs are authorised to arrest, detain, and use force against transgressors. A training manual that was examined by ICCT mentions that “sheriffs and their deputies must be qualified and trained in the expert use of force, to arrest and detain suspects, convicted criminals, and enemies of the republic.” (NB: the Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy, not a republic. This reference could allude to a different type of State that sovereigns envision). Moreover, the document states that “all sheriffs must be armed and equipped with protective gear.” 

Against the backdrop of the group’s public advocacy for arming its members, the currently ongoing trial of a Common Law sovereign citizen—who the Public Prosecutor alleges is a ‘sheriff’—attempting to acquire firearms is alarming. It shows that sovereign groups are earnest in their attempts to arm themselves. Coupled with their democratic state rejectionist ideology, the likelihood of an escalation of violence against state and democratic institutions increases. Moreover, as ICCT’s report indicates, efforts are made to actively recruit members with a military or law enforcement background. This is corroborated by previous convictions of Dutch Common Law sovereign citizens on weapon charges. In September 2023, a veteran was sentenced to eighteen months jail (twelve of which are probationary) for attempting to purchase firearms. The Public Prosecutor alleged that the man had intended to disseminate these firearms to other veterans, although the court did not rule this sufficiently evidenced. Nevertheless, this case, along with other cases of active-duty and veteran sovereign citizens in neighbouring countries such as Germany raises concerns about the tactical experience, technical expertise, and operational capabilities of Common Law and other sovereign citizen groups to handle firearms.

Symbols

The national Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Recommendations has released its report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023. 

The Bill would establish new offences in the Criminal Code for publicly displaying, and trading in goods that bear, prohibited Nazi or Islamic State symbols; and implement other measures relating to counter-terrorism offences and the listing of terrorist organisations. 

The Committee's recommendations are as follows 

1  that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 be amended to remove the Islamic State flag from the definition of a prohibited hate symbol. The Committee further recommends that the Government give consideration to establishing a new offence that would prohibit the public display and trade of symbols associated with terrorist organisations. 

2  that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 be amended so that the offence provisions for the trading of items bearing a prohibited symbol do not come into force for a period of 6-12 months, so that collectors have a window in which to dispose of part or all of their collections if they so wish. 

3  that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 be amended to extend the journalistic purpose exemptions in sections 80.2H(9)(b) and 80.2J(5) include editors, producers and others involved in the news and current affairs reporting process. 

4 that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 be amended so that the journalistic purpose defence in section 474.45D(1)(e) include editors, producers and others involved in the news and current affairs reporting process. 

5  that the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 be amended to clarify that any report by this Committee in respect of terrorist listings under the Criminal Code be presented to the Parliament. 

6  that, subject to the amendments recommended in this report, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Bill 2023 be passed by the Parliament.  

Pseudolaw

'New Hosts for an Old Disease: History of the Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Phenomenon in Canada - Part III' in (2023) 60(4) Alberta Law Review 971-1015 comments 

United States-sourced false law concepts, “pseudolaw,” were the schematic backbone for a number of Canadian anti-authority and criminal populations that operated in 2000–2015. These “first wave” pseudolaw groups and their descendants are now dead or inactive. A “second wave” of novel pseudolaw groups has since emerged, energized and catalyzed by economic stress and the COVID-19 pandemic. This article reviews Canadian second wave pseudolaw and its host populations, documents second-wave pseudolaw theories and activities, and examines their comparatively limited success. Finally, the potential of violence building off pseudolaw in Canada is investigated.

Netolitzky argues

The previous articles in this series, Netolitzky, “History #1” and Netolitzky, “History #2,” reviewed the post-2000 nature and characteristics of pseudolaw, and the overall patterns of pseudolaw activity in Canada. Netolitzky, “History #2” specifically investigated whether social scientists are correct that pseudolaw expands during periods of social stress and crisis, including the 2018–2019 economic downturn, and 2020-present COVID-19 pandemic. 

Netolitzky, “History #2,” concluded the two dominant 2000–2010 Canadian pseudolaw movements, the “Detaxers” and “Freemen-on-the-Land,” continued their decline post-2015. The Detaxers are now dead. The Freemen-adherent population retains its political and criminal orientation, but has not re-engaged pseudolaw toward those objectives. Neither pseudolaw movement exhibited the predicted crisis-based amplification and expansion. A second wave of Canadian pseudolaw gurus and movements, which have little to no “parent to child” connection to earlier Canadian pseudolaw antecedents, has emerged post-2015. These second wave Canadian pseudolaw movements continue to apply the six core components of pseudolaw inherited from the United States Sovereign Citizen movement. As such, second wave Canadian pseudolaw continues the pattern that pseudolaw’s various forms, worldwide, are new branches off an established trunk, or side tunnels off the same conspiratorial rabbit hole. 

What separates these new pseudolaw instances are characteristics distinct from earlier Canadian pseudolaw:

1. different pseudolaw theories and strategies in addition to the core six-part Sovereign Citizen pseudolaw components; 

2. host populations with different and more diverse characteristics than pre-2010 Canadian pseudolaw adherents; 

3. influence by non-Canadian sources; and 

4. pseudolaw directed to different social stressors.

Another novel characteristic of some new Canadian pseudolaw gurus and groups is that, although certain of these instances of Canadian pseudolaw developed a substantial following, that has not translated into court proceedings and judgments. As will become apparent, that pattern is not because these new expressions of pseudolaw do not reject conventional Canadian law. They do. However, the forum for that competition of laws is not litigation oriented. For many of these pseudolaw movements, Canadian courts are simply irrelevant. These groups do not litigate to conduct their dispute of laws. They expect to achieve their objectives in other ways. This distinguishing characteristic means, different from Detaxers and Freemen-on-the-Land, much less case law documents post-2015 second wave pseudolaw systems. 

Pseudolaw is always a risk factor, since, at its foundation, pseudolaw promises to transfer authority away from state actors and to its users. Unsurprisingly, the now (falsely) empowered dissident and marginal populations that use pseudolaw predictably become increasingly aggressive, engaging in abusive and harassing document-based schemes and litigation, commonly called “paper terrorism.” However, paper terrorism is not the full extent of the aggressive actions taken by some pseudolaw actors. Violence, too, is well-documented, particularly directed to law enforcement and court agents.  

Canadian second wave pseudolaw has introduced an unusual, novel, and disturbing form of violence and aggression. Multiple new pseudolaw movements are engaged in vigilante activity, purporting to be valid authorities who discipline “outlaws,” with imaginary court summons and proceedings, and false and spurious “peace officers,” and “citizens’ arrests.” This alarming escalation in illegal activity reappears repeatedly as a threat factor within modern Canadian pseudolaw communities.

Extremism

Last year's Victorian Legislative Council Inquiry into Extremism in Victoria report states 

1 Introduction 

F 1: The language used to describe any form of extremism is important and should be considered carefully. 

F 2: The present threat of violence from far-left extremism is not equivalent to the present threat of violence from far-right extremism, but the domestic violent extremism threat landscape is continually evolving and changing. 

F 3: Extremist movements have been identified as a significant issue in Australia. Findings from any future Commonwealth inquiry into these matters would be beneficial in increasing understanding of the issue at a national level. 

2 Extremism is a global issue 

F 4: The relationship between global, national and state economic policies can contribute to an environment where anti-immigration and anti-government sentiments grow, increasing the appeal of far-right extremist groups which claim to address these issues. 

F 5: Global and domestic populist movements, particularly the mainstreaming of anti-immigration and anti-democratic ideas, are risk factors for legitimising the rhetoric of extremist movements. 

F 6: The disruption from ongoing environmental deterioration and climate change should be considered a risk factor for increasing the threat of both far-left and far-right extremist groups. 

F 7: The transnational elements of extremist movements must be considered alongside their domestic manifestations because of the borderless and leaderless nature of some violent extremist movements. 

F 8: The impacts of and responses to violent extremism can be experienced globally, not just locally, with information about both extremist events, and government and community approaches in response to them, being accessible by a global audience. 

3 Risk factors for far‑right extremism in Victoria 

F 9: Far-right extremism is not new in Australia or Victoria, but there has been a re-emergence of far-right extremism, most notably from 2015 and 2016 onwards. 

F 10: Social isolation, economic insecurity and inequality are risk factors that may play a part in increasing susceptibility to extremist narratives. Addressing these issues is important for wellbeing and social cohesion and may reduce the appeal of extremist narratives. 

F 11: Evidence from stakeholders to the Inquiry and recent investigations suggest that trust in government and politicians has declined in Victoria, and in other jurisdictions globally, and this has been further exacerbated by the global COVID-19 pandemic. 

R 1: That the Victorian Government and Members of Parliament seek ways to build public trust in the Parliament, including developing measures to improve transparency. This should include investigating the potential benefits of introducing an integrity charter. 

F 12: Mainstream media has a critical role to play in the dissemination of accurate information during crises, as well as in reporting responsibly on the activities of far-right extremist groups and individuals, and not creating negative stereotypes of specific communities. 

F 13: Reporting of extremist activities, groups and individuals should be subject to strong media guidelines to minimise amplification of extremist propaganda that benefits or platforms extremist movements. 

F 14: An increasing focus on young people as a target of radicalisation and recruitment by the extreme far-right is of significant concern. 

F 15: The Committee is concerned that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reported that in 2021 minors made up 15% of new counter-terrorism investigations (up from 2–3% in recent years) and, on average, comprised more than half of ASIO’s highest priority investigations per week. Young people who experience feelings of social isolation, disengagement and alienation may be more vulnerable to radicalisation, and are among key targets of extremist propaganda and recruitment. 

F 16: In formulating intervention and prevention measures aimed at countering youth radicalisation to extremism, it is imperative that alienating, criminalising or discriminating against young people is avoided as far as possible. 

4 The threat of far‑right extremism in Victoria 

F 17: Both groups and individuals are capable of carrying out ideologically motivated terrorism, however, the risk from an individual acting alone is currently considered by authorities to be the more likely scenario. 

F 18: Far-right extremism poses a threat to democracy. Strengthening democratic processes and increasing transparency by providing information to the public about political processes and practices is an important part of mitigating this threat. 

F 19: Responses to extremism need to avoid measures that curtail civil liberties in a disproportionate manner. 

F 20: Violent extremism poses a risk to politicians and public figures in Victoria, who may be targeted by groups or individuals motivated by ideological, religious or single-issue grievances. 

F 21: Left-wing aligned (or perceived to be left-wing aligned) politicians and public figures have been targeted by far-right extremist groups and individuals. 

F 22: Racism and racist scapegoating, Islamophobia and antisemitism are common elements of far-right extremist ideologies, messaging and activities. 

F 23: When public and elected figures accept racist rhetoric and action this blurs the lines between what is acceptable and what is not in the community and leads to risks that multicultural communities will be targeted. 

F 24: Evidence from stakeholders suggests that far-right extremism can be gendered, and that misogyny and anti-feminist sentiment are common but not necessarily well understood features of far-right extremist movements. 

R 2: That the Government consider funding research investigating the links between extremism and family violence, anti-women or anti-feminist sentiment, and masculinity to identify further opportunities for counter-extremism measures. 

F 25: Both real and perceived threats from far-right extremist groups cause harm to the LGBTQIA+ community in Victoria. Government measures to support these communities are important. 

F 26: Improved collection and analysis of hate incident data is needed to inform prevention of hate crimes, and responses to hate, as well as to better understand the extent of far-right and other forms of extremism in Victoria. 

R 3: That the Victorian Government continue to implement the recommendations from the Legislative Assembly Legal and Social Issues Committee’s report on the Inquiry into anti-vilification protections, in particular recommendations 33 and 34. 

5 Extremist recruitment and communication 

F 27: Public trust in mainstream media has declined, while social media as a primary source of information has increased. 

F 28: The increasing use of social media and other online platforms by the wider public has enabled the increased ability of extremists to disseminate their ideology and attract people to their cause. 

F 29: Regulatory frameworks that govern the use of encrypted online communication platforms should be formulated to be able to effectively respond to and keep pace with developments in technology and behaviour. 

6 The impact of COVID‑19 on extremism in Victoria 

F 30: The factors that increase susceptibility and engagement with far-right extremism were heightened by the social and economic disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. This included the public health restrictions enacted by the Victorian Government in response to the pandemic alongside those of other states and the Commonwealth Government. The Committee notes that these restrictions were enacted to protect public health. 

F 31: Conspiracy theories and disinformation were attractive to some who felt disenfranchised by public health measures enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Far-right extremist groups and individuals capitalised on this by promoting conspiracy theories and disinformation to generate support for their ideologies. 

R 4: That in future public health emergencies, the Victorian Government build on its outreach and communication efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure that there is an emphasis on public information that is in plain language, timely, accessible and easy to interpret. 

F 32: Vile threats and abuse were made during the pandemic against public office holders, government officials and minorities. This kind of discourse has no place in an open, plural and multicultural democracy such as Victoria and should be condemned in the strongest terms. 

F 33: A small number of far-right extremist groups and individuals attended protests against the Victorian Government’s COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates in 2021, however, extremist ideology was not the primary motivating factor for the majority of those attending. Rather, a range of personal grievances relating to the impacts of the Victorian Government’s COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates were the primary motivators, despite the restrictions being implemented to protect public health. 

F 34: There has been a growth in exposure to far-right extremist ideology in Victoria since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the extent to which this exposure has translated to significant long-term growth in the far-right extremist movement remains unknown. The Committee found that personal grievances relating to COVID-19 restrictions and vaccine mandates were the primary motivation for protests seen in Melbourne in late 2021. Nevertheless, it is important for the Victorian Government to remain vigilant against the threat of far-right radicalisation in this context. 

7 Countering extremism 

F 35: Countering extremism is a whole-of-society issue. Governments and law enforcement can and should play a proactive role in the process of countering extremism, however, communities need to be supported with resources to ensure they have the capacity to effectively participate. 

F 36: Individual, needs-based interventions that look at a person holistically and work with them over a long period of time to build their strengths will be more effective for countering extremism in people already engaged in extremist behaviours. 

R 5: That the Victorian Government ensure all of Victoria’s countering violent extremism programs, including but not limited to the community integration support program (CISP), continue to be reviewed externally on a regular basis to ensure that they are effective and adapting to the evolving extremism landscape. 

F 37: Community-led and grassroots initiatives to promote social cohesion and community building are an important measure for countering extremism and have been demonstrated as effective in Victoria. 

R 6: That the Victorian Government develop a strategy to support community-driven social cohesion initiatives aimed at building connections and trust amongst community members and between community members and civic institutions. 

F 38: Anti-racism public education campaigns and education programs that teach respect and appreciation for multiculturalism are important for improving social cohesion in Victoria. 

F 39: Education about the Holocaust is particularly important for understanding some of the consequences of racism and vilification throughout history and should have ongoing inclusion in the Victorian school curriculum. 

R 7: That the Victorian Government support the ongoing provision of existing anti-racism education programs and actively seek to improve and increase the provision of such programs in the community. 

FINDING 40: Digital and critical literacy are essential skills for young people to navigate the internet safely, to develop resistance to the influence of extremist messaging and to analyse the quality of information they are exposed to. 

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Victorian Government should review the digital and critical literacy skills taught via the primary and secondary school curriculum to identify opportunities for improvement and expansion. 

F 41: Youth workers play a critical role in the delivery of effective support measures that work to both increase social cohesion and mitigate the risks of radicalisation to extremism. 

R 9: That the Victorian Government ensure youth workers are adequately and appropriately resourced to provide effective service delivery of youth supports and programs aimed at strengthening trust and social connectedness and mitigating the risks of radicalisation. Further, that youth workers are proactively engaged and consulted in the development and implementation of the Government’s youth policies and strategies. 

F 42: While online content regulation sits beyond the purview of state governments, the Committee reiterates the value of the Christchurch Call and the measures it outlines with regard to violent extremist and terrorist content. 

F 43: Multidisciplinary and cross-jurisdictional research into extremism offers valuable insights into emerging problems and prevention strategies. Norway’s Center for Research on Extremism would be a good model on which to base an Australian body working on developing empirical and theoretical knowledge on extremism in Australia and collaborating with domestic and international stakeholders to further information and understanding in this area. 

F 44: Access to firearms obtained legally or illegally by members of far-right extremist groups poses potential risks to the community and is of significant concern. 

F 45: Acquisition and use of firearms by far-right extremists, not all of whom may be easily identifiable, leads to a critical gap in counter-terrorism strategy that could be assisted by a coherent, national framework on firearm regulation.

SOCI

The ANAO report 'Administration of Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy: Department of Home Affairs' (Auditor-General Report No.38 2021–22) comments 

The department’s administration and regulation of critical infrastructure protection policy was partly effective. 

The department has partly effective governance arrangements to administer critical infrastructure protection policy. Implementation of critical infrastructure related risk assessments and reporting was not captured in risk documentation. The effectiveness of the department’s stakeholder coordination arrangements is reduced by not having an engagement strategy and providing limited support to other critical infrastructure regulators. The department’s performance framework as it related to critical infrastructure was not adequate, with performance statements, regulatory performance assessment, and use of internal measures to inform policy and regulation requiring improvement. 

The department’s administration of compliance activities consistent with critical infrastructure protection requirements is partly effective. The department’s compliance framework does not reflect existing responsibilities or compliance requirements. Compliance activities are not supported by approved procedures or systems controls. The department has not established a risk-based decision framework for achieving compliance outcomes or demonstrating its impact on asset security or resilience. The department does not have a process of effectively reviewing its use of regulation tools, impact on industry or to inform continuous improvement. 

Supporting findings 

Governance arrangements 

10. The department identified key critical infrastructure risks and had appropriate governance arrangements to assess and assign responsibility for these risks. The department’s critical infrastructure risk management does not represent an integrated approach to risk management between its enterprise and operational, legislative and policy functions. Implementation of critical infrastructure related risk assessments and reporting was not captured in risk documentation, which reduces its use to inform business planning, legislative reform, and policy decisions. (See paragraphs 2.3 to 2.23) 

11. While the department undertakes coordination activities with key stakeholders, including through some long-established forums, it does not have a documented stakeholder engagement strategy to identify the engagement purpose, means by which engagement occurs or scenarios are managed, or the basis for there being more established information-sharing arrangements with some key stakeholders than with others. (See paragraphs 2.26 to 2.35) 

12. The department’s performance framework requires improvement. Critical infrastructure related content in the department’s 2020–21 performance statements is not adequate. The department did not assess its critical infrastructure functions against the Regulator Performance Framework. The department has established internal performance reporting but could improve its use of measures in the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy to inform policy development and regulation. (See paragraphs 2.38 to 2.51) 

Compliance activities 

13. The department has established a compliance framework comprised of the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, Compliance Strategy and Administrative Guidelines. This framework would be enhanced by updating documents in the framework to align with and clarify the department’s existing responsibilities and regulatory posture. (See paragraphs 3.2 to 3.7) 

14. The majority of policy and procedural documents (15 of 22) to support possible critical infrastructure related compliance activities were drafted, but not finalised and approved, or included in the department’s policy and procedural repository. A lack of procedures, or procedures that remain in draft, increases the risk of inconsistency in administration and decision-making. The department does not have an established process to ensure that appropriately trained officials are engaged in investigations under critical infrastructure regulations. Classified network and critical infrastructure-related system security controls do not meet the requirements to mitigate the risk of unauthorised access. (See paragraphs 3.10 to 3.20) 

15. The department’s use of regulatory tools is not always consistent with legislative and procedural requirements, and approved procedures or decision records do not exist for all compliance activities and outcomes. Use of regulatory tools was consistent with the department’s documented regulatory posture. Decisions on whether to escalate to higher tiers of the regulatory compliance model were not supported by approved procedures, processes, or documented analysis of the administrative or financial burden associated with an escalation of compliance activity. (See paragraphs 3.23 to 3.29) 

16. The department does not have an established process to obtain assurance of regulatory compliance. This limited the department’s capacity to demonstrate that it has a proportionate and effective approach to resolving non-compliance, or has improved the security or resilience of critical infrastructure assets. (See paragraphs 3.30 to 3.44) 

17. The department has not established a process to effectively review regulatory tool use, impacts on industry, or lessons learned to inform continuous improvement. (See paragraphs 3.45 to 3.46)

The  Recommendations are

Recommendation no. 1 Paragraph 2.24 Recommendation no. 2 Paragraph 2.36 The Department of Home Affairs ensures that implementation of critical infrastructure related risk assessments and reporting is appropriate to inform policy and regulatory decisions. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs establish an engagement strategy to document how it will coordinate with stakeholders with shared responsibility for critical infrastructure security and resilience. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. Recommendation no. 3 Paragraph 2.52 

Recommendation no. 4 Paragraph 3.8 Recommendation no. 5 Paragraph 3.21 The Department of Home Affairs ensure performance measurement: 1. (a) in its corporate plan is adequate and measurable; 2. (b) aligns with the Regulator Performance Guide; and 3. (c) is used to inform policy and regulatory improvements. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs revise or replace the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy with documentation that reflects current policy, regulatory responsibilities and posture, and outlines its application by the department in relation to other critical infrastructure asset sector policy leads and regulators. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs support effective use of the full suite of available critical infrastructure related regulatory tools by having in place procedures that: 1. (a) are finalised, approved and lodged on the internal policy and procedural repository; 2. (b) ensure that trained officials are appropriately engaged in investigations; and 3. (c) align with the Protective Security Policy Framework and Information Security Manual requirements. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. The Department of Home Affairs approve, apply and monitor consistent use of policies, procedures and processes to: 1. (a) trigger, triage and manage escalated use of critical infrastructure compliance powers, including by making better use of its information gathering, and investigatory powers where national security concerns have been identified; and 2. (b) revise its risk approach and implement processes that enable effective assessment, prioritisation and management of non-compliance risks. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed. 

Recommendation no. 6 Paragraph 3.39 Recommendation no. 7 Paragraph 3.47 The Department of Home Affairs evaluate, monitor, and report on: 1. (a) the extent to which regulatory tools are used to effectively improve security and resilience of critical infrastructure assets to risks; and 2. (b) implementation of actionable items in strategies, reviews and lessons learned for which it is responsible and how they contribute to intended outcomes. 

Department of Home Affairs response: Agreed.

For some cyber security students the report's value will be in contextualisation paragraphs such as

1.1 Australian society and its economy are supported by a network of interconnected infrastructure assets across a broad range of industry sectors. The Australian Government defines critical infrastructure as:

those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia's ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. 

1.2 Threats such as natural disasters, pandemics, sabotage, and espionage have the potential to significantly disrupt critical infrastructure. Secure and resilient infrastructure ensures continuous access to services that are essential for everyday life, such as food, water, health, energy, communications, transport, and banking. A disruption to any of these critical infrastructure sectors could have serious implications for business, government, and the community. 

1.3 The Commonwealth, state and territory governments have different responsibilities for critical infrastructure depending on the sector or nature of the threats being mitigated. Responses to a threat can involve the asset owner and operator, technical and operational lead for that jurisdiction, and emergency services or law enforcement. Coordination among entities is therefore required to prepare and respond to critical infrastructure threats. 

1.4 The Department of Home Affairs (the department) is the lead Australian Government agency responsible for the administration of critical infrastructure policy and regulation. 

Critical infrastructure policy and regulation 

Regulatory options 

1.5 Governments may approach regulation through either legislative or non-legislative models. Non-legislative models involve achieving regulatory ends through non-legislative means, such as guidelines on market participants, and can include light touch or principles-based regulation4, self-regulation5 and quasi-regulation. Legislated approaches involve either  co-regulation or explicit government regulation, which is used where ‘there is a high perceived risk or public interest and achieving compliance is seen as critically important’. 

1.6 Australian Government regulators are empowered by, and subject to, a range of legal and other requirements including the following.

• Legislation that establishes the regulatory powers of an entity, and underpinning policies and relevant directions. 

• The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 along with delegated legislation such as the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, and the Commonwealth Risk Management Policy. 

• The Australian Government Regulator Performance Framework — introduced in October 2014 — to encourage regulators to achieve their objectives while minimising their impact on regulated entities. On 1 July 2021, the Regulator Performance Guide replaced the 2014 Framework and included a transition year for regulators to assess their approach to complying with its requirements. 

1.7 The Australian Government’s critical infrastructure regime is comprised of a combination of light touch, co-regulation and explicit government regulation. 

Overview of the Australian Government critical infrastructure regime 

1.8 Terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and Indonesia in 2002, were the catalyst for formal engagement between the Commonwealth, state and territory governments, and industry on how to prepare for and respond to threats against critical infrastructure assets. In 2003, the Australian Government established a Trusted Information Sharing Network as the primary engagement mechanism for business and government information sharing, and resilience building initiatives on critical infrastructure. 

1.9 Prior to the introduction of critical infrastructure focussed policy and legislation in 201810, national security threats to assets were primarily assessed under the Foreign Investment and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA). Under the FATA, certain proposed foreign investments, including those related to critical infrastructure assets require approval from the Treasurer. Conditions may be imposed, existing conditions may be varied, or a divestment from an approved investment may be required where a national security risk emerges. 

1.10 The Treasury remains the lead entity for assessments under the FATA. The department provides national security advice to support decisions made under the FATA, and may impose and enforce conditions on approved applications. In 2020–21, the department received 943 applications for review from the Treasury, an increase from the 640 received during 2019–20.

1.11 The Australian Government Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy was released in May 2015.11 The strategy comprises a policy statement and plan, and sets out the Australian Government’s policy position that:

• critical infrastructure is essential to Australia’s economic and social prosperity; • resilient critical infrastructure plays an essential role in supporting broader community and disaster resilience; • businesses and governments have a shared responsibility for the resilience of critical infrastructure, requiring strong partnerships; and • all states and territories have their own critical infrastructure programs that best fit the operating environments and arrangements in each jurisdiction. 

1.12 The policy statement sets out an approach based on non-regulatory business–government partnerships, mature risk management, and effective information sharing. The policy statement required the strategy to be reviewed in 2020. 

1.13 The Critical Infrastructure Centre was established in 2017 to coordinate the management of risks to Australia’s critical infrastructure and deliver more coordinated national security assessments to inform foreign investment decisions in significant and complex cases. In December 2017, critical infrastructure policy, regulatory and strategy functions were transferred to the department and the Critical Infrastructure Centre became a division within the department. 

Critical infrastructure legislation 

1.14 In 2018, legislative coverage of the security of critical infrastructure expanded from the FATA to include: 

• the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SoCI Act), which commenced on 11 July 2018; and 

• the amendments to Part 14 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, or Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR), which commenced on 18 September 2018. 

1.15 The legislation in paragraph 1.14 enables the government to obtain information to undertake risk assessments in relation to critical infrastructure, and gives government the power to issue directions to address national security risks if necessary. 

Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 

1.16 The SoCI Act was introduced to ‘strengthen the Government’s capacity to manage the national security risks of espionage, sabotage and coercion arising from foreign involvement in Australia’s critical infrastructure’.  The SoCI Act defines a critical infrastructure asset, and what assets can, and must not be prescribed as being ‘critical’.  The SoCI Act has three measures to manage national security risks related to critical infrastructure.

• The Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets (the Register), provides the government visibility of who owns and controls the assets. 

 • The information gathering power, provides the ability to obtain more detailed information from owners and operators of assets in certain circumstances. 

• The Ministerial directions powers, provide the ability to intervene and issue directions in cases where there are significant national security concerns that cannot be addressed through other means. 

1.17 In 2020, the Australian Government approved changes to the critical infrastructure regulatory regime on the basis that the SoCI Act did not enable it to impose requirements on entities to protect their assets, and an over-reliance on the FATA to manage risks arising from foreign ownership. In 2020, the department sought public contributions on the design of ‘an enhanced regulatory framework, building on existing requirements under the SoCI Act’. 

1.18 In December 2020, the Australian Government introduced a Bill that included amendments to the SoCI Act. These amendments would enact the regulatory framework that was the subject of public consultation. The Bill proposed mandatory incident reporting, an expanded application of the register of critical infrastructure sectors and assets, powers to obtain ownership, operational and risk management information, and powers to respond to serious cyber incidents. The amendments to the SoCI Act were described when they were introduced, as being ‘underpinned by enhancements to Government’s existing education, communication and engagement activities, under a refreshed Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy’. 

1.19 In December 2020, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) commenced an inquiry into the Bill that would amend the SoCI Act, as well as a statutory review into the Act.  In September 2021 the PJCIS published an Advisory Report on the concurrent reviews of the Bill and statutory review of the SoCI Act and made 14 recommendations. Among   the recommendations was that the Bill be split in two so that government assistance and an expanded definition of critical infrastructure sectors and assets could be legislated in the shortest time possible. 

1.20 An additional $42.4 million over two years from 2021–2221 was included in the 2021–22 Budget for ‘Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Systems of National Significance’.

• In September 2021, the Critical Infrastructure Centre was re-branded as the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre. 

• In December 2021, amendments to the SoCI Act expanded the asset classes covered from four to 22 across 11 sectors to include: communications, financial services and markets, data storage and processing, defence industry, higher education and research, energy, food and grocery, health care and medical, space technology, transport, and water and sewerage.  The department estimated that it would have ten times the number of assets on its Register under the SoCI Act as a result of this change. 

• Also in December 2021, the Australian Government commenced consultations on further amendments to the SoCI Act.   

• In March 2022, the PJCIS published an Advisory Report on the proposed further amendments to the SoCI Act and made 11 recommendations.

1.21 In March 2022, the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act 2022 was passed by the Parliament. Details of changes to Australian Government critical infrastructure legislation are in Appendix 3. 

Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms 

1.22 The TSSR established a regulatory framework ‘to better manage the national security risks of espionage, sabotage and foreign interference to Australia’s telecommunications networks and facilities’.  The purpose of the TSSR is to:

• introduce a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework to better manage national security risks of espionage, sabotage and foreign interference to Australia’s telecommunications networks and facilities; and 

• better protect networks, and the confidential information stored on and carried across them, from unauthorised interference and access. 

1.23 The aim of the TSSR is to encourage early engagement on proposed changes to networks and services that could give rise to national security risks, and to facilitate collaboration on the management of those risks. Key elements of the TSSR include: 

• a security obligation that requires all carriers, carriage service providers and carriage service intermediaries to do their best to protect networks and facilities from unauthorised access or interference; 

• a notification obligation that requires carriers and nominated carriage service providers to notify the Australian Government of planned changes to their networks and services that are likely to have a material adverse effect on their capacity to comply with the security obligation; 

• that the Secretary of the department can obtain information and documents for the purpose of assessing carriers and carriage service providers compliance with their security obligations; and 

• that the Minister for Home Affairs can direct a carrier, carriage service provider or carriage service intermediary to:  − not use or supply carriage services if the Minister considers the use or supply prejudicial to national security; and  − do, or not do, a specified thing that is reasonably necessary to protect networks and facilities from national security risks. 

1.24 In September 2020, the PJCIS commenced a statutory review of the operation of the TSSR. The PJCIS published its report on the statutory review in February 2022 and made six recommendations.  ...

Critical infrastructure security and resilience roles 

1.26 The Commonwealth, state and territory governments, and industry, have a shared responsibility to ensure the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, and to prevent, prepare, respond to, and recover from all hazards. Each participant has different roles as shown in Table 1.1. 

1.27 The Department, as the lead agency for ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure, must coordinate, complement, and support the programs and activities of all these participants. When the Critical Infrastructure Centre and SoCI Act were established, it was recognised that the Australian Government would have limited powers to implement risk management strategies, and monitor and enforce compliance, and should first leverage existing state and territory regimes to conduct these activities.